Journalism 101: How to Create a Conflict with Iran

BRONZE MEDAL: FROM 9-11 TO TEHRAN

A good rule of thumb is that any purported reporting by Con Coughlin of the Daily Telegraph should be considered a press release from Britain's MI6 or a "friendly" intelligence service.

The latest of these was Sunday's "Iran receives al Qaeda praise for role in terrorist attacks". The Con-man intoned:

Fresh links between Iran's Revolutionary Guards and al-Qaeda have been uncovered following interception of a letter from the terrorist leadership that hails Tehran's support for a recent attack on the American embassy in Yemen, which killed 16 people.

I'm betting that Coughlin didn't venture to Northwest Pakistan to retrieve "the letter, which was signed by Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's second in command". I'm pretty sure he hasn't been to Tehran or even Yemen. Instead, he strolled to a London club or other suitable hang-out to chat with "Western security officials, [who] said the missive thanked the leadership of Iran's Revolutionary Guards for providing assistance to al-Qaeda to set up its terrorist network in Yemen".

Since Coughlin didn't produce the letter or a single extract from it, we'll have to take his word and that this is really the smoking stationary proving an Iran-Al Qa'eda link. Coughlin's only contribution, beyond parroting his sources, is to repeat the tired story about the presence of Saad bin Laden, Osama's son, in Iran. (The Iranians have claimed for years that bin Laden is under house arrest.)

This was the same tale woven in spring 2003 to "prove" Iran's support of Wahhabi terrorism, which will lead us to our Gold Medal story. But first....

SILVER MEDAL: HERE COME THE (ISRAELI) BOMBS

Uzi Mahnaimi, who reports for The Times of London from Tel Aviv, is a favourite outlet for Israeli and American officials who want to give Tehran a scare.

So on Sunday Mahnaimi was primed, on the eve of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's visit to Washington, to report, "Israel is concerned that Bush will pass the Iranian hot potato to Barack Obama, the president-elect, while the last chance of destroying Tehran’s nuclear bomb-making programme may be passing."

Mahnaimi offers Tel Aviv's spin on the Iranian nuclear programme, “They are working on three programmes at once. They are speeding up their centrifuges to enrich uranium, calibrating a warhead to fit their ballistic missiles and improving the range and accuracy of their ballistic missiles," before getting to the drama of his piece:

In the baking heat of the Negev desert, the Israeli air force’s top guns are training for a secret mission. No one here knows if, or when, a raid will get the political go-ahead but the pilots say it could be their third attack in three decades on a nuclear plant and easily the most dangerous.

Perhaps, if Mahnaimi hadn't published this same narrative again and again in recent years, we might be sweating out the prospect of an Israeli attack. In this case, however, it's a rather limp shaking of the fist at Tehran.

GOLD MEDAL: AND THE NEXT IRANIAN LEADER IS....

The surprise winner is The Independent of London, which in the past has been a more considered voice against both irresponsible journalism and a drumbeat for war in the Persian Gulf. Last week, however, Anne Penketh couldn't resist the temptation of an exclusive chat with the son of the last Shah of Iran:

Reza Pahlavi (who answers to both "Your Majesty" and Mr Pahlavi), is plotting his return to the land he was forced to leave as a teenager when the 1979 revolution brought militant Shiism to power.

There are sceptical notes in the article --- "The wealthy US-based businessman seems remote from the concerns of the average Iranian" --- but Penketh's overall contribution is to the notion of a youthful Iranian population ready to topple the regime:

Mr Pahlavi, who concentrated in the past on rousing the Iranian diaspora, is now placing his hopes in the young generation which makes up 70 per cent of the Iranian population. "We need to discover the new generation, the children of the revolution," he argues.

Penketh's "exclusive" isn't so exclusive if you do a quick Internet search of newspapers from the spring of 2003. Indeed, The Times of London was going so far as to recommend a new Shah on its editorial pages. All of this was part and parcel of an American consideration that, after liberating Baghdad, Tehran was next.

