Justin Gengler writes on his blog Religion and Politics in Bahrain:
Call it a Formula 1 miracle: a day after tickets went on sale for Bahrain's (now slightly postponed) race, Al-Wasat reported that the royal court has contacted three opposition societies --- Wa'ad, Hasan Madan's Progressive Tribune, and the Nationalist Gathering --- to join [leading opposition society] al-Wefaq in "a dialogue" with the government. Of course, the news here is not that these three groups have been invited to join talks --- only Wa'ad has any significant following at all ---- but rather the seeming confirmation of recent rumors that opposition-government talks are actually ongoing. Presumably the inclusion of these (secular) societies is meant to allow the government to deny engaging with "the Shi'a opposition" per se. It's unclear who will be buying this.
Indeed, if last summer's National Dialogue was a failure precisely because it was designed to fight dialogue with more dialogue --- that is, to include so many voices that participants inevitably could only agree upon the lowest common denominator of recommended "reforms" --- then this current iteration involving the government, al-Wefaq, and the three secular societies may rightly be called the Anti-National Dialogue. And this Anti-National Dialogue is likely to fail also, though for the opposite reason.
In reaching out only to the "moderate" opposition (I guess that means al-Wifaq is not a Bahraini Hezbollah after all?), there are perhaps more parties excluded from this initiative than are included. Without even mentioning the exclusion of al-Haqq, al-Wafa', and 'Amal al-Islami, as their respective leaderships continue to sit in prison, the Government seems to be under the odd impression that the majority of Bahrain's political opponents today are under the sway of al-Wifaq. As the visceral reactions to the Al-Wasat story in this opposition forum thread indicate, however, few are praising al-WEfaq's effort to return to the negotiating table. Even fewer, perhaps, are confident in the genuineness of the government's re-engagement, coming as it does conveniently in the run-up to the Formula One race, as always seems to happen in Bahrain.
One may judge for himself whether Bahrain's activists seem likely to accept an al-Wefaq brokered deal. The following graphics come from a popular thread outlining "the Opening [فتح] of the Pearl Roundabout" via a new campaign of "holy attack". A grenade sporting the slogan of this new "stage" of protest:
A brilliant military strategy overlaid with the words, "This is [how they did it] in Vietnam":
Even more brilliant strategies for the "opening" of the Pearl Roundabout (probably too advanced for us to appreciate here):
Finally, something right out of the playbook of Stormin' Norman [Schwarzkopf, head of US forces in the 1991 US-led war with Iraq] himself:
In short, the vast majority of those involved in the street movement could care less about any dialogue involving the government and al-Wefaq, and indeed may simply be incited by it to act even more violently. Although one would imagine that this is already the operating assumption of all parties, the fact that the government is even willing to talk to al-Wefaq implies that both sides believe the latter can ensure the acquiescence of "the street" in the event of any agreement. Anyone taking bets on that? Because I want in.
As obvious and basic as this question is, an even greater potential roadblock is the inevitable push-back from the other side of society, i.e. from among ordinary Bahraini Sunnis unhappy to be excluded from any eventual deal struck by the government and the formal "opposition" (of which, for the sake of the argument, we may say there is some non-zero possibility). Indeed, conspicuous in their absence from Al-Wasat's report on the Anti-National Dialogue are Bahrain's newly-mobilized Sunni groups--at the very least, the National Unity Gathering, but also other groups such as the Al-Fatih Awakening.
Quite apart from the likely possibility that Sunnis will reject any compromise with the opposition, this is a delicate situation for the government, whose basic problem is this: if Sunni groups were allowed to participate in some three-way talks involving the government and al-Wifaq, it may turn out that they have more in common with their Shi'a "enemies" than they realized.