Tuesday
Jun232009
Iran: More than Khamenei v. Rafsanjani? (Gary Sick and a Response)
Tuesday, June 23, 2009 at 17:11
The Latest from Iran (23 June): Preparing for Thursday
Iran Latest: A Khatami Action Plan?
Iran: 2+2 = A Breakthrough? (Mousavi and the Clerics)
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I think Gary Sick's work is among the best in US-based analyses of Iranian politics, and this blog is no exception. He considers the Supreme Leader's decision "to get out in front as the spokesman of the regime" and focuses on the manoeuvres of former President Hashemi Rafsanjani as he "stay(s) behind the scenes as a master strategist".
That said, I think Sick reduces the situation too much to a Khamenei v. Rafsanjani contest. Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mohammad Khatami, and Mehdi Karroubi are far from bystanders or foot soldiers in this battle; indeed, they have moved towards centre stages in the last few days (see our posts over the last 48 hours on the developing steps in the protest movement). And there are numerous arenas in this contest, from the seminaries at Qom to Parliament possibly to the inner sanctum of the Revolutionary Guards.
And I think Sick (like Robert Fisk in his column today in The Independent of London) risks "disappearing" the demonstrators who have reshaped political dynamics since a week ago Monday. This is not to say, of course, that People Power replaces Rafsanjani in any potential showdown with Ayatollah Khameini and President Ahmadinejad. On the other hand, Rafsanjani, Mousavi, Khatami, and Karroubi depend on a continuing protest and, yes, resistance for leverage in their political challenge. It is very much a hand-in-hand relationship (at the risk of stretching an analogy, as was the case in the Philippines in the toppling of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986).
So I think we may be past the point where, as Sick puts it, there will be "a negotiated solution in which everyone saves face". But whether negotiation or confrontation, this is not just (again to borrow Sick's analogy) a chess match. It is three-dimensional chess, and there are more than two players.
GARY SICK
Here are a few observations about the situation in Iran based on my own experience of watching the Iranian revolution and hostage crisis from the White House thirty years ago.
Don’t expect that this will be resolved cleanly with a win or loss in short period of time. The Iranian revolution, which is usually regarded as one of the most accelerated overthrows of a well-entrenched power structure in history, started in about January 1978 and the shah departed in January 1979. During that period, there were long pauses and periods of quiescence that could lead one to believe that the revolt had subsided. This is not a sprint; it is a marathon. Endurance is at least as important as speed.
There may not be a clear winner or loser. Iranians are clever and wily politicians. They prefer chess to football, and a “win” may involve a negotiated solution in which everyone saves face. The current leadership has chosen, probably unwisely, to make this a test of strength, but if they conclude that it is a no-win situation they could settle for a compromise. The shape of a compromise is impossible to guess at this point, but it would probably involve significant concessions concealed behind a great public show of unity.
Leadership is key. Ayatollah Khamene`i, the rahbar or Leader, has chosen – again probably unwisely – to get out in front as the spokesman of the regime. Unlike his predecessor, the father of the revolution Ayatollah Khomeini, he has openly taken sides with one faction over another. He is clearly speaking for the ultra conservative leaders of the Revolutionary Guards and their equally reactionary clerical supporters, who fear any possible threat to their dominant power. Curiously, President Ahmadinejad has largely vanished from sight, which adds to the impression that he is more of a pawn than a prime mover in this affair.
On the other side is Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, the erstwhile colleague and now principal antagonist of the rahbar. He has chosen, as he usually does, to stay behind the scenes as a master strategist, leaving the public field to Mir Hossein Mousavi and the other disappointed candidates and their followers.
The irony of two former colleagues now competing for power over the expiring corpse of the Islamic Republic that they created with such grandiose expectations, is lost on no one. The important sub text, however, is that these two understand very well what they are doing. They know how a revolt can be turned into a revolution. They also know they have everything to lose. The shared consciousness of high stakes has until now prevented an all out political confrontation between rival factions in the elite. That may help explain why the rahbar and the Revolutionary Guards were so reckless in their insolent contempt of the reformers and the public. They may have believed that no one would dare take it to this level.
Now that it has arrived at this point, both protagonists are faced with decisions of unprecedented gravity. There has been nothing like this in the thirty year history of the Islamic Republic, and today there is no Khomeini father figure to moderate and mediate among the warring factions. They must improvise in conditions of severe uncertainty. If anyone tells you that they know how this will turn out, treat their words with the same regard you would have for any fortune teller peering into a crystal ball.
