Iran Elections: Will the Results Be Accepted by All?

Yesterday's analysis of Iran's Presidential elections sparked a lively debate on whether the results will be honoured. An initial note is that today is only the first round, with the likely outcome of President Ahmadinejad and former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi as the top two candidates; the crunch question over an "acceptable" vote would come in the following week's second-round decider.

That said, an article by Robert Dreyfuss of The Nation, one of the better "Western" reporters in Tehran, offered these observations:

There's worry and anger about cheating and unfair campaigning. Yesterday, the state-run Iranian TV gave Ahmadinejad twenty minutes of free air time for a speech, while offering one minute each to his three rivals. (They turned it down contemptuously.)

At a Mousavi rally, people chant: "Iranian TV has become Ahmadinejad's PlayStation!" A man says that if there is evidence of cheating, people won't stand for it. Later, the crowd chants: "If there is any cheating, we are going to make hell in Iran!" Rumors that people would storm the offices of Iranian TV if Ahmadinejad were given the free time proved unfounded, and the speech was aired without incident.

But there's an uneasy feeling that, especially if the vote is close, one side or the other won't accept the results. Perhaps the greatest danger comes from the angry, inflamed supporters of Ahmadinejad, though a highly informed analyst says that Iran's Leader, Ali Khamenei, will be able to control the backers of Ahmadinejad in the event of a Mousavi victory. But there's no question that Iran is highly divided, and when the results are announced--probably Saturday morning--there will be a few days of tension before it's clear how the voters on the losing side react.

"I hope the gap is wide enough that the losing side accepts it," says a well-known professor at Tehran University. If Ahmadinejad loses, if the gap is wide, Khamenei will put a lot of pressure on him not to make trouble."

The reality is that Khamenei and his all-powerful Council of Guardians has approved all four candidates, and virtually everyone I've spoken with says that the Leader will be happy if either Ahmadinejad or Mousavi wins. It's even likely that Khamenei may have decided that Ahmadinejad has served his purpose, and that a more acceptable, more moderate president would better serve Iran's broader interests.

How Not to Cover Iran's Elections: The Awards Ceremony

On Tuesday, we profiled our first entry in the competition to write the worst story about Iran's Presidential election: Colin Freeman's effort, for The Daily Telegraph of London to turn the campaign into a "a rock gig moshpit" and "a World Wrestling Federation grudge match" and to make over President Ahmadinejad as a member of The Sex Pistols.

We could not have anticipated the flood of entries that would follow. Each time, we thought the bottom had been reached, an intrepid reporter or commentator would take the bar lower. So, without further ado, the ultimate in Bad Election Journalism:


HONOURABLE MENTION

The Washington Post: Any Label Will Do

Friday's piece by Thomas Erdbrink is OK in its profile of the campaigns of President Ahmadinejad and Mir Hossein Mousavi. That is, until he and his headline writers try to put the voters and their candidates into easy-to-open boxes: "[This] is a confrontation not just between Iran's haves and have-nots, but between the old revolutionaries who seized power from the shah and a new cadre of radicals seeking to dislodge them."

All right, who are "the old revolutionaries" here? Mousavi? Former President Rafsanjani? And who is the "new radical"? Ahmadinejad? But wait --- Ahmadinejad is already in power. So is he seeking to dislodge himself?

And the people on the streets? If they support Ahmadinejad, are they automatically "have-nots"? A student wearing green for Mousavi becomes a "have"?

Hours later, we can't decide if this entry is Zen-like or just Lost in Confusion.

BRONZE MEDAL

Assorted Newspapers: Iran's Michelle Obama

Apparently it's not enough to put Tehran under the spell of "The Obama Effect". You have to carry out a metaphormosis into the Great Man, or at least his nearest and dearest.

So in the last 72 hours Zahra Rahnavard suddenly became, in The Boston Globe, Der Spiegel, The Huffington Post,  "a no-nonsense university dean who has been compared to Michelle Obama".

So who in Iran had anointed Professor Rahnavard as the American First Lady of the country? Well, no one actually. That is, apart from Reza Sayah of CNN, who topped a profile of Rahnavard "Iran's Michelle Obama".

