Video and Transcript: Iran's Ahmadinejad on ABC's This Week (26 April)

Latest Post: Ahmadinejad Engages (and Wins) in US Television Interview

VIDEO (PART 1 OF 2)

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QMwdlOk2wMw[/youtube]

VIDEO (PART 2 OF 2)

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=77eeYWxbqWQ[/youtube]

SPEAKERS: GEORGE STEPHANOPOULOS, HOST

PRES. MAHMOUD AHMADINEJAD, IRAN

STEPHANOPOULOS: During the last administration, no other world leader next to you was as critical of the American administration as [Venezuelan President Hugo] Chavez. Yet, look at this picture right here. Is this a picture that you would like to see, you and President Obama? And what do you think the Iranian people would think of you and President Obama meeting, shaking hands, engaging in conversation?

AHMADINEJAD (through translator): Well, we are calling for peace and security for all. We would like international relations to be based on just this and friendship. Wherever a hostile relationship turns into friendship, that would make us happy.

STEPHANOPOULOS: President Obama says that’s exactly what he wants right now. He says he wants a new beginning in a relationship with Iran. He sent a message to the Iranian people on the occasion of the Novruz holiday, where he called Iran a great civilization.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

OBAMA: Very best wishes.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

STEPHANOPOULOS: He talked about the Islamic Republic of Iran, where he signaled that he wasn’t interested in regime change, and he talked about his vision for the United States/Iranian relationship.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

OBAMA: It’s a future where the old divisions are overcome, where you and all of your neighbors and the wider world can live in greater security and greater peace.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

STEPHANOPOULOS: Do you share that vision?

AHMADINEJAD (through translator): You need to appreciate that the American administration, 29 years ago, unilaterally cut its relations with Iran. In the past 29 years, different U.S. administrations have opposed the Iranian people.

Now they say that we have given up that enmity. That’s fine. We have welcomed such comments. But an administration which, up until yesterday, was saying that I’m going to kill you, and today says that I’m not going to kill you?

STEPHANOPOULOS: So there is change, though. What will Iran do in response? The United States has said that the United States is ready to talk with Iran and the other great powers -- Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China. Are you prepared to sit down at those talks without preconditions?

AHMADINEJAD (through translator): Well, previously, first of all, I sent a congratulatory message to Mr. Obama. This was a major decision, although the Iranian people were very much dismayed with the conduct of previous U.S. administrations, and I was criticized here at home in Iran.

Nevertheless, I did that. I am yet to receive a response.

With the European group and the American group, we will talk. We have announced as much, that we are going to negotiate. But...

STEPHANOPOULOS: When will you join those talks?

AHMADINEJAD (through translator): ... again, based on justice and mutual respect.

Well, after everything is said and done -- well, planning needs to be made, and some timetables need to be set. We believe in talking, in negotiating, based on sincerity and respect and justice. But the U.S. administration severed its relations with us.

STEPHANOPOULOS: But that was the past administration. And now President Obama said he is prepared to sit down, along with the other European powers, without any preconditions. And it sounds to me as if you’re suggesting now Iran is the one with the preconditions, echoing, in fact, the policy of the last U.S. administration.

Are there preconditions or not? Why not sit down right now with the U.S. and the European powers to discuss the nuclear program?

AHMADINEJAD (through translator): Last year we proposed a package of proposals for talks. Everyone knows that in this year many changes, developments have unfolded on the international stage. Many new issues have been added to the agenda, so to speak, and we are reconsidering our proposed package. We are adding new issues to the realm, if you will, of the talks. And we are going to make that public as soon as possible. We are always ready to talk...

STEPHANOPOULOS: Why not now?

AHMADINEJAD (through translator): ... with no preconditions.

What should I do?

STEPHANOPOULOS: Tell me your proposal.

AHMADINEJAD (through translator): Should I share that with you, sir?

STEPHANOPOULOS: The world, American viewers.

AHMADINEJAD (through translator): We are going to do that officially. We think that we should prepare the ground so that all states and peoples can have their say.

We are ready to contribute to international security, peace, and global friendship and global disarmament.

