Rafsanjani is clearly personally corrupt. His personal fortune stands as a testament to that reality. Ahmadinejad is still a relative newcomer, but give him time. The IRGC component is additionally problematic (e.g. the IRGC side makes the system look more Russian-mafia style “Kleptocracy” than a technocratic, authoritarian regime like China). Iran has tremendous innate potential based on its human capital, its geographical location, and its natural resources — but its political structure tends to squander many of these strengths.

As far as subsidies go; the U.S. may not provide a direct subsidy to Iran, but the indirect subsidy that it provided via oil consumption from 2005-2008 was much more than $5 billion a year. Neither Rafsanjani nor Khatami oversaw the economy at a time like 2005-2008 when oil revenue was through the sky.

In terms of economic policy and public corruption, there’s not much question that western democracies outperform more closed political systems over the long-term.

Democracies are built on the premise that there is no perfect political system, because men are not angels by nature.

There is also an understanding that two heads are smarter than one. As Abraham Lincoln once said: “You can fool some of the people all of the time; and you can fool all of the people some of the time; but you can’t fool all of the people all of the time. It is even harder to do this when you have to fool a lot of people.”

The advantage that a China, or Singapore has is that it can pivot much more quickly and enact “best economic practices” without needing to explain or justify their decisions to an electorate that’s made up of non-specialists.

The centralization of decision making though is a mixed blessing — especially when the decision makers are insulated from the consequences of their decisions. The virtues may be amplified, but so are the vices. A democratic system tends to spread risk and benefits of risk much more widely. It’s unwieldiness and seeming chaos is part of its virtue.

Sazegara has been doing 10 minute youtube broadcasts everyday since this all began. I have listened to a few, and they are good. He gives instructions for civil disobedience, gives tips on staying safe, and how to organize groups of Greens in schools or places of work. He provides consistent messaging such as the need for staying non-violent, and tips about other movement and counter-movement tactics. I haven’t confirmed this, but his broadcasts are disseminated in Iran through various medias.

Google Trend will show you this effect: http://www.google.com/trends?q=sazegara and most of the queries are from inside Iran.

Also if he wasn’t such a torn in the coup government’s eye, they wouldn’t have broadcasts this video on state TV: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X4yS5_cJXjc

“I remember his leadership of the Referendum Movement — before he became a fellow at WINEP. Anybody know if he still has his gig with Voice of America? And wouldn’t that be a curious (ok, problematic) platform from which to be a leader of the Green Wave?”

I see your point, but in my opinion this movement’s leader is not its decision maker, at least not yet! The people make the decisions, and leaders provide general advice and guidelines. People cheer and follow their champions, and as soon as they sense mistrust, they would shift direction. Just look at how Rafsanjani was cautiously cheered during his Friday sermons and then when people saw that he is not aligned with them, he was put away. So if Sazegara steps out of line, he would be put away as well.

Again in my opinion, you can look at Sazegara as the leader of the troops and a catalyst for the movement. Giving it a hand to achieve its goal, but not setting its goals.

I don’t disagree with you that the Govt. must pursue more effective economic policies. And please there is plenty of debate about that in parliament and other venues. Look at how many of AN’s nominees for the Cabinet have been rejected over the years.

Of course unlike other countries in the Region Iran does not receive 5+ Billion dollars every year from a superpower. We should also note that Khatami and Rafsanjani have zero credibility when it comes to the issue of corruption.

I have said that while AN is not personally corrupt he does depend too much on yes men and has opposed some very capable individuals, Naqdi the current head of the Basij for one, simply because they haven’t fallen into that category.

I don’t agree that western style democracy necessarily leads to better economic policy. Lee Kuan Yew, the famous former leader and founding father of Singapore (one of Asia’s economic miracles) has spoken on this issue much more eloquently than I ever could.

Samuel, did it ever occur to you that countries will, almost inevitably, outlive some of the values of Revolutions? Like, oh the Bolshevik Revolution?

Your countrymen seem to be saying that many of the ideals of ‘79 no longer apply. I would agree.