Unfortunately for "the Obama effect/transformation", Rahnavard refused to play along at a press conference on Sunday: ""I am not Iran's Michelle Obama...I am a follower of Zahra (the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad)."

Which makes us wonder: if Mousavi becomes President of Iran, will someone be bold enough to call Michelle Obama's "America's Zahra Rahnavard"?

SILVER MEDAL

The New York Times: Release the Bush Hounds

It is one thing for the editors of The Wall Street Journal, seeking the Mother of all Counter-Revolutions, to feature John Bolton's call for the Israeli bomb to replace the ballot. It's another for the flagship of US newspapers to wheel out Elliott Abrams, years after he tried and failed as a George W. Bush Administration official to knock off the Iranian Government:

The Lebanese had a chance to vote against Hezbollah, and took the opportunity. Iranians, unfortunately, are being given no similar chance to decide who they really want to govern them.

GOLD MEDAL

The Daily Telegraph's Colin Freeman: It's All Rubbish Anyway

Still, at the end of the day, you can't keep a bad journalist down, or rather raise him up. The World's Worst Tehran Correspondent followed his initial entry with this content-free "profile" of the campaign:

Instead of being seen as a respected statesman and upholder of the Islamic regime, the man rubbing shoulders with the Supreme Leader may be known popularly as either "Ahmadinejad the Liar", "Karoubi the Corrupt", or "Mousavi the Illiterate US Stooge" – epithets endorsed by their own colleagues. Those, surely, are not the kind of people a regime that brooks no real opposition would ideally want as figureheads.

Which I guess means that, at least, we won't be calling the eventual winner of this contest --- be he "old revolutionary" or "new radical" --- "Iran's Barack Obama".

Iran: A Preview of Tomorrow's Presidential Election

Related Post: Iran Elections - Will the Results Be Accepted by All?
Related Post: Iran Elections - Mousavi on US/Israel, Nuclear Programme, Dress Code
Related Post: Iran's Election - Summary of Ahmadinejad's Final TV Message (10 June)

In Enduring America on 12 February, Chris Emery evaluated the announcement of former President Mohammad Khatami that he would stand in June's election. He wrote, "[It is] an error...to link Khatami’s entry to the tentative prospect of normalised relations between Iran and the US," and focused on internal dynamics of Iranian politics: "It had been widely reported that Khatami would not run if former Prime Minister Mir-Hussein Mousavi chose to....So all Iranian eyes will now watch if Mousavi, another popular reformist, is now the one to withdraw."

Three months later, and 24 hours before Iranians cast their votes in the first round of the Presidential election, I read Chris' piece with pride. He was half-right on the issue of the potential challenger to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad --- it was Khatami who withdrew, leaving Mousavi in the race --- but months before many "Western" journalists and analysts noticed the campaign or dismissed it out-of-hand (only yesterday Thomas Friedman cast it aside as a "pretend election"), Chris saw its significance. This would not be a procession for the re-election of Ahmadinejad or a charade for Supreme Leader Khamenei to hand-pick a winner but a political space for Iranians to consider their political and economic present and future. Equally important, he got to the core of the issues that would shape the outcome: "It will be over presidential legacies and broken promises."

Yet, with respect, not even Chris could forecast how dynamic --- and potentially important --- this campaign has become.

From the moment that the field of major candidates was settled in March --- Ahmadinejad, Mousavi, former Revolutionary Guards commander Mohsen Rezaei, and former Speaker of the Parliament Mehdi Karroubi --- it was clear that the President faced a very real challenge. Two words should have made this clear: The Economy.

When he took office in 2005, Ahmadinejad promised an uplift of Iran's people, especially its poorer people, through distribution
of state revenues and advances in technology, investment, and production. Generally speaking, that has not happened. There have been repeated conflicts between the President and his leading economic ministers and advisors, investment in key sectors has not progressed, and the over-reliance on oil income has tied re-distribution in part to the vagaries of the international market. (Of course, US-led sanctions have continued to constrict Iranian development, but these alone cannot account for Ahmadinejad's handling of the economy.)