STEPHANOPOULOS: You say you want to talk on the basis of respect. The president has expressed his respect for the Islamic Republic of Iran, and he said he is ready to talk. I just want to know, when will Iran sit down with the United States and the European powers to discuss the nuclear program?

AHMADINEJAD (through translator): Well, the nuclear issue of ours is a special issue. We think that the nuclear issue needs to be resolved in the context of the agency and regulations.

We are just utilizing our legal rights.

I have no reservations when it comes to talking.

STEPHANOPOULOS: So you’re ready to talk without preconditions?

AHMADINEJAD (through translator): No, no. We should just have a clear-cut framework for talks. The agenda should be clear.

But so far we have only heard this from the media, the newspapers, that they’re interested in talking. And obviously, they’re going to receive a response from the papers.

I was fully expecting Mr. Obama to participate in the Geneva Conference. What issue is more important than racial discrimination? The United Nations has organized...

STEPHANOPOULOS: Yes, sir, since you bring that up...

AHMADINEJAD (through translator): ... such a conference. I don’t think or believe that Mr. Obama supports racism. However, the gentleman should have been there and should have condemned outright racism and racial discrimination.

This is a good possibility for talks and cooperation. We should all cooperate with one another to help racism to go away from the international...

STEPHANOPOULOS: What he doesn’t agree...

(CROSSTALK)

STEPHANOPOULOS: ... with, if I may (inaudible), is the idea that Israel is a racist state.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

OBAMA: I found many of the statements that President Ahmadinejad made, particularly those directed at Israel, to be appalling.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

STEPHANOPOULOS: And, frankly, many in the West look at your speech in Geneva, and they wonder whether you really do want a better relationship with the West when you deny that there was a Holocaust when it’s an established historical fact. They believe that you’re not showing respect for the West and the beliefs of the West.

AHMADINEJAD (through translator): Well, I was talking against the Zionist regime in the racism conference. The first proviso for successful talks would be to give the other party the freedom to speak. Mr. Obama has the right to have his own opinion, obviously.

He is ready to express his points of view. But the Geneva conference had been organized to combat racism, to oppose racism. My point of view is that the Zionist regime is the manifestation of racism.

STEPHANOPOULOS: Yet when you speak at that conference, Western diplomats walk out. Even the U.N. secretary-general condemns your remarks.

AHMADINEJAD (through translator): That’s fine. That’s fine. They are free to have their own points of view. Why do they want to deny me my ideas?

STEPHANOPOULOS: Why do you insist on questioning the Holocaust even when it’s established as an historical fact, and even when politicians here in Iran worry that that kind of talk isolates Iran?

AHMADINEJAD (through translator): I’m going to talk about that as well. Don’t be hasty. I have posed two questions over the Holocaust. My first question was, if the Holocaust happened, where did it take place? In Europe. Why should they make amends in Palestine? The Palestinian people had no role to play in the Holocaust. They had no role, for that matter, in the Second World War. Racism happened in Europe, but amends are made in Palestine?

My second question about the Holocaust. If this is indeed a historical event, why do they want to turn it into a holy thing? And nobody should be allowed to ask any questions about that? Nobody study it, research it, permitted to research it. Why?

STEPHANOPOULOS: It’s the most studied historical event in history. AHMADINEJAD (through translator): If this is a historically documented event, why do Western states show so much sensitivity towards a historical event?

STEPHANOPOULOS: Let’s talk about...

AHMADINEJAD (through translator): (inaudible) the lid to be taken off.

STEPHANOPOULOS: Let’s talk about what’s happening right now.

AHMADINEJAD (through translator): I am asking them to permit studies.

STEPHANOPOULOS: President Obama has appointed Senator George Mitchell to help negotiate a peace between Israel and Palestine. Do you support that effort?

AHMADINEJAD (through translator): Well, we are asking for the legal rights of the Palestinian people. What we are saying is that the Palestinian people, like other peoples, have the right to determine their own fate. Muslims, Christians and Jews alike. We should -- they should allow them to engage in elections, free elections and a free referendum to determine for themselves their own fate. We must not repeat the mistakes of the past.

