These conclusions in the latest report from the International Atomic Energy Agency on Iran's nuclear programme are far from dramatic. Much of the wording could have been taken from any IAEA finding of the last two years: there is no evidence that Tehran is shifting uranium to make a nuclear weapon, but the Agency cannot be sure because it has not gotten access to all areas of the programme.
No, what is notable about the IAEA report is the "spin" being put on it by media, fed by unnamed officials. On almost every occasion in the last two to three years, reporters from leading US newspapers would have trumpeted that the IAEA had shown Iran was on the verge of material for at least one bomb in the next year and that Tehran was guilty of hiding this effort.
Yesterday, however, that guilty verdict was missing. It had been replaced --- even before the report was released --- by the headline of "Problems with Iran's Nuclear Effort". This was based on a passage which stated IAEA inspectors had found that the enrichment process had halted, for at least a day, at Iran's main plant at Natanz.
Why the change in emphasis? "Western" officials, especially in the Obama Administration, want to prove that sanctions are working and that there is no need for military action against Iran. They also would like to be in a position of strength if and when talks begin with Tehran.
So the storyline is that the pressure on Tehran is crippling enrichment. No need to panic, and, yes, we're finally putting Iran in its place.
CONCLUSIONS
37. While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, Iran
has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in
Iran is in peaceful activities.
38. More specifically, Iran is not implementing the requirements contained in the relevant resolutions
of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, including implementation of the Additional
Protocol, which are essential to building confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of Iran’s
nuclear programme and to resolving outstanding questions. In particular, Iran needs to cooperate in
clarifying outstanding issues which give rise to concerns about possible military dimensions to its
nuclear programme, including by providing access to all sites, equipment, persons and documents
requested by the Agency. Iran also needs to implement the modified Code 3.1 on the early provision
of design information. The Agency acknowledges Iran’s submission of a revised DIQ for FFEP and its
advance notification to the Agency of the loading of fuel at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant.
39. In addition, contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security
Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities. Iran has continued with the operation
of FEP and PFEP at Natanz, and has continued to produce UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 at PFEP.
Iran has continued the construction of FFEP. In order to verify the chronology and original purpose of
FFEP, Iran still needs to provide the Agency with access to relevant design documents and to
companies involved in the design and construction of the plant. Iran has also announced that it has
selected the venues for new enrichment facilities and that construction of one of these facilities will
start around March 2011, but has not provided the Agency with the necessary design information and
access in accordance with Iran’s Safeguards Agreement and Subsidiary Arrangements.
40. Similarly, contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security
Council, Iran has also continued with the construction of the IR-40 reactor and with heavy water
related activities. The Agency has not been permitted to take samples of the heavy water which is
stored at UCF, and has not been provided with access to the HWPP. While the Agency can report that
Iran has made statements to the effect that it has not suspended those activities, without full access to
the heavy water at UCF and the HWPP, the Agency is unable to verify such statements and therefore
to report fully on this matter.
41. The Director General requests Iran to take steps towards the full implementation of its
Safeguards Agreement and its other obligations, including implementation of its Additional Protocol.
42. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.