For the United States, the watchword should be Do No Harm. The situation in Iran is being exploited for short term domestic political purposes by those who have been looking for an opening to attack the Obama administration. Wouldn’t it feel good to give full throated expression to American opposition to the existing power structure in Iran? Perhaps so — but it could also be a fatal blow to the demonstrators risking their lives on the streets of Tehran, and it could scotch any chance of eventual negotiations with whatever government emerges from this trial by fire.
The crisis in Iran is an Iranian crisis and it can only be resolved by the Iranian people and their leaders. There is no need to conceal our belief in freedom of speech and assembly and our support for the resolution of political disputes without bloodshed. But we should not be stampeded by domestic political concerns into pretending that our intervention in this crisis could be anything but pernicious.
Can President Obama play chess as well as he plays basketball?
Iran Latest: A Khatami Action Plan?
Iran: 2+2 = A Breakthrough? (Mousavi and the Clerics)
Receive our latest updates by email or RSS- SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
I think Gary Sick's work is among the best in US-based analyses of Iranian politics, and this blog is no exception. He considers the Supreme Leader's decision "to get out in front as the spokesman of the regime" and focuses on the manoeuvres of former President Hashemi Rafsanjani as he "stay(s) behind the scenes as a master strategist".That said, I think Sick reduces the situation too much to a Khamenei v. Rafsanjani contest. Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mohammad Khatami, and Mehdi Karroubi are far from bystanders or foot soldiers in this battle; indeed, they have moved towards centre stages in the last few days (see our posts over the last 48 hours on the developing steps in the protest movement). And there are numerous arenas in this contest, from the seminaries at Qom to Parliament possibly to the inner sanctum of the Revolutionary Guards.
And I think Sick (like Robert Fisk in his column today in The Independent of London) risks "disappearing" the demonstrators who have reshaped political dynamics since a week ago Monday. This is not to say, of course, that People Power replaces Rafsanjani in any potential showdown with Ayatollah Khameini and President Ahmadinejad. On the other hand, Rafsanjani, Mousavi, Khatami, and Karroubi depend on a continuing protest and, yes, resistance for leverage in their political challenge. It is very much a hand-in-hand relationship (at the risk of stretching an analogy, as was the case in the Philippines in the toppling of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986).
So I think we may be past the point where, as Sick puts it, there will be "a negotiated solution in which everyone saves face". But whether negotiation or confrontation, this is not just (again to borrow Sick's analogy) a chess match. It is three-dimensional chess, and there are more than two players.
Reading the Crisis in Tehran
GARY SICK
Here are a few observations about the situation in Iran based on my own experience of watching the Iranian revolution and hostage crisis from the White House thirty years ago.
Don’t expect that this will be resolved cleanly with a win or loss in short period of time. The Iranian revolution, which is usually regarded as one of the most accelerated overthrows of a well-entrenched power structure in history, started in about January 1978 and the shah departed in January 1979. During that period, there were long pauses and periods of quiescence that could lead one to believe that the revolt had subsided. This is not a sprint; it is a marathon. Endurance is at least as important as speed.
There may not be a clear winner or loser. Iranians are clever and wily politicians. They prefer chess to football, and a “win” may involve a negotiated solution in which everyone saves face. The current leadership has chosen, probably unwisely, to make this a test of strength, but if they conclude that it is a no-win situation they could settle for a compromise. The shape of a compromise is impossible to guess at this point, but it would probably involve significant concessions concealed behind a great public show of unity.
Leadership is key. Ayatollah Khamene`i, the rahbar or Leader, has chosen – again probably unwisely – to get out in front as the spokesman of the regime. Unlike his predecessor, the father of the revolution Ayatollah Khomeini, he has openly taken sides with one faction over another. He is clearly speaking for the ultra conservative leaders of the Revolutionary Guards and their equally reactionary clerical supporters, who fear any possible threat to their dominant power. Curiously, President Ahmadinejad has largely vanished from sight, which adds to the impression that he is more of a pawn than a prime mover in this affair.
On the other side is Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, the erstwhile colleague and now principal antagonist of the rahbar. He has chosen, as he usually does, to stay behind the scenes as a master strategist, leaving the public field to Mir Hossein Mousavi and the other disappointed candidates and their followers.
The irony of two former colleagues now competing for power over the expiring corpse of the Islamic Republic that they created with such grandiose expectations, is lost on no one. The important sub text, however, is that these two understand very well what they are doing. They know how a revolt can be turned into a revolution. They also know they have everything to lose. The shared consciousness of high stakes has until now prevented an all out political confrontation between rival factions in the elite. That may help explain why the rahbar and the Revolutionary Guards were so reckless in their insolent contempt of the reformers and the public. They may have believed that no one would dare take it to this level.