There were student demonstrations in May/June 2003 in the capital, but these never developed into a serious threat to the Government. Five years later, despite Con Coughlin and Uzi Mahnaimi's efforts, I'm not sure the situation has changed. Indeed, as Penketh has to conclude after his visit to Reza Pahlavi's "London townhouse...a far cry from the sumptuous palaces of his father in Tehran":

While Mr Pahlavi might have had an open door to the White House under George Bush, it is less likely the Obama administration will have the same enthusiasm for the exiled Iranian leaders, having offered diplomatic overtures to Tehran.

Unintentionally Ironic Statement of the Day

William Kristol in the New York Times: "So I hope the best and the brightest who will be joining the new president will at least entertain the possibility that a lot of what they think they know is wrong."

Forget about those around the new Prez, Mr Bill. What about those who advised the current one?

Fun Statement from the Past --- Mr Bill on 14 January 2008: "[There is] a refusal to admit real success because that success has been achieved under the leadership of ... George W. Bush."

Iraq: The Breaking-Point Politics Beyond the Surge

For months, I've put forth the paradox surrounding the proposed Status of Forces Agreement between the US and Iraqi Governments. As Washington grows increasingly desperate to get the fig-leaf of the Agreement to underpin its military presence, the political fight over that agreement highlights the mounting irrelevance of US forces.

This week could highlight that paradox. Today the New York Times, close to disgracefully, parades a series of experts (Frederick Kagan, General David Petraeus' former executive officer Peter Mansoor, Petraeus worshipper Linda Robinson, and --- in an act that defines chutzpah --- Donald Rumsfeld) urging us to "stay the military course". James Glanz's Sunday puff-piece in the paper is "In Ramadi, With A Fresh Coat of Paint" .

In Baghdad, however, folks aren't taking their leads from the Times. And I suspect many in the Bush Administration --- though not the President, who is blissfully tripping towards the exit door --- are worrying they aren't taking direction from the US.

On Wednesday, the Iraqi Parliament was convened to support the second reading of the Agreement but was suspended amidst shouting and scuffles. The scene was repeated on Thursday. On Friday, the cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and his supporters made their show of political force after prayers, as thousands took to the streets to denounce the agreement. A stream of Parliamentarians let it be known that they would be absent from Baghdad this week, as they had decided to fulfil their once-in-a-lifetime obligation to make the pilgrimage to Mecca.

Perhaps most importantly, the leading clerical figure in Iraq, Ayatollah Sistani, declared that he would not support the agreement unless there was a national consensus behind it. Now, as the leading Shi'a parties --- the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and Daw'a --- seemed to have swung behind ratification, leading to the Cabinet's vote in favour last weekend, Sistani's statement pointed to the worry that the key Sunni parties would not offer their support.

In mid-week Juan Cole, with his specialist reading of the Arab press and other signs from Iraq, was still predicting that Parliament would narrowly ratify the Agreement; however, he also noted that without clear Sunni backing, Sistani's condition for consensus would not be met. By today, he was being notably cautious. With the Iraqi Parliament postponing the vote again, this time from Monday to Wednesday, Cole wrote, "It is still not clear how the Sunni Arab MPs will vote; without their support, the agreement would likely be seen as a joint Shiite-Kurdish conspiracy."

Absolutely. Here's the twist in the surge that almost no one in the mainstream US media has picked up. The well-trumpeted wonder of the Petraeus strategy was the bolstering of local and regional Sunni groups, the Awakening Council, in provinces outside Baghdad. The unnoted but always-lurking questions was the relationshp of those groups to the national government.

Well, now we're getting the answer. Sunni parties have the perception that, with its desperation to get an Agreement before the UN mandate for the occupation expires on 31 December, Washington has swung again into backing of the Shia-dominated government. It's a cycle that has recurred periodically since 2003, for example, in the debates over the Iraqi constitution in 2005. Meanwhile, there's a minority but very significant Shi'a faction, embodied by but not exclusive to the "Sadrists", who are ready to fight this Agreement to the end, inside Parliament and possibly on the streets.

Which is why the political process had reached the point on Saturday where the Defence and Interior Ministers called a press conference and invoked "the specters of a reborn insurgency, foreign attack and even piracy" if ratification did not occur. This in turn followed a Thursday speech from Prime Minister al-Maliki and, according to some press reports, his threats to resign if Parliament did not act appropriately.