STEPHANOPOULOS: Do you believe President Obama’s new effort is repeating the mistakes of the past?

AHMADINEJAD (through translator): Well, I am yet to have a clear idea about Mr. Obama’s Palestinian policy. However, the gentleman’s support of the massacre of Gazans and support for the criminals who were responsible for that atrocity was a major mistake on the part of the gentleman.

I think that if Mr. Obama wants to help with the Palestinian issue, he has to move in accordance with justice, fair play. And also, again, I am calling for the right for the Palestinians to determine their own fate.

STEPHANOPOULOS: If the Palestinian people negotiate an agreement with Israel and the Palestinian people vote and support that agreement, a two-state solution, will Iran support it?

AHMADINEJAD (through translator): Nobody should interfere. Allow the Palestinian people to decide for themselves. Whatever they decide.

STEPHANOPOULOS: That’s all I’m asking. So if they choose a two- state solution...

AHMADINEJAD (through translator): It is the right of all human beings.

STEPHANOPOULOS: ... with Israel, that’s fine?

AHMADINEJAD (through translator): Well, what we are saying is that you and us should not determine the course of things beforehand. Allow the Palestinian people to make their own decisions.

STEPHANOPOULOS: But if they choose a two-state solution, if they choose to recognize Israel’s existence, Iran will as well?

AHMADINEJAD (through translator): Let me approach this from another perspective. If the Palestinian people decide that the Zionist regime needs to leave all Palestinian lands, would the American administration accept their decision?

STEPHANOPOULOS: I’ll ask them. But I’m asking you if they decide to say Israel should exist and (inaudible) Israel, would Iran support that?

AHMADINEJAD (through translator): Can I ask you questions as well?

STEPHANOPOULOS: I’m not part of the American government. I’ll put that question to the American government, but I have a question for you as president of Iran.

AHMADINEJAD (through translator): That’s fine.

STEPHANOPOULOS: If the Palestinians sign an agreement with Israel, will Iran support it?

AHMADINEJAD (through translator): Whatever decision they take is fine with us. We are not going to determine anything. Whatever decision they take, we will support that. We think that this is the right of the Palestinian people.

However, we fully expect other states to do so as well. The U.S. administration, European governments. The right to determine their fate by the Palestinians should be respected by all of them.

STEPHANOPOULOS: Let me ask you one final question. You are up for election on June 12th. If you are successful in this reelection, what is your hope for the Iranian-U.S. relationship over the next four years?

AHMADINEJAD (through translator): Well, Iran and U.S. relations are dependent on the decision taken by the U.S. administration. Mr. Obama sends us messages of friendship, but in the communique issued by the five plus one, enmity can be seen. So this is a dual route, if you will.

I have sent a message to Mr. Obama myself. We welcome change. We are praying to the Almighty for that. And we will help to bring change about.

STEPHANOPOULOS: Mr. President, thank you very much for your time.

AHMADINEJAD (through translator): Thank you. Good luck. And please convey my regards to the American people.

(END VIDEOTAPE)

STEPHANOPOULOS: President Ahmadinejad in Iran.

Saturday Special: Is Barack Obama Another JFK?

Our colleague Bevan Sewell of the University of Nottingham and Libertas is a leading young scholar on US foreign policy in the 1950s and 1960s. Taking some of the lessons from that research, he looks at the foreign policy prospects of the new American President:

The rapid rise of Barack Obama to the White House has been accompanied by desire among leading commentators to find an appropriate historical analogy. The number one comparison so far has been between Obama and John F. Kennedy, President from 1961 until his assassination in 1963, who also rose to prominence at a comparatively young age. As early as 2007, Ted Sorenson, Kennedy’s leading speechwriter and one of his closest advisors, anointed Obama as a successor. In February 2008, William Rees-Mogg of The Times wrote:

[Obama] has built up an excitement such as no candidate has created since President Kennedy in 1960. He is, in my view, a better speaker than Kennedy. Like Kennedy, he combines personal magnetism with a strong appeal to American idealism.

