The Free Syrian Army in Idlib Province
The Obama Administration, and the majority of the world's nations, now believe that the situation in Syria is unacceptable. However, in the short term, direct intervention is not on the table. Without binding action from the UN Security Council, it will take time for the international community to agree a course of action. In the meantime, those who advocated military intervention have begun to look for alternative methods to push the Assad regime out of power. One option is now prominent: directly arming opposition fighters, specifically those operating under the mantle of the Free Syrian Army.
Before endorsing or rejecting the proposition, a look at the facts on the ground:
Opposition fighters are engaged in military campaigns in almost every region of the country. These campaigns can be placed into three categories:
1. Semi-Permanent Occupation: The Free Syrian Army has occupied several cities --- Zabadani, Madaya, and Rankous --- all about 20 miles outside the capital Damascus. Al Rastan, north of Homs, can also fit into this category, as can parts of Homs itself, but to a lesser extent because the pro-Assad military and police have strongholds in multiple neighbourhoods in the city. Kafer Takharim, in Idlib Province, was held by the opposition forces for a month, before falling to the regime in the last two days.
These cities, which were claimed by the opposition at appproximately the same time, had been distinguished by large demonstrations, with defectors hiding in the near-by countryside.
In early January the Free Syrian Army soldiers entered into pitched battle with the regime army. The FSA scored numerous hits, knocking out tanks, armoured vehicles, and transports and inflicting many casualties. The more the Assad forces tried to counter the threat, the more soldiers would defect. Iin Zabadani, an armoured convoy was ambushed by opposition fighters, and a unit that was deployed to assist the convoy joined the opposition. The harder the regime fought to hold these territories, the fast their losses, to both casualties and defections, mounted. And in close-city fighting, the recently-defected soldiers proved that they were capable of knocking out Assad's tanks, despite the lack of heavy weapons.
After several weeks of relative peace when the FSA controlled these areas, all the towns were heavily bombarded by medium-range artillery and rocket strikes. The Assad forces doing the bombardment did not suffer heavy casualties, and they lost nearly no soldiers to defection. The regime also did not lose much in the way of armuored vehicles or other heavy equipment. After weeks of softening up the areas, the Assad army retook them with heavily armoured convoys entered the cities from multiple directions, supported by long-range weapons, infantry, and in some cases helicopters.
2. Temporary occupation: In many towns and villages across the countrysides of Rif Dimashque, Aleppo, Hama, Daraa, Homs, Idlib, and, to a lesser extent, Deir Ez Zor, members of the Free syrian Army are well-known occupants. Many of the towns are too small to have any sort of a permanent military base, so the FSA presence was not established through military victory. Many towns have an FSA presence on the outskirts, but have a regime police presence in the centre, vulnerable to attack.
Particularly in Daraa and Idlib Province over the last few weeks, the regime has pursued the tactic of a concerted "blitz", rolling in with large amounts of troops and heavy equipment, making arrests, killing protesters and/or FSA fighters, and leaving, only to return within the next several days.
A notable example of this was in the suburbs east of Damascus. Encouraged by success elsewhere, and by large-scale protests in the Ghouta area, the FSA established checkpoints, pursued counter-sniper operations, and set out to defend protests from security forces. This occupation was short-lived, however, as the suburbs did not offer the topographical or geographical advantages present in places like Zabadani.
These territories are important strongholds for the FSA, but they do not offer the locations capable of building an effective base of operation, even if they testify to the widespread loss of control suffered by the Assad regime.
3. Asymmetrical Insurgency: In locations which the FSA can neither hold semi-permanently or occupy temporarily, the opposition has begun to fight using the traditional methods ofinsurgent methods. We see greater evidence of ambushes on highways and along supply routes, sneak attacks against positions like military bases and police stations, and improvised explosive devices against military convoys and even tanks. These events are far less than those in Iraq or Afghanistan, but there is evidence that they are increasing. While disruptive and demoralizing, these attacks are not enough, yet, to pose a serious logistical threat to the regime. This may change, but if Iraq is any indication, it could take months to spin up an effective guerrilla war.
What Would Arming the Opposition Accomplish?
The opposition forces are lightly armed, the bulk of them made up of defecting soldiers who took their arms with them. Most FSA soldiers have AK-47 rifles. Some have sniper rifles, RPG launchers, or heavier machine guns. There are men who have joined the FSA who were civilians without weapons; however, small arms are readily available.
While ammunition for the AK-47 is widely available, ammunition for the other weapons is in shorter supply. Inside some cities, like Zabadani and Homs, that ammunition has become very scarce. Even if the opposition on the borders is armed by foreign countries, this would not significantly help cities which are already besieged by Assad forces.
As recent events have proven, the FSA does have the limited capacity to destroy heavily armoured vehicles, even T-72 tanks, in close-quarter fighting. Also, the FSA has established that many units are adequately trained to ambush armoured divisions. Some armoured-vehicle crews have been captured, for example, in Zabadani and Homs. These capabilities could be expanded, and the FSA would benefit if they were supplied RPGs or even more powerful shoulder-fired anti-tank missiles.
However, the real damage that is being done, in Zabadani, in Homs, in al Atareb in Aleppo Province, and beyond, is being done by the regime's long-range artillery and tank shelling. Even the armoured units that have defected to the opposition have been afraid to take their tanks, as they are easy targets for Assad's armored divisions or his airpower, which has been on the sidelines so far.
This threat cannot be countered by shoulder-fired weapons or small arms. It can only be met with tanks or from the air.
Are There Other Consequences to Arming the Free Syrian Army?
There are two fundamental dangers in arming the Syria opposition. If the Free Syrian Army becomes stronger, but is still incapable of delivering a knock-out blow to the Assad military, then the regime will likely retaliate against the citizens in the besieged cities, as we are already seeing in Homs and elsewhere. The residents of a city that harbours the Free Syrian Army will pay for each soldier who dies at the FSA's hands . An armed opposition which is not capable of gaining the upper hand will lead to a protracted, and a potentially sectarian, conflict.
And what happens to these weapons if the regime falls, or if the FSA becomes stronger but is too decentralized and the regime endures? This is the unknown, the consequence of arming an enemy of an enemy and hoping for the best.
It is an irresponsible, incomplete solution to an unacceptable and untenable problem.
So what are the other options?
A no-fly zone, one that targets Assad's tanks and artillery --- even if it is only over parts of the country --- would diminish the threat that the Syrian military poses to both the civilian population and the Free Syrian Army. That no-fly zone would provide for transport of humanitarian aid into(and possibly injured civilians out of) the country. This area would also become a base of operations for the Free Syrian Army to gather strength without fear of reprisal from the air or from the ground. Most importantly, this option would introduce little in the way of additional weapons. In effect, a no-fly zone, one that also targeted the heavy weaponry of the Assad regime, would allow Syrians to determine Syria's fate.
This would be no small task, and would likely amount to open war with the Assad regime. However, arming the opposition, without supporting it from the air, would also sentence thousands or tens of thousands of soldiers --- on both sides of the conflict --- to their deaths without effectively dismanteling Assad's primary threat and without supplying safe harbour for civilians caught in the crossfire.