Wednesday
Dec302009
Iran: The Uncertainties of Oppression and Protest
Wednesday, December 30, 2009 at 8:01
After more than a week of mourning, memorials, dramatic confrontation, and arrests, Iran has "settled" into uncertain tension this morning.
The uncertainty on the Government side is what can be offered beyond threats. Those were in abundance on Tuesday, with high-profile members of Parliament, including the Speaker Ali Larijani, the Revolutionary Guard, and the state media issuing declarations of crushing dissent and cutting off hands.
That was the start and end of a post-Ashura position, however. President Ahmadinejad popped up briefly but only to put the label of foreign-run "masquerade" on the protests. The Supreme Leader has still not been heard since Sunday. There have been, as an EA reader has helpfully informed us, pro-regime rallies of unknown size (the label "thousands" has been used in the state media reports and Reuter's account of those reports --- see video in separate entry) but even these were framed now as objections to Ashura "rioting" rather than an assertion of Government legitimacy.
On the opposiiton side, there is an inevitable retreat from the high point of Sunday's demonstrations --- inevitable because of the need to re-group and re-organise, inevitable because the regime's strategy of arrests seeks to prevent any regroups and reorganisation.
An EA reader asked yesterday, "Who now leads the movement?" It is both the strength of and challenge for this movement --- with Mousavi and Karroubi under "semi-house arrest", their chief aides in detention or re-arrested in the last 72 hours, and communications under constant attack --- that it draws strength from a collection of groups who persist and proceed despite the Government attempts to hammer them out of existence.
That in itself is enough to ensure that there will be another emergence of mass protest. However, even as the movement lives and --- in moments like Sunday --- "wins", the question grows: "What is that movement 'for'?" Indeed, the regime's own attempts to make that question irrelevant only bring it to the centre of political consideration and concern.
Because the regime has ruled out compromise --- not only the compromise of the increasingly-distant "National Unity Plan" but also the compromise of the legal measures demanded by Mousavi and Karroubi --- the notion of resolution within the system recedes. A movement which was largely propelled by the perception of a rigged election has moved beyond that election to a confrontation with the religious as well as secular foundations (at least the foundations as embodied in the current leadership) of the Islamic Republic.
The easy answer, seen in the slogans of recent protests, is "Throw the Rascals Out" or even "Death to the Rascals". But that increasingly turns general demands for change into a showdown of Opposition v. the Rascals --- the so-called "radicalisation" which has become a handy label to stick on dissent.
And, then, what if the Rascals do go? Where then the Islamic Republic?
That may be an uncertainty which, in practical terms, does not have to be confronted immediately. Opposition can propel itself just by opposing. But if the protests are seeking to win over and mobilise those who initially did not support its call for change, then the necessity of setting out a "positive" may emerge even before the fantasy of the Supreme Leader hopping a jet to Russia takes on the shape of a possibility.
With each passing day, the regime is shorn of its own claim of the "positive" in Iran --- politically, economically, socially --- and falls back on the "negative" of fighting a supposed evil. The defining issue for the opposition, as it moves beyond the symbolism and political reality of a "leader" (first Mousavi, then Karroubi) may be whether it can avoid doing the same.
The uncertainty on the Government side is what can be offered beyond threats. Those were in abundance on Tuesday, with high-profile members of Parliament, including the Speaker Ali Larijani, the Revolutionary Guard, and the state media issuing declarations of crushing dissent and cutting off hands.
That was the start and end of a post-Ashura position, however. President Ahmadinejad popped up briefly but only to put the label of foreign-run "masquerade" on the protests. The Supreme Leader has still not been heard since Sunday. There have been, as an EA reader has helpfully informed us, pro-regime rallies of unknown size (the label "thousands" has been used in the state media reports and Reuter's account of those reports --- see video in separate entry) but even these were framed now as objections to Ashura "rioting" rather than an assertion of Government legitimacy.
On the opposiiton side, there is an inevitable retreat from the high point of Sunday's demonstrations --- inevitable because of the need to re-group and re-organise, inevitable because the regime's strategy of arrests seeks to prevent any regroups and reorganisation.
An EA reader asked yesterday, "Who now leads the movement?" It is both the strength of and challenge for this movement --- with Mousavi and Karroubi under "semi-house arrest", their chief aides in detention or re-arrested in the last 72 hours, and communications under constant attack --- that it draws strength from a collection of groups who persist and proceed despite the Government attempts to hammer them out of existence.
That in itself is enough to ensure that there will be another emergence of mass protest. However, even as the movement lives and --- in moments like Sunday --- "wins", the question grows: "What is that movement 'for'?" Indeed, the regime's own attempts to make that question irrelevant only bring it to the centre of political consideration and concern.