Continuing difficulties do not doom the President. He still appears to retain a solid base of support amongst many voters who still the prospect of an improvement in their economic status, and Ahmadinejad --- normally a shrewd speaker and campaigner --- could overlay the power of his office with the appeal of nationalism. That in part explains why, far from US-Iranian relations and President Obama's "engagement", Ahmadinejad has ensured the appearance of Tehran as a front-line actor on the world stage, with setpieces such as his speech to the World Conference Against Racism and his recent summit with Afghan and Pakistani leaders. (It also probably explains in part why there have been high-profile test-firings of new Iranian missiles.)

However, as Ahmadinejad broadened the campaign beyond the economy, so did his opponents. Rezaei called for more accountability, Karroubi appealed for wider social rights, and Mousavi argued for meaningful change to ensure representation of and response to the populace's concerns. And, doing so, they (perhaps unexpectedly) opened the gates for an extraordinary escalation in the political process.

"Reform" has always accompanied the Islamic Revolution in its political discourse. President Khatami promised changes in his 1997 victory (and, arguably, was undone because he failed to deliver in his eight years in office). Ahmadinejad promoted reform in his surprise rise to the top in 2005. Lest it be forgotten, he ran as the outsider against the "establishment", defeating former President Hashemi Rafsanjani in the second round.

The convergence of economic concerns and repeated disappointment with the lack of political and social reform can lead to resignation that there will never be improvement. However, that convergence also carries the potential for moments of great change. (Forgive my one moment of a superficial jump from Iran to a "Western" analogy, but think USA 2008.) And, from my outsider's perspective, that moment may have occurred this year in Iran.

Symbolically, the catalyst appears to have been the Presidential Debates. The mere announcement that there would be, for the first time in Iran, head-to-head discussions between the four major candidates raised public interest. However, it was the second of the debates, between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi, that lit the touchpaper. Thousands of people came onto the streets to watch the big-screen broadcasts. Politics turned into political theatre as Ahmadinejad --- again trying to stay off the ground of the economic situation --- levelled charges of corruption against not only Mousavi but also former Presidents Khatami and Rafsanjani but impropriety against Mousavi's wife and, equally importantly, as Mousavi overcame initial nervousness to put an effective case against the President's four years in office.

What does it means tomorrow? Any prediction of a victor would be not only fool-hardy but premature. After all, this is only the first round of the election when, unless anyone captures an unlikely majority of the vote, four candidates are narrowed to the top two. (I really do not believe many Western journalists, in their simplified renditions of the campaign, have noticed this.)

Those top two --- although this should not diminish the efforts of Rezaei and Karroubi --- will probably be Ahmadinejad and Karroubi. So, once more on the narrow but important ground of the pragmatic, there will be assessments of whether Karroubi will endorse Mousavi and his voters will follow (probable) and whether Rezaei will express any second-round preference, publicly or privately (uncertain). Ahmadinejad will likely re-double his paradoxical effort to portray himself as the "outsider" running, after four years in office, against the corrupt establishment of political figures such as Rafsanjani, although this may be curbed by the increasing disquiet not only of many voters but also of politicians and clerics over the tactic. Mousavi will turn the President's tactic around, portraying Ahmadinejad as not only the insider but the leader who has frittered away his mandate, and the good of the Iranian people, since 2005.

But what will happen tomorrow and even in the second round does not capture the ongoing importance of these recent months.

On my visits to Iran, and afterwards in correspondence with friends and colleagues, I have learned about and been reminded often of the "third generation", those Iranians who came of age after the Islamic Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. Quite often, the third generation was characterised as detached from the Revolution, disillusioned, dissatisfied. In recent weeks, however, the third generation --- and more than a few other Iranians --- have been in rallies, on the streets (on Monday, there was the largest outside gathering in more than a decade), and, yes, even on Facebook with excitement and some expectation.

I don't know if this constitutes a "Gradual Revolution", another phrase that I have frequently heard. I certainly would not twist and misrepresent it with the politically-loaded "Velvet Revolution". But, again as an outsider, there has been an opening of debate and thus of political space which could be significant not just for this election but for years to come.

Put simply --- and anticipating Western headlines after Friday about "The Obama Effect" in Iran, about "moderates" v. "hard-liners", about reinforcement or downfall of an Axis running from Iran to Syria to Lebanon's Hezbollah to Palestine's hamas --- these events first and foremost are not about the US. They are not about a clash in the Middle East, in nuclear arsenals, between civilisations.

