Sunday
Aug162009
Iran: The Battle over the Judiciary and the Republic's Future
Sunday, August 16, 2009 at 8:06
Iran Special: Mohammad Sadegh Larijani and a “Militarised” Judiciary
The Latest from Iran (16 August): New Challenge to Khamenei?
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The announcement on Facebook, which came just after 1000 GMT yesterday, was short but to the point: "Ayatollah Sadeg Amoli Larijani has been nominated [by] Iran revolution supreme leader to post of administration in department of justice". A few minutes later, a photo of the Supreme Leader and the new head of Iran's judiciary, Mohammad Sadegh Larijani, was posted.
Below the surface of that sentence, and a longer mention on Khamenei's website, is a struggle for power which illuminates how complex and diffuse the contest has become.
As we noted yesterday in a teaser, Khamenei's announcement had to negotiate his relationship with Iran's senior clerics. Larijani does not have the religious standing of "Ayatollah" but is just a "Hojatoleslam"; his title of Ayatollah is a political one, from his appointments to the Guardian Council and Assembly of Experts. After his initial reference to "Ayatollah" Larijani, the Supreme Leader reverted to "Hojatoleslam" Larijani. Questions will still remain amongst some, however, over the new head of judiciary's relative lack of religious qualifications to deliver justice as well as his relatively young age for a senior post.
That, however, is only the beginning of the political manoeuvres. The Supreme Leader's declaration yesterday was no less than an attempt to seize victory in the battle between conservatives in the Iranian establishment. It was clear last week that Larijani's proposed appointment was backed by figures such as his brother Ali, the Speaker of Parliament, and Mayor of Tehran Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, as well as a lrage number of MPs, but bitterly opposed by supporters of President Ahmadinejad.
Ahmadinejad's camp won a preliminary victory when the formal ceremony for Larijani's accession was postponed but then Khamenei played his card. He would name Larijani anyway, albeit through a brief decree. This lacked high profile but was still a powerful marker of authority: go on, Mahmoud, challenge this at your peril.
This is the easy part for the Supreme Leader, though. For behind (and, for some, alongside and even ahead of) Ahmadinejad are the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. And they may have more reason than the President to oppose Larijani's appointment.
Bring in the issues that are now symbolically defining the fight for the Islamic Republic: detentions, abuses, confessions, trials. Throughout last week, the story emerged that Larijani wanted to bring an end to the prosecution/persecution of political detainees. As this story appeared in pro-Ahmadinejad outlets, it may have been psychological warfare to taint Larijani as too soft for head of judiciary, but it may also have been based, at least in part, on Larijani's sentiments.
Whatever the case, it immediately brings to the fore the question: does the new head of the judiciary step in to limit the crackdown on the opposition? And today, less than 24 hours after he had his nice picture with Khamenei, Larijani gets his first test. Trials for another 25 detainees open in Tehran, bringing the total appearing in court so far to more than 125.
It appears, however, that a number of these trials have not been arisen from the judiciary. They have not stemmed from arrests by the police or cases built by prosecutors. Instead, these defendants are the property of the IRGC: picked up early in the post-election crisis, sometimes held under IRGC control, and now brought into public as agents of the "velvet revolution".
And the IRGC has not been shy about hiding its intent. To the content, as the debate over Larijani circulated last week, Guard commanders were continuing their drumbeat --- supported in some quarters, such as the Friday prayer of Ahmad Khatami --- for the arrest of opposition leaders such as Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi.
So, if he is serious about limiting the cases against the detainees, Larijani knows who his main opposition is. It is not in Parliament or in the streets but in the corridors of the Revolutionary Guards.
Now take a step further out. For, of course, Larijani is not the only official (if the reports are true) who has split from the President over the actions against the opposition. The Green movement, conservative and priniciplist politicians inside and outside Parliament, senior clerics, and Hashemi Rafsanjani are each --- often from different viewpoints and motives, but converging with the same demands --- insisting that something must be done about the abuses of power and legal process since 12 June. Even the Supreme Leader, with declarations such as the closure of Kahrizak prison, has joined in.
These forces do not and cannot constitute a "bloc" against the IRGC. "Conservatives" and "reformists", even in agreement on specific measures, each cannot afford to be seen as having allied with the other. There is no prospect that the Supreme Leader will suddenly give a warm embrace to Mehdi Karroubi.
At the same time, the temperature over the detentions is steadily rising. And, far from reducing that temperature, someone in the Iranian system --- and I am increasingly thinking that someone means "IRGC" --- is paradoxically raising it by insisting on the trials and the public display of confessions.
