An initiative to revise the procedures for reviewing the cases of detainees in order to free marginal insurgents and innocent Afghans has run afoul of the interests of officers of the powerful Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in defending their role in earlier detention decisions.
A study of U.S. detention policy in Afghanistan by Maj. Gen. Douglas
Stone in early 2009 had concluded that holding hundreds of detainees
without charge in both U.S. and Afghan detention facilities was helping the hardcore Taliban radicalise the vast majority of the detainees.
Stone was reported by The Guardian Oct. 14 to believe that two-thirds of the prisoners held in Bagram were innocent and should be released.
But the new procedures for detainee review put in place late last year
have led to relatively few releases, and the conditions attached to
those releases have rubbed more salt on old Afghan wounds.
A month after the hype of the “victory” of the US offensive for the town of Marjah in Helmand Provice, reality is proving troublesome. Th Associated Press has the counter-hype, “The Taliban have begun to fight back, launching a campaign of assassination and intimidation to frighten people from supporting the U.S. and its Afghan allies,” while Asia Times Online reports that on 7 March, “Afghan President Hamid Karzai faced an angry reception from people” when he visited the southern town of Marjah following a major military assault against the Taliban.
Good government will matter little, though, if the local economy is in a shambles. Marja’s agricultural base relies primarily on opium, and any new counternarcotics policies will wreak havoc; arresting or killing the drug traffickers will ultimately be the same as attacking local farmers. The timing of the offensive could not be more damaging: opium is planted in the winter and harvested in the spring, which means those who planted last year cannot recoup their investment.
It’s eight in the morning and Nabi Gaichi, or Commander Nabi as he’s known in the Qalaizal district of Kunduz in northern Afghanistan, is cleaning his Kalashnikov rifle as he discusses plans for the day’s patrolling duties with fellow ‘commanders.’
Gaichi’s 8-year-old daughter, Ashma, brings us cups of tea and thick Afghani naan bread served with lamb meat as the group spends the next half hour discussing ways to expand patrols in the district.
Gaichi, 35, is the head of a 145-member strong private militia in Qalaizal—a sleepy town of mud houses interspersed with a few concrete buildings whose inhabitants, until recently, lived in fear of the Taliban.
Imagine this scenario: within the space of a single day, two deadly bombs hit two different cities in two different countries. The death toll from each bomb is dozens killed and dozens more injured. Both bombs are placed by arms of the same terrorist organization.
Now suppose these two cities were in France and Spain. The two countries would immediately share all the information they with each other to find a solution to a shared problem. It’s common sense. But sadly in this case, the two countries are Afghanistan and Pakistan. They have not understood this logic of sharing information, even after years of being subjected to such terrorist attacks.
On 12 March, suicide bombings in the Pakistani city of Lahore killed 72 people and injured dozens. On 13 March, a bomb ripped through the southern Afghan city of Kandahar, slaying more than 30 people and wounding dozens more. More bombs exploded in the following days.
Under the cover of a benign government information-gathering program, a Defense Department official set up a network of private contractors in Afghanistan and Pakistan to help track and kill suspected militants, according to military officials and businessmen in Afghanistan and the United States.
The official, Michael D. Furlong, hired contractors from private security companies that employed former C.I.A. and Special Forces operatives. The contractors, in turn, gathered intelligence on the whereabouts of suspected militants and the location of insurgent camps, and the information was then sent to military units and intelligence officials for possible lethal action in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the officials said.
While it has been widely reported that the C.I.A. and the military are attacking operatives of Al Qaeda and others through unmanned, remote-controlled drone strikes, some American officials say they became troubled that Mr. Furlong seemed to be running an off-the-books spy operation. The officials say they are not sure who condoned and supervised his work.
UPDATE 14 MARCH: A statement from the International Security Assistance Force has rejected Starkey’s latest report as “categorically false”. Later it attributes the claims of bound and killed civilians were due to “confusion” from “initial operational reports”.
UPDATE 13 MARCH: Jerome Starkey, the reporter who broke the story of the handcuffed and executed civilians, makes another claim today: “A night raid carried out by US and Afghan gunmen led to the deaths of two pregnant women, a teenage girl and two local officials in an atrocity which Nato then tried to cover up, survivors have told The Times.”
When Charlie Company’s Lt. William Calley ordered and encouraged his men to rape, maim and slaughter over 400 men, women and children in My Lai in Vietnam back in 1968, there were at least four Americans who tried to stop him or bring him and higher officers to justice. One was helicopter pilot Hugh Thompson Jr., who evacuated some of the wounded victims, and who set his chopper down between a group of Vietnamese and Calley’s men, ordering his door gunner to open fire on the US soldiers if they shot any more people. One was Ron Ridenhour, a soldier who learned of the massacre, and began a private investigation, ultimately reporting the crime to the Pentagon and Congress. One was Michael Bernhardt, a soldier in Charlie Company who witnessed the whole thing, and reported it all to Ridenhour. And one was journalist Seymour Hersh, who broke the story in the US media.
MARJAH — Azizullah Khan might be this town’s best example of civic-mindedness.
He is a middle-aged farmer here in Marjah, a cluster of shops and low-slung mud walls at the center of a recent large-scale military effort against the Taliban in Afghanistan’s volatile Helmand Province.
His dedication to community under the most trying of circumstances earned him the respect of Marjah’s locals, who long depended on his pharmacy in the town’s dusty bazaar as their only health-care option.
Gareth Porter has an excellent piece up on Inter Press Service, “Fiction of Marja as City Was U.S. Information War,” in which he breaks down the media disinformation campaign on the size of Marja:
Marja is not a city or even a real town, but either a few clusters of farmers’ homes or a large agricultural area covering much of the southern Helmand River Valley.
“It’s not urban at all,” an official of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), who asked not to be identified, admitted to IPS Sunday. He called Marja a “rural community”.
“It’s a collection of village farms, with typical family compounds,” said the official, adding that the homes are reasonably prosperous by Afghan standards.
Porter is right on, and you should read the whole thing for an idea on exactly how these disinformation campaigns are spread, but I’m afraid in the case of Marja, we might be missing the point. We’re complaining that Marja is only an excuse for a propaganda victory while at the same time complaining that the victory won’t be worth anything because it’s not a city.
As Woody Allen said on a much different topic, “This food is terrible, and such small portions!”
Gareth Porter writes for Inter Press Service:
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