Iran's Elections: Ahmadinejad Plays His Israel-US Cards

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been working flat-out to maximize his vote before the Iranian Presidential election on June 12. His ‘hard-line’ stand against the West was subtly elaborated when he referred to Israel with the words of Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Revolution: , when on Friday. Referring to Israel, he quoted Khomeini’s words: "They are like dogs. If you attack them, they retreat; if you retreat they attack."

Ahmadinejad’s verbal salvos against the West are part of an effort to criticise his opponents, linking them to the "concessionary" policies of the previous reformist government, led by Mohammad Khatami. According to Ahmadinejad, Khatami "could not show resistance against pressures", whereas the current government succeeded in "deflecting" pressures and “burying the sanctions in the cemetery of history".

However, if Ahmadinejad’s rhetorical attacks are primarily in a domestic arena, they are bolstered by external foes. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s National Security Adviser, Uzi Arad, said last Thursday: “Israel maintains its liberty to operate against Iran.” He added that on past occasions, Israel had not updated the US on military options.

Arad may have been shaky in his historical references, comparing Ahmadinejad to Egypt's President Nasser in 1956 and 1967, but this did not deter the United States from dropping its own hints. US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, stated on Friday that President Obama had asked him to update the plans for the use of military force against Iran, prepared during former President George W. Bush’s terms in office.

It is irrelevant whether Gates and Obama are opposing the use of military force against Iran at this point; what matters is what Iranians perceive on the eve of the elections. Indeed, Amadinejad is countering on such perceptions in the next three weeks. That is what does matter in determining the ‘retreat-attack’ game…

EA Exclusive: Israel Unravels Obama's "Grand Design" for the Middle East

On Monday, Benjamin Netanyahu had a chat with President Obama. We wrote at the time, "The very public refusal of the Israeli Prime Minister [to accept separate Israeli and Palestinian states] is likely to damage, if not sink, far more than the American position on Israel-Palestine. The bigger casualty may be Obama’s strategy towards the Middle East and the Islamic world."

We wrote too soon. What happened after Netanyahu left the White House--- according to Israeli media, unnoticed by most US outlets --- is even more important.

President Obama, contrary to our earlier assessments, may have had a grand plan to offer on 4 June in Cairo. And Israeli officials, publicly and privately, have spent the last 96 hours ripping that plan apart.

The first revelation came on Wednesday in the Hebrew-language newspaper Yediot Arhonot. A report, summarised by the English-language Jerusalem Post, claimed that the Obama Administration was preparing the proposal of "a demilitarized Palestinian state, with east Jerusalem as its capital, within the next four years....[The] independent, democratic and contiguous Palestinian state would not have its own army and would be forbidden from making military agreements with other states, in order to provide for Israel's security." Palestinians would give up their claim of a "right of return" to land previously held in Israel, with Europe and the US arranging compensation for refugees.

The newspaper, citing Palestinian sources, claimed that the plan was developed in recent talks between President Obama and King Abdullah. There would also be wider talks with Syria and Lebanon, and an effect to get a general agreement between Israel and Arab States.

Some of Yediot Arhonot's information is shaky. There is an inconsistency between East Jerusalem as a Palestinian capital and the paper's later assertion of Jerusalem as an international city, and Abdullah's meetings in Washington were to brief him as an emissary for the plan. Still the revelations, when matched up to the diplomacy of Obama officials and allies like Abdullah and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in recent weeks, make sense.

Most importantly, Israeli officials believe this is a possibility. That is why, on the plane back from Washington, Netanyahu advisors told reporters that Obama's two-state plan was "childish" and "juvenile". (I first read this news on Wednesday, again via Yediot Arhonot; it was later picked up by the Associated Press, although I saw no mention of it in US newspapers or television.) Far from contradicting those advisors, the Prime Minister --- speaking on Jerusalem Day, which commemorating the Israeli takeover of the city in the 1967 Six-Day War --- declared yesterday, "Jerusalem was always ours and will always be ours."

Netanyahu has made other, balancing manoeuvres. He held out the prospect of renewed discussions with Syria, although he pointedly added that there must be no preconditions, such as a Syrian demand for the return of the Golan Heights. Israeli forces destroyed an illegal settlement yesterday.

These, however, are only sidesteps as Israel re-stakes its position both against specific US demands and the general Obama plan. On Wednesday, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton renewed Obama's call for a halt to Israeli expansion, putting it in stronger terms, ""We want to see a stop to settlement construction - additions, natural growth, any kind of settlement activity - that is what the president has called for." The removal of one illegal settlement could not cover up the resounding silence of the Netanyahu Government to Clinton's demand.

