2135 GMT: Rumour of Day. Kalameh alleges that prisoners held in cellblock 209 of Evin Prison have been commanded to fill in forms about their views on election fraud and whether the protest leaders are connected to foreign countries.
2100 GMT: Dr Mohammad Maleki, the former head of Tehran University, has reportedly been released after 191 days in detention. Maleki, 76, suffers from prostate cancer.
2055 GMT: United4Iran has a profile of Jahanbakhsh Khanjani, former advisor to Iran’s Minister of Interior in the Khatami Presidency, who was released on 24 February after spending more than eight months in prison. According to another released prisoner, Khanjani was under pressure to confess and was constantly moved from general confinement to solidarity confinement.
For eight months now, there has been a steady stream of footage showing security forces beating up protesters. What sets apart the footage from the night of 24-25 Khordad 88 (14-15 June 09), shown by BBC Persian and disseminated by YouTube, is the cameraman. Almost all other videos have been taken by ordinary people on their cameraphones. (A few clips were taken by professional camera crews in the first days of the post-election protests in June, before they were expelled by the authorities.) This footage was taken by one of the attackers using a professional camera.
Much of the amateur footage of the protests has shown security and intelligence agents filming the protestors. For the first time in eight months we are actually seeing one of these videos. In that sense, this is the first “official” footage confirming the brutality of the Islamic Republic’s security forces.
2300 GMT: Urgent Correction on the Labour Front. Earlier today (1600 GMT) Tehran Bureau reported that the Tehran Bus Workers had called for civil disobedience over the case of jailed activist Mansur Osanloo. Tonight Iran Labour Report has issued an effective retraction of the story:
On February 12, a statement appeared on various Iranian websites, including Balatarin which is one of the largest Persian-speaking community websites in the world, in the form of a poster. The poster called for solidarity with the imprisoned leader of Tehran’s bus drivers union, Mansoor Osanloo, through acts of civil disobedience beginning on March 4 around Tehran’s Valiasr square. The statement purported to be an offcial statement of the union (formally known as the Syndicate of Vahed Company Workers of Tehran and Environs). Subsequently, in an article for the popular web journal Tehran Bureau, a staff member at Iran Labor Report wrote an analysis of the union statement as it had appeared on the various websites.
It now appears that the poster-statement was not authentic and that the union’s leadership had not issued the statement. Moreover, the provenance of the statement is still not clear. The union had apparently not published an official disclaimer earlier on due to the recent disuptions with internet use in Iran. Subsequent to this, the union requested that the inauthenticity of the statement be made public and that henceforth no reference would be made of it.
2145 GMT: Labour Rights. The joint statement of three Iranian unions — the Syndicate of Tehran Bus Workers, the Syndicate of Haft Tapeh Sugar Cane Company, and The Free Union of Workers in Iran — to the United Nations Human Rights Council has been posted:
[Workers'] most urgent and most basic demands at the present time are:
Yesterday, three days after a Human Rights Watch report on the same topic (see separate entry), the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center released its initial findings, “Violent Aftermath: The 2009 Election and Suppression of Dissent in Iran”:
INTRODUCTION
On June 13, 2009, the day after the tenth presidential election in the Islamic Republic of Iran, demonstrations erupted in cities across the country. Demonstrators protested what they viewed as widespread fraud—calls of “Where is my vote?” predominated. The Guardian Council had permitted only four men to campaign: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the incumbent; Mohsen Rezaei, a former head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah), considered a conservative; Mir-Hossein Mousavi, a former prime minister of Iran during the war with Iraq, considered a reformist; and Mehdi Karroubi, a former speaker of the Majlis, also a reformist.
Mousavi had declared himself the winner late on Election Day. The government immediately announced that Ahmadinejad had won by 62 percent of the vote. The regime also responded by cutting off electronic communication avenues within Iran and with the outside world. As the week progressed, cell phone and internet services were regularly shut down and slowed. On June 16, the authorities announced that foreign journalists were forbidden from reporting from the streets, and that their visas would not be renewed. Hundreds of domestic journalists and members of the press were arrested and intimidated.
The nearly nine months since Iran’s presidential election sparked widespread popular demonstrations against alleged vote-rigging have been among the most tumultuous in the history of the Islamic Republic, which marks the 31st anniversary of the revolution that paved the way for its establishment on February 11, 2010. This has been a period of repeated serious human rights abuses that include extra-judicial killings, violations of the rights to freedom of assembly and expression, and the prohibition of torture, not to mention arbitrary arrest and detention and countless due process violations.
In the two months immediately following the June 12 election, the government carried out a major campaign of repression that included mass detentions of protestors, political reform figures, and rights activists, culminating in public trials in August. November and December saw renewed attacks on protestors as large demonstrations commemorated significant dates in the history of the Islamic revolution and the Shia Muslim religious calendar.
2325 GMT: That’s it for today. We’ll be back at 0600 GMT. Look forward to seeing you then.
2315 GMT: What’s Your Punchline? Looking for a joke to end the evening. Here’s the set-up line, courtesy of Press TV: “A senior Iranian commander has announced that the country has developed a new system to distract missiles.”
2310 GMT: On the Labour Front. Mansour Osanloo, the leader of the Tehran bus drivers union, has been transferred to Solitary Ward Number 1 in Gohardasht Prison, also known as the “doghouse”.
2225 GMT: Taking Away Karroubi’s Protection? In an interview with Radio Farda, Mohammad Taghi Karroubi, Mehdi Karroubi’s son, says that several former Revolutionary Guards, wartime commanders, and family members of martyrs who had volunteered for protect Mehdi Karroubi on 22 Bahman have been called in for questioning and have not yet gone home. He says that they have probably been arrested. Read the rest of this entry »
Q: We are approaching the 31st anniversary of the Islamic Revolution. How can the recollection and commemoration of those days benefit us today?
MOUSAVI: First and foremost, I want to congratulate all of our people on the 31st anniversary of our [victory in the] Revolution, particularly the families of our martyrs, our [war] veterans and prisoners of war [with Iraq].
Analyzing the Islamic revolution has not come to an end yet. There have been thousands of books and articles written about it and many still to come. It is interesting that the recent elections and the events following it have brought forth new critiques of the Revolution.
We’re awaiting the full translation of Mir Hossein Mousavi’s statement today in Kalemeh. (Khordaad 88 is working on the text, and Pedestrian has posted the English text of the answers to two of the ten questions.) But, to emphasise the importance of the answers he gave in the interview, an EA correspondent has brought out the 14 high points:
1) The Constitution is not an unalterable Revelation. It was changed in 1989, and we can change some parts of that [version], based on needs and demands of the people and on our national experience.
2) Those who have limited the media and monopolise Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting for their demands weaken the basis of the Islamic Republic.
3) Based on that (the restriction of the free flow of information in Iran), the foreign media have become more important than Iran’s but Iranian people do not give up their national interests and religious and historical value for foreign propaganda.