Iran's Presidential Election: Khatami Stands Down, Moussavi Stands Up

Yesterday's news that former President Mohammad Khatami would not challenge President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has prompted responses such as that of Time Magazine, "Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has reason to smile: His opponents in this June's presidential election appear to be in some disarray."

Chris Emery, Enduring America's observer of Iranian politics, gets behind the superficial headlines to offer an in-depth analysis:

Former President Mohammad Khatami’s decision to drop out of the upcoming Iranian presidential elections seems to be based on the long-standing assumption that splitting the “reformist” vote would be electoral suicide. His decision also confirmed what Khatami had maintained all along: if former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Moussavi (pictured) joined the race, which he did several days ago, Khatami would drop out and offer him his support.

Whilst it now appears that Khatami was never enthusiastic in his bid, the timing of his decision begs questions on the strategies the reformists are pursuing and with what degree of coordination.

Until yesterday, the following ‘Grand Strategy’ was presented as a possible hypothesis. Moussavi and Khatami, and possibly even veteran politician Mehdi Karroubi, were working in coordination to keep the “conservatives” guessing as to who would be the eventual reformist candidate. This would prevent their conservative opponents from uniting, politically and strategically, whilst maximising media coverage in a campaign in which a high voter turnout is a prerequisite for a reformist victory. Such a deliberately vague strategy would also have given the "principlists" (or "pragmatic conservatives"), who may be deciding between Ahmadinejad and Tehran Mayor Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a severe headache as they tried to predict who would be the ultimate "reform" candidate.

This analysis supposed that when the reformist base had been optimally galvanised by their two biggest hitters, perhaps after a month or so, the reformists would look at the polls and public sentiment and then unite behind the appropriate candidate.

Yesterday’s developments suggest that what we are seeing is, at best, a working plan amended to suit a rapidly changing political environment. The decision making of both Khatami and Moussavi is defined not by a nuanced strategy of smoke and mirrors but by personal wranglings with what could be defining decisions in their public life. Yet the opportunity for political and tactical intrigue, in a highly fluid political situation, should not be discounted. All these factors make deciphering political motives and manoeuvrings hugely difficult; even more so to the western observer.

Generally speaking, however, this unpredictability must be a good thing for Iranian democracy. Three questions are pertinent. Firstly, why did Khatami stand in the first place? Secondly, what prompted his decision to stand down (perhaps put another way, what prompted Moussavi’s decision to run)? Thirdly, behind whom will the broad conservative base now unite?

Answering the first two questions, the strongest case is that Moussavi overcame his initial reticence. This was a big decision for him, given his previous well-documented differences with the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. The two clashed often on domestic and foreign policy in the 1980s when Khamanei was President and Moussavi Prime Minister. (This was before the office of prime minister was abolished in favour of a much more powerful president.)

Though accounts differ, some believe that Hashemi Rafsanjani, perhaps the most effective politician in modern Iranian politics, persuaded an increasingly frail Ayatollah Khomeini to create an enhanced presidency in the belief that he would be next in line. Moussavi interpreted this move as a personal attempt to sideline him and was not too subtle about displaying his opposition. With mutual enmity still strong and Khameini succeeding Ayatollah Khomeini as Supreme Leader, Moussavi decided to quit politics for 20 years.

Mousavi retreated back into his work as an architect, and it appears only very recently felt willing or able to return to mainstream politics. When he was asked four years ago, he alluded to "difficulties on the road", which was interpreted that Khameini would oppose his candidacy. In this sense, his decision to run in 2009 is all the more fascinating in what it may say about the Supreme Leader’s presence in electoral politics.

Khatami had served under Moussavi in the 1980s and the two enjoy relatively good relations. The two met shortly before Khatami chose to announce his candidacy, and it appears likely that Khatami probably wanted a decision from Moussavi. Moussavi remained hesitant, and thus Khatami put his hat in the ring to end continuing speculation and test the electoral water. Had Moussavi been more definitive at this stage, it seems likely that Khatami would not have stood.

It is of course also possible that Moussavi was never keen to be closely associated with Khatami in any plan and that his supporters urged Khatami to clear the way as soon as Moussavi’s mind was made up about standing. In any case, it seems clear that Khatami was never enthusiastic about entering the fray.

