Mr Verde drops by EA to offer this analysis

The news stories in recent days might appear unrelated, but all of them point to behind-the-scenes manoeuvres and disagreements within the regime. It is too early, given the limited information, to understand exactly what is going on within the Islamic Republic, but it is well worth watching for emerging significance.

1. The Release of Mostafa Tajzadeh

During the week, Mostafa Tajzadeh, leading member of the reformist Islamic Iran Participation Front and former Deputy Interior Minister, was released without bail for the Iranian New Year.

It is an unusual move. The Iranian judiciary has been setting very high bails for post-election detainees. In some instances, even after posting the required bail, detainees have been held for several days. Tajzadeh had refused to pay the bail, saying that he does not own any property to put up as collateral, and now he has been freed temporarily.

Tajzadeh has been a bitter critic of the Guardian Council and its head Ahmad Jannati. He has in the past accused Jannati by name of taking part in fraud during Parliament elections. Given this, who has taken the decision to released Tajzadeh without bail? Why give this small, but very symbolic victory (Tajzadeh has received a hero’s welcome, with visits by high-profile political figures) to the reformists at this time?

2. The Parliament Vote Against Ahmadinejad’s Subsidy Reform Proposal

To pressure the Majlis to accept his proposal for control of $40 billion from reductions in subsidies, President Ahmadinejad asked the Supreme Leader for help. Khamenei in turn summoned the Majlis Speaker, Ali Larijani, and asked that the Parliament consider the Government’s proposal carefully. t

Ahmadinejad then went to the Majlis on the day of the vote and spoke at length in defence of his proposal. He even stayed during the voting to lobby MPs. (Both of these actions are considered illegal.) Despite the Leader’s personal intervention and Ahmadinejad’s appearance, the Majles voted against the President, allowing him to control only $20 billion of the revenue.

Because of the way elections are held in Iran, with the filtering of candidates by the Guardian Council, MPs usually take very seriously what the Supreme Leader says. Many of the current MPs are ex-military, with close links to the Revolutionary Guard and the intelligence services.

So why did 111 MPs vote against the Supreme Leader’s wishes? Has someone else managed to influence the Majles in order to embarrass both Khamenei and Ahamadinejad? Has the Supreme Leader said one thing in public but privately given the go-ahead for the negative vote?

3. The Altered Khamenei Speech

Two weeks after his speech to the Assembly of Experts, the Supreme Leader’s website has publisedh a verson of the address with new sections, including references to the Expediency Council’s moves to change the election laws. Khamenei says that he will only approve parts of the Council’s proposals with which he agrees.

Why the two-week delay?  Was this section added to the “speech” after the meeting?  Was it originally omitted not to upset certain people or groups? Is the new version intended to reassure the Guardian Council and its supporters that the Supreme Leader is backing them?

4. Ahmadinejad’s Nuclear Story

On Saturday, Fars News quoted Ahmadinejad as saying that, after the 2005 election, he met with the Supreme Leader and asked that the International Atomic Energy Agency’s seals be taken off Iran’s nuclear facilities before the President took office.

This directly contradicts Khamenei’s version, as the Supreme Leader has said that he had himself decided for the seals to be removed and uranium enrichment to be resumed.

Is Ahmadinejad deliberately trying to undermine Khamenei? Is he just trying to talk himself up without considering the consequences?

5. Rafsanjani’s Moves

Recently Hassan Rohani and Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, both said to be close to Hashemi Rafsanjani, have taken direct aim at Ahmadinejad’s government. Rouhani said that some people want to run the country with one gang. Qalibaf said that for the past 14 months no serious work has been done in the country.

Rafsanjani has recently said that he does not want students to be quiet, but he has warned students against talk and actions that would provide excuses for people who want crackdowns on Iranian society.

So what is “The Shark” up to? Is he, working with or through Rohani and Qalibaf, pushing against Ahmadinejad? Is he sanctioning protest or trying to hold it back?

Too early to answer any of these questions, but more than enough here to question where All is Well within the Islamic Republic.

Masoud Shafaee writes at The Newest Deal:

As the Persian Nowruz New Year fast approaches and Iran’s post-election crisis enters its ninth month, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani remains as mercurial a figure as ever in Iranian politics. True to his nickname of Kooseh, or “The Shark”, Rafsanjani has been paying lip-service to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei while simultaneously signaling (if only tacitly) solidarity with Iran’s Green opposition movement. With his reputation as an incredibly calculating figure, it is hard to believe that this contradiction is coincidental. In fact, Rafsanjani’s high level of influence in the system may be paradoxically inhibiting him from more closely aligning with the Green Movement.

In many ways, Rafsanjani’s position resembles that of the boy who stuck his finger in the leaking dike in Hans Brinker’s classic tale.

In the story, the boy’s plugging of the hole with his finger was not an attempt to solve the problem at hand, but rather, to prevent an immediate and far more dangerous outcome from occurring. Had the boy gone to fetch help to repair the dike, the levee would have broken and the city would have been flooded. By staying at the dike all night — not fixing the problem, but preventing it from worsening — the boy bought time until others discovered him the next morning and were able to make necessary, lasting repairs.

Rafsanjani may find himself in similar circumstances and equally incapable of making a significant move. Ahmadinejad and the Revolutionary Guard have shown no intention of curbing their quest to completely control the Islamic Republic. What started out as a President hand-in-hand with the Supreme Leader (with his undoubted blessing of plans to rig the June election) has grown into something far greater. Only one month after the election, Ahmadinejad publicly disobeyed Khamenei by failing to immediately withdraw Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai as his top deputy after the Supreme Leader voiced his disapproval. A month later, he showed up unannounced in the Majlis parliament flanked by his armed bodyguards. Constitutional rights have been discarded in countless instances. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s statement that “Iran is moving toward a military dictatorship” appears troublingly accurate.

One factor that has arguably prevented a complete takeover of the regime from already occurring is the enormous weight that Rafsanjani carries inside of Iran. A father-figure of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, head of two constitutional branches of government, and a man of considerable wealth and influence, Rafsanjani has in many ways served as a buffer to Ahmadinejad’s megalomaniacal ambitions. And while by no means himself a democratizing figure, Rafsanjani’s perceived loyalty to the Supreme Leader (and the ruling theocracy) has gone to ensure that he remains a formidable presence in the country’s politics, thereby creating space for the Green Movement to breathe, evolve, and grow. Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani’s recent remarks labeling “those who want to exclude Rafsanjani” from the system as “irrelevant” speaks of just this clout.

This public backing of Khamenei came as recently as two weeks ago, when Rafsanjani reaffirmed his support for the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih. “Our focal point is clear and that is the constitution, Islam, the principle of the office of the jurisprudent and supreme leadership,” he said. Statements such as this are far more calculated than simply supporting the Supreme Leader for the sake of winning political capital. Indeed, Rafsanjani is essentially forcing Khamenei to own the very mess that he created. This was just the case when he stated back in December and again earlier this month that the Supreme Leader is “the only one” capable of unifying the country out of the current crisis. While elevating the position of the Supreme Leader with false praise, Rafsanjani’s words actually directly clash with the regime’s official line that there is in fact “no crisis in the country” to begin with.

This obviously does not mean that the Supreme Leader will lead the country out of crisis, nor would it excuse his actions were he to do the unthinkable and actually reverse course and unify the country. Rather, it points to Rafsanjani’s maneuvering within the system. He is not with the Greens per se, but he is taking steps that ultimately help their cause. He is not fixing or replacing the dike; he is plugging the hole until help arrives.

But just as Rafsanjani has been cautious to not stray too far from the conservative camp, he has also been equally cognizant of the need to reassure the Greens that he shares many of their same concerns. His daughter, Faezeh Hashemi, has phrased it less ambiguously,claiming that her father’s demands “are the same as the Green Movement.” When asked of the possibility of political reconciliation, she went even further, stating that any compromise would be “out of the question” if it did not take into account the gross violation of people’s rights. The fact that the Iranian judiciary has now filed charges against Faezeh Hashemi (and her brother Mehdi) for “fomenting riots” in Tehran only adds to the credibility of the Rafsanjani name within Green circles.

Whether Rafsanjani is technically a ‘Green’ or not, comments posted on his website following his Khobregan [Assembly of Experts] address are unmistakably similar to some of the criticisms coming from the leaders of the Green Movement. Comparing the current crisis to the events surrounding the 1906-1911 Constitutional Revolution, Rafsanjani said that certain individuals, while conspiring against the regime, pretend to be supporting the ideals of the Islamic Revolution. With the proper historical context, his message is less veiled: much like how the country’s very first National Assembly collapsed, leading to the coup d’etat of Reza Shah in 1921, the regime faces similar dangers today from those who carry the regime’s banner but stray from its ideals. Mir-Hossein Mousavi made a similar assessment when he told Kalemeh in a post-22 Bahman interview that the refusal to listen to the people’s demands “is a sign of tyranny and a distortion of the ideals of the Islamic Revolution.”

And while “the Shark” has kept a relatively low profile during the last few months  — at least when compared to the increasingly pointed rhetoric of both Mousavi and Mehdi Karoubi — his maneuvering within the Islamic Republic’s framework points to a strategy to align with some of the more immediate goals of the Green Movement. Just as Mousavi called for the reform of electoral laws in his 17th statement, the Expediency Council  — a constitutional body which Rafsanjani chairs — began considering a proposal that would take away the Guardian Council’s vetting role, and instead give it to a new “National Election Committee.” The committee, not coincidentally, would be under Rafsanjani’s supervision at the Expediency Council. It should also be noted that Rafsanjani himself alleged election fraud following his defeat in the 2005 presidential election to none other than Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Yet it would be remiss to neglect mentioning that Khamenei ordered the new election plans to be drawn up two years ago. The plans, in other words, outdate post-election developments. Irrespective of their origin, there is no chance that the regime, facing its greatest crisis since its inception, will suddenly decide to make itself more democratic, and inevitably, more vulnerable.

Rafsanjani’s intentions should not be seen in an altruistic or nationalist light. If he is indeed scheming to help the Greens, then he is surely being driven in part by his own political ambitions. For this was Ayatollah Khomenei’s right-hand man, a two-term (and almost three-term) president, and still the head of two powerful constitutional bodies. He is Iran’s de facto number-two. Helping the Green Movement’s cause ultimately helps his cause: more power.

While Rafsanjani’s current primary concern may be preventing Ahmadinejad from tearing Iran’s already-polarized political landscape asunder, that may in time prove to be lead to his grander scheme: he was the boy who saved the city from ruin.

Bahavar’s recent article in Rooz Online, “The destination was to begin the journey”, was the reason for his latest arrest. This is Part 1 of 3, with the following parts coming out in the next few days:

The Latest from Iran (11 March): Marathon

The destination was to begin the journey
Rooz Online, 6 March 2010

It is now quite obvious that what happened before and after the presidential election was a result of a very clumsy solution devised by security and military forces, to solve the “crisis of leadership” in the future system of the Islamic Republic. A solution that did not solve the crisis, and in fact, inflicted irreversible injury and damage to the very structure and legitimacy of the political system.

The ruling elite try to deny the existence of any political crisis, and to show that indeed it is the reformists who have reached a dead end. But analyzing their behavior and their responses to the aftermath of the election and the “green movement”, proves the opposite. A “political crisis”, in its most urgent form presents itself as a “crisis of legitimacy”, and a “crisis of legitimacy”, at its worse, becomes a “crisis of leadership”. Thus, not only is the system in a political crisis right now, this crisis is no ordinary quandary and is the worst of its kind.

“Who will be the next leader?” “What sort of mechanism will be used to choose the next leader?” “Is the current system of Leadership of the Jurist, in the current context of the constitution, sustainable?” These are questions which reformists, principalists and conservatives have been grappling with. The events of the recent election are in a way the product of different groups thinking of these questions. The events are in fact, a direct result of “serious measures” taken by the most hardline base of the establishment, in response to those questions. The result of the explosive, destructive actions following the election brought to light the very fact that a solution to these questions is not possible by “simple minded solutions” and the “crisis” and “dead end” argued here is much more serious to be solved by an adventurous wing of the establishment on its own.

What was this all about?