I don’t think that the Iranian Revolution is rigid or static — clearly the Iranian system has some dynamism. It is also true that the revolution has come full circle in many ways.

Iran is more self-reliant in many ways than it was before the revolution. Some good was accomplished in the years before the present time. Ahmadinejad inherited a pretty good foundation. Although, in four years he appears to have squandered much. He is to Iran what George W. Bush was to the U.S.

Nominally the state maintains its Islamic roots; however, in practice its ruling elite today seem to enjoy the fruits of earthly power in a manner that is clearly not disinterested.

In terms of governance, the political elites seem to have been seduced more by secular crony capitalism (they seem more like adherents of Putin or the Shah than adherents of the Imam). Their words and deeds are not in harmony.

Of course they will deny this, but the truth is what it is. A leader does not amass an earthly fortune of hundreds of millions, or billions of dollars while in political power, if that leader puts the interests of the people before his own. This was true in the time of the Shah; this is no less true today. Imam Khomenei enjoyed public confidence in part because he exercised power with an eye towards national interests — he did not use political power simply as a means to enrich himself.

If economic gains were more widely shared; unemployment was low; and inflation was largely in check, I suspect more people would be supportive of the current political arrangement. The cronyism which exists within the current regime and the mismanagement of economic affairs by cronies weakens the overall health of the Iranian state.

To the degree that the economy is well-managed, the regime will enjoy some degree of internal confidence. To the degree that political leaders mismanage the economy, it loses confidence — especially when the political leaders profit when others do not. Political and economic power are inter-related.

In reference to Hezbollah, it co-exists right now within a relatively open society inside Lebanon (albeit tenuously). If Iran enjoyed the same electoral and press freedoms that currently exist in Lebanon, there would be more transparency and greater accountability — the political system would have a means for removing incompetent members of the government; people would have a stake in the political process, because the political process would offer a means for accommodating legitimate grievances (especially as they relate to the conduct of earthly affairs). As it stands now, there is no check against earthly incompetence in the Iranian political system. That is part of the problem. Using violence and coercion do not remedy the underlying problem.

In reference to Hezbollah, it is also too bad that Iranian hardliners have not taken the lessons of the Doha compromise into account. Whether the compromise holds is an open question, but the willingness of the parties in the conflict to seek mediation and avoid another civil war demonstrates the kind of pragmatism that you highlight.

I do not believe for a second that that permanent values of the Iranian Islamic Revolution of the Ayatollah Khomeini means that one has a rigid, static society. As I’ve pointed out before the Revolution has gone through periods of greater and lesser liberalizations. I’m repeating myself but the reformists were in control of the Presidency for eight years and before that there was President Rafansjani, today the idol of reformists.

This is not the Soviet Union of Gorbachev where glasnost and perestroika were totally unprecedented.

Let me give you an example outside Iran but closely related to the Revolution. In my opinion there is no one more loyal to the values, the aspirations, the dreams of the Iranian Revolution in its totality than Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Although obviously not an Iranian this man studied in Qom and spent many years in Iran. It has even been said that Nasrallah is like a son to the SL which I find to be completely believable.

Today Hezbollah controls vast areas of Shiite Lebanon, areas where no one even comes closing to forcing women to wear the Hijab. This is but one example that can be cited. I know some will say that Nasrallah is simply waiting for the day he finally takes over all of Lebanon to end the current pragmatism.

The truth is that Hezbollah, the great champions of the Islamic Revolution have been pragmatic, flexible, adaptable to meet the realities around them while remaining loyal to the Khomeini vision.

Speaking of flexibility the Iranian Govt. under Imam Khomeini did not hesitate to deal with the Great Satan at the time of the Iran-Contra controversy because such dealings were for the benefit of the Iranian Revolution.

This notion of the Iranian Revolution being rigid, static, or “frozen in time” is nothing more than a caricature dreamed up by reformist propaganda.

China is an interesting case.

