Police in Bahrain caught on camera throwing metal rods
See also Bahrain Special: Nabeel Rajab's Speech "Our Problem is with the King"
Syria, Bahrain (and Beyond) Live Coverage: Meaningless Amnesty, Cosmetic Speech?
[James Miller writes: Many debates are taking place about Bahrain. Is the regime guilty of human rights abuses? Are small segments of the opposition crossing the line and inciting violence? Should the US continue to support the Bahraini regime? Amid the questions and controversy, however, there is this feature, supported by many pictures, videos, eyewitnesses, journalists, and the report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry....
The Bahraini police are poorly-trained, overly aggressive, reckless, and sometimes incompetent.
EA has collected footage of police nearly shooting each other with tear gas, pictures of 10 policemen who cannot a single scrawny teenager, and numerous videos that show dangerous use of "less-than-lethal" weapons, like tear gas, incendiary grenades, rubber bullets, and batons. US law-enforcement officials, to whom EA has shown some of this evidence, have been taken aback by the brutality, amateur tactics, and the chaotic nature of the actions of police, most of them in riot gear.
To quote one US observer, "That is not how you make an arrest, and this is not how to control a crowd. Are you sure these guys are the police?"
The regime is aware of this problem, though efforts to reform and retrain seem to have only accelerated the bad behavior of these "law enforcers". Following the situation on the ground day-by-day, we wonder what exactly John Yates and John Timoney, leaving their careers in Britain and the US to reform the security forces, are doing.
In his debut analysis for EA, Marc Owen Jones considers one aspect of this controversy --- both the police and by the opposition activists allege that the other side is throwing "steel rods". There is also the larger question of whether the Bahraini regime is serious about training its officers, or reforming its heavy-handed approach to the growing protests.]
The reputation of Bahrain’s security apparatus has long been plagued by allegations of torture, ill treatment, and arbitrary arrest, yet it is only since February 2011 that such transgressions have been so well-documented. The prevalence of new media technologies combined with the scale of this year’s crackdown have enabled the global public to get an insight into the day to day transgressions perpetrated by the state’s security apparatus, which includes acts of theft, vandalism, excessive force, and unjustifiable violence. In addition to this, there is a growing body of evidence that shows how the security forces are using more unorthodox weapons to suppress protesters, including stones, slingshots and Molotov cocktails. In addition to this auxiliary arsenal of weapons, a number of videos have emerged that show members of the security forces throwing steel rods at protesters.
These steel rods, or rebars, are traditionally used to reinforce concrete during construction. They vary in size but most of the ones that seem to be thrown are about 12 inches long and a centimetre in diameter. In short, they make formidable weapons, as was tragically demonstrated on 18 November, when one struck and eventually killed a young woman called Zahra Mohammed Saleh. The heavy rebar penetrated six inches into her skull, and although she was able to walk and talk immediately after the impact, Zahra passed away on 8 December, after spending three weeks in hospital. The grisly incident was caught on camera shortly after Zahra had been hit (graphic content).
The circumstances surrounding Zahra’s death are ambiguous, and although the Ministry of the Interior state that her death was the result of protesters throwing the rods, it is impossible to know for sure. It is not unreasonable to suggest that the demonstrators threw the rods, especially considering the emerging evidence, yet the pertinent fact remains that there at least seven videos that show members of the security forces throwing steel rods at protesters or in the direction of protesters. So, while it is impossible to determine whether it was steel rods thrown by the police that killed Zahra, the videos serve to further the credibility of the Ministry of the Interior, who are already viewed by many as an incompetent and brutal institution.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of these videos is that none of the perpetrators are filmed in isolation. All of them throw the steel rods in full view of their fellow officers, yet none of their colleagues or superiors attempt to intervene. This seems to allude to a number of possibilities: a complete absence of authority within the chain of command, institutionalised/tolerated transgressions, a lack of discipline or complete lack of training in rules of engagement. Irrespective of cause, such behaviour is inexcusable.
Indeed, transgressions perpetrated by the security forces were documented in the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry report, a fairly damning investigation into human rights abuses that prompted the government to embark on a series of reforms to the security apparatus. Retraining was a significant aspect of these reforms, and the government of Bahrain enlisted the help of two "super cops" - former Assistant Commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police John Yates and ex Chief of Miami Police John Timoney.
In addition to these new hires, one of the recommendations states that there is a need "to implement an extensive program of public order training for the public security forces, the NSA and the BDF, including their private security companies, in accordance with UN best practices". It also states that "the security forces should be trained in the human rights dimensions of detention and interrogation, and in particular the obligation to refuse to participate in any actions involving torture and other prohibited ill-treatment".
Despite the new hires and the aforementioned recommendations, it is hard to see any tangible impact of reform. On the contrary, there seems to have been little abatement in police brutality, as this recent incident illustrates. Furthermore, there have been a number of recently recorded instances of the security forces using molotov cocktails, behaviour that surely is not condoned by the like of Yates or Timoney, or any respectable law enforcement agency for that matter. There is also little evidence to suggest that the security apparatus have kicked their dependence on balTajiyya (plain clothes thugs) to assist them in quashing dissent.
What such trangressions reveal is a huge discord between Government rhetoric and reality. Of course change takes time, but there are still big question marks about the sincerity of such reforms. Indeed, no Government ministers resigned following the scathing BICI report, and although the head of public security (Tariq bin Dinnah) and the head of the national security agency (Sheikh Khalifa bin Abdullah al Khalifa) were "replaced", they were then given advisory roles. Regardless of one's views on political culture, this reshuffle is hardly a damning indictment of individuals who many believe should be investigated for possible human rights violations. The only ones to be facing possible justice for violations are lower level employees such as policemen.
This attempt to blame the lower ranks seems to be more of a PR stunt than a concerted effort to tackle police brutality. The topic itself is virtually taboo in Bahrain's national media, and displays of police brutality are never shown, though even if they were it would not necessarily sway the hardliners, many of whom believe the police are justified in throwing metal rods because protesters do it. These attitudes convey a misunderstanding of what it is a police force should be. If one believes that revenge is a justification for police violence, then they are inadvertently condoning the protester violence they claim to abhor, for they remove violence from any context of legitimacy and instead put it in a framework of "violence justifies violence". It is not an understatement to say that an undisciplined police force who fail to adhere to a strict code of conduct are no more than a group of thugs themselves. After all, without such strict codes of behaviour, only a uniform separates the police from the plain clothed baltajiyya.
Finally, the regime is facing a crisis of legitimacy. The lack of broad support enjoyed by the Government renders their ability to carry out legitimate violence void. As Government legitimacy declines, the question "who are the security forces actually protecting?" becomes more pertinent. The less legitimacy a regime enjoys, the more their security forces resemble a private security force, protecting only the interests of a few. This issue is compounded when the security forces fail to abide by any sense of professionalism, which would at least partially endorse their position as enforcers of the law. It is impossible to have policing by consent in a country whose unelected government does not enjoy major popular support, for retaining the reigns of power necessitates a disproportionate use of violence and fear, one that replaces "rule of law" with "rule by law". Without a legitimate government, a country’s security apparatus are no more than a militia who exist solely to ensure the longevity of an elite body who control the means of wealth and power distribution.