More importantly, the Obama Administration appears to be stuck --- in the face of far-from-subtle Israeli opposition --- on how to re-shape the grand design for a Palestinian state and Arab-Israeli agreements. Having found a way to exclude Hamas from the "engagement", Obama has been unable to bring Netanyahu on board.

Which means --- with 13 days to the Cairo speech --- that Israel has sabotaged Plan A. Is there any prospect of a Plan B?

The UN Special Envoy to the Middle East: "Let's Wait and See."

Robert Serry, the UN Special Envoy to the Middle East, appeared on BBC's Hard Talk, hosted by Stephen Sackur, last Monday.  Serry's "wait and see" approach, shedding light on the relationship between Israel and the UN since Operation Cast Lead in January, again called the extent of the effectiveness of the UN into question.

Here are some remarkable extracts from the conversation:

The Confession of the Trust Problem between the United Nations and the State of Israel

S.S.: Robert Serry, welcome to Hard Talk. Would you accept that you have a problem? You are the UN’s envoy to the Middle East peace process, yet one party to the Middle East conflict, that is, Israel, does not trust the UN.

R.S.: I took the job; I knew it was not going to be an easy one. What you refer to is something which I think we have to resolve. And I do believe that Israel will look at peacekeeping operations. And the UN peacekeeping operation is one of the most successful.

S.S.: UN plays a role in various ways across the Middle East region. But would you accept that there is a fundamental problem of trust between Israel and the United Nations?

R.S.: Yes, I think we have a problem, and it is there to be resolved.

“Yes” to an Investigation but No Breakthrough:

S.S.: Do you believe that war crimes were committed? And a special panel created by the Human Rights Council must go to Gaza and Israel and do a detailed investigation of allegations these war crimes?

R.S.: Certainly. And the Goldstone mission is preparing to go.

S.S.: The Israelis will not let you into Gaza. What did they say; when you said the panel must be allowed in? What did they say?

R.S.: We have not yet received a final answer on that issue.

A Vague Answer to the Current Situation of Gazans:

S.S.: John Ging who runs the Relief Operation in Gaza Strip. I am quoting his words: “The level of access to humanitarian assistance in Gaza today is wholly and totally inadequate.” If the situation is current and if the Israelis are refusing to lift the blockade, to stop the situation being wholly and totally inadequate, does that constitute a violation of humanitarian law?

R.S.: You can not keep a population hostage, no matter how difficult a security situation Israel claims it finds itself in. We have had a war, and after the war, none of the underlying issues in Gaza have been resolved. The rocket fire, into the southern Israel, which is completely unacceptable, and the Secretary General has always called it for what it is, terror acts. But for the moment, there is a relative calm. Then we have the continued siege. There is enough food and medicine, but we cannot start the process of reconstruction four months after the conflict. Then you have Palestinian reconciliation. You have illicit smuggling of arms, and of course, Gilad Shalit. We had all these issues before, and we still have them. We desperately need a more positive situation for Gaza. The UN has been one of the first to go for that.

A Cold Shower:

S.S.: When I hear that long list, I wonder if you have one of the most frustrating jobs in the world. I can talk about a number of mission you have tried to undertake, and it seems that you have absolutely no leverage, no impact at all.

R.S.: I don’t think so.

S.S.: Can you point to where you have actually changed the situation on the ground in this conflict between Israel and the Palestinians?

R.S.: Come back to Gaza, we are making a difference. We are involved in the difficult situation between the Palestinian factions.

Did Someone Ask about Hamas?

S.S.: But you can not talk to Hamas, can you?
R.S.: I don’t talk to them myself.
S.S.: You do not to talk to Hamas, do you think you should?
R.S.: Let us take a step back.
S.S.: A direct question, should you be able to talking to Hamas, given your role as the UN Special Envoy?
S.R.: If Hamas would take the steps which and I needed to have a successful reconciliation – these are the real issues. If it would be like that, I would be the first to talk to them.
S.S.: Your predecessor has made it quite plain that he believes the UN, the players to the peace process, must engage with and involve Hamas. He said that isolating them has been a disaster.
S.R.: I agree with him there. Having a siege in Gaza leads nowhere. It is a policy which I do not support. We have the Quartet. We have the so called Quartet principles which mean that the Palestinian government needs to renounce violence. It needs to recognize Israel and abide by previous commitments. We are now at a very important moment if we are looking ahead. A renewed, serious attempt, led by the new administration of the United States.
S.S.: Here is what strikes me… The situation has changed. We have Barak Obama in the White House; a man who says he wants to reach out to those enemies who prepared to unclench their fists. We have George Mitchell who was involved in the process of making peace in Northern Ireland when the peacemakers had to talk to the IRA long before they put down their weapons and committed to the lasting peace. We also have the Americans in Iraq who worked with indeed armed men. In this 21st century of peacemaking, can you not accept that you will have to accept Hamas?
R.S.: I would be the first and happy to talk to Hamas if it indeed leads to some positive results.

