The news stories in recent days might appear unrelated, but all of them point to behind-the-scenes manoeuvres and disagreements within the regime. It is too early, given the limited information, to understand exactly what is going on within the Islamic Republic, but it is well worth watching for emerging significance.
1. The Release of Mostafa Tajzadeh
During the week, Mostafa Tajzadeh, leading member of the reformist Islamic Iran Participation Front and former Deputy Interior Minister, was released without bail for the Iranian New Year.
As the Persian Nowruz New Year fast approaches and Iran’s post-election crisis enters its ninth month, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani remains as mercurial a figure as ever in Iranian politics. True to his nickname of Kooseh, or “The Shark”, Rafsanjani has been paying lip-service to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei while simultaneously signaling (if only tacitly) solidarity with Iran’s Green opposition movement. With his reputation as an incredibly calculating figure, it is hard to believe that this contradiction is coincidental. In fact, Rafsanjani’s high level of influence in the system may be paradoxically inhibiting him from more closely aligning with the Green Movement.
In many ways, Rafsanjani’s position resembles that of the boy who stuck his finger in the leaking dike in Hans Brinker’s classic tale.
Pedestrian posts the thoughts of Emad Bahavar, a political activist in the Freedom Movement of Iran, writer, and the head of “Supporters of Khatami and Mousavi” in the 2009 Presidential campaign. He was arrested shortly after the election, and released after two months. He was detained last week but released on Tuesday.
Bahavar’s recent article in Rooz Online, “The destination was to begin the journey”, was the reason for his latest arrest. This is Part 1 of 3, with the following parts coming out in the next few days:
The destination was to begin the journey Rooz Online, 6 March 2010
It is now quite obvious that what happened before and after the presidential election was a result of a very clumsy solution devised by security and military forces, to solve the “crisis of leadership” in the future system of the Islamic Republic. A solution that did not solve the crisis, and in fact, inflicted irreversible injury and damage to the very structure and legitimacy of the political system.
2135 GMT: Rumour of Day. Kalameh alleges that prisoners held in cellblock 209 of Evin Prison have been commanded to fill in forms about their views on election fraud and whether the protest leaders are connected to foreign countries.
2100 GMT: Dr Mohammad Maleki, the former head of Tehran University, has reportedly been released after 191 days in detention. Maleki, 76, suffers from prostate cancer.
2055 GMT: United4Iran has a profile of Jahanbakhsh Khanjani, former advisor to Iran’s Minister of Interior in the Khatami Presidency, who was released on 24 February after spending more than eight months in prison. According to another released prisoner, Khanjani was under pressure to confess and was constantly moved from general confinement to solidarity confinement.
2045 GMT: Sunday Absurdity. A slow day, which leading to a perusing of opinion in the newspapers. Unfortunately, that turns up a piece of anti-Muslim diatribe posing as analysis by Ephraim Karsh in The New York Times: “Muslims Won’t Play Together”. The slurs have to be read to be believed, but here is the policy recommendation: “A military strike must remain a serious option: there is no peaceful way to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions, stemming as they do from its imperialist brand of national-Islamism.”
1700 GMT: Where’s Mahmoud? President Ahmadinejad has been at a conference in Tehran attended by Palestinian leaders such as Hamas’ Khaled Meshaal, Islamic Jihad’s Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, and the head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (General Command), Ahmed Jibril. Ahmadinejad offered this commentary:
2230 GMT: Sneaking Out the News. It appears that the official statement of the Assembly of Experts meeting has been quietly placed on its website. We are reviewing and will have an analysis in the morning.
First impression is that while the statement is effusive about the “leadership and guidance” of the Supreme Leader to get Iran through the post-election crisis, it is not as severe in condemning the “sedition” of the opposition as the alleged statement released by Fars News in mid-week.
2115 GMT: Larijani Watch. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, continuing his Japan tour with a visit to the Peace Memorial Museum in Nagasaki, declared both Tehran’s commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and the perfidy of the West:
Iran will host an international conference on nuclear disarmament within the next two months….After the bombardment of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the US made no change in its policies. Two nuclear bombs of the United States have now increased to tens of thousands.
2110 GMT: Khamenei v. Khomeini. Radio Zamaneh has more on the criticism of Ayatollah Khomeini’s grandson, Seyed Hasan Khomeini, by the Supreme Leader’s representative in the Revolutionary Guards, Ali Saidi.
The conflict was sparked when the head of the Institute of Ayatollah Khomeini’s Publications, Mohammad Ali Ansari, wrote to Saidi to remind him of the Khomeini’s insistence on no military intervention in politics, Ali Saidi then criticized Hassan Khomeini’s decision not to attend the August inauguration of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He alleged that the Ayatollah’s grandson was standing against “the system and the Leader”.
2100 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Mehrdad Bal Afkan, a senior member of the Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution party and Mir Hossein Mousavi’s campaign, was arrested in Isfahan on Thursday.
In his 17th statement, Mir-Hossein Mousavi made five specific points that he deemed necessary to start the political (and national) reconciliation process. The proposal lead to a noticeable uptick in the weeks leading up to 22 Bahman in talk of the need for national “unity” and also garnered much attention from Iranian intellectuals and dissidents. Ultimately, the regime’s more radical elements reemerged and silenced the chatter before the security apparatus prevented a strong opposition showing on the revolution’s 31st anniversary. But Mousavi’s “five points,” as they have come to be called, still carry much weight. Generally, they are:
Government accountability for post-election violations
Legislation of new election laws that would safeguard reform-minded candidates from regime’s current vetting process
Release of all political prisoners
Freedom of the press and political-neutrality on state-run IRIB television
Freedom to assemble, as guaranteed by the Islamic Republic’s constitution
Were these five conditions to be met, the Green movement would arguably have the breathing space it needs to mobilize and begin the long process of transforming Iranian society. For if anything became apparent in the weeks leading up to and after the June election, it was that Iran has undergone an awakening. It has simply been the repression that the above five grievances capture that has prevented the social movement’s aspirations from coming to fruition.