Khatami did not perhaps receive the kind of reception for which he had hoped; one city refused to allow him to campaign, obscurely citing traffic issues. He also found himself almost assaulted by a mob of hardliners chanting “Death to America”. Doubts may also have crept in as to Khatami’s suitability, certainly compared to Moussavi, to fight an election that will be based on economic competency and social justice.

Perhaps most significantly, Khatami observed that the very broad ‘conservative’ base actually relished a contest between him and Ahmadinejad. There were, indeed, signs that the hardliners were uniting. Amir Mohebian, political editor of the conservative Resalat newspaper but far from a staunch supporter of the President, recently stated that if Ahmadinejad could “display an appropriate element of flexibility, and his flexibility were not seen as an election [ploy], he would make a very good choice”.

It appears that Ahmadinejad was galvanised by the reformists’ moves, embarking on a charm offensive and confident of being backed by the principlists if Khatami emerged,as the leading reformist candidate. There was even talk of Tehran Mayor Ghalibaf being quietly urged to give up his ambitions until 2013, when he will still be 51.

Moussavi’s entry and Khatami’s exit thus provides a considerable headache for conservatives. Ahmadinejad may be more vulnerable to Moussavi with the lower middle class and working class vote, which helped carry him to victory in 2005. Moussavi’s emphasis on social justice echoes that of Ahmadinejad and could conceivably challenge Ahmadinejad for the rural vote.

On the other hand, this is still Ahmadinejad’s core vote, and it would take a lot to shift many people. Those within groups close to the Basij will also likely vote for the current president in any circumstance.

Ahmadinejad still faces questions other than Mousavi's candidacy. If Ghalibaf stands, he will certainly be effective in Tehran and has a broader, if not deeper, base of support amongst the various factions of conservatives and principlists. Observers should watch carefully whether the popular mayor of Tehran, will enter the race in the coming days.

The principle issue of this election, as it was in America, remains the economy. Moussavi will rely on his economic record whilst glossing over fundamental changes that have occurred since he was in charge 20 years ago. He will also emphasise his close links with the Ayatollah Khomeini, who was his principle political sponsor. He also has the face recognition factor amongst the middle-aged and may even find substantial support amongst moderate conservatives. The extent that Khatami can help deliver him the younger vote, who must be mobilised in large numbers, is difficult to say, but it will be a decisive factor. To challenge Ahmadinejad he must, and will, run on a platform of social justice.

The final fly in the ointment could be the reformist Karroubi. He could either be the next to drop out or, as he has repeatedly stated, remain firmly committed to his candidacy. The question would then be, could he succeed in splitting the reformist vote to the point where Ahmadinejad would win outright without a run-off. This would seem unlikely. However, if Ghalibaf is a candidate, it could keep the President out of a run-off with Moussavi and a “united” reformist bloc.

Comments

[loopin]

Interesting post Chris. I have two questions that I have semi-tackled but I was hoping someone might be able to provide a better answer…

1) I’ve read several reports that before his candidacy, Khatami met Mousavi and he was assured that if Khatami would announce his candidacy, Mousavi would not enter the race (and vice versa) so what is really not clear to me is why Mousavi announced his candidacy now? Could it have it do with Karroubi not withdrawing in favour of Khatami or is there another factor I’ve missed?

2) I have no idea how accurate these polls are but Meir Javedanfar in his blog today published these polls from Tehran based Alef news. It would suggest that Khatami was the stronger reformist candidate- so why withdraw to increase the reformist electoral chances?

From http://www.realclearworld.com/blog/2009/03/why_khatami_withdrew_iran.html
Amongst other questions, the participants from Iran's 32 major cities
(excluding Tehran) were asked: If the elections were held tomorrow, who would you vote for?

46.5% said Ahmadinejad
33.5% said Khatami
4.2% said Ghalibaf (current Tehran Mayor)
1.9% said Ayatollah Karoubi (former Majles speaker)
1.7% said Mousavi

The same question was asked of Tehran's citizens and the results were:

36.1% Ahmadinejad
34.7% Khatami
12.8% Ghalibaf
2.1% Mousavi
1.2% Karroubi

My only idea is that with Khatami out the race Mousavi can take the majority of the reformist vote while also getting a fair slice of the more moderate conservative vote. The two sons of Ay. Beheshti are apparently helping Mousavi (http://www.kalemeh.ir/pages/4972.php) and their father was associated with the right wing of the Islamic Republican party. Moreover he apparently is popular with some in the Sepah. Javendanfar was suggesting Mousavi would be more effective once in power but any other ideas?