“Give Time to Netanyahu”:

S.S.: You told there about a two-state solution. Those are words which Benjamin Netanyahu has steadfastly refused to use since he became the Israeli prime minister. Does that worry you?
R.S.: He will talk with President Obama…
S.S.: You have a Prime Minister who finds it very difficult to even to say the words two-state solution, which you say must be the very underpinning of any solution? Is that a problem?
R.S.: It could be a problem.
S.S.: It is a very big problem.
R.S.: We have a new government. The elected government is having its own policy review at the moment. We have to give time to complete that. They will then tell us where they stand.

“Wait & See” Part 1:

S.S.: If the Israelis refuse to cooperate with this UN Commission, what will relations be?
R.S.: Let’s wait and see.

“Wait & See” Part 2:

S.S.: Do you think the government led by Benjamin Netanyahu is going to stop the settlement expansion?
R.S.: Let’s wait and see.
S.S.: All right, let’s wait and see on that.

Sadly we can't embed a video here, but readers in the UK can watch the show on the BBC iPlayer.

Israel-Palestine: Obama's Two-Week Window

The Netanyahu Meeting: Obama Wins Battle, Loses War
Assessing Netanyahu-Obama: Israel, Iran, and Palestine
Video and Transcript : Obama-Netanyahu News Conference

The most interesting follow-up to Monday's meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Obama is in Ha'aretz. In contrast to the non-coverage in The New York Times and the puff pieces in The Washington Post (Howard Schneider: Netanyahu was fantastic; David Ignatius: Obama is fantastic), the Israeli newspaper has the important story:

The Obama Administration is scrambling, against a 4 June deadline, for something to offer the Arab world. And the prospects aren't looking good.

Aluf Benn and Barak Ravid open their article with the dramatic statement from an American official: "The United States expects Israel to make concrete concessions to the Palestinians before U.S. President Barack Obama's visit to Cairo." It soon turns out that the concessions, though welcome, aren't that dramatic:Washington wants the Israeli Cabinet to agree on Sunday to "ease its restrictions on imports and exports of goods to Gaza...to ease restrictions on movement in the West Bank".

That is unlikely to be enough. American officials also told Benn and Ravid that "senior Saudi officials have so far rejected outright the idea of gradual normalization". Riyadh is insisting that the US must press for negotiations on "a detailed plan for an Israeli-Palestinian final-status agreement". The plan would include "an Israeli withdrawal from almost all of the West Bank, a division of Jerusalem, and a complex arrangement on the [Palestinian] refugees".

Netanyahu's suggestion to Obama "that the Arab states amend the Arab peace initiative to make it more attractive to Israel" was flatly rejected by the Saudis in private talks with the US. In particular, Saudi Arabia balked at any concessions on the rights of refugees.

On other issues, the US and Israeli delegations used the old tactic of "committees" to cover up differences and thus lack of movement. Because Netanyahu refused Obama's request to halt the expansion of Jewish settlements, that will now have a Working Group. So will Iran and "normalization with Arab states".

All of which is well and good to cover the non-results of the Obama-Netanyahu talks, but next to useless for the President's grand speech in 15 days. If Barack can offer no more than "working groups", and token shipments of goods across the Gaza border, he may want to consider what "hope" and "change" will mean to his audience.

The Netanyahu Meeting: Obama Wins Battle, Loses War

Latest Post: Israel-Palestine - Obama's Two-Week Window
Assessing Netanyahu-Obama: Israel, Iran, and Palestine
Video and Transcript : Obama-Netanyahu News Conference

Enduring America, 16 May: "What President Obama needs now is not an Iranian concession but an Israeli one. If Netanyahu holds fast and does not open up the possibility of “genuine” talks with the Palestinian Authority, including discussions of political status as well as economic development and security, then Obama’s message — launched on Inauguration Day — of a new day in the Middle East is looking shaky."

Obama didn't get it. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made his high-profile visit and engaged in two hours of discussions with the President. And after those talks, there was no sign that Netanyahu had given any ground on the US showpiece demand: two-state negotiations with the Palestinian Authority.

