Cole’s comments on how the reduction in car bombings were achieved is reflective of his lack of interest in how jihadi groups operate, and how they were combated.

The car bombs were largely produced in rural areas of provinces like Anbar, and then transported in to Baghdad. Limiting mobility in Baghdad was not enough to defeat them – ultimately dismantling the networks and safehaven all the way back to the farms and garages was essential.

This could not have been done without the political reconciliation between the USG and Sunni Arab tribal sheikhs.

Since the US handed over control to Iraqi forces the central government has refused to pay the security forces of the Awakening Councils, and refused to integrate their militias with government forces.

This repeats the mistakes of the USG 2003-05. Gunmen will rejoin jihadi organisations, and tribal sheikhs have no incentive to collaborate with the Iraqi govt against the jihadi tanzims. The result has been the recovery of jihadi networks.

The Iraqi government MUST integrate the Sunni tribal sheikhs and their tribal forces in to the political and security framework, or reap the consequences.