Sigh....
Yesterday we began with a letter from detained activist Majid Tavakoli to Iranian students, a letter which I think articulately --- and poignantly --- set out the extent of the Government's repression but held out hope: "Despotism's palace is shaking on its foundations."
At no point did Tavakoli, sitting in Rajai Shahr Prison, expend his ink on Iran's nuclear programme or its relations with the West. The emergency and confrontation was much closer to home, and the aspiration had little to do with uranium: "I know that we will be together to joyfully celebrate liberty."
This morning opens far differently, thousands of miles away. Phillip Stephens of The Financial Times writes an account of discussions amongst the West's best and brightest at the Aspen European Strategy Forum, "Caught Between Bombing Iran and an Iranian Bomb".
Stephens does briefly mention, "The uprising on the streets that greeted Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad’s fraudulent re-election showed his regime to be more vulnerable than many had imagined." This reference, however, has little to do with freedom, justice, and rights: it is only held out as a possible, failed salvation from the spectre of nuclear-armed Tehran.
The rest of the piece is a series of blunt assertions, untroubled by any attempt at verification or consideration of context, either by Stephens or --- at least in his report --- his best-and-brightest sources: "The message I took from the policymakers, diplomats, intelligence types and physicists was depressing in almost every dimension. Iran wants the bomb; and nothing that the west has done thus far is likely to persuade it otherwise."
So it's panic stations, even granting Stephens' declaration as established rather than potential: "Iran is developing a nuclear weapons capability."
There are incorrect declarations: "As the reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency indicate, the programme does not make sense as a civilian enterprise." (The IAEA has made no such statement in its reports.)
There is a wilful blindness to the assessments that have been published: "Adding in the need to master warhead technology, most estimates range from a minimum of two to more likely three or four years." (The most prominent analysis, the 2007 US National Intelligence Estimate, put the window at weapons capability of 2013 to 2015. For more than a year, American officials have said the estimate is being revised but have given no indication of if and to what extent that projected date will shift. Beyond that, what does "capability" mean? One bomb? Two? Dozens? Stephens feels no need to think about this.)
There are dramatic scenarios void of support: "If Tehran does succeed in its ambition, it will probably start a nuclear race in one of the world’s most volatile regions. The pressures on Arab states to follow suit – Saudi Arabia and Egypt spring first to mind – would be intense. Turkey would have to consider whether to cross the nuclear threshold."
There is an ignorance of any political developments away from Stephens' one-dimensional narrative. The article never shows an acknowledgement, for example, of Tehran's position that 20% enriched uranium is needed for medical isotopes from its Tehran Research Reactor. (Of course, that might be a pretext, but Stephens show at least show cognizance of Iran's alternative position as well as significant moves like Tehran's declaration with Brazil and Turkey over talks on uranium enrichment.)
But back to my original objection. Stephens concludes, "Readers who have persevered this far will have realised that this is not a column offering easy answers or prescriptions. I am not sure there are any."
Let me offer an amendment: what I realised is that a prominent columnist in the "West", mingling with officials who supposedly hold similar views, did not offer the difficult but necessary recognition that "Iran" is not necessarily about a day-by-day fretting about the Bomb and Apocalypse. That scenario only feeds into the rhetoric of a regime all too ready to deal with more important matters --- for example, the suppression of dissident --- by holding up the US and its allies as menaces ready to strike Tehran.
No, rather than offer the easy answer or prescription, "It's all about nukes", a day-by-day assessment might begin with regard to the Iranian people and their political, economic, social, and religious situation. Far from Aspen's lavish banquets and its chit-chat, that might be the best way to approach Majid Tavakoli and hundreds --- thousands --- of others like him.