These events first seriously began when the most hardline wings of the system, composed of military groups, quasi-miliatry groups and extremist clerics, devised a strategy for “the transfer of leadership”. When Ayatollah Khamenei began his leadership of the country, most groups in the ruling establishment formed a consensus on his appointment and by acting above and beyond any faction or group, he was able to give the system relative stability and solidity. The election of a reformist president during his time, also gave many groups the belief that there is a chance to be active in the system and to reform it, without jeopardizing the stability of the entire system. But there was no guarantee that this stability would continue on forever.

There was no guarantee that when it came time to transfer the leadership to a “new leadership”, the same political stability would remain. By all accounts and all analysis, the system would experience great tension during this period and this tension might undermine its very existence. That is why all political factions within the system, from reformist to conservative to hardline, attempted to put forth a solution to this quandary in the frameworks of their own beliefs. For reasons of which I can not write about, it was the hardliners who were given the opportunity to carry out their solution. They were appointed to establish a “military rule”, a homogeneous ruling system empty and silent of dissent, to create an appropriate circumstance for the period of the transfer of leadership. This is how in 2005, “Mahmoud Ahmadinejad” was chosen to serve as president and to prepare suitable conditions for this period.

What was the hardliners’ solution?

The worst kind of political stability is when the future of an entire system is put to depend on the future of one person, because the smallest change in the top of the hierarchy will influence the entire system. In a monarchy, this quandary has been relatively solved by hereditary rule and the selection of the children or kin of the monarch as the next rulers. In this system, the death of the king and the succession of his son is seen as a legitimate, natural process, and does not undermine the entirety of the system.

But in the current ruling system of the Islamic Republic, the mechanisms are neither monarchical or democratic. From one angle, it seems that the Assembly of Experts is chosen by the nation to elect a leader, from another angle, the approbation supervision of the Guardian Council over the members of the assembly means that a substantial number of the nation’s real representatives never make their way through and thus have no say in the selection of the leader. Thus, the very principle of legitimacy and admissibility of the leader by the people [in the tradition of democratic systems] is undermined with the role of “approbation supervision” of the the Guardian Council.

So what was the solution the hardliners put forth? As we know, the hardliners follow extremist clerics like Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, who never believed in the selection of the leader by the Assembly of Experts, and has always disapproved of this article of the constitution. The emphasis of Ayatollah Yazdi on the appointment of the leader is based on a theory of “seeking and appointing” — not electing.

Thus, the solution of the hardliners for the transition process is something like a hereditary monarchy, with the different that the new leader does not necessarily have to be next of kin. In the view of Ayatollah Yazdi, the current leader has ways to seek the opinion of the twelfth Imam [who will return from occultation one day], and when notified of the Imam’s choice, inform the Assembly of Experts. The Assembly of Experts will in turn swear allegiance to the new leader on behalf of the nation and through this mechanism, the people’s approval will be satisfied. Thus, the new leader will be appointed by the old one (he will be “sought and appointed”), will have holy legitimacy, and through the approval of the Assembly of Experts (an indirect swearing of allegiance by the people) also have the people’s approval.

The belief of the hardliners is nothing but a recreation of theory of the caliphate. The Assembly of Experts and Parliament are nothing but a seal of approval for the caliphate. Hardline Shi’as in this way are very similar to hardline Sunnis. They believe that by implementing these theories, the tensions during the transition period will reach a minimum, and these tensions will be limited to insignificant political dissent and disapproval. In this way, the old leader will appoint the new one, and the Assembly of Experts will approve.

But the real quandary for the hardliners was implementing these plans, not writing them, as they had been written long ago, from the time of Sheykh Fazlollah. How can it ever be brought to fruition in the time of reformist publications, numerous newspapers, well known intellectuals, and clerics deeply opposed to such views? Is the implementation of such a project possible in such a pluralistic, politicized environment?

How did the hardliners’ project begin?

The hardliners were appointed to create a military government, homogeneous and clear of dissent, to pave the way for the new leadership. For this purpose, Ahmadinejad was chosen as president in 2005 and most of the positions on his cabinets were taken by former military officials. The hardliners’ plan was written out in “two parts”, for two presidential terms. In his first term, Ahmadinejad was appointed to either control or destroy the potentials created in civil society during the reformist era. The aim of this period was to “return to square one”. In this period, student associations, NGOs, political parties and the press were put under excruciating pressure, to attempt to return to the pre-1997 era [before Khatami].

The most important part of the project however, was to do with Ahmadnejad’s second term. The second term was a “period of elimination”. Two groups of political players had to be eliminated. One group which was a “barrier”, and one group which was the “goal”. The reformists were a barrier to the hardline project. It could be predicted that they would be vocal in their opposition to election fraud. So a scenario was written to widely arrest and eliminate the reformists, by accusing them of a “velvet revolution” and “soft overthrow”.

A second group which was to be eliminated consisted of moderate conservative politicians who had traditional been an ally to Rafsanjani. The goal was to eliminate Rafsanjani and his allies, because, in the view of hardliners, this group would have a big role in determining the next leader. Before the election, and in Ahmadinejad’s first term, there was great effort to take many of Rafsanjani’s close allies to court, people like [Hassan] Rowhani, [Housein] Mousavian, and Mehdi Hashemi. And that attempt was not very successful. The process of eliminating Rafsanjani was to begin with Ahmadinejad’s televised debate, and by firing up the nation, it was to be carried out swiftly.

Thus, by imprisoning more than 500 political and civil activists, and eliminating conservatives from the top of the ruling establishment’s hierarchy, a suitable environment for the period of transition was to be prepared. In such an environment, there would even be an appropriate chance for changing to constitution to be more inline with the principle of “seeking and appointing”. But as we saw, all did not go according to the hardliners plan. The green movement was born.

What really Happened?

The discussion about how the Green Movement was born requires a lot more space, and will  not be the focus of this article. But what is quite obvious is that this movement was a blow to the hardliner project which they had been planning for years. Not only did they not achieve an appropriate environment for transferring leadership, but rather, the political landscape of the country was badly shaken. The hardliners expected to see hopelessness and silence from political activists and the public, after a brief period of protest following the election. But just the opposite happened. The protests saw no end and they became louder and louder every day. Even those people who had previously been apolitical and disinterested, got involved. Thus, not only were the political not silenced,the apolitical became active as well.

The hardliners project was defeated. The reformists stood their ground and did not back down. Imprisoning the reformists was not a victorious strategy, and did not have the desired result. The resilience of some reformists actually gave more life to their cause. Rafsanjani with his insightful brilliance, deterred any attempts by the hardliners to be eliminated. Not only did he not lose his position, he wisely kept his distance with the leadership.

The hardliners solution for this period of transfer was a simple minded “the use of brute force”. They assumed that technology and money would be enough. But the result was just the opposite of what they had planned for. The legitimacy of the system was greatly tarnished, and over night, its national and international appeal was damaged. Many of the system’s previous supporters became doubtful. The stability of the system was greatly undermined and the fracture between the people and the political elite became wider.

Thus, the effort of the hardliners was to return things to the way they were before the election. They tried to substitute their betrayal of the nation with violence. But whatever they did, it created a worse situation.

The blow that the hardliners forced on the system was worse than what any opposition could do. The damage and destruction brought on the system after the  election was the sole responsibility of military and quasi military forces which were the masterminds of the project. Only relying on their might and financial backing, they jeopardized the very existence of the system.

What was the role of pragmatic conservatives?

Last year, a group of conservatives had sent a message to reformists, asking them not to announce a candidate for the presidential election, and instead to back the conservative candidates (someone like [Mohammad-Baqer] Qalibaf, [Ali] Larijani, etc). The argument was that if the reformists have no candidate, there will less of a consensus on Ahmadinejad, and the moderate conservative would win. In the view of these pragmatic conservatives, that was the only way to unseat Ahmadinejad. The reformists of course turned down this offer. In their view there was no way to be sure that a consensus around Ahmadinejad could be broken. The conservatives took orders after all, and the harliners were bent on keeping Ahmadinejad in power. The only power that could unseat Ahmadinejad would be a nation wide momentum, like that of the 2nd Khordaad [when Mohammad Khatami was elected in 1997], not backroom deals between political factions. Thus, the reformists put their efforts in nominating Khatami again, and recreating 2nd of Khordaad.

Now, after nearly a year, individuals like Ali Motahari send letters to Mousavi and ask him to back down, and leave the job to moderate conservatives. The likes of Motahari argue that so long as the reformists are active, the hardliner and conservative consensus around  Ahmadinejad will not be broken. But if the reformists back down, the conservatives themselves will take care of Ahmadinejad.

This time too, the reformists and Mousavi’s response was negative. If Karoubi and Mousavi back down, not only will this not weaken Ahmadinejad, it will allow for a swift move on the part of hardliners to eliminate conservatives as well. The only reason that Rafsanjani’s allies and moderate conservatives have gone unscathed is that the hardliners have been busy with the repression and silencing of the green movement. The pragmatic conservatives underestimate the hardliners. If the hardliners remove the “barrier” that is the green movement, they will go straight for the conservatives. We must not forget that the actual aim was Rafsanjani and his allies, and the project remains unfinished. If the hardliners are not deterred, the pragmatic conservatives will not fare any better than the reformists.

During the months following the birth of the green movement, pragmatic conservatives tried to steer clear of the fights so that the two reformist and hardline factions would wear each other down. So that once both these factions were completely weakened, they could emerge as “the third force” or “saviors” and take control of government. But what happened was that the conflict between reformists and hardliners grew worse by the day and the political landscape was becoming ever more polarized and radicalized to a point where the entire system was at risk and there was no place for the conservatives.  That is why these conservatives decided to play a role in the events, after seven months of silence. A mediating role. The letter Mohsen Rezaie wrote to the leader, their attempts to reform election laws and to take Saeed Mortazavi [former Tehran Prosecutor General] to court, an attempt at changing the head of the police forces and the IRGC, parliament’s reports on government’s violations of law, their efforts to free imprisoned reformists and their numerous interviews in criticizing the government were all efforts on the part of pragmatic conservatives to end the conflict. Their efforts became more apparent after 22 Bahman [31st anniversary of the revolution].

What is waiting ahead?

The events of 2009 were a result of the deadlock in the reformist movement between 2002-2006. Who can clearly guess the repercussions of eliminating the reformists all together? The silencing of the symbols of the green movement has not destroyed that movement, but taken it to the inner layers of society. The green movement was beyond just “street protests” to be killed off when protests were no longer possible. The demands of this movement are very serious and the lack of a response to them leads the way for possible future political crises and more tension. Right in that moment when the hardliners think everything has come to an end and everything is calm, everything will start anew.

Two groups have always offered a wrong analysis of the Green Movement: an opposition which wants to overthrow the system, who interpreted the street protests as a “last action before the fall of the system” [a reference to Mohsen Sazegara] and the other group is conservatives who thought the Green Movement is the only obstacle towards a final stability of the system. (a writer in the conservative magazine Panjereh [Window] had declared the “end of history” right before a “final sin”; a sin that was the greatest sin of all and was the product of the devil).

The Green Movement however is a reformist, peaceful civil rights movement with clear demands, which is stubbornly trying to create better living conditions for all citizens. Thus, this movement will continue to live beyond the frameworks of those two groups, and will continue to speak out of its demands to the rulers, in whichever way possible, – and not just street protests. With the eruption of every national or international crisis, there is the chance that more street protests will take place. Even though Ahmadinejad has spent a great budget giving charity to the impoverished populations, with growing inflation and unemployment, this group too has much to protest. Amir Mohebian was right when he said: “Mousavi couldn’t tie the struggle of the lower classes to that of the middle class” but certainly, Ahmadinejad is up to the task.

2- Reformists and their leaders will not stop protesting. But the protests of the pragmatic conservatives will be much more effective and useful when they stand with the green movement, and not when they are alone. One of the reasons the reform movement was defeated was that Saeed Hajjarian’s strategy of “pressure from below, bargaining from above” never materialized. There was no pressure from below, and those around President Khatami had no ability to bargain.

The Green Movement is the restructuring and the reforming of the reform movement. When[Saeed] Hajjarian was in prison and was preparing for his televised interview, his strategies were being implemented outside prison. In an unwritten agreement, the people and the leaders of the Green Movement were pressuring [the ruling establishment] from below, and the bargaining was being done by the conservatives from above. This was an effective, realistic dividing of the responsibilities.