Let's call it forthrightly: if the current Government does not get ratification, it will collapse. And even if it gets a narrow victory, it faces the prospect of a renewed sectarian conflict, at best one of protracted political tension and at worse a return to violence. Hey, even supposed allies may be suspect --- it was reported this weekend that planeloads of weapons from Bulgaria were arriving in Kurdish territory.

Where is the US military in all this? Well, an inadvertent black comedy illustration came in a Thursday story in the Washington Post. The headline portended another good-news surge tale: "U.S. Troops in Baghdad Take a Softer Approach Focus Shifts to Reconciling Factions" . The opening paragraph offered a more pertient, off-script message:

It was billed as a peace concert in war-scarred Baghdad. But after 30 minutes of poetry and patriotic songs, only a scattering of tribal leaders and dark-suited bureaucrats were sitting in the vast expanse of white plastic chairs before a stage painted with doves.

Iran: The Way Forward

Twenty specialists on Iran, including ambassadors, government officials, and scholars, have issued a statement calling on the new President to pursue "engagement" with Iran. It should be an important and influential document. Whether it is will be an important guide to how much "change" is delivered in US foreign policy under Barack Obama.

The text is reprinted from Informed Comment, the website of Juan Cole, one of the signatories. The website also publishes the statement's Annex of Eight Myths, such as "President Ahmadinejad calls the shots on nuclear and foreign policy" and "The political system of the Islamic Republic is frail and ripe for regime change".

Among the many challenges that will greet President-elect Obama when he takes office, there are few, if any, more urgent and complex than the question of Iran. There are also few issues more clouded by myths and misconceptions. In this Joint Experts' Statement on Iran, a group of top scholars, experts and diplomats - with years of experience studying and dealing with Iran - have come together to clear away some of the myths that have driven the failed policies of the past and to outline a factually-grounded, five-step strategy for dealing successfully with Iran in the future.

Joint Experts' Statement on Iran

Despite recent glimmers of diplomacy, the United States and Iran remain locked in a cycle of threats and defiance that destabilizes the Middle East and weakens U.S. national security.

Today, Iran and the United States are unable to coordinate campaigns against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, their common enemies. Iran is either withholding help or acting to thwart U.S. interests in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Gaza. Within Iran, a looming sense of external threat has empowered hard-liners and given them both motive and pretext to curb civil liberties and further restrict democracy. On the nuclear front, Iran continues to enrich uranium in spite of binding U.N. resolutions, backed by economic sanctions, calling for it to suspend enrichment.

U.S. efforts to manage Iran through isolation, threats and sanctions have been tried intermittently for more than two decades. In that time they have not solved any major problem in U.S.-Iran relations, and have made most of them worse. Faced with the manifest failure of past efforts to isolate or economically coerce Iran, some now advocate escalation of sanctions or even military attack. But dispassionate analysis shows that an attack would almost certainly backfire, wasting lives, fomenting extremism and damaging the long-term security interests of both the U.S and Israel. And long experience has shown that prospects for successfully coercing Iran through achievable economic sanctions are remote at best.

Fortunately, we are not forced to choose between a coercive strategy that has clearly failed and a military option that has very little chance of success. There is another way, one far more likely to succeed: Open the door to direct, unconditional and comprehensive negotiations at the senior diplomatic level where personal contacts can be developed, intentions tested, and possibilities explored on both sides. Adopt policies to facilitate unofficial contacts between scholars, professionals, religious leaders, lawmakers and ordinary citizens. Paradoxical as it may seem amid all the heated media rhetoric, sustained engagement is far more likely to strengthen United States national security at this stage than either escalation to war or continued efforts to threaten, intimidate or coerce Iran.

Here are five key steps the United States should take to implement an effective diplomatic strategy with Iran:

1. Replace calls for regime change with a long-term strategy

Threats are not cowing Iran and the current regime in Tehran is not in imminent peril. But few leaders will negotiate in good faith with a government they think is trying to subvert them, and that perception may well be the single greatest barrier under U.S. control to meaningful dialogue with Iran. The United States needs to stop the provocations and take a long-term view with this regime, as it did with the Soviet Union and China. We might begin by facilitating broad-ranging people-to-people contacts, opening a U.S. interest section in Tehran, and promoting cultural exchanges.

