War on Terror Watch: Putting Away the "Torture is Effective" Argument

Over the weekend, former Bush Administration officials continued blowing smoke that the release of Government memoranda confirming the authorisation of torture was a "threat to national security" (rather than admitting that they are trying to cover up their roles in an illegal and ineffective programme). There was also some media silliness, notably a lengthy piece by Scott Shane in The New York Times that offered the choice, "Would you rather be tortured or hit by a Hellfire missile?" (Scott, I believe the answer is, "Neither.")

Two articles, however, got to the heart of the matter: the Bush-era torture didn't work.
Ironically, the first is by the same Scott Shane of the insipid "waterboarding or death by missile" dilemma:

The first use of waterboarding and other rough treatment against a prisoner from Al Qaeda was ordered by senior Central Intelligence Agency officials despite the belief of interrogators that the prisoner had already told them all he knew, according to former intelligence officials and a footnote in a newly released legal memorandum. The escalation to especially brutal interrogation tactics against the prisoner, Abu Zubaydah, including confining him in boxes and slamming him against the wall, was ordered by officials at C.I.A. headquarters based on a highly inflated assessment of his importance, interviews and a review of newly released documents show. Abu Zubaydah had provided much valuable information under less severe treatment, and the harsher handling produced no breakthroughs, according to one former intelligence official with direct knowledge of the case.

Shane's piece, which follows an even better investigation by Peter Finn and Joby Warrick of The Washington Post, confirms:

1. The first priority for key members of the Bush Administration, based in the Vice President's office and the Department of Defense and supported by the Office of Legal Counsel, was to get acceptance that "enhanced interrogation" could and would be used. 2. Those officials wanted a "demonstration case" for the techniques. To justify that, they needed a "high-value" detainee. They didn't have one at this point (this was before the capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, one of the 9-11 planners), so they exaggerated intelligence to create one. 3. Senior CIA officials, probably including Director George Tenet, supported this and overruled CIA personnel "on the ground" who had better knowledge of Abu Zubaydah and the information he was giving. 3. The torture of Abu Zubaydah set aside an interrogation which was providing some useful information and instead led to inaccurate and false statements. At the website Firedoglake, "Emptywheel" pulls out an important detail from the torture memoranda:

The CIA used the waterboard "at least 83 times during August 2002" in the interrogation of Zubaydah and 183 times during March 2003 in the interrogation of KSM [Khalid Sheikh Mohammad].

To put that number in perspective, Emptywheel notes this paragraph:

...where authorized, it may be used for two "sessions" per day of up to two hours. During a session, water may be applied up to six times for ten seconds or longer (but never more than 40 seconds). In a 24-hour period, a detainee may be subjected to up to twelve minutes of water appliaction. Additionally, the waterboard may be used on as many as five days during a 30-day approval period.

That adds up to a maximum --- for 12 minutes in a 24-hour period --- of 90 waterboarding in a month, only 1/2 of the actual treatment of Khalid Sheikh Mohammad. Yet, six years later, despite this extraordinary application of "enhanced interrogation" techniques, Bush Administration defenders of torture still cannot point to one significant piece of intelligence produced by the waterboardings.

Quote of the Day: Hillary Clinton on the New Relationship with Latin America

From Saturday's New York Times: "Asked whether the United States would build bridges to hostile Latin American leaders, like Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, Mrs. Clinton said, 'Let’s put ideology aside; that is so yesterday.'"

After the Rescue: What Now with Somalia?

Related Post: Combating Somali Piracy - How Many People Can We Afford To Kill?

UPDATE (15 April): Pirates have attacked The Liberty Sun, a U.S.-flagged cargo ship bound for Mombasa, Kenya, but failed to board the ship. Four other ships have been hijacked in the Gulf of Aden since Sunday.

In the aftermath of the rescue of Captain Richard Phillips from Somali pirates by US Navy SEALs, analysis has generally been dominated by cheerleading and a good bit of relief that the United States and (for supporters of the current Administration) President Obama have not appeared "weak". The New York Times breathlessly wrote, "To Rescue Captain, U.S. Snipers Held Steady Despite Many Moving Parts", while Watergate felon turned talk show host G. Gordon Liddy settled for, "Gman is joined by a former sniper who tells you what thoughts race through your mind when facing a killer".

Tristan McConnell, writing for our partners Global Post, goes an essential step farther. While Captain Phillips and his crew might be safe, the naval lanes off Somalia are not secure: "Short of escorting every one of the estimated 20,000 ships that use the Suez Canal every year, it is an impossible task to end piracy with navy patrols."

The obvious but difficult point? The piracy is connected to the economic and political instability in Somalia, and unless the US Government can dream up a military solution for the difficulties in Mogadishu --- "no one so far has managed to defeat Somalis by outgunning them, either on land or at sea" --- it's going to have to find a different approach that is far removed from the temporary solution of one-bullet sniping a pirate.