Because the regime has ruled out compromise --- not only the compromise of the increasingly-distant "National Unity Plan" but also the compromise of the legal measures demanded by Mousavi and Karroubi --- the notion of resolution within the system recedes. A movement which was largely propelled by the perception of a rigged election has moved beyond that election to a confrontation with the religious as well as secular foundations (at least the foundations as embodied in the current leadership) of the Islamic Republic.
The easy answer, seen in the slogans of recent protests, is "Throw the Rascals Out" or even "Death to the Rascals". But that increasingly turns general demands for change into a showdown of Opposition v. the Rascals --- the so-called "radicalisation" which has become a handy label to stick on dissent.
And, then, what if the Rascals do go? Where then the Islamic Republic?
That may be an uncertainty which, in practical terms, does not have to be confronted immediately. Opposition can propel itself just by opposing. But if the protests are seeking to win over and mobilise those who initially did not support its call for change, then the necessity of setting out a "positive" may emerge even before the fantasy of the Supreme Leader hopping a jet to Russia takes on the shape of a possibility.
With each passing day, the regime is shorn of its own claim of the "positive" in Iran --- politically, economically, socially --- and falls back on the "negative" of fighting a supposed evil. The defining issue for the opposition, as it moves beyond the symbolism and political reality of a "leader" (first Mousavi, then Karroubi) may be whether it can avoid doing the same.
tagged Iran, Iran Elections 2009 in Middle East & Iran
Reader Comments (6)
Today someone brought up the excellent point that perhaps Artesh is not taking any action because they fear that enemies would take advantage of the situation to attack while Artesh was busy inside Iran and presumably less vigilant on the borders. This is something that may not have occurred to Westerners who assume that of course nobody would attack Iran while it was in the throes of kicking out the rascals and figuring out a stable new government. It's possible this is a very real fear for Artesh that is causing them to hold back.
Perhaps Western governments could give Artesh the peace of mind it needs by clearly and unequivocally stating that should Artesh need to move to restore order and constitutional law within Iran, the Western world would stand united against any attack on Iran during that time. I don't know if that would make any difference but at least we could make our position clear, that nobody in the West is plotting some kind of sneak-attack for the time when Artesh comes to the defense of Iranian citizens.
Excellent idea, Rev Magdalen. It's probably also a good idea to start planning ahead just in case the the regime falls apart much sooner than anticipated/hoped:
Iran's Protest Movement Must Prepare for the Morning After
By Nader Habibi
Summary: After December 20th Iran's protest movement has entered a more violent and unpredictable phase. One of the many possible courses of events in the next few months is a sudden regime collapse which can plunge the country into revolutionary chaos. The Green Movement must draft a plan for governing the country during a temporary transition period after such an unexpected regime collapse. ....
http://www.payvand.com/news/09/dec/1288.html
Rachel (Rev Magdalen) - What you posted is certainly a an excellent thought, and you suggestion is certainly worthwhile. But there might be also some pretty bad consequences to doing what you suggested - it is effectively putting the U.S. on record as endorsing (or green-lighting, or whatever the correct word is) a coup. What do you think the chances are that the U.S. govt has enough contacts in Iran to make private contacts with key Artesh members instead?
Scott - great to see that Radio Netherlands has also climbed aboard the Supreme Leader's jet overnight: http://www.rnw.nl/english/article/iran-has-plane-ready-take-leader-safety :)
I think western countries need peace in Middle Est and they will never venture to attak Iran taking advantage of this crisis; it's in the interest of everybody to have a quiet Iran so that peace be brought in this erea; I think Artesh is not enough fair and seek a pretext !
On National Public Radio in the US yesterday there was some discussion of a different factor allegedly slowing progress of the opposition/Green movement or at least causing its (diffuse) leadership to regroup: the lack of major engagement by Iran's ethnic minorities (which are a pretty large slice of the population, depending on how you define them). The gist of the argument, as I got it, was their saying to the Greens "What new are you offering us? So far it all looks to us like little more than a tweedledee-tweedledum swtich at the top." Is this all just fantasy or is it a real stake in the process and are there, to your knowledge, necessary negotations of this kind underway?
Folks, "Artesh" (the national army as opposed to the Rev. Guards) has been emasculated over the last 30 years. Officers, from colonel and up, are 100% vetted by the IRGC intelligence (I know, an oximoron...). The top echelon (generals) are all IRGC transfers. "Religious Commissaries" constantly conduct brain washing education. No one in Artesh can move a finger without being immediately reported. The possibility of something like the "homafars" (non accredited officers in the Shah's army revolting as they did in '79 is very improbable.
In fact given that the IRGC are less suspect to the top staff than Artesh, there might be a higher (but still slim) probability of a more independent faction emerging from within them to oppose the anti-constitutional acts of their superiors.