2. Support human rights through effective, international means

While the United States is rightly concerned with Iran's worsening record of human rights violations, the best way to address that concern is through supporting recognized international efforts. Iranian human rights and democracy advocates confirm that American political interference masquerading as "democracy promotion" is harming, not helping, the cause of democracy in Iran.

3. Allow Iran a place at the table - alongside other key states - in shaping the future of Iraq, Afghanistan and the region.

This was the recommendation of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group with regard to Iraq. It may be counter-intuitive in today's political climate - but it is sound policy. Iran has a long-term interest in the stability of its neighbors. Moreover, the United States and Iran support the same government in Iraq and face common enemies (the Taliban and al-Qaeda) in Afghanistan. Iran has shown it can be a valuable ally when included as a partner, and a troublesome thorn when not. Offering Iran a place at the table cannot assure cooperation, but it will greatly increase the likelihood of cooperation by giving Iran something it highly values that it can lose by non-cooperation. The United States might start by appointing a special envoy with broad authority to deal comprehensively and constructively with Iran (as opposed to trading accusations) and explore its willingness to work with the United States on issues of common concern.

4. Address the nuclear issue within the context of a broader U.S.-Iran opening

Nothing is gained by imposing peremptory preconditions on dialogue. The United States should take an active leadership role in ongoing multilateral talks to resolve the nuclear impasse in the context of wide-ranging dialogue with Iran. Negotiators should give the nuclear talks a reasonable deadline, and retain the threat of tougher sanctions if negotiations fail. They should also, however, offer the credible prospect of security assurances and specific, tangible benefits such as the easing of U.S. sanctions in response to positive policy shifts in Iran. Active U.S. involvement may not cure all, but it certainly will change the equation, particularly if it is part of a broader opening.

5. Re-energize the Arab-Israeli peace process and act as an honest broker in that process

Israel's security lies in making peace with its neighbors. Any U.S. moves towards mediating the Arab-Israeli crisis in a balanced way would ease tensions in the region, and would be positively received as a step forward for peace. As a practical matter, however, experience has shown that any long-term solution to Israel's problems with the Palestinians and Lebanon probably will require dealing, directly or indirectly, with Hamas and Hezbollah. Iran supports these organizations, and thus has influence with them. If properly managed, a U.S. rapprochement with Iran, even an opening of talks, could help in dealing with Arab-Israeli issues, benefiting Israel as well as its neighbors.

***

Long-standing diplomatic practice makes clear that talking directly to a foreign government in no way signals approval of the government, its policies or its actions. Indeed, there are numerous instances in our history when clear-eyed U.S. diplomacy with regimes we deemed objectionable - e.g., Soviet Union, China, North Korea, Libya and Iran itself (cooperating in Afghanistan to topple the Taliban after 9/11) - produced positive results in difficult situations.

After many years of mutual hostility, no one should expect that engaging Iran will be easy. It may prove impossible. But past policies have not worked, and what has been largely missing from U.S. policy for most of the past three decades is a sustained commitment to real diplomacy with Iran. The time has come to see what true diplomacy can accomplish.

Signed:

* Ambassador Thomas Pickering (Co-chair)
* Ambassador James F. Dobbins (Co-chair)
* Gary G. Sick (Co-chair)
* Ali Banuazizi
* Mehrzad Boroujerdi
* Juan R.I. Cole
* Rola el-Husseini
* Farideh Farhi
* Geoffrey E. Forden
* Hadi Ghaemi
* Philip Giraldi
* Farhad Kazemi
* Stephen Kinzer
* Ambassador William G. Miller
* Emile A. Nakhleh
* Augustus Richard Norton
* Trita Parsi
* Barnett R. Rubin
* John Tirman
* James Walsh

Will Guantanamo Close?: Canuckistan on Press TV

Canuckistan, who wrote earlier this week about the situation of the detainees at Camp X-Ray at Guantanamo Bay, was on a Press TV panel to discuss "Guantanamo: Is It Really the End of an Era?" The full programme is available on Press TV's website.