HOW TO STOP THE SOMALI PIRATES

Analysis: More Gunships May Not Be the Answer

NAIROBI — After the dramatic rescue of American captain Richard Phillips from the clutches of Somali pirates, U.S. President Barack Obama announced his determination to end piracy: “We remain resolved to halt the rise of piracy in this region,” he said.

Easier said than done. Dozens of international warships patrolling the Indian Ocean coastline have done little to deter the pirates.

And pirates seized an Italian tug with impunity even as the the world watched a small lifeboat of Somali pirates with their one solitary hostage facing down a flotilla of U.S. warships.

Currently the pirates hold more than a dozen ships with more than 200 hostages from a range of mostly poor countries.

Read rest of article....

US-Iran Engagement: Washington to Drop Nuclear Precondition on Talks?

Yesterday's New York Times reported, "The Obama administration and its European allies are preparing proposals that would shift strategy toward Iran by dropping a longstanding American insistence that Tehran rapidly shut down nuclear facilities during the early phases of negotiations over its atomic program."

That fits with our developing analysis that the faction within the Administration which favours an improvement of diplomatic relations with Tehran, linked to co-operation on issues such as Afghanistan, is winning an internal battle. That faction, which includes President Obama, has recognised that there is no hope of getting Iran to drop the nuclear programme and, I suspect, that the programme is devoted primarily to civilian purposes rather than acquisition of the Bomb. Equally important, they have likely concluded that there is no good option to block Iran's nuclear development: the US is unlikely to get strengthened multilateral economic sanctions, and an Israeli military strike --- which still accepted by some within the Administration --- would have serious, possibly disastrous, political consequences.

This does not mean that the internal battle is over. White House spokesman Robert Gibbs, showing nerves over the leaked story, denied that it reflected an Administration decision. The dramatic declaration in the "Times" was hedged with the escape clause: the phrase "allow Iran to continue enriching uranium for some period during the talks" also allows for a move back to sanctions --- or a halt to discussions --- if Tehran does not allow inspections that the US considers suitable. And a "senior Administration official" maintained that the Iranians would ultimately have to halt uranium enrichment, “Our goal remains exactly what it has been in the U.N. resolutions: suspension.”

Still, the trend continues to be towards US-Iran negotiation, rather than confrontation. Substantive talks, especially in public, still have to await the Iranian Presidential elections in June. However, Tehran's signals that discussions will be welcomed, and Obama's gradual ascendancy over his own hard-liners, points to another date in this new US-Iran relationship.

Engagement Dance: The US-Iran Meeting on Afghanistan

Perhaps the most naive summary of the exchange between American and Iranian officials at The Hague conference on Afghanistan came in the opening sentence of The New York Times account: "It was brief, it was unscheduled and it was not substantive."

Anyone with a shred of diplomatic experience or perception would recognise that the "encounter" between Richard Holbrooke, the US envoy on Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad Mehdi Akhondzadeh (pictured) was far from accidential. The choreography behind the meeting would have done Twyla Tharp proud.

Because the Iranians had held back from sending their Foreign Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had to maintain, "I myself did not have any direct contact with the Iranian delegation.” Because of domestic politics in both countries and because neither side wants to be see as approaching the other cap-in-hand, the Iranians officially denied these were "talks" and Clinton insisted, "“It was cordial, unplanned and they agreed to stay in touch." And to cover the Obama Administration's claim that any engagement will cover concerns over human rights, Clinton added that a letter setting out US concerns over Iran's detention of Roxana Saberi and student Esha Momeni and the fate of the missing Robert Levinson.

To get behind the dance, you only have to note the public Iranian position: "Iran pledges Afghan help in new gesture to U.S." Akhondzadeh told the conference that Tehran was ready to help fight Afghanistan's opium trade and to assist in reconstruction.

That is an opening position for "engagement" which is Spockian logical. The flow of drugs across the border has caused major social problems in Iran, and reconstruction of areas in western Afghanistan offers the prospect of financial benefit and enhanced Afghan-Iranian trade.

At the same time, Iran's position set outs to the US that it wants to move on specific issues rather than discuss the general American position, especially on the military side. Leave aside the obvious that the domestic audience in Tehran would be resistant to any Iranian support of the expansion of the American force. The experience of the US occupation in Iraq is enough to ensure both that Iran will want no association with a military intervention which can turn sour and that it will take advantage of any political vacuum/turmoil that results.

No, Mr New York Times. This was carefully scripted and it was very substantive. The silver lining of the past and possibly future debacle in Afghanistan is likely to be a US-Iranian rapprochement. If that is to occur, however, it will face a specific and limited Tehran agenda vs. the general ambitions of Washington in its "re-development" of Afghanistan and Central Asia.