3- Up to this point, the hardliners have been defeated in their project. They have not been able to unseat Rafsanjani, and they have not been able to imprison Khatami, Mousavi and Karoubi. Even if Tehran does not see any other street protests, the political environment is so tense and inflamed that it will not allow them to carry out any other projects.

But we must remember that the hardliners are so determined to take the next leadership of the country that they are willing to put the country under any pressure. In order to create extreme circumstances, they are even willing to go to take the country to war with neighboring countries. We know that a war is a good excuse to carry out certain political decisions inside the country. (Faridedin Adel, the son of [Gholam-Ali] Hadad Adel [hardline ex-speaker of parliament] has predicated in an article that Iran will be going to war with Turkey in the next few months.)

4 – It has become quite obvious to the ruling establishment that the hardliners’ solution for the transfer of leadership is very very costly, and full of risk. And that even if this project was to succeed, sustaining it (in terms of its national and international legitimacy, economic difficulties, etc) would be near impossible. That is why we can be hopeful that in the future, the reformists and the pragmatic conservatives will also have the chance to put forth their  solution. These solutions include democratizing the parliament and the Assembly of Experts, eliminating the approbation supervision of the Guardian Council and creating a “Council of Leaders”.

The destination, was to begin the journey.

We can clearly witness two defeats for the contemporary  hardline Shi’a movement: the executions of Sheykh Fazlollah and Navab Safavi. Ayatollah Khomeini too left them dissappointed when establishing the Islamic Republic, by incorporating modern democratic institutions within the frameworks of the system. After the ayatollah’s death, the hardliners spent years trying to reclaim their century long pursuits. But in the last instant, with the rise of the “Imam’s prime minister” [Mousavi], a great movement took shape. The birth of the green movement was an end to the hardliner project, and marked another disappointment for them in history. The family of Ayatollah Khomeini raised their voice in protest and many of the marjas [grand ayatollahs], even some of the most conservative, spoke out in criticism.

If there is any group that is guilty of attempting to overthrow the system, it is the hardliners who wanted to overthrow the “Islamic Republic” and replace it with a “Shia Caliphate”. Mousavi had no choice but to disagree with such a move, even though it had a heavy price for him and the people. Mousavi consciously paid this  price to steer the reformists out of deadlock, because the reform movement is the only way of saving the democratic aspects of the system, and saving the Islamic Republic.

The hardliner project for eliminating the democratic aspects of the system was defeated with the birth of the green movement. The green movement reached its aim right at the start; whatever it might gain hereafter, are all added achievements. The destination was to begin the journey.

2100 GMT: Dr Mohammad Maleki, the former head of Tehran University, has reportedly been released after 191  days in detention. Maleki, 76, suffers from prostate cancer.

Iran: Understanding the Assembly of Experts Statement “Crisis Continues”
Iran Document: Mousavi’s Interview “Reform Within the Current Framework” (27 February)
The Latest from Iran (28 February): What Do The Statements Mean?

2055 GMT: United4Iran has a profile of Jahanbakhsh Khanjani, former advisor to Iran’s Minister of Interior in the Khatami Presidency, who was released on 24 February after spending more than eight months in prison. According to another released prisoner, Khanjani was under pressure to confess and was constantly moved from general confinement to solidarity confinement.

2030 GMT: 2nd Picture of the Day (see 1540 GMT). The staff of Etemaad newspaper just after its suspension (1455 GMT) by Iranian authorities: “Victory”.

1935 GMT: Faoud Sadeghi, the managing director of Ayande News, has reportedly been released.

Journalist Mahsa Jazini has been freed on $100,000 bail in Isfehan.

1930 GMT: Khatami Stands Firm. Back from an academic break to find a statement from former President Mohammad Khatami, responding to the Supreme Leader’s declaration that opposition figures had put themselves beyond the Iranian system with their post-election challenge. He said in a meeting with students:

It is easy to create tensions in the world, but difficult to eliminate them. Detente requires courage and finesse, and the system has to take steps to that effect. We should not embark on adventurism in the world under pretext of having won so many enemies. We should hold back from speaking in a manner to inflict heavy costs….

Everyone may have had his own interpretation of reforms, but we mean reforms within the framework of criteria born out of Islam, the revolution and the nation’s will. In the face of any possible deviation from Islam and Imam Khomeini’s line, we have to give warning….

Go and ask the former revolutionary militants if the ongoing conditions reflect what they were after. Ask them if these arrests, blame games, vendettas and the imposition of costs on the nation were what the revolutionary forces sought. If not, our conscience necessitates that we close ranks in order to improve conditions….

We should not retreat from our demands, and we should keep fighting even if certain groups beat us on the head. Unfortunately, certain hard-line groups in the society are opposed to any compromise within the society.

1615 GMT: Really. Not-Very-Much-News. Iran’s Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki has denied, amidst the fuss over the International Atomic Energy Agency report on Tehran’s nuclear programme, that there is any problem:

The new chief and the new managers of the agency should look at the record of Iran’s cooperation. We have fully cooperated with the agency. This cooperation will continue. We have always welcomed and encouraged negotiations and talks.

1555 GMT: Rigi Mystery. This story isn’t over….

Kyrgyzstan’s foreign ministry has issued a statement saying that Iran has officially apologised for forcing a Kyrgyz plane to land in Iran. More significantly, the foreign ministry has denied that any passengers were taken off the plane, including Jundullah leader Abdolmalek Rigi, by the Iranians: “According to information available to this ministry, media reports that s two foreigners were arrested in this fight are untrue.”

Now, is Kyrgyzstan making the denial to save face and cover up that Rigi was lifted from one of its flights? Or is it the case that the Jundullah leader was never on that plane?

1540 GMT: Picture of the Day. Abdolreza Tajik after his release from prison (see 0945 GMT):

1520 GMT: A Most Symbolic Visit. Seyyed Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of Ayatollah Khomeini, has visited Ali Karroubi, the son of Mehdi Karroubi who was beaten on 22 Bahman.

1515 GMT: Cutting off Business. Caterpillar, the US building equipment group, has announced steps to sever trading links with Iran. The company is barring its non-US subsidiaries from accepting orders for products that they know are destined for delivery to Iran.

1510 GMT: Not-Very-Much-News (from the Other Side). Press TV gives the Iran version:

Iran has called on the UN nuclear watchdog to bear in mind the West’s past breaches of atomic fuel exchange deals with Tehran while reviewing Iran’s nuclear program.

In a letter to the UN body, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran’s envoy to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), cited three instances on which Western countries failed to meet their commitments and provide Iran with nuclear fuel.

In other words, Tehran will hold out against a “3rd-party enrichment” deal involving Germany, US, or French authorities because they cannot be trusted.

But (and excuse me for being repetitive)…no mention of Japan as unreliable.

1505 GMT: Stopping the Protests. Rah-e-Sabz claims that 20,000 people were detained during the rallies of 22 Bahman (11 February).

1455 GMT: Back to the (Banned) News. Fars reports that Iranian authorities have banned the weekly magazine Iran Dokht, linked with Mehdi Karroubi. Etemaad has also been suspended.

1445 GMT: Not-Very-Much-News (cont.). Nothing — yes, nothing — new in the Amano report to the IAEA. It merely restates the long-standing finding, “[The IAEA] continues…to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, but we cannot confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.”

This, however, will not stop many in the media from declaring that something dramatic has occurred. The lead from the Associated Press: “The chief of the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency says he cannot confirm that all of Iran’s nuclear activities are peaceful.”

Nor will it deflect some from overblown declarations and calls to global conflict. Jamsheed Choksy (apologies that you’ll have to pay to get the full polemic) in The Wall Street Journal: “Iran’s New World Order — Its nuclear program is part of a larger plan to radically reduce U.S. power.”

1430 GMT: Today’s Not-Very-Much-News. Back from an academic break to find the media buzzing over the International Atomic Energy Agency meeting, with a report from new Secretary-General Yukiya Amano. The section on Iran:

I would like to inform you about the current situation concerning Iran’s request to the Agency for assistance in providing fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, as I receive many questions in this regard.

In June 2009, the Agency received a request from Iran for assistance in obtaining fuel for the research reactor in Tehran, which produces isotopes for medical purposes. In October 2009, at a meeting with the Governments of Iran, France, the Russian Federation and the United States, the Agency made a proposal under which Iranian low enriched uranium (LEU) would be shipped to Russia for further enrichment and then to France for fabrication into fuel. Three of the four countries gave their consent to this proposal.

In a letter to the Agency dated 18 February, 2010, Iran said it continued to wish to buy the necessary nuclear fuel or, if this was not possible, to exchange some of its LEU for reactor fuel from abroad. Iran requested the IAEA to relay its request to potential suppliers and to facilitate the provision of the fuel. The Agency circulated Iran’s letter to Member States as requested.

The arrangement proposed by the Agency in October 2009 remains on the table. I believe it would ensure continued operation of the Tehran Research Reactor and serve as a confidence-building measure. At the same time, I am following up on Iran’s February 18 request, in accordance with the IAEA Statute, and have been in contact with the relevant countries….

Implementation of Safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran

You have received my report on Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is longer than previous reports because I wanted my first report to be a stand-alone document. I tried to make it factual, without overdoing the detail.

The Agency continues, under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with Iran, to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, but we cannot confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities because Iran has not provided the Agency with the necessary cooperation.

The necessary cooperation includes, among other things, implementation of relevant resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council, implementation of the Additional Protocol and of modified Code 3.1, as well as clarification of issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.

I request Iran to take steps towards the full implementation of its Safeguards Agreement and its other obligations as a matter of high priority.

1200 GMT: Rafsanjani Watch. Faezeh Hashemi, the daughter of Hashemi Rafsanjani, has declared that her father accepts no bargaining on people’s rights and that the only way out of the crisis is to follow the suggestions in his Friday Prayer of 17 July. Replying to the question of why Rafsanjani has not taken the podium at Friday Prayers since then, Hashemi said, “His main reason is not to cause harm to innocent people. In his last sermon, security and intelligence forces attacked protesters and arrested some of them.”

Hashemi, indirectly commenting on last week’s Assembly of Experts meeting that Rafsanjani chaired, warned that extremists were trying to unseat Rafsanjani to achieve their goals.

1100 GMT: Claim of the Day. Rah-e Sabz asserts that the head of Iran’s judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, has said that the Supreme Leader asked him to execute more protestors.

Larijani was reportedly confronted by his relatives and associates, including Mostafa Mohaghegh-Damad, the former head of the National Audit Office, who were unhappy with the  executions of Arash Rahmanipour and Mohammad Reza Ali Zamani in late January. Larijani replied, “Go and thank God that I have lowered the number of executions.”

Larijani allegedly said that he had attended a meeting at the time  including Khamenei. Ahmad Jannati (head of the Guardian Council), Mohammad Yazdi, and Mohammad Momen Qomi all invoked of the Sharia law demanding that the protesters and the “leaders of sedition” be executed.

Khamenei responded that, although this was their religious opinion, a large number of executions would cause political problems for the regime. He then turned to Larijani saying, “In all honesty we expected more than this [two executions].” Larijani later told associates, “I have tried very hard to keep the number of executions low, as my superiors had asked for more”.

1045 GMT: Following Up the Assembly. The political moves from last week’s Assembly of Experts meeting continue, even beyond Mr Verde’s Sunday analysis. While the official statement — once it finally appeared — pledged loyalty to the Supreme Leader, there has been an overlooked postscript.

The Secretariat of the Assembly has published the report by the Assembly’s Investigation Committee into the circumstances of the Supreme Leader and his fitness to remain in the post, under Article 111 of the Iranian Constitution). The report, dated 27 February, is signed by Mohsen Mojtahed-Shabestari (Assembly member, Khamenei’s representative to East Azerbaijan, and Tabriz’s Friday Prayer leader.

Although the report is similar to the Assembly’s closing statement, the Green website Rah-e-Sabz is celebrating the publication of this report as a victory for public pressure on the Assembly. For the first time, the Supreme Leader’s fitness for his post is now a matter of public discussion.