And Obama, or at least his advisors, may not get it. That very public refusal of the Israeli Prime Minister is likely to damage, if not sink, far more than the American position on Israel-Palestine. The bigger casualty may be Obama's strategy towards the Middle East and the Islamic world.

The outcome is the result both of flaws in the Administration's Palestine approach, which has never been comprehensive but rests on the narrower illusion that peace rests on an agreement between the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Authority and --- more importantly in the short term --- the tactical error of announcing an Obama talk from Cairo on 4 June.

Up to two weeks ago, the Administration was not suffering from an approach which was making little headway but still had the superficial gloss of "engagement". With little possibility of an Israel-Palestine breakthrough, Obama and Co. could do the minimum --- keep the Palestinian Authority's Mahmoud Abbas propped up and thus keep Hamas as arm's distance --- while maintaining the priority of the US policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Indeed, Obama's success yesterday was connected with "Af-Pak". By blocking Netanyahu's demand that Washington break off talks with Tehran, the President ensured that Iran was kept in play as the US sought co-operation for its military campaign in Afghanistan. He could wave good-bye to Bibi and return to the central crisis for his Administration.

The only problem is that by yesterday, in symbolism if not substance, Obama had given himself another Presidential talk: Get an Israel-Palestine Settlement, Save the World.

When Obama takes the podium in Egypt in two weeks' time, it will be the fourth time that he has put out his unclenched fist to the Arab and Islamic worlds. The Inaugural Address, the interview on Al-Arabiya, and the speech from Ankara were generally received as the since words of a US President who wanted to rebuild America's relations --- not just political but cultural and ideological --- with countries and peoples in the Middle East and beyond.

Now, however, almost five months have elapsed since the Gaza War, two since a new Israeli Government took office. Inevitably, the question emerges --- especially since the US is putting Palestine First back at Netanyahu's Israel First --- so what, in substance rather than rhetoric, is going to be done?

This isn't to say that Palestine is everyone's political priority. However, in part because of history, in part because of the Gaza War, and in large part because it has become a touchstone for justice and legitimacy, other Governments have to pay heed to it.

So, for example, up to December 2008, Syria was looking towards direct talks with Israel on political and economic issues. Then Tel Aviv chose to launch the Gaza attack. Now, although the Obama Administration has tried to restart the process with Damascus, Palestine stands in the way. Netanyahu has effectively said, Iran First, Then Palestine, Then Maybe Syria. Meanwhile, Damascus concentrates on bolstering its regional position after its withdrawal from Lebanon, building links not only in the Middle East but with Turkey and Iran.

Saudi Arabia, whose 2002 plan for Israel-Palestine talks was loudly rebuffed by the Bush Administration, also hangs back. Why, given internal instability and its interest in other conflicts such as the Pakistani situation, expend political capital when Washington has committed itself to leading the way?

So instead the Arab point man for the Israeli-Palestinian, and indeed a supposed Arab-Israeli, detente is King Abdullah of Jordan. Whatever his altruism in serving this cause, it also repays the US for the aid necessary to prop up the Jordanian economy. Never mind that the grand notion of an Islamic agreement with Tel Aviv, especially the notion that Israel can be recognised while Palestine is not, is still in the realm of fantasy: someone has to go through the motions.

Meanwhile Hamas continues its slow entry from the cold. While its latest initiatives, such as Khalid Meshaal's restating of the offer of a 10-year truce and distancing from the 1988 Charter, are predictably being dismissed by many in the US, they are resonating in the Middle East. The organisation which, up to December 2008, was still being treated as a pariah by many other governments is now gaining acceptance. Grudging acceptance, but still an acceptance of political legitimacy.

The problem is that a lot of folks, maybe not in Middle Eastern Governments, but amongst populations in and beyond the region, are going to ask the Emperor if his clothes are real when Obama speaks in Cairo. And I can't see where the cloth is coming from. When Hosni Mubarak declares in Washington on 26 May that he is very happy with the Israel-Palestine process, most will recognise that the Egyptian leader --- now closer to Tel Aviv than to many Arab states --- is doing it for his position with Washington. And even if Palestinian Authority Abbas declares in Washington on 28 May that he's quite happy to sit down with Netanyahu, he will do so as a weak (if not illegitimate) leader.

Obama continues to impress with his day-to-day tactics, and he did so yesterday against another master tactician, but as strategists, he and his Administration have put themselve in a difficult position.

Where I come from, it's called a "hiding to nothing".