Yet, beyond the immediate imagery of youthful leaders, accomplished speakers, and forceful men regenerating America politically, what do these analogies actually mean? Can any worthwhile comparison be drawn, or is this just the search by contemporary commentators for populist appeal?

At least with respect to US foreign policy, any analogy has to avoid the temptation of predictions about how Obama’s policy might work. Labeling him as the "new" Kennedy is not as hopeful as many commentators have suggested. In fact, the potential (if tentative) lessons of the Kennedy era are that, in a time of international flux, presidents are likely to make mistakes. Those errors may undermine the US national interest even if, ultimately, this does not result in disaster.

One of the most powerful moments of Obama’s Inaugural Address came when he spoke of those nations that wished America ill:

To those leaders around the globe who seek to sow conflict, or blame their society's ills on the West - know that your people will judge you on what you can build, not what you destroy. To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history; but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.

In the summer of 1961, President Kennedy adopted a similar tone in the midst of an ongoing crisis over Berlin which had seen the Soviet Union and the US come to diplomatic blows over the future of the city. In an address to the American people, Kennedy sought to reassure them of the US commitment to waging the Cold War and of his willingness to use force if required. But he also included a message of conciliation and an offer to communicate with the Soviets if they acted appropriately:

So long as the Communists insist that they are preparing to end by themselves unilaterally our rights in West Berlin and our commitments to its people, we must be prepared to defend those rights and those commitments. We will at all times be ready to talk, if talk will help. But we must also be ready to resist with force, if force is used upon us. Either alone would fail. Together, they can serve the cause of freedom and peace.

In both speeches, there was a clear link between the American will to use force if required and the US willingness to negotiate given a suitable opportunity. Of course, the contexts were very different, but these examples suggest there are certain themes that repeat themselves during different eras. While it is going too far to take these as the basis for predictions about Obama’s foreign policies and possible outcomes, they can be useful in terms of moderating grandiose expectations.

Indeed, Kennedy’s foreign policy travails in his first year in office show the wisdom not expecting too much from leaders that have been heralded enthusiastically. They are, after all, human: mistakes will be made, readjustments will be necessary, and it takes time for a President to get a grip on the internal dynamics of the US foreign policy bureaucracy.

Upon entering the White House in 1961, the Kennedy administration wanted to jettison an over-reliance upon the threatened use of nuclear weapons and a fiscal conservatism that had limited the policies of President Dwight Eisenhower. Instead, Kennedy and his advisors would pursue a strategy marked out by the military concept of flexible response and by economic and social development based on modernization theory.

Clear intentions did not, however, make for clear policy. In its first year, the Kennedy administration faced crises in Cuba, Berlin, Laos, and Vietnam. Kennedy was verbally humiliated by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in Vienna and had to confront internal problems with his national security team.

The decision to give the go-ahead to a CIA-backed invasion Cuba, just three months into his term, was disastrous for Kennedy; the Bay of Pigs fiasco brought widespread criticism for the new president and undermined the credibility of the so-called “best and the brightest” that made up his coterie of advisors. Further problems were encountered in Berlin, where a lack of presidential leadership, an absence of a clear foreign policy structure, and too many competing voices crippled US policy. So chaotic was the situation in these early days that, in a candid and forceful memo, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy felt compelled to lay out a strident critique of the new president’s management of the foreign policy sphere:

The National Security Council, for example, really cannot work for you unless you authorize work schedules that do not get upset from day to day. Calling three meetings in five days is foolish-and putting them off for six weeks at a time is just as bad….Truman and Eisenhower did their daily dozen in foreign affairs the first thing in the morning, and a couple of weeks ago you asked me to begin to meet you on this basis. I have succeeded in catching you on three mornings, for a total of about 8 minutes, and I conclude that this is not really how you like to begin the day. Moreover, 6 of the 8 minutes were given not to what I had for you but what you had for me.

Bundy’s depiction of an incoherent national security structure suggested obvious difficulties for an incoming administration. Adversaries abroad and the situation inherited from Eisenhower were the catalyst for many of the problems that the administration faced, but there were also internal difficulties that had to be addressed if the administration’s foreign policy was going to function effectively.