1000 GMT: But You Could Just Watch the Nukes Instead. On the nuclear programme front, it looks like another day of media focus on the rhetorical battle between Iran and members of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA, with a new Director-General, begins a four-day discussion of the draft report on Iran’s current uranium enrichment efforts, and the occasion has been preceded by a series of Iranian verbals attacks, including the Supreme Leader’s denunciation of a US-controlled IAEA.

The Los Angeles Times, for example, devotes a lengthy article to the political theatre: “[Iran has] dramatically shifted its public tone toward the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog, dropping its previous deference while harshly criticizing the agency’s latest report and its new director-general as an incompetent and biased lackey of the West.”

Amidst the furour, few take any notice of Iran’s more conciliatory position accepting Japan as a country for “third-party enrichment”, signalled by Ali Larijani during his trip to Tokyo. And none, to my knowledge, consider the ripples of Larijani’s changed position across the Iranian political waters.

0915 GMT: And so unfolds another week in a crisis which, according to the regime, was over. Mir Hossein Mousavi’s interview continues to command attention and more than a few questions about strategy and prospects for the Green Movement. After initial doubts, I’m tilting towards a more optimistic reading. Because of the importance of the issue, the analysis is still being developed: we’re hoping to have it out tomorrow.

Meanwhile, the regime — which, again, has supposedly won this conflict — continues to bluster. Basij Commander Mohammad Reza Naqdi, continuing the Government’s propaganda drive on the capture of Jundullah leader Abdolmalek Rigi, declared that President Obama would confess as quickly if he came to Iran:

This pure form of Islam [practiced in Iran] is such that it will even break our staunchest enemies. This thug [Rigi] was nothing, even if Obama himself, who Rigi has confessed to cooperating with, comes to Iran he will also confess to all his sins under the influence of this [pure form of] Islam.

The U.S. and other Western countries have reached a cultural, military, political and economic dead-end and the only weapon in their hands to bully other countries is technology and if we succeed in prying this tool away from them they will be finished.

Far more significant is the news of the regime’s freeing of high-profile figures from detention. Saturday and Sunday releases included editors and journalists Ali Hekmat, Abdolreza Tajik (Farheekhtegan), Mashallah Shamsolvaezin (formerly of Kayhan, Jame’eh, Neshat, and Asr-e Azadegan), Behrang Tonkaboni (Farhang va Ahang), and Mohammad Javad Mozafar (publishing house Kavir and vice president of the Committee for the Defense of Prisoners’ Rights), and retired science professor Mohammad Sadeq Rabani.

An Iranian activist adds that journalist Rozbeh Karimi was released today and 20 protesters arrested on Ashura were freed from Rejaie Shahr prison in Karaj last night.

It is too early to tell if this is an orchestrated strategy of mass releases by the regime — an effective “amnesty” if those freed will just shut up, stop writing, and stay off the streets — but it follows Sunday’s carrot-and-stick statement by Tehran prosecutor Abbas Jafari Doulatabadi (see yesterday’s updates). Doulatabadi promises detainee releases on the eve of Iranian New Year but added that those who did not recent would be treated harshly.

The “stick” part of the strategy also has come out in a Rah-e-Sabz report:

Many of those arrested and released over the past few months have been contacted and told to be prepared for interviews, which are subsequently conducted inside Evin Prison….

Interrogators contacted these former prisoners, who have either received their initial verdict or are waiting to receive their verdict, and force them to participate in these interviews. A transcript of the interview is given to the prisoners by their interrogators and they are told to memorize the content and say it in their own words. These former prisoners have been threatened that if they refuse to participate in the interviews they will have to spend the [Iranian] New Year holiday in prison or receive a heavier sentence.

The Jaras [Rah-e-Sabz] reporter said, “Transcripts of these interviews are given to news agencies close to the Reformists and they are forced to publish them. In the recent scenario, aside from the Islamic Student News Agency (ISNA), where prisoners were escorted to upon their release to conduct interviews, Iranian Labor News Agency (ILNA) has been forced on board [as well]. For the news scenario, the date of the interview is sometimes days or months from the time of the prisoner’s release and secondly the exact transcription has been forced on news agencies.”

Still, even if the Green Movement could be quelled, the Government faces the trouble within. The latest sign of unhappiness is over the recent 18-minute video, shown on BBC Persian and then spread on YouTube, of the 15 June attack on Tehran University’s dormitories. Kazem Jalali, a member of Parliament’s “truth-finding committee”, has hinted that some colleagues are holding out against an acknowledgement of possible wrongdoing:

It would be better if the members of the truth-finding committee all watch this film….I have followed up on the issue a few time via Mr. [Mohammad-Hassan] Abutorabi who heads the committee. I think you should also ask him this question.

However, the head of the National Security Commission, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, has tried to pre-empt any consideration of the evidence of damage, beatings, and even killings by the attackers, whose exact affiliation with the regime is still unclear: “Since the narrator of the film is the BBC, we must look at the matter with doubt because we do not consider the BBC a reliable source.”

NEW Iran: Understanding the Assembly of Experts Statement “Crisis Continues”
NEW Iran Document: Mousavi’s Interview “Reform Within the Current Framework” (27 February)
Iran Analysis: Now It Gets Interesting….
The Latest from Iran (27 February): The Mousavi Interview

1700 GMT: Where’s Mahmoud? President Ahmadinejad has been at a conference in Tehran attended by Palestinian leaders such as Hamas’ Khaled Meshaal, Islamic Jihad’s Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, and the head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (General Command), Ahmed Jibril. Ahmadinejad offered this commentary:

With God’s grace and thanks to the Palestinian resistance the occupying Zionist regime has lost its raison d’être. [Israel's] presence even in one inch of the region’s soil causes threat, crisis and war. The only way to confront them (Israelis) is through the Palestinian youths’ resistance, and that of the regional nations.

1435 GMT: US-Israel Front (cont.). Haaretz has more on Israel Defense Minister Ehud Barak’s Iran manoeuvres after his US trip (see 0955 GMT). Barak had indicated earlier that Israel would not pursue military action but would look for tougher sanction; however, in a talk in Washington, he returned to the formula that “everything is on the table”:

It’s clear to me that the clock toward the collapse of this regime works much slower than the clock which ticks toward Iran becoming a nuclear military power. And this is the reason why simultaneously with diplomacy and effective sanctions, we recommend to all players not to remove any option from the table and we adopt this attitude for ourselves as well.

1400 GMT: Political Prisoner News. Journalist Ali Hekmat, editor-in-chief of the banned newsaper Khordaad, has been released after two months in detention. Civil rights activist Jamshid Zarei has also been freed.

1325 GMT: That Larijani Fellow. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, continuing to grab headlines after his trip to Japan, has spoken to the Majlis about the capture of Jundullah leader Abdolmalek Rigi, “Fortunately, his confessions confirmed our previous information on the close cooperation between the US and NATO and the terrorist grouplet.”

1300 GMT: No Protests. A day after Mir Hossein Mousavi called for the regime to allow rallies, Tehran Prosecutor General Abbas Jafari Doulatabadi has given a sharp rejection:

Even though some go on trying to agitate the atmosphere in society with statements… they’ve been given the answer by the people. We will not witness street demonstrations and we will not allow anyone to come to the streets to disrupt public security without proper permits….

Even though threats against the revolution will not come to an end, we will not succumb and certainly one day in the not so distant future despair will take them and they will surrender. The file on the election has been closed and law enforcement agencies have been asked to preserve security.

Having wielded a large stick, Doulatabadi offered a small carrot with the promise that some post-election detainees would be released before the Iranian New Year.

1220 GMT: O” the Economic Front. Kalemeh denounces President Ahmadinejad’s slogan of bringing oil income to people’s tables, comparing it with “vanished billions” in revenues.

Rah-e-Sabz reports on a protest at an Isfahan steel plant over seven months of unpaid wages.

1215 GMT: Bluster of Day. Deputy Revolutionary Guard commander Hossein Salami warns, “Iran is standing on 50% of world’s energy resources. If it decides to do so, Europe will spend the winter in the cold.”

1205 GMT: Maintaining His Silence. The Supreme Leader used a meeting with Tehran’s ambassador to take a nationally-televised swipe at the International Atomic Energy Agency, “Measures and reports of the agency show its lack of independence…. Unilateral acts erode trust in this institution and the United Nations and it is very bad for the reputation of these international assemblies.”

No news there, as it is a restatement of Iran’s public line on the IAEA, a day before the Agency’s four-day discussion of a draft report on Tehran’s nuclear programme. What is more intriguing is the Supreme Leader’s lack of reference to Ali Larijani’s manoeuvres in Japan for “third-party enrichment” (see 0935 GMT).

1155 GMT: MediaWatch. Leading US newspapers have noted and evaluated the Mousavi interview. Borzou Daragahi of the Los Angeles Times leads with Mousavi’s accusation of the regime’s “wasteful exercise” of 22 Bahman (11 February) but then puts his key point, “Mousavi offered few specifics on what the so-called green movement should do next.”

In The Washington Post, Thomas Erdbrink  takes a similar line with Mousavi’s denuncation of the Government as a “gang with no respect for Iran’s interests” and the note that “he did not, however, propose new strategies”. Nazila Fathi has a shorter piece in The New York Times, following the Associated Press, with the criticism of the Iranian leadership as a dictatorial “cult” but with no comment on Mousavi’s goals.

0955 GMT: On the US-Israel Front. Laura Rozen has an intriguing reading of Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak’s appearance at the Washington Institute of Near Policy, after his meetings with senior Obama Administration officials:

It became quite clear that [Barak] did not want to answer [a] question about the state of U.S.-Israel relations on Iran….It was his impression that Washington believes that, while it’s highly undesirable, at the end of the day the U.S. could live with a nuclear Iran; [however] for Israel, Barak said, it would be a “tipping point” in the strategic equation in the region.

0945 GMT: Today’s Propaganda Special. Iranian state media pronounces, “Rigi planned to meet Holbrooke in Kyrgyzstan”, which paints the picture of the Jundullah leader sitting down with President Obama’s special envoy on Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke.

The source? “Famous Washington, D.C. based investigative journalist and reporter Wayne Madsen“. Funny, but I don’t actually see that on the website of “famous reporter” Madsen.

Safer, I think, for Iran’s loudspeakers to rely on “Iranian forces bust terrorist cell in Azarbaijan“.

Meanwhile, Jundullah has chosen a new leader to succeed Rigi.

0940 GMT: Speaking of Larijani. Ali Larijani has avoided the nuclear issue on his return to Iran from Japan, issuing instead an un-controversial condemnation of US policy in Afghanistan and an announcement that Japanese officials are willing to cooperate with Iran on the reconstruction of the Afghan infrastructure.

0935 GMT: The Larijani Debate. Elsewhere, there is a spirited discussion going on, as Ali Larijani returns to Iran from a five-day trip, over the significance of his manoeuvres in Japan, especially on the nuclear programme.

I stand by the reading that Larijani’s sudden embrace of “3rd-party enrichment” (no doubt backed by the Supreme Leader) is a political move meant not only to keep open links with the international community but to out-manoeuvre and even push aside President Ahmadinejad. Mr Verde is more cautious:

I think Larijani’s talk of enrichment by Japan is an attempt by the Islamic Republic to break or slow down the anti-Iran posturing. Larijani may be chipping away at Ahmadinejad, but it is all with Supreme Leader’s permission.

The post-elections protest shocked the regime and Khamenei. And the Larijani/[Ahmad] Tavakoli spat with Ahmadinejad is possibly an attempt to show that the Republic is not just one voice (that of the Supreme Leader) but it actually tolerates dissent.

A well-placed EA contact, however, is dismissive that there is any significance, writing of “incremental
developments that oftentimes go nowhere”.

0930 GMT: We have published a Sunday special: there is a summary of the official statement of the Assembly of Experts, and a detailed analysis by Mr Verde: “The institutions of the Islamic Republic are unable to pull it out of the current crisis. All that have any power (at least on paper) are under the direct, and at times illegal, control of Khamenei.”

0745 GMT: It will be a slightly later start this morning, as we wrap up our coverage of the Chile earthquake and tsunami watch and also pick up on the important statements out of Iran.

