Members of the Free Syrian ArmyEmile Hokayem, Senior Fellow for Regional Security, has posted an< a href="http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-voices/?blogpost=313">overview of the political and leadership structure of the Syrian opposition which, he argues, is now moving into Phase 3: consolidation and the militarisation of the conflict. He focuses on the status of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), an organisation mostly comprised of defected soldiers, and the Syrian National Council (SNC), an organisation with international and local civilian leaders.
We agree, as the title of Tuesday's LiveBlog, "A New Phase in the Conflict", testifies.
Two paragraphs jumped out at us. The first describes the tension between the military front, the FSA, and the more peaceful, protest-centric front, the SNC:
Asked about his level of confidence in the Syrian National Council (SNC), the opposition’s umbrella group, a senior FSA officer said there were contacts but also disagreements because SNC members didn’t understand security matters. He also said that the FSA had to force the SNC to harden its position by threatening to form and announce an independent Syrian Military Council.
From the first day of protests up to today, most of the demonstrators have opposed violence, chanting or holding up signs "Peaceful". Statements from civilian organisations have insisted that the opposition remain committed to this, but in recent days those calls have been muted. While the peaceful opposition movement shows no signs of turning militarised, there has been a notable lack of condemnation of the defecting soldiers who have been engaged in open combat in cities across the nation.
Hokayem is vague on this issue, but the subtext of that passage points to a possible shift in the thinking of the civilian leaders.
The second passage we noted is on the possibility and role of a no-fly zone, called for by some in the opposition but rejected by international powers:
The members of the FSA I met or talked to make another case: while they certainly care about the protection of civilians, they argue that only when Assad’s air dominance is eroded can major units defect with all their gear and heavy weaponry and confront the regime’s hardcore loyalists. They say it makes no sense for these would-be defectors to flee with mechanised assets, transport vehicles and command-and-control equipment if this makes them more visible and more vulnerable from the air. They add that a no-fly zone would help them capture and occupy barracks, government buildings, roads and other infrastructure, which they have refrained from doing so until now. To be sure, this military rationale does not align with the logic of humanitarian intervention under the responsibility to protect doctrine that was invoked in Libya.
On Monday, I was struck by the incident in which defecting soldiers from an armoured division blew up 5 tanks that were under their control in Alma, Daraa; not willing to leave them with the Syrian army, and not willing to take the vehicles with them. This would never have happened in Libya, and we may have seen why. Within minutes of the reported explosions, Syrian Air Force warplanes were reported in the area. While the regime has refrained from attacking large groups of civilians from the air, the planes and helicopters may have had devastating effect on the defectors in several night battles.
The international community, unlikely to act because of the Syrian air force's participation in a civil war, so the opposition is arguing that a no-fly zone would assist the Syrian Free Army, whose primary goal is to protect the peaceful demonstrations. Hokayem writes:
Asked to describe current FSA activities inside Syria, a senior FSA commander listed:
- protecting demonstrations;
- facilitating the movement of defectors;
- identifying regime informants;
- securing exit routes and supply lines;
- stocking weaponry and ammunition;
- linking and organising defectors inside Syria.
To be clear, neither Hokayem nor EA is saying that the peaceful protesters will pick up arms and join a civil war. What we may be looking at, however, is a situation with similarities to Yemen, where a militarised wing of the opposition begins to attack the regime in order protect a peaceful protest movement.
In any case, the FSA is clearly growing and is more organised and far more aggressive. The protests are still large and widespread, and the rate of military defections appears to be accelerating. This third phase, a bloody phase, may be the decisive one.
Read Emile Hokayem's article "Revolutionary Road: Among the Syrian opposition"....