For President Obama, similar problems are all too obvious. The renewed US support for the war in Afghanistan, a deteriorating situation in Pakistan, ongoing crises in the Middle East, the debate over diplomatic openings to Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela, and a state of flux in US-European affairs all provide ample evidence of an administration yet to establish a clear foreign policy identity. Reports of turf battles between Obama and his military advisors, echo the Kennedy era where factionalism and a lack of coherent command within the administration could strain the implementation of policy. And while Obama has been handed the poisoned chalice of the legacy of eight years of Bushian foreign policy, the struggle to learn how to ‘do’ foreign policy in his first months inevitably complicates matters for US officials.

Though Obama has a set of foreign policy priorities that he wants to pursue, his attempts to achieve these will be accompanied by ongoing difficulties. Shaking hands with Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez is an obvious example. The depth of enmity that existed between Bush and Chavez means that a rapprochement is welcome, but the wider connotations also need to be factored in. Chavez divides opinion in Latin America as much as among other nations of the world; therefore, the US relationship with him needs to be managed carefully lest it have an adverse impact on the already strained inter-American relationship.

Likewise, attempting to broker a diplomatic opening with Iran has multi-faceted elements that must be considered. For while Obama scores highly for trying to open constructive diplomatic links with Tehran, it is a gambit that can backfire if Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad continues to make inflammatory international statements like his recent pronouncement to the UN World Conference on Racism.

Yet it is the internal schisms in the Administration that are potentially most damaging. During the Kennedy era the debates that arose between new advisors like Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and older hands like former Secretary of State Dean Acheson pointed not just to a lack of internal harmony but also to an absence of presidential leadership. The Berlin crisis was a clear examples with Kennedy prevaricating between policy alternatives while canny advisors like Acheson and General Lucius Clay used a bureaucratic vacuum to advance their own agendas. Obama’s disagreements with General David Petraeus and more broadly the Pentagon, vident in discussions over Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan, are reminiscent of this.

Of course, the history of the Kennedy era does not suggest that there will be an episode as damaging as the Bay of Pigs or as climatic as the Berlin crisis during the Obama Presidency. But they do suggest that, however talented and however capable, Obama may struggle to develop a fully effective foreign policy until he can eradicate some of the difficulties that blighted the early hope of his Democratic predecessor almost fifty years ago.

Scott Lucas in The Guardian: Obama Administration's Battle over Iran and Israel

Since I wrote this for The Guardian, there have been further developments, notably Israel's stepped-up campaign to bump Washington into a hard-line Iran-first policy. The efforts have been more political than military, notably Tel Aviv's threat that it will not enter meaningful negotiations over Palestine unless the US commits to further pressure upon Tehran.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton struck back yesterday, telling Israel to back off on the threat. That indicates that the Obama line of engagement is still prevailing within the Administration, as does the silence of Petraeus and Mullen over the last two weeks.

Forgive the somewhat dramatic headline, which led to a lot of irrelevant comments. The issue is not whether the US backs an Israeli airstrike but whether it suspends the gradual but clear move towards discussions with Iran.

To bomb, or not to bomb, Iran

Just over a month ago, President Barack Obama broke a 30-year embargo on US relations with Iran: he offered goodwill not only to "Iranians" but to the country's government. Speaking on the occasion of Nowruz, the Iranian New Year, he said:

"I want you, the people and leaders of Iran, to understand the future that we seek. It's a future with renewed exchanges among our people, and greater opportunities for partnership and commerce. It's a future where the old divisions are overcome, where you and all of your neighbours and the wider world can live in greater security and greater peace."

It's no surprise that this message, given a generation of tension between Washington and Tehran, has been challenged in the US. What's more interesting is that the greatest threat to Obama's engagement comes not from media sceptics from Fox News to the Wall Street Journal or the foundations now packed with refugees from the Bush administration or even the Middle Eastern institutes putting a priority on Israeli security. No, Obama's most daunting opponents are within his own administration.

Less than two weeks after the Nowruz address, General David Petraeus, the head of the US military command overseeing Iran and the Persian Gulf, offered a far different portrayal of Iran to a Senate committee:

Iranian activities and policies constitute the major state-based threat to regional stability. … Iran is assessed by many to be continuing its pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, which would destabilise the region and likely spur a regional arms race.