We have posted the English translation of Mir Hossein Mousavi’s Saturday interview with Kalemeh. Initial reading is both of a Mousavi trying to maintain the momentum of opposition but also carefully defining how far the challenge goes — is it enough to call for the “spread of awareness”, “free rallies”, and “adherence to the Constitution” if the regime stands firm against even those measured demands? We’ll think about that today, looking forward to an analysis on Monday.

Later today, however, we may have an equally important reading. The official statement of the Assembly of Experts, which did not appear for several days after last week’s meeting, is now posted. Beyond its loyalty to the Supreme Leader, the references to the opposition are not clear. Was this really the declaration that “sedition” would be put down and opposition would longer be acceptable in the Iranian system?

First impression is that while the statement is effusive about the “leadership and guidance” of the Supreme Leader to get Iran through the post-election crisis, it is not as severe in condemning the “sedition” of the opposition as the alleged statement released by Fars News in mid-week.

2115 GMT: Larijani Watch. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, continuing his Japan tour with a visit to the Peace Memorial Museum in Nagasaki, declared both Tehran’s commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and the perfidy of the West:

Iran will host an international conference on nuclear disarmament within the next two months….After the bombardment of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the US made no change in its policies. Two nuclear bombs of the United States have now increased to tens of thousands.

NEW Iran Analysis: Now It Gets Interesting….
Iran Document: Latest Karroubi Interview “The Shah Didn’t Behave Like This”
Iran: Mousavi, The Regime, & “The Prerequisites of Escalation”
Latest Iran Video: The Rigi “Confession” (25 February)
Iran Analysis: Khamenei’s Not-So-Big Push
Iran Follow-Up: Interpreting the Assembly of Experts “The Certainty of the Uncertain”
The Latest from Iran (26 February): Closing the Door?

2100 GMT: And the Jundullah Beat Goes On. More of the same from Iran’s Foreign Ministry on Saturday, via spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast:

Ties between this terrorist group and security services of the so-called advocates of human rights including the US, Britain and certain other countries indicate that they are not honest about their claims of having respect for human rights.

The support of certain so-called human rights advocates for terrorist groups and criminals such as Abdolmalek Rigi has turned into a routine issue. We have always witnessed the support of these countries for terrorist groups to continue their moves in the region.

1720 GMT: Waiting for News on “Earthquake Weapons”. Apart from the Mousavi interview, a quiet day inside Iran. Press TV’s website has noted the Chilean earthquake and tsunami warning; so far, however, it has not blamed the disaster on US “secret weapons” (as Iran and Venezuela did with Haiti).

1505 GMT: Academic Newsflash. Fars News reports that more than 1000 “experts” have asked for an independent inquiry of the 11 September 2001 attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The article is based on a press conference held by Architects and Engineers for 9-11 Truth on 19 February.

1455 GMT: Almost all major news outlets now have summaries of the Mousavi interview. A prominent Iranian activist, via Iran News Now, offers anotherabridged version in English that parallels our translation (see 0955 GMT).

1235 GMT: Discovering Mousavi. Agence France Presse and the Los Angeles Times have now noted Mir Hossein Mousavi’s interview (see 0955 GMT). Both are picking up on Mousavi’s condemnation of the 22 Bahman “engineered” rally by the regime and his call for a “free” march of the Iranian people.

1200 GMT: Big in the Countryside? Peyke Iran claims that the publications, Hemmat and Mowj-Andishe, banned earlier this year are still distributed in Iran’s provinces. Both are allegedly linked to President Ahmadinejad’s Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai.

0955 GMT: Mousavi’s Interview. Setareh Sabety provides a few important extracts: “Mr. Karroubi and I, in our meeting, decided that we will once again ask for a permit, according to Article 27 of the Constitution, for a march that will put an end to the rumors and accusations.”

Referring to 22 Bahman (11 February) as an “engineered” rally, Mousavi says that he does not like “insulting those who do not agree with us” and continues, “We did not suppose that everyone shared our opinions or that those who were not like-minded were bad people. All are our compatriots with the exception of some sabre-wielding thugs and murderers.”

Mousavi compares the amount of money and methods used to muster crowds and transport them to Tehran for 22 Bahman — “these kinds of engineered and mandatory rallies remind us of those used prior to tne 1979 Revolution” — with the protest of the opposition. “Our movement looks like a traditional bazaar with many kiosks, cafes and store fronts of opinion connected to one another,” Mousavi asserts, and he ends with an optimistc question, “When millions of young students are part of this movement, which is unique in our history and perhaps in the history of the world, how can we not have hope for the future?”

0950 GMT: Economy Watch. Seyyed Hossein Hashemi, the head of the Mining Commission, has declared that if Iran continues its present level of imports, “grave problems will arise”. He warned in particular of under-investment in the domestic metal and mining industries.

0945 GMT: Your Friday Prayer Summary (A Day Later). Rah-e-Sabz offers a biting commentary on the Friday Prayers of Tehran’s Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati and other clerics: “Praise of the Assembly Experts and [Jundullah leader Abdolmalek] Rigi’s arrest, that’s all.”

0940 GMT: So Much for Unity. Davoud Ahmadinejad, the brother of the President, pronounced in a speech before Friday Prayers in Isfahan that the National Unity Plan “equals the reconciliation of Yazid with Imam Hossein” (Yazid, in fact, killed Hossein)”. He declared, “After all these insults, why should we sit at a table for the ‘dialogue of civilizations’? We have nano-technology and we have a nano-quarrel.”

0930 GMT: Economy Watch. Member of Parliament and Larijani ally Ahmad Tavakoli, writing in the pro-Larijani Khabar Online, declares that the Government’s claims on implementation its subsidy reform plan are ridiculous: “In the current year the administration has not taken an actual step for executing subsidy reform bill. The Government should have requested the permission of the Majlis [Parliament] for amending the bill, but it didn’t.”

Rah-e-Sabz publishes a long anlaysis by Professor Mohsen Massarrat with “Answers to the Riddle of the Subsidies”, especially in the energy sector.

0905 GMT: No doubt what the big story will be this morning. Kalemeh has just posted its interview with Mir Hossein Mousavi (see separate, earlier analysis). The tone is defiant, but the deeper issue will be the substance of Mousavi’s call. Defending the opposition over 22 Bahman and calling for a “spread of awareness” is fair enough, but it is the substance of Mousavi’s 5 points — issued in his statement of 1 January — that gave a boost to political demands. We’ll be reading closely to see if and how Mousavi expands that platform.

Elsewhere, Robert Mackey of The New York Times has a thoughtful, in-depth consideration of the regime’s propaganda over the capture of Jundullah leader Abdolmalek Rigi. He raises the interesting point that the spin on Rigi’s “confession” of his contacts with US officials is meant to discredit President Obama’s “engagement” launched in his March 2009 Nowruz address to the Iranian people.

The conflict was sparked when the head of the Institute of Ayatollah Khomeini’s Publications, Mohammad Ali Ansari, wrote to Saidi to remind him of the Khomeini’s insistence on no military intervention in politics, Ali Saidi then criticized Hassan Khomeini’s decision not to attend the August inauguration of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He alleged that the Ayatollah’s grandson was standing against “the system and the Leader”.

NEW Iran Document: Latest Karroubi Interview “The Shah Didn’t Behave Like This”
Iran: Mousavi, The Regime, & “The Prerequisites of Escalation”
Latest Iran Video: The Rigi “Confession” (25 February)
Iran Analysis: Khamenei’s Not-So-Big Push
Iran Follow-Up: Interpreting the Assembly of Experts “The Certainty of the Uncertain”
Iran Analysis: The Assembly of Experts Mystery
The Latest from Iran (25 February): Misleading Statements?

2100 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Mehrdad Bal Afkan, a senior member of the Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution party and Mir Hossein Mousavi’s campaign, was arrested in Isfahan on Thursday.

2050 GMT: That “Path to Atonement” Thing (see 1915 GMT). Could the regime be setting up an offer of amnesty or reduced punishment for those who will give up their opposition? Alongside Ayatollah Jannati’s Friday Prayer are the words of Iran’s Attorney General Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie: “If those who have been arrested in recent riots truly repent and compensate for the damages they have caused and correct their past conduct, they will be helped in the Appeals Court.”

2005 GMT: Back to the Friday Prayer (see 1915 GMT). Ayatollah Jannati might have been a bit less hard-line than usual with the invocation that all the naughty protesters “to wake up and come to their senses”, but I think he may have a message for a Mr Hashemi Rafsanjani: “If the elite are not in accordance with the movement of these rioters, why don’t they protest against them and advise them?”

1945 GMT: Larijani Watch. Blink and you might miss the story….

Agence France Presse headlines a ritual denunciation by Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, speaking in Tokyo, of the International Atomic Energy Association and the “West”:

One of the defects in the IAEA is that it changes positions and attitudes if it is put under certain political pressure. I think the IAEA should be an organisation that states its views based on concrete facts, but should not comment on something such as ‘there is a possibility.

Yawn. It’s only in the 8th paragraph that AFP gets to the real story, with Larijani repeating his Thursday welcome to “third-party enrichment” by Japan: “I don’t know if you read the Japanese offer, but various proposals are made in it. We welcome this kind of subsurface-level initiative.”

1915 GMT: Your Friday Prayer Summary. Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati taking the podium in Tehran, and a bit of a surprise. After all the talk this week of the “sedition” of the opposition, the hard-line head of the Guardian Council appears to have been a bit of a softie, declaring, “the path to atonement is still open”. Of course, those who atone need to recognise that, on 22 Bahman, the Iranian people “showed that [they] do not fear enemies, threats or sanctions, are committed to [their] stances and are loyal to and believe in ‘velayat-e-faqih’ (clerical authority).”

1910 GMT: An EA Special. We’ve posted the English translation of Mehdi Karroubi’s latest interview, with his forthright defiance and the lament, “The Shah didn’t behave like this.”

1500 GMT: Nuclear Power Play. What a way to come back from an academic break. I find that Press TV is pushing the statement of the head of the Parliament’s National Security Commission, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, declaring in Tokyo:

Japan’s participation and involvement in the construction of Iran’s power plants will serve the interests of Japanese state and private companies. Iran’s suggests that Japan start its job from a particular point, by building a nuclear power plant inside the country.

How big? Boroujerdi is in Japan with Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, who announced yesterday that “third-party enrichment” is back on the table, with Japan enriching Iran’s uranium stock. So the deal is laid out: the international community gets its oversight of Iran’s nuclear fuel, Tehran gets a nuclear power programme with the assistance of Tokyo, and Larijani and his allies — no doubt representing the wishes of the Supreme Leader — also outflank President Ahmadinejad.

1130 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch (cont.). Activist websites reported that the women’s ward in Section 209 of Evin Prison is overcrowded, with cells holding seven detainees rather than the recommeded two or three. Most in Section 209 are academics.

The news follows the revelation of imprisoned journalist Bahman Ahmadi-Amoui that 40 prisoners are being held in a 20- meter cell in Evin.

1105 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. A series of reformist members of Parliament and parties have asked the head of Iran’s judiciary, Sadegh Larijani. to release journalists and political activists for Iranian New Year, Nowruz. Pro-Ahmadinejad MPs replied that it is up to the judge to decide the status of detainees, and this has nothing to do with Nowruz.

1100 GMT: Larijani v. Ahmadinejad Watch. Even when he’s in Japan, Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani is slapping at the President: he has declared that 34 of 39 proposals presented by the Government do not conform to the law.

1055 GMT: Khamenei, Khomeini, and the Revolutionary Guard. The Supreme Leader’s representative in the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, Hojatoleslam Ali Saidi, has sharply answered the criticism of those who accuse the Revolutionary Guard of interference in political matters: when civilians attack the holy republic, how can the IRGC stand aside?

There were also pointed words for the grandson of Ayatollah Khomeini, Seyed Hassan Khomeini: how could he oppose the Supreme Leader and the Iranian system (nezam)?

1050 GMT: A slow political day, but that gives us the chance to feature a provocative analysis, from The Newest Deal, that the momentum for the Green Movement will come from the regime’s rejection of Mir Hossein Mousavi’s five proposals for justice and reform.

0810 GMT: The Committee for Human Rights Reporters posts that women’s rights activist Somayeh Rashidi has been released from Evin Prison after more than two months in detention.

