Fighting in the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli flared this spring, killing several people and bringing the intervention of the army, but it is this week's escalation that has seized headlines and raised fears of ongoing violence in a country which is Syria's neighbour and endured a civil war from 1975 to the 1990s.
Writing for Al-Akhbar, Nicolas Nassif is a bit more sanguine about the future, seeing conflict which will continue but not surge out of control:
The latest clashes in Tripoli are being seen as a message related directly to the disturbances in Syria, but into which not too much should be read. They are not about to expand further, despite the heavy casualties, nor is this the last round in a long series. In context, they can be viewed as part of an expected, even normal, course of developments:
First, neither side in the fighting – the Arab Democratic Party (ADP) in Jabal Mohsen, and followers of the Future Movement and other parties, Salafi groups or leading Tripoli figures in Bab al-Tabbaneh – is capable of settling the armed conflict in its favor. The besieged Alawi minority, which is said to be supplied with arms via two routes from Zgharta and Baddawi refugee camp, cannot translate its arsenal into a political or territorial victory. Nor can its rivals who represent the city’s Sunni majority. They have neither the means nor the necessary local and foreign political cover to resolve the conflict militarily. But they are capable of engaging in a prolonged and costly war of attrition, without the balance of power changing in the slightest.
The other players backing the rival sides in Tripoli, such as Hezbollah and the Future Movement, also do not want to see a military showdown (and none of the Lebanese players from outside the city have intervened directly in the armed conflict). But the two sides have enough arms and ammunition to engage in one round of fighting after the other, using the lulls, which can sometimes last for weeks, to resupply. The narrowly confessional nature of their war transcends the political divide between the March 8 and March 14 coalitions, with pro-March 8 Sunni fighters fighting their supposed allies, the Alawis of Jabal Mohsen.
Second, the message sent out by the fighting has to do with spreading chaos and deepening the division in Tripoli, but not long-term political goals or changing the balance of power in the city or North Lebanon. It is not likely to directly spark other clashes elsewhere. This does not mean that such clashes are unlikely; merely that they will not will be consequences or direct repercussions of what is happening in Tripoli.