The next day Petraeus's boss, Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, visited the offices of the Wall Street Journal, which has taken a consistent editorial line against dialogue with the Iranian government. Far from supporting his president, Mullen told the newspaper: "I think we've got a problem now. ... I think the Iranians are on a path to building nuclear weapons." Not even past enemies were as menacing: "Even in the darkest days of the cold war we talked to the Soviets. … [But now] we don't have a lot of time."

What's going on here? There are clear political goals behind Obama's approach of dialogue rather than confrontation. The hope is that Iran will not challenge the US approach to Middle Easten issues, in particular Israel-Palestine and Israel-Syria talks, through its connections with Hamas and Hezbollah. An easing of political tensions in turn may remove the motive for Tehran to reverse its suspension of research and development for a nuclear weapons – as opposed to civilian nuclear energy – programme.

Yet there are also military benefits from a US-Iran rapprochement. As Obama's envoy Richard Holbrooke has made clear, a partnership with Tehran could ease the American burden in Afghanistan, especially as the troop surge is being implemented. Better relations could assist with the political transition in Iraq as the US draws down its overt military presence. Eventually, an Iranian renunciation of nuclear weapons would finally remove a significant strategic question mark in the region.

In part, the calculation of Petraeus and Mullen is that Iran cannot be trusted in these areas. For years, US commanders in Iraq have alleged that Iran has been backing the insurgency, and Petraeus has also claimed that Tehran has supported the Taliban in Afghanistan. In his testimony to the Senate committee, the general expanded this into a grand nefarious Iranian scheme:

Iran employs surrogates and violent proxies to weaken competitor states, perpetuate conflict with Israel, gain regional influence and obstruct the Middle East peace process. Iran also uses some of these groups to train and equip militants in direct conflict with US forces. Syria, Iran's key ally, facilitates the Iranian regime's reach into the Levant and the Arab world by serving as the key link in an Iran-Syria-Hezbollah-Hamas alliance and allows extremists (albeit in smaller numbers than in the past) to operate in Damascus and to facilitate travel into Iraq.

Still, in their public opposition to Obama's Iran policy, the military commanders are playing one card before all others: Israel.

Petraeus's threat to the congressmen was far from subtle: "The Israeli government may ultimately see itself so threatened by the prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon that it would take pre-emptive military action to derail or delay it." Mullen told the Wall Street Journal: "There is a leadership in Israel that is not going to tolerate" a nuclear Iran. This was a "life or death" matter in which "the operative word is 'existential'".

Are they bluffing? If so, it's a bluff that has been coordinated with Tel Aviv. Last summer, Israel asked for but did not get George Bush's support for an airstrike on Iran. It took only six weeks for the Israelis to revive the topic with the new Obama administration: the commander of the Israeli armed forces, General Gabi Ashkenazi, visited Washington with the message "that an Israeli military strike was a 'serious' option".

While Ashkenazi was told by Obama's political advisers to put his fighter planes away, the story of Israeli military plans continues to be circulated. Only last weekend, Sheera Frenkel of The Times was fed the story: "The Israeli military is preparing itself to launch a massive aerial assault on Iran's nuclear facilities within days of being given the go-ahead by its new government."

High-level Obama officials are fighting back. Aware that a frontal assault on the popular Petraeus would be politically dangerous, they have tried to curb the "Israel will strike" campaign. Vice-president Joe Biden told CNN that new Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu "would be ill-advised to do that". Perhaps more importantly, secretary of defence Robert Gates said last week that an Israeli attack would have "dangerous consequences". Reading that signal, Israeli President Shimon Peres backed away from earlier tough talk and assured: "All the talk about a possible attack by Israel on Iran is not true. The solution in Iran is not military."

So, for this moment, Petraeus and Mullen appear to have been checked. However, they and their military allies, such as General Raymond Odierno in Iraq, have been persistent in challenging Obama over strategy from Kabul to Baghdad to Jerusalem. It is their manoeuvring, rather than Tehran's jailing of an Iranian-American journalist like Roxana Saberi or even Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's speeches at UN conferences, that is Barack Obama's greatest foe.