0800 GMT: The big manoeuvres yesterday were within the regime, as key participants either tried to close the door on any challenge or to keep it slightly open for further manoeuvres. We’ve got two special analyses: Mr Verde takes a long look at this week’s inconclusive, somewhat confusing Assembly of Experts meeting, featuring Hashemi Rafsanjani, and we assess the Supreme Leader’s “not-so-big push” to secure his position.

Meanwhile, you could take your pick of sideshows. There was Iran’s unsubtle propaganda push on captured Jundullah leader Abdolmalek Rigi with his confession (see separate entry) as proof of US sponsorship. Bashir al-Assad and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad struck their poses in Damascus, and US and Israeli officials met in Israel in a “strategic dialogue” which featured Iran’s nuclear programme.

In his 17th statement, Mir-Hossein Mousavi made five specific points that he deemed necessary to start the political (and national) reconciliation process. The proposal lead to a noticeable uptick in the weeks leading up to 22 Bahman in talk of the need for national “unity” and also garnered much attention from Iranian intellectuals and dissidents. Ultimately, the regime’s more radical elements reemerged and silenced the chatter before the security apparatus prevented a strong opposition showing on the revolution’s 31st anniversary. But Mousavi’s “five points,” as they have come to be called, still carry much weight. Generally, they are:

1. Government accountability for post-election violations
2. Legislation of new election laws that would safeguard reform-minded candidates from regime’s current vetting process
3. Release of all political prisoners
4. Freedom of the press and political-neutrality on state-run IRIB television
5. Freedom to assemble, as guaranteed by the Islamic Republic’s constitution

Were these five conditions to be met, the Green movement would arguably have the breathing space it needs to mobilize and begin the long process of transforming Iranian society. For if anything became apparent in the weeks leading up to and after the June election, it was that Iran has undergone an awakening. It has simply been the repression that the above five grievances capture that has prevented the social movement’s aspirations from coming to fruition.

Therefore, perhaps an alternative frame can be adopted to view Mousavi’s five points. As a recent Tehran Bureau profile wonderfully captured, the reluctant leader of Iran’s opposition has matured into a rather shrewd, cautious, and patient figure. While circumstances prevent him from voicing such a sentiment in public, the leader of the Green movement likely recognizes that the regime has reached a point of no return. The tyranny, the executions, the outright fascism — all of it is, to quote his Mousavi from an interview on the eve of 22 Bahman, an outgrowth of the “revolution’s failures” and the “roots of tyranny and dictatorship” that persist in society from the reign of the Shah. These are damning (and yet still very measured) words from one of the Islamic Republic’s own founding fathers.

Thus, seeing the regime in this light gives Mousavi’s five points new significance. The demands would no longer be five steps the regime must take in order to rescue the country from its current crisis, but rather, five blatant and particularly egregious shortcomings that the regime will inevitably be unwilling to address, and that will thus escalate the conflict between the Greens and the regime. For in the wake of the June coup d’etat, if one thing has become clear it is that those currently in control will never meet any such conditions, even if moderate voices within their camp plead otherwise. Political calculus has been replaced by megalomania, with the possibility of reconciliation falling victim.

And so if these five points are instead five tests that the regime must fail before confrontation with the regime escalates to the next phase, the news emerging this week from the Expediency Council and Assembly of Experts — both bodies chaired by Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani — is indeed very telling. First, the Council began considering aproposal being pushed by Rafsanjani and Mohsen Rezaei that would take away the Guardian Council’s vetting role and instead give it to a new “National Election Committee” of sorts, which would conveniently be under Rafsanjani’s supervision in the Expediency Council. (Ironically, the proposal to revise the country’s election laws was made to Supreme Leader two years ago, after which he ordered for a new plan to be drawn up).

Make no mistake: this would essentially be a first step in meeting the second condition laid of Mousavi’s 17th statement. Were the change to the vetting process be enacted, the Guardian Council would no longer be able to disqualify candidates from running for president or parliament, as it did when it disqualified all but four candidates from running in the 2009 presidential election.

The chances of the plan coming to fruition, however, appear slim. With the regime still reeling from the aftermath of the June elections and still off-balance going forward, it would have no reason to suddenly invite more political opposition in Majlis through freer elections in 2012. Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of the ultra-conservative Kayhandaily and someone who is regarded as being close to Khamenei, has already come out on the attack, stating that any propsoal to create such an electoral commission would be “against the Islamic Republic’s constitution.”

No sooner than the proposal was being discussed, more divisive conservative rhetoric emerged from the other body Rafsanjani chairs, the Assembly of Experts. In a statement reported by Fars News, the Assembly allegedly declared that the regime’s patience with the opposition “ended in December after sedition leaders missed numerous chances to repent and return into the gown of the revolution.” (Enduring America notes, however, that the statement is missing on the Assembly of Experts’ official website and that several prominent members were absent from the Assembly’s two-day meeting). Khamenei, for his part, has reiterated the statement’s pronouncement in his own statement, saying that those who still do not accept the June presidential election result “would be disqualified from participating in the Islamic system.”

The obstacles in revising the regime’s election laws aside, the other four points from Mousavi’s 17th statement have gone unheeded as well. Saeed Mortazavi, though implicated by Majlis [Iran's Parliament] in the Kahrizak torture-murders, remains a free man. Rather than having political prisoners freed, the country recently saw the greatest wave of arrests sweep dissidents since late June and early July. Meanwhile, state-controlled media remains entirely propagandized while any questions regarding citizens’ right to freely assemble were surly answered by the enormous security presence deployed on 22 Bahman.

Not even appearing to consider the proposals, the regime seems bent on acting counter to each of Mousavi’s five points. Despite the intentions of some del-soozan, (or “heartbroken” moderate conservatives), any promise for political reconciliation also appears dead. Rather, the crisis seems destined to continue indefinitely, and with neither side refusing to back down, Mousavi’s five grievances may come to be prerequisites for the regime to unconditionally reject before the opposition begins to decide on how to take the uprising to the next level.

For the latest on the continuing politics, see our analysis of the Supreme Leader’s “big push” and our latest updates:

The Assembly of Experts has been holding twice a yearly for many years. Most of its meetings are behind closed doors. The official reports of the meetings usually included a few set-piece and rather predictable speeches. And they were ignored by most people.

Iran Analysis: Khamenei’s Not-So-Big Push
Iran Analysis: The Assembly of Experts Mystery

The only notable “news” about the Assembly meetings in recent years was the 2007 election to replace the deceased Ali Meshkini as chair. Until then only one candidate stood in the election and was elected unanimously to show unity. This time, however, there were two candidates: Rafsanjani and Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati.

Most people expected Jannati to win because Jannati heads the Guardian Council, which has to approve members of the Assembly. Rafsanjani had lost the second round of the 2005 presidential election to Ahmadinejad. Yet Rafsanjani beat Jannati. And then people again forgot about the Assembly and its sessions.

This was until the June 2009 presidential elections.

Soon after the disputed elections, a statement was released by the secretariat of the Assembly declaring that the members not only supported the Supreme Leader but they also supported the results. It later transpired that the statement was signed only by Mohammad Yazdi, a strong Ahmadinejad backer, a Guardian Council member close to Jannati, and the secretary of the Assembly. It was in effect Mohammad Yazdi’s opinion printed on Assembly letterhead.

Some of those hoping that the Islamic Republic would find a way out of the post-election crisis looked to the autumn session of the Assembly for a solution. They were disappointed, but this time they took note of the limited news of the Assembly’s proceedings. Mohammad Yazdi did not attend the meetings of that session, and citing his illness, he resigned as secretary of the Assembly. His resignation was rejected by Rafsanjani, who wished him a speedy recovery and return to his duties (a few days later Yazdi was pictured attending another event, which may point to illness being used as an excuse).

During the session some members criticised the actions of the regime and, by implication, the Supreme Leader. They were and still are attacked by the radical right for their stance.

Then during the final meeting, a strongly worded statement was read out on behalf of the Assembly by Ahmad Khatami, a hardline cleric and fervent supporter of Ahmadinejad. It was reported that Rafsanjani was not present during that part of the meeting and, later, that he had received a call from Khamenei asking him to attend a meeting with the Supreme Leader immediately. No news was ever published about the subject of this meeting was about and why it was it so urgent that Rafsanjani had to leave in the middle of the Assembly.

The struggle between Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad supporters continued after the autumn session. At one point Rafsanjani was criticised, indeed threatened, by Yazdi. For the first time in the post-election crisis, Rafsanjani responded directly to an attack and said that he would reveal facts about Yazdi’s past actions. This lead to Yazdi calling a truce.

This week, Ahmadinejad supporters were hoping to create an atmosphere in which they could force Rafsanjani out as the head of the Assembly. The Yazdi attacks were accompanied by castigations of Rafsanjani’s family and political associates.

It seems that the plan to remove Rafsanjani has not worked, but there were no reports of speeches by critics of the current situation either. Instead, there were anomalies putting a question mark over the legitimacy of the meeting. Again Yazdi was absent because of “illness”; instead his son, who has no legal right to attend, was present.

Rafsanjani made a point of announcing the attendance of the younger Yazdi, raising speculation. Was the head of the Assembly effectively declaring that the body’s status had been compromised? Was this a personal response to Yazdi, implying that he is so used to illegal actions that he would dare send his son to represent him? Or was Rafsanjani trying to protect the legitimacy of the gathering by citing “special circumstances”?

Yet the meeting was further damaged, at least in its official standing, by the absence of key members. Ayatollah Ebrahim Amini was either too ill or staged a personal boycott. (Amini, although a “conservative”, stepped down as Friday Prayer leader of Qom because of his dissatisfaction with post-election events.) Rafsanjani ally Hassan Rohani was missing, as was Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani, who had reportedly worked with Rafsanjani and others last autumn to forge a National Unity Plan. Perhaps most surprisingly, Mesbah Yazdi, a hardline cleric reported to be Ahmadinejad’s religious mentor, was also a no-show.

So instead of ending in resolution, this week’s meeting merely adds more puzzles and complications. The regime was trying to demontration both its unity after the events of 22 Bahman and its power, amidst symbolic developments like the launching of the Jamaran warship and the arrest of Jundullah leader Abdolmalek Rigi. It wanted to present the image to the Iranian people that all is back to normal. Meeting Assembly members yesterday, the Supreme Leader tried to drive home the impression, emphasising that those who continued to question the June election were no longer acceptable in the Iranian system.

Rafsanjani served the regime to an extent by warning all to be careful that the arrows of criticism are not turned towards the Supreme Leader. Yet he later said, in a statement he repeated yesterday at Ayatollah Khomeini’s mausoleum, that some officials are not taking responsibility for their own actions and are instead trying to push the blame onto Khamenei. (At one stage he said that we need to be careful that the crisis does not escalate further, using the word “toghyan”, which can be translated into English as insurrection or insurgency or uprising.)

So, just as the Assembly was far from “normal” with the absences and the continuing political manoeuvres within its ranks, the Islamic Republic is far from settled. In one moment, the call is “all is well”. In the next, it is that “all should be well” with the threats against the opposition. And then, finally, with a wink and a nod, Hashemi Rafsanjani says “all might not be well” because of “uninformed individuals” (who are they?).

This is the certainty of the uncertain.

My reading of what happened with President Kennedy is that it’s exactly what he did. It was high-stakes diplomacy. It was pushing hard to get the world community to understand, going to the UN, making a presentation, getting international opinion against the placement of Russian weapons in Cuba, making a deal eventually with the Russians that led to the removal of the weapons.

That is the kind of high-stakes diplomacy that I’m engaged in, that other members of this administration are, because we take very seriously the potential threat from Iran.

2100 GMT: Rafsanjani Watch. After all the political positions (take your pick) he adopted at the Assembly of Experts, Hashemi Rafsanjani used a ceremony at the tomb of the late Ayatollah Khomeini to issue a warning about “uninformed individuals” (who are they?): “These individuals shirk from their responsibilities and make irrelevant declarations, thus causing the leadership to bear the responsibility of all the actions that the people reject.”