In terms of industrialization, China today is no longer a feudal economy thanks in part to economic liberalization begun under Deng Xiaoping. In respect to the way that economic power is distributed, the current period has some resemblances to the one party rule of the KMT under Chiang in the 1930s and 1940s (e.g. a small coterie is reaping extreme economic benefits — concentrations of wealth are also located heavily in cities along the eastern coast with tension growing in the interior and west). In some respects the revolution has come full circle. History never fully repeats itself, but the current period bears some resemblances to the pre-revolution period in terms of economic structures — a kind of crony capitalism — than it did under Mao.

The economic development in China is also creating political pressures that in time may yield to greater liberalization (e.g. the creation and growth of a middle class tends to result in political demands in time; the only way to reverse those demands is to stifle entrepreneurial innovation, shut the country off from the world again, and in turn reverse economic gains).

China today may still be an authoritarian state, but with economic growth, I would not be surprised to see greater political liberalization. The pursuit of materialism in modern China is something that people in the West understand quite well. These were not values held during Mao’s period — in fact, he would likely frown upon many of the changes that have taken place today.

There are some resemblances between China today and the U.S. during the period of industrialization during the “Gilded Age” (when our own crony capitalists exerted disproportionate control over our political system). This is a stark contrast from China under Mao. Political power in China is still more centralized today than it was in the U.S. during Gilded Age; although, the parallels with that period are greater now than they were under Mao.

Economic structures and political structures are related. If the goal is to create static political structures, it is necessary to do as the Spartans and Mao did (and as the North Koreans do to this day) — and still, in time, the reality of an ever-changing world tends to wear down even the most closed society.

As the cliche goes, the only thing that is constant is change.

Values change in response to internal and external changes.

In theology there may be “permanent values”; in politics, the world is always in flux. Closed political systems can maintain an illusion of static, permanent values, but this illusion is maintained through artificial constraints at a heavy price. Closed political systems are like a form of inbreeding. In time, they are not good for the health of a nation.

But look at China. Some Revolutionary values have changed, even radically since the time of Mao. Yet China today is one of the two superpowers in the world and it will be THE superpower if the Americans continue these losing wars against Muslims.

China has dramatically changed its economy from Mao’s period but it has not adopted western values either. If not for the Chinese Revolution and everything that followed China would have remained a miserable, pathetic, undeveloped, western exploited non-entity. Think of the Opium Wars.

China certainly was not a case of “meet the new boss, same as the old boss”.

“I learnt to use AK-47…”

I’m very encouraged by all this talk of violent counterrevolution from the pro-Greenies. I would not mind it at all if those Greenies started to clean their AK-47’s right about now. Actually it’s a Kalashnikov with that heavy piston it does not have to be cleaned all that much.

Just be aware that once the Greenies do that the Basij will also bring out an AK or two as the picture below clearly shows. For those interested those are Romanian AK’s in the picture. Iran makes its own AK’s these days–and a fine version it is.

http://english.khamenei.ir//components/com_mhasgallery/img_pictures/originals/20080526_1439601590_17.jpg

In terms of the broad sweep, I guess I’m more cynical about these kind of things. Ultimately revolutions are about power and the way the power is organized and distributed. At the core that’s about the only common, enduring element in revolutions.

In politics there are no “permanent values” — every arrangement is provisional and contingent. Reality is dynamic and things change. A system of political organization which may be well-suited to one moment, might be ill-suited at another time (e.g. centralization can be positive in some circumstances — such as times of crisis; but over an extended period of time it can also stifle innovation and create its own set of crises).

Soviet leaders may have talked about the international proletarian revolution, and perhaps many of the leaders believed it. At the end though Stalin, et al, simply replaced one form of authoritarian rule with another form. In some respects there were differences with respect to increases in say literacy, but in others it was a case of “meet the new boss, same as the old boss”.

No it is not. That is only true if you view the world in a rigid, unthinking way. A Revolution like the Iranian one or the Russian one or the Chinese one contain permanent values. (In Soviet Society it might have been belief in anti-imperialist militancy, collectivization of production and indeed society, solidarity with the international proletariat etc.,). Within a broad set of beliefs policies are changed or MODIFIED according to current conditions.

In order to stay dry one does not walk around with an open umbrella all the time regardless of whether it is raining or not.