Israel-Palestine: The Political Wreck on Netanyahu's Economic Track

Related Post: Israel’s Emerging Statesmen - Avigdor Lieberman and Natan Sharansky

Enduring America's Ali Yenidunya has dropped in on our partner website, Libertas, with a guest blog on the Israeli Government's new strategy on Palestine. His prediction? Prime Minister Netanyahu, trying to block a "two-state" resolution, is only making trouble for himself with an economics-first approach:

A month ago, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu opened a conference in Jerusalem. In contrast to other high-profile meetings such as that last week with US envoy George Mitchell and in May or June with President Obama, this was a quiet affair. However, the Jerusalem Wealth Management Conference, featuring Netanyahu’s participation, was far from insignificant.

The conference’s concern was difficulties with investments in Palestine and Israel, both for individuals and for companies. Amongst those considering the matter were the Bank of Israel, the Ministry of Trade, the International Monetary Fund, the Association of Banks in Palestine, the US Embassy in Israel, the new Israel-Palestine Chamber of Commerce, and the PalTel (Palestinian Telecommunications) Group. Discussions were in three main panels: Israeli Inc. as a Grade A Destination, Israel's Investment Opportunities, and Investment in the Palestinian Economy.

This, however, was a conference with political as well as economic significance. It was no less than a forum for Prime Minister Netanyahu’s strategy towards the Israeli relationship with Palestine. In his commitment to “economic peace initiatives”, he was also drawing the line against a political two-state resolution. Netanyahu was once again declaring that peace talks could focus on building the Palestinian economy and its governing institutions, but there was no need for them to engage other issues such as settlements, refugees, the status of Jerusalem, and borders.

While there is no record to dissent from the gathered bankers, financiers, and investors to Netanyahu, the weakness --- possibly even the folly --- of his approach was clear. A progressive peace plan cannot be achievable merely through “investment”, strengthening the Palestinian economy and the economic relationship between Israel and the West Bank.

Read rest of article....

Video and Analysis of Obama Torture Statement: Let's Blame the Lawyers?

The politics of torture rumbles on. Facing criticism over the release of the four memoranda documenting the Bush Administration's authorisation of "enhanced interrogation" (from Bush defenders: releasing the memos jeopardises national security and/or torture worked; from Bush critics: OK, so who is going to be prosecuted for this?), President Obama manoeuvred through a short statement yesterday in response to a reporter's question (the exchange begins at 4:26 --- transcript below):

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LBIcjXrfEKQ[/youtube]

Obama began with the rhetoric that "there are still enemies out there" being fought by "courageous people" who have to make "difficult decisions" but the memoranda showed we were "losing our moral bearings". Then his deliberate answer got interesting:

For those who carried out some of these operations within the four corners of legal opinions or guidance that had been provided from the White House, I do not think it's appropriate that they be prosecuted. With respect to those who formulated those legal decisions, I would say that is going to be more a decision for the attorney general within the parameter of various laws, and I don't want to prejudge that.

The President immediately returned to the theme of let's move on: "As a general deal, I think we should be looking forward and not backward. "I do worry about this getting so politicized that we cannot function effectively, and it hampers our ability to carry out critical national security operations." Still he had opened up the question:

Are the Bush Administration's lawyers going to take the criminal fall for the torture authorised by their President and his senior advisors?

Reviewing the video, I think Obama, with his dedication to reassuring intelligence and security personnel that he "has their back" and his decision not to challenge the Bushmen who ordered torture, inadvertently held open the door of prosecution for a few lawyers. He may well close that door quickly.

Let's state the bluntly obvious, however. These lawyers --- John Yoo, Jay Bybee, William Haynes, Stephen Bradbury --- were merely carrying out a job handed to them by policymakers, notably the officials in Vice President Dick Cheney's office. The task was not "Are these proposed interrogations legal?" but "Give us a finding which says these interrogations are legal." No doubt some of the lawyers eagerly took on the job --- John Yoo, in particular, saw the sanctioning of torture as part of a legitimate exercise in Executive power --- but, without the direction from above, their memoranda and guidances do not get written.