1935 GMT: Diplomatic Poses (cont.). Well, I guess Washington had to strike its own posture given the statements of President Ahmadinejad and his Syrian counterpart Bashir al-Assad in Damascus today (1335 GMT). Here’s State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley:

As the secretary [Hillary Clinton] reiterated yesterday, we have expressed our concern directly to President (Bashar) Assad about Syria’s relationship with Iran. This is ultimately a decision that Syria has to make, but as President Assad assesses Syria’s long-term interests, he need only look around the region and recognize that Syria is increasingly an outlier.

We want to see Syria play a more constructive role in the region. One step would be to make clear what Iran’s need to do differently and unfortunately there was no evidence of that today.

The key here is that it is a spokesman making the statement, not the President, not the Secretary of State. Yes, of course, the US would prefer that Damascus put Iran into isolation. But they know that, given the regional dynamics, Syria will not publicly cut off Tehran. So the real diplomacy will take place away from these statements.

1925 GMT: Back from a lengthy academic break — the US Ambassador to Britain was in Birmingham today — to catch up on the full force of Iranian propaganda. Here is the “confession” of Jundullah leader Abdolmalek Rigi, tailor-made to put the US as the main sponsor of his terrorism:

After Obama was elected, the Americans contacted us and they met me in Pakistan.They met us after clashes with my group around March 17 in (the southeastern city of) Zahedan, and he (the US operative) said that Americans had requested a meeting.

I said we didn’t have any time for a meeting and if we do help them they should promise to give us aid. They said they would cooperate with us and will give me military equipment, arms and machine guns. They also promised to give us a base along the border with Afghanistan next to Iran.

They asked to meet me and we said where should we meet you and he said in Dubai. We sent someone to Dubai and we told a person to ask a place for myself in Afghanistan from the area near the operations and they complied that they would sort out the problem for us and they will find Mr. Rigi a base and guarantee his own security in Afghanistan or in any of the countries adjacent to Iran so that he can carry on his operations.

They told me that in Kyrgyzstan they have a base called Manas near Bishkek, and that a high-ranking person was coming to meet me and that if such high-ranking people come to the United Arab Emirates, they may be observed by intelligence people but in a place like Bishkek this high-ranking American person could come and we could reach an agreement on making personal contacts. But after the last major operation we took part in, they said that they wanted to meet with us.

The Americans said Iran was going its own way and they said our problem at the present is Iran…not al-Qaeda and not the Taliban, but the main problem is Iran. We don’t have a military plan against Iran. Attacking Iran is very difficult for us (the US). The CIA is very particular about you and is prepared to do anything for you because our government has reached the conclusion that there was nothing Americans could do about Iran and only I could take care of the operations for them.

One of the CIA officers said that it was too difficult for us to attack Iran militarily, but we plan to give aid and support to all anti-Iran groups that have the capability to wage war and create difficulty for the Iranian (Islamic) system. They reached the conclusion that your organization has the power to create difficulties for the Islamic Republic and they are prepared to give you training and/or any assistance that you would require, in terms of telecommunications security and procedures as well as other support, the Americans said they would be willing to provide it at an extensive level.

NEW Iran Analysis: The Assembly of Experts Mystery
Latest Iran Video: Rafsanjani’s Daughter is Confronted
Iran Special: Interpreting the Videos of the Tehran Dorm Attacks
The Latest from Iran (24 February): Shocks and Erosions

1350 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Journalist Hengameh Shahidi has been arrested again.

Ebrahim Yazdi, former Foreign Minister and head of the Freedom of Movement Iran, underwent open heart surgery soon after his 10-day release yesterday. His family said that the surgery was a success.

1340 GMT: Trying to Shut the Door. The Supreme Leader has returned to his rhetoric of last June. In a statement reported by Iranian state media, he said those not accepting the results of the Presidential election “would be disqualified from participating in the Islamic system, and they have already lost their credibility”. Certain individuals caused the post-election turmoil because they wanted to “deny the vote of the people.”

1335 GMT: Damascus Poses. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have made their declarations during the Iranian President’s visit.

Assad gave a lecture to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton over her comments that the US is “troubled” by Syrian ties with Tehran, “We hope that others don’t give us lessons about our region and our history. We are the ones who decide how matters will go and we know our interests. We thank them for their advice.”

Ahmadinejad was even bolder, “(The Americans) want to dominate the region but they feel Iran and Syria are preventing that. We tell them that instead of interfering in the region’s affairs, to pack their things and leave.”

No real surprises in either man’s pose. What is more important is whether there is any substantial support from Damascus for Iran, and more specifically Ahmadinejad, beyond the rhetoric of increased cooperation and cancelling of visa restrictions.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his Syrian counterpart, Bashar Assad, vowed increased cooperation during a meeting in Damascus and canceled visa restrictions between the countries.
1330 GMT: Political Prisoner Update. An activist updates that Mousavi campaign aide Asghar Khandan has been sentenced to 2 years and 74 lashes. Another aide Jahanbakh Khanjani, a former senior official in the Ministry of Interior, has been released on bail after eight months in detention.

1038 GMT: Claim of Day. According to Kalemeh, Iran’s Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, Mohammad Hosseini, has said that “there is no censorship” of the press.

1035 GMT: Where’s Mahmoud? President Ahmadinejad is in Damascus for talks with Syrian President Bashir al-Assad. Let’s see if he can trump Ali Larijani’s political manoeuvre.

1000 GMT: Larijani’s Nuclear Move. This looks like it may be big news. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, after talks with Japanese officials, has said Japan’s offer to enrich Iran’s uranium “has the substance to be worth discussing. We want to deepen the discussion on it.”

That would be a major shift from Iran’s line since November that uranium had to be enriched or swapped inside the country, and it is a dramatic change in Larijani’s previous hostility to third-party enrichment. A likely assumption is that the Speaker is representing the views of the Supreme Leader.

So now the key political question: is Larijani also speaking for the President or is he making a move to claim personal credit, surpassing and pushing aside Ahmadinejad?

0950 GMT: The Rigi Mystery. It may be that Iranian state media, when it finally settled on the story that the leader of Jundullah, Abdolmalek Rigi, was detained on a flight from Dubai to Kyrgyzstan, had it right (and that our reports of Rigi’s detention last week were inaccurate). The deputy chief of Kyrgyzstan’s national airline has confirmed that a plane was forced to land in Bandar Abbas in southern Iran on Tuesday (in fact, other information indicates that the interception occurred Monday night) and two passengers were taken away by Iranian authorities.

0905 GMT: The Wrong Lawyers. An unexpected but still stunning story from Rooz Online about the screening of “unsuitable” human rights lawyers:

Last week the administrative committee of Iran’s bar association has disqualified nearly half of the candidates seeking to serve on Iran’s bar association.

The official website of the Iranian Bar Association reported yesterday that 36 candidates running for management positions at the Association’s headquarters were disqualified. The Association’s President, Seyed Mohammad Jondoghi-Kermanipour…said, “Today we received a letter from the administrative judicial tribunal, which stated that, pursuant to their previous letter, only 43 candidates were qualified, the remaining candidates having been disqualified for failing to meet the specified criteria.”

[As well as] Jondoghi-Kermanipour, other prominent attorneys such as Abdolfatah Soltani, Naser Zarafshan, Abdolsamad Khorramshahi, Mohammad-Ali Dadkhah, Nemat Ahmadi, Farideh Gheirat, Goudarz Eftekhar-Jahromi (former head of the Association), Ali Najafi-Tavana, Reza Nourbaha, Mohammad-Hossein Aghasi, Jahangir Mostofi, Akbar Sardarizadeh, Ramezan Haji-Mashadi have been disqualified.

0855 GMT: Satire of Day. Ebrahim Nabavi sets a Philosophy Quiz for readers. A sample question:

[Government spokesman] Gholam-Hossein Elham said, “Cutting off AN’s government is the insurgents’ next project.” What is the logical mistake in this sentence?

1 – There exists no government to be cut off.
2 –  The government will be cut off by itself. There is no need for the insurgents to do anything.
3 – Even if the insurgents killed themselves, they could not stop the downfall of the government.
4 – The Agha [Supreme Leader] himself has started this project a long time ago.

0840 GMT: The Forgetful Assembly. Amidst the confusion over the statement/non-statement from the two-day meeting of the Assembly of Experts (see separate analysis), the Green website Rah-e-Sabz offers an overview of the divisions within the body since the election and declares that it is suffering from “Continuous Alzheimer’s”.

0825 GMT: Comparing the Numbers. Iran News Now, using video and photographs, compares the non-crowd at the President’s speech in Birjand, Khorasan, yesterday with the masses who turned out for a Mir Hossein Mousavi campaign rally and concludes:

Let’s look at the crowd gathered in Birjand for Ahmadinejad…and let’s be realistic. This thing is FAR from over. The aspirations of the Iranian people will not go unheeded.

EA’s Mr Verde adds, “The interesting fact about the turnout (if one can claim it is interesting at all) is that even in a place close to Ayatollah Khamenei’s hometown of Mashhad, people don’t really care about Ahmadinejad.”

0820 GMT: Economy Watch. Mohammad Reza Khabbaz, a member of Parliament’s Economy Committee, has denounced President Ahmadinejad’s proposed budget as “unrealistic”.

0815 GMT: This is a Secure Regime? Revolutionary Guard commander Hossein Hamedani, in his statement yesterday, announced that the number of Basiji bases in Tehran would be increased from 6 to 22.

0800 GMT: Wednesday was marked by loud proclamations from the Government. There were the attempts to limit the damage of the video of June’s attack on Tehran University dormitories, the aggressive promotion of the “terrorist” threat from Jundullah to Kurdish groups to the Green Movement, and the President’s sparsely-attended speech in eastern Iran (see  inset.

However, the most intriguing statement by far was the supposed proclamation of the Assembly of Experts supporting the Supreme Leader and warning against the “sedition” of opposition leaders. This morning, however, it looks this was a non-statement, an attempt by pro-Ahmadinejad members of the Assembly and media to create the image of a regime ready to crush Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and Mohammad Khatami (and, probably, to back Hashemi Rafsanjani into a corner). We have a special analysis.

OK, so each may have had a reason to be absent. But was Mesbah Yazdi, perhaps Ahmadinejad’s most fervent backer, not present at a session that supposedly declared opposition “sedition”?

UPDATE 1430 GMT: Let’s add to the mystery. At the beginning of the Assembly of Experts session, Rafsanjani said that Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, the Deputy Chair of the Assembly was not present; instead, his son was attending. (Yazdi Senior also missed the autumn session, saying he was ill, and he tried to resign from the secretariat of the Assembly, but Rafsanjani rejected the resignation.)

Legally Yazdi Junior cannot represent his father in Assembly meetings. So was Rafsanjani making the point that Mohammad Yazdi, a backer of President Ahmadinejad, is so used to illegal activity that he sends his son to represent him? And/or was Rafsanjani diminishing the legitimacy of a meeting “under special circumstances” where non-members could sit in?

When the news came through, it hit like a hammer blow. The Assembly of Experts, headed by Hashemi Rafsanjani, had issued their statement after a widely-anticipated two-day meeting. The 86-member body had declared its loyalty to the Supreme Leader:

The more we go ahead, the more our supreme leader proves his competence. Ayatollah Khamenei shed light on realities in dealing with the post-election sedition and undertook huge efforts in view of bringing unity to the nation.

So far, nothing surprising. Last summer’s possibility of an Assembly challenge to Khamenei is long gone; all “establishment” figures, including Rafsanjani, have circled political wagons around the concept of clerical supremacy (velayat-e-faqih). But then the unexpected:

The revolutionary patience of the Iranian nation and the Islamic Republic ended in December after sedition leaders missed numerous chances to repent and return into the gown of the revolution. Sedition leaders flunked the Dec 30 final exam and they were removed from Iran’s political spirit.

Bam. Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, Mohammad Khatami: your resistance is over. Not just over, forbidden. With that doubly-offered word “sedition”, the threat of arrest had been made, not by the Revolutionary Guard or the Iranian judiciary but by clerics, some of whom were supposedly sympathetic to the opposition demands.

No wonder a prominent (and shrewd) activist e-mailed me, “This statement has me worried. And it takes a lot to get me worried.”

But then the story moves from drama to mystery. Did the Assembly really put down this challenge to Mousavi-Karroubi-Khatami?