These events are about Iranians: their concerns, their hopes, their ideals. And, whatever the outcome tomorrow and in the second round, they should be respected as such.

Iran's Election: Summary of Ahmadinejad's Final TV Message (10 June)

Related Post: Iran - A Preview of Tomorrow’s Presidential Election

From the United States Government Open Source Center via Juan Cole:

Tehran Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 1 in Persian at 1820 GMT on 10 June began to broadcast a recorded election message by Iranian President Ahmadinezhad.

Television allocated Ahmadinezhad time to record a message, in order to respond to remarks made against him by other election candidates in their live TV debates, in Ahmadinezhad's absence. The other candidates were also allocated airtime, but all three opponents decided not to submit messages. Television allocated Ahmadinezhad a maximum length film of 20 minutes.

In his recorded message, the Iranian president said that it was all against one in this race. Ahmadinezhad said the other candidates opted for false accusations, as they knew they could not compete. The president said that his administration achieved outstanding results, and said that he was attacked because the other candidates wanted a psychological war. He added: "They constantly accused me of deceit."

He said the fact that Iran made progress in its nuclear program, and in many other programs, are not lies. He said his administration built many hospitals, and Iran was successful is sports, contrary to what other candidates say.

Ahmadinezhad said that he is always polite. He added that if he attacked some individuals, this was only to defend people's rights. Ahmadinezhad once again defended his decision to raise the case of Musavi's wife on TV. He said that Musavi's wife obtained her degree unlawfully. He said he had always supported students, and added that he is the real representative of the students and university.

Ahmadinezhad said millions of CDs containing false information about him had been distributed. He said that his relatives do not work in government offices, and he never favored any of his relatives. Ahmadinezhad said that the graphics which other candidates showed are not true. He said other candidates use information provided by Israeli research companies. He stressed that his administration is honest, and had been chosen by the people.

The Iranian president said that Iran's economy is growing under his supervision. He promised that he will resolve the inflation issue, and explained that he is aware that there are still problems.

Ahmadinezhad asked his supporters to stay calm, as his victory is guaranteed. He added that he has information that his opponents trail in the polls.

This recorded speech ended at 1840 GMT.

Lebanon and Iran Elections: It's All About (The) US

Related Post: Lebanon’s Elections - From Global “Showdown” to Local Reality

This piece started as an update on our main analysis of the results of Lebanon's elections, but with the US and British media's misreading, simplifications, and exaggerations spreading like kudzu, a separate entry is needed.

For Michael Slackman of The New York Times, it's not just a question of Washington shaping the Lebanese outcome: "Political analysts...attribute it in part to President Obama’s campaign of outreach to the Arab and Muslim world." You can slap the Obama model on top of any election to get the right result: "Lebanon’s election could be a harbinger of Friday’s presidential race in Iran, where a hard-line anti-American president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, may be losing ground to his main moderate challenger, Mir Hussein Moussavi."

Simon Tisdall, normally a shrewd observer of international affairs, trots out the same simplicities in The Guardian of London: "It's possible that watching Iranians will be encouraged in their turn to go out and vote for reformist, west-friendly candidates in Friday's presidential election. Lebanon may be just the beginning of the 'Obama effect'."

Juan Cole has posted a more thoughtful assessment, even as he opens with the reductionist and sensationalist declaration, "President Obama's hopes for progress on the Arab-Israeli peace process would have been sunk if Hezbollah had won the Lebanese elections." And Howard Schneider of The Washington Post, although premature in his anointing of Saad Hariri as Lebanon's next and primary leader (setting aside not only President Suleiman but also presuming that Hariri will be chosen as PM), sets out "the choice...between a showdown with his supporters, a showdown with Hezbollah or -- the more likely outcome -- a continued stalemate over the very issues voters hoped they were addressing in Sunday's balloting".

But if there is to be a simplification, in light of the internal political issues that follow the election, I would like it to come from Robert Fisk in The Independent of London:

What stands out internationally is that the Lebanese still believe in parliamentary democracy and President Obama, so soon after his Cairo lecture, will recognise that this tiny country still believes in free speech and free elections. Another victory for Lebanon, in other words, beneath the swords of its neighbours.