In January 2009 the US Embassy in Rome sent Washington a long despatch of concern about "a strong tendency for Italy's foreign policy to be highly receptive to Russian efforts to gain greater political influence in the EU [European Union] and to support Russia's efforts to dilute American security interests in Europe".
The Embassy noted that "the quest for stable energy supplies from Russia frequently forces Italy to compromise on security and political issues". However, it also saw an important influence in Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's relationship with Russian leader Vladimir Putin:
Berlusconi believes that Putin is his close and personal friend and continues to have more contact with Putin than with any other world leader. During the Georgia crisis, Berlusconi spoke to Putin on a daily basis for a period of almost a week. The basis of the friendship is hard to determine, but many interlocutors have told us that Berlusconi believes that Putin, a fellow "tycoon", trusts Berlusconi more than other European leader. (A contact in the PM's office told us that their frequent meetings are accompanied by exchanges of lavish gifts). Berlusconi admires Putin's macho, decisive, and authoritarian governing style, which the Italian PM believes matches his own.
The Embassy assessed with concern:
All of our interlocutors...report that Berlusconi determines Italy's policy on Russia single-handedly, neither seeking nor accepting counsel. Virtually all are reluctant to confront the PM even when he is at his worst on Russia....
Distressingly, Berlusconi treats Russia policy as he does his domestic political affairs --- tactically and day-to-day. His overwhelming desire is to remain in Putin's good graces, and he has frequently voiced opinions and declarations that have been passed to him directly by Putin. One such example: in the aftermath of the Georgia crisis, Berlusconi began (and continues) to insist that Georgia was the aggressor and that the GOG was responsible for several hundred civilian deaths in South Ossetia.
What to do? The Embassy's response was no less than an all-out intervention in Italian politics:
To tackle the problem head-on, Post [the Embassy] has deployed a robust diplomatic and public affairs strategy targeting key figures inside and outside government. Our aim is two-fold: educate our interlocutors more profoundly on Russian activities and thus the context for U.S. policy, as well as build a counter-weight of dissenting opinion on Russia policy, especially within Berlusconi's political party.
Since the beginning of the summer, with Berlusconi's return to power and the Georgia crisis, we have been engaging with GOI leaders aggressively at all levels. Pol, PA and Econoffs [Political, Public Affairs, and Economic officers] have engaged party members, GOI contacts, think tanks and even press to provide an alternative narrative to the Berlusconi insistence that Russia is a democratic and stable country that has been provoked by the West.
The effort seems to be paying off. The opposition has begun taking jabs at Berlusconi by portraying him as choosing the wrong side of the debate. Some in [Berlusconi's party] have begun to approach us privately to say that they would like greater dialogue with us on the Russia issue, and have indicated their interest in challenging Berlusconi's giddiness about Putin. While we have a long way to go in changing the narrative, unfortunately, we have help --- in the form of a PM who appears increasingly to be the mouthpiece of Putin.
In early June, briefing President Obama for a meeting with Berlusconi, the Embassy was less focused on the dangers of Russia and Putin's influence: "His shortcomings notwithstanding, marginalizing Berlusconi would limit important cooperation with a key ally." Still, there was wariness:
Dependence on Russian energy, lucrative and frequently nontransparent business dealings between Italy and Russia, and a close, personal relationship between Berlusconi and Putin have distorted the PM’s view to the point that he believes much of the friction between the West and Russia has been caused by the U.S. and NATO.
In the end, or at least by October, it appeared that the situation would be resolved not by the Embassy's intrigues within Italian politics but by Berlusconi's distinctive behaviour. US officials reported:
Though PM Berlusconi’s parliamentary majority is strong, and nobody is yet willing to predict his political demise, a growing list of scandals, adverse court decisions and health issues have weakened him and led some erstwhile Berlusconi allies to begin hedging their bets on his political longevity. In a souring political environment, talk of conspiracy theories often trumps real political debate and distracts the Berlusconi government from pursuing, or even developing, a coherent political agenda.
One incident in particular led the Embassy to predict the possible demise of a flamboyant and uncertain, but ultimately not-to-be-dismissed, ally. In a nice bit of symmetry, it involved none other than his good friend in Moscow:
Ahead of a three-day trip to Russia to celebrate Vladimir Putin’s birthday in mid-October, Berlusconi put out a press line that the visit was a “strictly private affair.” This announcement was met with disbelief and some mockery. Adding to the mystery, however, the day before his departure, Berlusconi canceled his participation in the state visit of Jordan’s King Abdullah of Jordan, staying in Milan with the explanation that he was feeling under the weather.
Berlusconi, who prides himself on his personal relationships with key Middle East interlocutors thus, unavoidably, left the impression that, in choosing private fun over statecraft, he was husbanding his flagging energies for a blow-out party at Putin’s private dacha. With the further news that Berlusconi was accompanied on the trip solely by Valentino Valentini, an unofficial intermediary/bagman who serves as Berlusconi’s interpreter, Italy’s political class openly questioned whether Berlusconi was going to Russia principally because the scrutiny of his private time by Italian and foreign photographers had made parties in Italy too risky for the time being.