The original source for the statement appears to have been Fars News. The Iranian Students News Agency also featured the story but simply summarised the  Fars account. However, as far as I can tell, the supposed statement has not been covered by the Islamic Republic News Agency, and it certainly has escaped any mention on Press TV’s website.

Perhaps most importantly, there is still no sign of the statement on the official website of the Assembly.

So this morning, we are left, not with the certain shock of a once-and-for-all challenge to opposition leaders but with the uncertainty of whether Fars — which has been known to create or distort stories — has been the source of either outright fabrication or the channel for someone (who? take your pick) to “leak” a statement which had not been agreed by the Assembly.

A bit of recent history may be in order. Last summer a statement appeared, in the name of the Assembly, criticising the leadership of Hashemi Rafsanjani and calling on him to step down as chair. The initial reading, given Rafsanjani’s high-profile Friday Prayer speech in mid-July standing up to the Government and the subsequent pressure and threats against him and his family, was that the regime had rallied against the former President.

Not so. Within days, it emerged that the statement had been drawn up by only a handful of clerics and signed by the fiercely pro-Ahmadinejad Ayatollah Mesbah Mohammad Yazdi. A number of Assembly members made it clear that they had no part of the effort, and Rafsanjani remained in his post.

So now, rather than the intended portrait of a regime now united against the opposition, we have the picture — should the speculation of a clumsy propaganda effort be borne out — of a system whose heart is still divided. There will be no resolution.

Watch this space.

An Iranian activist today is adding that the weapon used on Fazli-Nejad was a “dessert knife”.

NEW Latest Iran Video: Rafsanjani’s Daughter is Confronted
NEW Iran Special: Interpreting the Videos of the Tehran Dorm Attacks
Iran Document: Karroubi Statement on 22 Bahman & The Way Forward (22 February)
UPDATED Iran 18-Minute Video: Attack on Tehran University Dormitories (14/15 June 2009)
The Latest from Iran (23 February): Videoing the Attacks

2040 GMT: War on Terror, I Tell You. I’m sure it is entirely coincidental in light of current events — announcement of arrest of Jundullah leader a week after it occurred, Ahmadinejad declaring that it is Iran not “the West” that is fighting terrorism (1745 GMT), declaration of 100 arrested on 22 Bahman as “terrorists” (1435 GMT) — but this just in from the Ministry of Intelligence:

Three agents of the [Kurdish] Komala terrorist group who were planning to bomb a factory belonging to the defence ministry in Tehran were identified and arrested….Two foreign made bombs concealed in loudspeakers and three Kalashnikovs (assault rifles) were seized….Due to the occupying presence of the US forces in Iraq and their support of some terrorist groups like Komala, their training, and equipping them with military hardware is carried out by America’s intelligence services.

1940 GMT: Urgent — Assembly of Experts Statement. Fars News reports, and Zamaaneh summarises, that the statement at the end of the two-day Assembly meeting has not only declared support for the Supreme Leader (expected) but declared that the opportunity for the “repent and reform” of opposition leaders has ended (unexpected). This “sedition” against the “intelligence guidance” of Ayatollah Khamenei can no longer be tolerated.

1920 GMT: Is This the Level of Ahmadinejad’s Support? Claimed video from Birjand in south Khorasan (eastern Iran) for the President’s speech today:

Click here to view the embedded video.

1910 GMT: Defending Against the Video. The Los Angeles Times, drawing from Iranian state media (see 0645 GMT) has a summary of damage control from regime officials:

“Today, police are powerful, popular, courageous and reasonable,” Maj. Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi, the top military adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, told police commanders….”Everywhere in the world, even in Europe and America, police strongly confront rioters. No government tolerates insecurity, arson and vandalizing of public properties.”….

“All detention centers, interrogation rooms and reformatories have been ordered to install surveillance cameras and monitoring equipment,” [Iran's police chief Gen. Esmail Ahmadi-Moqaddam] said. “Police inspectors will regularly visit the detention centers. Police are also setting up a committee to protect civil rights in detention centers.”….

“Even when a European city hosts a summit, the city is militarized,” said Brig. Gen. Hossein Hamedani, commander of the Tehran Revolutionary Guards. “How can we turn a blind eye to people’s security?”

1900 GMT: Political Prisoner News (cont.). Iranian authorities have issued temporary release orders for Ebrahim Yazdi, head of the Freedom Movement of Iran, and Hedayat Aghai, of the Kargozaran Party, today.

The case of Yazdi, who has been released for 10 days, is still being considered; however, Aghai, freed released tomorrow for a week, has been sentenced to 2 1/2 years in prison.

It is also reported that Feizollah Arabsorkhi, executive member of the Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution party, has been sentenced to six years in prison for “activities against national security and propaganda against the regime”.

1850 GMT: Political Prisoner News. The Iranian Supreme Court has commuted the death sentence of Kurdish journalist Adnan Hassanpour, who has been jailed since 2007 for mohareb (war against God). Adnanpour will now serve a 31-year prison term.

1840 GMT: The wife of Mohammad Maleki, the first post-1979 chancellor of Tehran Revolution, has spoken to Radio Farda of her husband’s deteriorating health. The 76-year-old Maleki, who was detained in August and charged in September with actions against national security, suffers from prostate cancer.

Ghodsi Mirmoez said her husband sounded very ill the last time they spoke and that she had not been allowed to meet him for more than 20 days. She pleaded, “I wonder if international organizations can do anything for my husband. His physical condition is grave.”

1805 GMT: Not Defeated. Writing for Tehran Bureau, Ali Chenar in Tehran reflects on the politics of 22 Bahman and its aftermath and concludes:

Certainly one of the questions about the Green Movement is why it has remained a grassroots movement and not become a political organization. One reason might be that it does not care to become identified with a specific ideology and risk alienating various segments of the society whose support it currently enjoys. In the past eight months it has instead walked a fine line, remaining a popular but amorphous phenomenon, encompassing all political factions and social groups seeking justice. It has avoided intensifying the conflict, avoided pressing for regime change. Rather than evolving, it has maintained a state of entropy. Yet over the past several months, its inclusive nature has helped it sustain its momentum and survive.

What the Green Movement has achieved already is enormous. Many would tell you that the events of the past eight months have permanently changed the social and political landscape. A new era has begun. Those groups critical of the government now map the very fabric of Iranian society. They include both traditional conservatives and secular liberals, progressive students and cautious businessmen, men and women alike. As one observer told this correspondent, “Everyone has realized that everyone else thinks the emperor is naked too.”

1745 GMT: It’s Our “War on Terror” Now. President Ahmadinejad neatly twinned the “terrorism” and “Iran v. the West” themes in his speech today in Khorasan in eastern Iran. “Why have you [in the US] issued a passport for Rigi if you want to arrest a terrorist?….The Iranian security forces captured Rigi without any bloodshed. It is better for these countries to adopt the Iranian model of campaigning against terrorism.”

1435 GMT: The Big “Terrorist” Push. Ahh, here we go. In the same week that Iranian authorities trumpet the capture of Jundullah leader Abdolmalek Rigi, Revolutionary Guard Commander Hossein Hamadani declares that security forces arrested about 100 members of dissident groups on 11 February. He asserts that they are members of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran and Association of Iranian Monarchists and intended to carry out “bombings and assassinations”.

1355  GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. On a very slow day for news, we have noted the account by blogger and journalist Zhila Baniyaghoub, posted by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, about the detention of her husband, “Bahman Amouei”, and others in Evin Prison. Amouei is among the hundreds of journalists and activists arrested in the postelection crackdown:

Bahman says he, along with 40 others are imprisoned in a cell less than 20 meters square. He says their whole day is wasted in lines; queuing for the toilet, queuing for the showers, and queuing for the telephone….

Their condition is so harsh that he envies Masud and Ahmad, who got transferred to the Rajai Shahr prison. They would at least be able to spread their legs.

I asked if he read books there. He retorted with another question, “Do you think it’s possible to read in such conditions?”

0925 GMT: We’ve posted a four-minute video, circulating widely on the Internet, and translation of an encounter between Faezeh Hashemi, the daughter of Hashemi Rafsanjani, and an unidentified group of men.

0910 GMT: Larijani in Japan. No surprise that the Speaker of the Parliament would make headlines in Iranian state media, as he begins his 5-day trip in the Far East, for a nuclear declaration: “Although the Islamic Republic has remained committed to its obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the agency does not fulfill its duties about supplying fuel needed for the Tehran research reactor. Based on terms of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the IAEA has no right to urge Iran to suspend its nuclear activities.”

0800 GMT: Full credit to CNN for highlighting the role of social media in disseminating the post-election news about events in Iran, featuring activists such as “OxfordGirl”.

Shame, however, that the report closed with a soundbite reduction of the events of 22 Bahman: “while activism on-line was successful in organising the masses and keeping opposition alive, the opposition inside the country either did not plan for or now lacks the power to respond to the Government’s crackdown”. (No doubt that social media can soon put that right.)

0755 GMT: Firebreak. Amidst the drumbeat in parts of the US media for military action against Tehran (see our entry yesterday on The Washington Post), some Obama Administration officials are holding the line against an attack. Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, repeated yesterday, “I worry a lot about the unintended consequences of any sort of military action. For now, the diplomatic and the economic levers of international power are, and ought to be, the levers first pulled.”

0745 GMT: And the (Jundullah) Beat Goes On. Press TV tries once more to drive home the right message, “Iran says it has irrefutable evidence confirming that terrorist ringleader Abdolmalek Rigi had been aided and abetted by the US government before his arrest.”

On the side, however, it is interesting how state media’s narrative is changing. Initially, Rigi was taken in Dubai as he was awaiting the departure of his plane. Or he was captured in Iran’s Sistan-Baluchistan province. Or he was seized in Pakistan. Now “the leader of the Jundallah terrorist group was on a flight from the United Arab Emirates to Kyrgyzstan when he was tracked down by Iranian security forces on Tuesday”.

All especially interesting, in fact, because an EA source continues to report that Rigi was actually detained last week. (Al Jazeera is also reporting this from its sources.)

0645 GMT: At one point on Tuesday it felt as if EA staff were trying to measure an earthquake that had taken place in a remote area. We all had seen and been taken aback by the 18-minute video of the 15 June attack on Tehran University’s dormitories, but we did not know how many people inside Iran had viewed or knew of the footage.

We did know, from one of our correspondents with excellent contacts in Iran, that the BBC Persian broadcast which first displayed extracts from the video had been viewed and that those who had seen it had been unsettled and angered. And this morning, we have confirmation that the footage has shaken the political ground: Fars News has posted a long article trying to put the imagery in the “proper” context.

The impact of earthquakes is not necessarily that they bring a collapse, however; they can have longer-term effects by eroding and thus changing the landscape. So Tuesday was also a case of challengers chipping away at the Ahmadinejad Government, even as the regime was trying to manufacture its own earthquake with the propaganda around the capture of Abdolmalek Rigi, the leader of the Baluch insurgent group Jundullah.

While Ministers used press conference to announce that Rigi’s detention proved the US-Israel-Europe campaign to terrorise the Islamic Republic into submission, former President Hashemi Rafsanjani and his allies in the Assembly of Experts were staking out their limited but important call for changes to Iran’s electoral system. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani was away from the main political arena, beginning his five-day trip to Japan (an event which, in itself, deserves attention; what is Larijani hoping to accomplish, not just for his country but for himself?), but his media outlets were not halting their assault on President Ahmadinejad.

And then there were the ripples from Mehdi Karroubi’s statement, which made clear that the opposition — rebuilding, re-assessing — has not been quieted.

The significance of the Tehran University video is two-fold. On the one hand, it points to rifts within the regime; as Mr Verde has analysed in a separate entry, the vital question, “Who leaked the fotoage?”, brings a variety of answers, but all of them point to battles and uncertainties in the Islamic Republic and the inability of the Supreme Leader to resolve them. And on the other hand, its existence — even if known only to a fraction of the Iranian people at this moment — is a catalyst for anger and thus renewed determination of those who want justice and responsibility from their Government and system.

And so another day begins. There may not be aftershocks, but there will be more shifts. And it is in the shifts, rather than the drama of earthquakes, that this crisis is playing out.