The current battle between terrorists linked to or inspired by Al Qa'eda and counter-terrorist forces is similar to a chess match. Each terrorist move is met by a response. The response is then examined and the next move is made by those planning attacks.
The terrorists cleverly exploited gaps in airport security to carry out 9/11. Airport security was tightened, but gaps remained. The shoe bomber Richard Reid was the next test. So now shoes had to be scanned at airports. Then it was the liquid gel plot, leading to the restriction that not more than 100 millilitres of liquid can be carried on an airplane. Last December it was the underwear bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, and full body scanners are in place.
The latest development is cargo bombs after terrorists recognised that freight, even on passenger planes, does not receive the same scrutiny as people and their luggage. So what are the lessons from the incident?
First, al-Qaeda-inspired and linked groups remain a continuing threat.
There is clearly a determination to carry out attacks on aircraft as opposed to other less well-protected methods of transportation. The focus on planes is a form of one-upmanship against the counter-terrorist forces: "You can not stop us, even when the targets are difficult for us."
The particular terrorist efforts emanating out of Yemen have shown a worrying level of innovation. There appears to be obvious connections not only between the cargo bombs and the underwear bomber but also with an attack last August on the head of Saudi Arabian counter-terrorism.
The symbolism of the latest failed attack is also obvious. There was the targeting of several airplanes in a coordinated attack designed to generate maximum attention. The addressing of the packages to Jewish groups in Chicago ticks off two enemies of al-Qaeda and its ilk: Israel and the US, which has a resident of Chicago as its current president.
There are obvious counter-terrorism lessons as well. The carrying of the bombs on airplanes means that this episode can hardly be hailed as a triumph of prevention.
The flow of intelligence, particularly human intelligence, remains crucial for any level of disruption. Although the British media was quick to claim that the plot had been discovered by either MI6 or GCHQ, the intelligence tip-off seems to have come from Saudi Arabia. This testifies to the reliance of both the UK and the US upon those countries in the areas where the plots are being hatched. It is intelligence from such places, likely generated through human sources as opposed to technology, which is needed to foil plots.This creates a Catch-22 for the Americans and British: the governments of those countries they are most dependent on for counter-terrorism intelligence frequently have abysmal human rights records.
Finally, these attacks have a message about the threat of terrorism in general. Despite the originality of the attack, technically the terrorists failed, as they did with the underwear bomber. Repeated failures cannot be counted on, however, hence the need for continuing intelligence.
However, 9/11 was truly a one off: the surprise and gaps in security that would allow an attack on such a scale no longer exist. Instead, the terrorists now pursue terrorism that is achievable: small-scale efforts that, even if they fail, will generate attention.
And thus to the paradox: the attack that can most easily come to fruition is that which has the least likelihood of truly achieving strategic success. In the moves and counter-moves, we are left with statemate.