So, to return to Ayatollah/Hojatoleslam Larijani, does he have enough support from other concerned factions within the Iranian system to stand up to the Revolutionary Guard? Or does he become another bystander, or casualty, in this crisis?
The Latest from Iran (16 August): New Challenge to Khamenei?
Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis
The announcement on Facebook, which came just after 1000 GMT yesterday, was short but to the point: "Ayatollah Sadeg Amoli Larijani has been nominated [by] Iran revolution supreme leader to post of administration in department of justice". A few minutes later, a photo of the Supreme Leader and the new head of Iran's judiciary, Mohammad Sadegh Larijani, was posted.Below the surface of that sentence, and a longer mention on Khamenei's website, is a struggle for power which illuminates how complex and diffuse the contest has become.
As we noted yesterday in a teaser, Khamenei's announcement had to negotiate his relationship with Iran's senior clerics. Larijani does not have the religious standing of "Ayatollah" but is just a "Hojatoleslam"; his title of Ayatollah is a political one, from his appointments to the Guardian Council and Assembly of Experts. After his initial reference to "Ayatollah" Larijani, the Supreme Leader reverted to "Hojatoleslam" Larijani. Questions will still remain amongst some, however, over the new head of judiciary's relative lack of religious qualifications to deliver justice as well as his relatively young age for a senior post.
That, however, is only the beginning of the political manoeuvres. The Supreme Leader's declaration yesterday was no less than an attempt to seize victory in the battle between conservatives in the Iranian establishment. It was clear last week that Larijani's proposed appointment was backed by figures such as his brother Ali, the Speaker of Parliament, and Mayor of Tehran Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, as well as a lrage number of MPs, but bitterly opposed by supporters of President Ahmadinejad.
Ahmadinejad's camp won a preliminary victory when the formal ceremony for Larijani's accession was postponed but then Khamenei played his card. He would name Larijani anyway, albeit through a brief decree. This lacked high profile but was still a powerful marker of authority: go on, Mahmoud, challenge this at your peril.
This is the easy part for the Supreme Leader, though. For behind (and, for some, alongside and even ahead of) Ahmadinejad are the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. And they may have more reason than the President to oppose Larijani's appointment.
Bring in the issues that are now symbolically defining the fight for the Islamic Republic: detentions, abuses, confessions, trials. Throughout last week, the story emerged that Larijani wanted to bring an end to the prosecution/persecution of political detainees. As this story appeared in pro-Ahmadinejad outlets, it may have been psychological warfare to taint Larijani as too soft for head of judiciary, but it may also have been based, at least in part, on Larijani's sentiments.
Whatever the case, it immediately brings to the fore the question: does the new head of the judiciary step in to limit the crackdown on the opposition? And today, less than 24 hours after he had his nice picture with Khamenei, Larijani gets his first test. Trials for another 25 detainees open in Tehran, bringing the total appearing in court so far to more than 125.
It appears, however, that a number of these trials have not been arisen from the judiciary. They have not stemmed from arrests by the police or cases built by prosecutors. Instead, these defendants are the property of the IRGC: picked up early in the post-election crisis, sometimes held under IRGC control, and now brought into public as agents of the "velvet revolution".
And the IRGC has not been shy about hiding its intent. To the content, as the debate over Larijani circulated last week, Guard commanders were continuing their drumbeat --- supported in some quarters, such as the Friday prayer of Ahmad Khatami --- for the arrest of opposition leaders such as Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi.
So, if he is serious about limiting the cases against the detainees, Larijani knows who his main opposition is. It is not in Parliament or in the streets but in the corridors of the Revolutionary Guards.
Now take a step further out. For, of course, Larijani is not the only official (if the reports are true) who has split from the President over the actions against the opposition. The Green movement, conservative and priniciplist politicians inside and outside Parliament, senior clerics, and Hashemi Rafsanjani are each --- often from different viewpoints and motives, but converging with the same demands --- insisting that something must be done about the abuses of power and legal process since 12 June. Even the Supreme Leader, with declarations such as the closure of Kahrizak prison, has joined in.
These forces do not and cannot constitute a "bloc" against the IRGC. "Conservatives" and "reformists", even in agreement on specific measures, each cannot afford to be seen as having allied with the other. There is no prospect that the Supreme Leader will suddenly give a warm embrace to Mehdi Karroubi.
At the same time, the temperature over the detentions is steadily rising. And, far from reducing that temperature, someone in the Iranian system --- and I am increasingly thinking that someone means "IRGC" --- is paradoxically raising it by insisting on the trials and the public display of confessions.
So, to return to Ayatollah/Hojatoleslam Larijani, does he have enough support from other concerned factions within the Iranian system to stand up to the Revolutionary Guard? Or does he become another bystander, or casualty, in this crisis?
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