P.S. - You’re right about the economy- his two campaign websites are both emphasizing it.

[ChrisE]

Hi Loopin,

1. My impression is that the ball was always in Mousavi's court- it was Khatami who always insisted that he would make way if and when Moussavi decided to enter the race. Perhaps Khatami got fed with the continual speculation and, egged on by his enthusiastic supporters, got fed up with waiting and decided to test the water. His campaign immediately and increasingly looked like an up hill battle and he sensed that his candidacy had united support behind Ahmadinejad.

I guess he either conveyed this message to Mousavi or Mousavi read it independently. Either way, there appears to be a general consensus that Khatami would not have been able to beat Ahmadinejad.

2. Your poll seems to support my last sentence. However, as you point out, it also suggests that Mousavi would be even more unlikely. My response would be that this poll is now by defintion flawed- in that the question asked is now fundementally different. I imagine that few Khatami voters will gravitate to Ahmadinejad- I think the majority will got to Mousavi (but some to Karroubi).

Also, the Association of Combatant Clerics (ACC) Secretary General Hadi Khamenei said on Saturday that the ACC will support Mousavi in the presidential election.

I do agree with your speculation that Mousavi can certainly challenge for some of the moderate conservative vote. I also believe he can challenge Ahm' on an economic and social justice platform. Khatami's campaign would have been distracted from doing this by the obvious and constant attacks he would face. One of the few things I agreeds with in the RCW article is that this probably the wrong time for a polarising candidate.

As an aside, I would venture that there are some pretty dodgy statements in that RealClearWorld article. We know, for instance, that Mousavi and Khameini did not have a 'close 8 year working relationship' and that the statement: 'If elected, Mousavi would be able to open more doors than Khatami. The Supreme Leader will be more sympathetic to him' is also questionable.

Regarding the Beheshti bros- Mousavi was the editor of the Islamic Republican Party's newspaper and was very close to Khomeini- so he was close to those kind of people.

However, if the two sons of Ay. Beheshti are apparently helping Mousavi (I have no idea), I would not say that is a significant indication of support amongst conservatives for Mousavi. I was under the impression that they are loosely supportive of reformist politicians. I believe they are (or were) academics.

I don't really know how influential the Beheshti bros are, so I can't really gues how significant their support is.

[loopin]

Thanks Chris- you brought up some really great points.

1) I think you are probably right with this one. I read a piece by a former Iranian MP in which he strongly asserted that Mousavi had agreed not to run if Khatami went forward. However, as you stated in your original post, I think it’s hard to really call it for sure. It would be strange if there was any acrimony- they obviously have a strong relationship. Mousavi’s wife even worked for Khatami as an advisor and just before he dropped out, Khatami’s campaign website reported that he had a meeting with Mousavi so they obviously discussed it.

2) I think your point about polarization is bang on. Linking this to Karrubi- he has asserted that he can better bargain with the conservative centres of power. His campaign website title is ‘tagheer, amal’gara’, which means ‘Change and Pragmatic.’ Some peeps have considered organizations that are behind Khatami of having a polarizing effect. Mousavi can perhaps not only take the reformist vote but challenge Karrubi by being acceptable to the moderate conservatives as well.

3) Again, I liked your point about Mousavi being better placed to challenge Ahmadinejad, particularly on economic social justice. From what I have read he is admired for his economic track record during the war and has in his recent speeches and websites consistently brought up issues of eghtesad melli, ‘national economy’ in the context of social justice.

4) I wouldn’t take the RealClearWorld article too seriously. I was interested in just the poll really. However, even that should be taken with a pinch of salt- let’s not forget the polls were not so useful in 2005!

5) I too am not too sure of how influential the Beheshti brothers are. However, they must have some power as they are trying to set up a newspaper for Mousavi named Kalemeh.