Now that it has arrived at this point, both protagonists are faced with decisions of unprecedented gravity. There has been nothing like this in the thirty year history of the Islamic Republic, and today there is no Khomeini father figure to moderate and mediate among the warring factions. They must improvise in conditions of severe uncertainty. If anyone tells you that they know how this will turn out, treat their words with the same regard you would have for any fortune teller peering into a crystal ball.
For the United States, the watchword should be Do No Harm. The situation in Iran is being exploited for short term domestic political purposes by those who have been looking for an opening to attack the Obama administration. Wouldn’t it feel good to give full throated expression to American opposition to the existing power structure in Iran? Perhaps so — but it could also be a fatal blow to the demonstrators risking their lives on the streets of Tehran, and it could scotch any chance of eventual negotiations with whatever government emerges from this trial by fire.
The crisis in Iran is an Iranian crisis and it can only be resolved by the Iranian people and their leaders. There is no need to conceal our belief in freedom of speech and assembly and our support for the resolution of political disputes without bloodshed. But we should not be stampeded by domestic political concerns into pretending that our intervention in this crisis could be anything but pernicious.
Can President Obama play chess as well as he plays basketball?
Reader Comments (4)
Scott I disagree. I might be far off the mark but it appears like there are two levels to current events. What’s going on in the street and the internal struggle that is being played behind closed doors. The internal struggle in many ways reflects the transformation of the political struggle in Iran being one being between the conservatives and the reformists to one within the powerful conservative faction itself.
I think you are overestimating the power of Khatami and Karoubi. The reformist movement was defeated politically, and lack the momentum it had during the late 1990’s (I do not view Mousvai as a reformist). As the door to state institutions are locked to them, these individuals have looked to alternative methods of political engagement, whether through the expansion of civil society or through use of the internet and in that way they been significant in motivating on the street level but they don’t have an important hand to play in the internal struggle.
We really should be noting the manoeuvring of Nateq-Nouri, Asagarouladi, Asadollah Badamchian, Muhammad Reza Bahonar, the Larijani brothers and conservative organizations- such as Jam'aiyat Mo'atalefeh Islami (the Society of Islamic Coalition), Jame'eh-ye Ruhaniyat-e Mobarez (the Society of Combatant Clergy), Anjoman Islami Mohandesin (the Society of Engineers) and Shoray-e Hamahangi (the Council of Co-ordination).
With the beauty of hindsight, one can see this conservative struggle has been clearly visible: think back to Rafsan/Ahm/Larijani snipes- ‘undermining national unity’ and ‘charges of corruption for Rafsanjani officials’ and also the change in Sepah’s role with the rise of the New Right. Some could even say it has been visible since 1993 when the ‘New Right’ first made their organized presence felt. I don’t think Sick is particularly oversimplifying it by looking at ‘old guard’ (pragmatic conservatism- occupying many of the unelected offices) vs. ‘new guard’ (rise of military /IRGC/ Basiji (think Ezatullah Zarghami as one point)/ and other cliques such as the Hojjatieh Society). Throughout the past four years, both conservative factions have been manoeuvring to create political space and dominate various institutions with like minded individuals. Khamenei has remained somewhat ambivalent, unwilling to jump on either bandwagon (up until now). His power has been consolidated and strengthened during Ahmadinejad’s tenure, with supreme leadership, presidency and parliament and state institutions in conservative hands for the first times in years.
Loopin,
Thanks for this --- it adds a level of expertise and knowledge that is invaluable. And I would be grateful if you could help with any comments/insights on those manoeuvrings that you mention.
I don't want to deny that the intra-conservative struggle may be the primary game in town; I just don't think it's the only game. While I take the point that my (simplistic) snap response is overstating the effect of Khatami and Karroubi, I do think their initiatives re-configure the game. Again, put simply, their activities and those of their supporters open up political space that others --- "old guard", possibly some clerics, and, yes, even "reformists" --- can use and exploit.
It could well be that the conclusion comes to the old guard v. new guard paradigm but I don't think we're there yet. Hundreds of thousands of people on the streets a week ago Monday made a difference; so, I think, did the events of last Saturday.
This three-dimensional chess game still has a variety of openings, well before we take about an endgame.
S.
Loopin (and readers),
I'm just working through latest reports, including the story of the very different lines taken by Ali Larijani and his brother. Will post on this soon, but would appreciate your help in interpretation.
S.
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