Presidents and their right-hand men --- unless they are overthrown in coups or toppled by wars --- don't wind up in jail. Their lawyers, however, are expendable.

If you don't think so, ask a man named Lewis "Scooter" Libby. Remember? Out of all the Bush Administration folks who leaked the name of CIA operative Valerie Plame to tarnish her and thus defend their "legitimate" intelligence on Saddam Hussein's Iraq, he's the only one who wound up in jail.

TRANSCRIPT

QUESTION: (OFF-MIKE) to ask you about the interrogation memos (OFF-MIKE) you were clear about not wanting to prosecute those who -- who carried out the instructions under this legal guidance.

OBAMA: Right.

QUESTION: Can you be that clear about those who devised the policy? And then, quickly, on the second matter, how do you feel about investigations, whether a special -- special commission or something of that nature (OFF-MIKE) to go back and really look at the issue?

OBAMA: Well, the -- look, as I said before, this -- this has been a difficult chapter in our history and one of the tougher decisions that I’ve had to make as president.

On the one hand, we have very real enemies out there, and we rely on some very courageous people not just in our military, but also in the Central Intelligence Agency to help protect the American people, and they have to make some very difficult decisions, because, as I mentioned yesterday, they are confronted with an enemy that doesn’t have scruples, that isn’t constrained by constitutions, aren’t constrained by legal niceties.

Having said that, the -- the OLC memos that were released reflected, in my view, us losing our moral bearings. That’s why I’ve discontinued those enhanced interrogation programs.

For those who carried out some of these operations within the four corners of legal opinions or guidance that had been provided from the White House, I do not think it’s appropriate for them to be prosecuted.

With respect to those who formulated those legal decisions, I would say that that is going to be more of a decision for the attorney general within the perimeters of various laws, and -- and I don’t want to prejudge that. I think that there are a host of very complicated issues involved there. As a general view, I think that we should be looking forward and not backwards. I do worry about this getting so politicized that we cannot function effectively and it hampers our ability to carry out critical national security operations.

And so if and when there needs to be a further accounting of what took place during this period, I think for Congress to examine ways that it can be done in a bipartisan fashion, outside of the typical hearing process that can sometimes break down and break it entirely along party lines, to the extent that there are independent participants who are above reproach and have credibility, that would probably be a more sensible approach to take.

I’m not suggesting that, you know, that should be done, but I’m saying, if you’ve got a choice, I think it’s very important for the American people to feel as if this is not being dealt with to provide one side or another political advantage, but rather is being done in order to learn some lessons so that we move forward in an effective way.

And the last point I just want to emphasize, as I said yesterday at -- at the CIA when I visited, you know, what makes America special, in my view, is not just our wealth, and the dynamism of our economy, and our extraordinary history and diversity. It’s -- it’s that we are willing to uphold our ideals even when they’re hard.

And sometimes we make mistakes, because that’s the nature of human enterprise. But when we do make mistakes, then we are willing to go back and correct those mistakes and -- and keep our eye on those -- those ideals and -- and values that have been passed on generation to generation.

And -- and that is -- is what has to continue to guide us as we move forward. And -- and I’m confident that we will be able to move forward, protect the American people effectively, live up to our values and ideals.

And that’s not a matter of being naive about how dangerous this world is. As I said yesterday to some of the CIA officials that I met with, I wake up every day thinking about how to keep the American people safe, and I go to bed every night worrying about keeping the American people safe.

I’ve got a lot of other things on my plate. I’ve got a big banking crisis, and I’ve got unemployment numbers that are very high, and we’ve got an auto industry that needs work.

There are a whole things -- range of things that during the day occupy me, but the thing that I consider my most profound obligation is keeping the American people safe.

So I -- I do not take these things lightly, and I’m not in any way under -- under illusion about how difficult the task is for those people who are on the front lines every day protecting the American people. So I wanted to communicate a message yesterday to all those who overwhelmingly do so in a lawful, dedicated fashion that I have their back.

All right? Thank you, everybody.