With another round of discussions on Iran's nuclear programme soon to take place in Turkey, this document from WikiLeaks is an important snapshot of why the last set of talks between Tehran and the 5+1 Powers (US, UK, France, Germany, China, and Russia) failed to make progress in autumn 2009.
The delegations had gathered at Geneva at the start of October, with the first direct involvement of the US and Iran at the same table since 1979. Initial discussions were promising, with technical talks scheduled for the end of the month. However, the negotiations suddenly stalled, and those talks never took place. Subsequent revisions of the "third-party enrichment" plan, in which Iran would send most of its low-enriched uranium for processing into fuel for its Tehran Research Reactor, made no advance.
At the time and since, the Iranian Government and its defenders have blamed the "West" for duplicity that broke down the talks. EA's interpretation, based on sources, was very different: while there was still ground to cover before a resolution, the primary reason for the suspension of discussions was domestic opposition to President Ahmadinejad's quest for an agreement.
This WikiLeaks document supports our analysis. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, serving as a broker between Iran and the 5+1, tells Assistant Secretary of State Philip Gordon of continuing efforts --- weeks after the technical talks failed to take place --- for a resolution. Washington is not the main barrier to this for the Iranians, who "have told the Turks that they have serious problems with...the British. They have 'more trust' in the US...[and] would also prefer to get fuel from the US rather than the Russians."
So if the US was not sabotaging the talks, where was the problem? Over to President Ahmadinejad, who told the Turks "the core of the issue is psychological rather than substance....The Iranians agree to the proposal but need to manage the public perception."
Ahmadinejad's barrier to this mission was not the Americans. Instead he faced "serious domestic problems inside Iran....The Turks actually see Ahmadinejad as 'more flexible' than others who are inside the Iranian Government."
THE ORIGINAL CABLE
O 171708Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1256
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001654
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2019
TAGS: KNNP PREL TU IR
SUBJECT: TURKEY: A/S GORDON PRESSES FM DAVUTOGLU ON IRAN
REF: ANKARA 1626
Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4(b,d)
¶1. (S) Iran dominated A/S Gordon's 40-minute meeting November 12 with Foreign Minister Davutoglu. The FM had just gotten off the phone with El-Baradei and had discussed in detail the IAEA proposal to send Iran's low enriched uranium to Turkey. El-Baradei had said he would "call Washington" that same morning. This had followed two long "harsh" sessions with the Iranians in Istanbul on Sunday evening. The Iranians have said they are willing to meet with Solana, but have told the Turks that they have serious problems with Cooper and the British. They have "more trust" in the U.S. The Iranians would also prefer to get fuel from the U.S. rather than the Russians.
¶2. (S) Davutoglu said the Iranians: a) are ready to send a delegation to Vienna to work out the specifics on this proposal; b) have given their "full trust" to Turkey; c) continue to face serious domestic problems inside Iran. He said the Turks actually see Ahmadinejad as "more flexible" than others who are inside the Iranian Government. Ahmadinejad is facing "huge pressure" after statements from some P5 members to the effect that a nuclear deal would succeed in weakening Iran,s nuclear capability -- which is interpreted by some circles in Iran as a virtual defeat.
¶3. (S) Given this context, the Turks had asked Ahmadinejad if the core of the issue is psychological rather than substance. Ahmadinejad had said "yes," that the Iranians agree to the proposal but need to manage the public perception. Accordingly, the Iranians are proposing that the first 400 kilos be transferred to Kish Island -- thereby keeping it on Iranian soil -- and would receive right away an equivalent amount (30-50 kilos) of enriched fuel. The second stage would focus on the management of Iranian public opinion, after which Tehran would proceed with the Turkey option for the remaining 800 kilos, probably in two tranches. Davutoglu said Baradei agreed to consider this.
¶4. (S) Davutoglu noted that he had spoken to NSA General Jones Wednesday, who had said that we should perhaps suggest to the Iranians that they transfer 600 kilos to Kish Island and 600 kilos to Turkey simultaneously. A/S Gordon said he could not give an official response to the proposal as this is the first time we heard it, but that he anticipates much skepticism about providing fuel to Iran before all the LEU has been taken out. It would be better to get all 1200 kilos out right away.
¶5. (C) Davutoglu noted that these are two different proposals. The first is Iran's request for fuel for its nuclear reactor. Even if this takes place, he said, we still need to work on limiting Iran's nuclear enrichment capability. If we succeed with this proposal, he said, it will create "confidence" and a "new momentum" and would allow room for negotiation.
¶6. (C) Noting that Davutoglu had only addressed the negative consequences of sanctions or the use of military force, Gordon pressed Davutoglu on Ankara's assessment of the consequences if Iran gets a nuclear weapon. Davutoglu gave a spirited reply, that "of course" Turkey was aware of this risk. This is precisely why Turkey is working so hard with the Iranians. President Gul himself had spent two hours Sunday with Ahmadinejad in Istanbul.
¶7. (C) Gordon noted that while we acknowledge that Turkey can be helpful as a mediator, some of the Prime Minister's recent public comments raise questions about how Turkey sees this issue. Davutoglu said he is aware of these concerns, but contended that the Guardian newspaper had not accurately presented its recent interview with the Prime Minister. The PM's comments had been taken out of context. Erdogan had been asked if he views Iran as a friend. If he had said "no," it would not have been possible to convince Tehran to cooperate on this latest proposal. Only Turkey can speak bluntly and critically to the Iranians, Davutoglu contended, but only because Ankara is showing public messages of friendship.
¶8. (C) Gordon pushed back that Ankara should give a stern public message about the consequences if UN resolutions are ignored. Davutoglu countered that Erdogan had given just such a statement in Tehran when he visited. He emphasized that Turkey's foreign policy is giving a "sense of justice" and a "sense of vision" to the region. Turkey has provided a "third option" in addition to Iran and the Saudis (who he contended are viewed as "puppets" of the US). The result, he said, is that we "limit Iranian influence in the region." We need a "pro-Western approach AND a sense of justice."
¶9. (C) A/S Gordon has cleared this cable.
JEFFREY