Tehran genuinely does not want to actually construct and detonate a nuclear device….But having a rapid breakout capability — being able to make a bomb in short order if it is felt absolutely necessary to forestall a foreign attack — has a deterrent effect. So Iran would have the advantages of deterrence without the disadvantages of a bomb if it could get to the rapid breakout stage.

Cole’s immediate reading of the current position is hit-and-miss: he’s on shaky ground with his analysis that the Revolutionary Guard has vetoed the Supreme Leader’s acceptance of an enrichment deal (I don’t think anyone except Ayatollah Khamenei knows what he will do), but Cole is invaluable in reading the non-Iranian politics: don’t expect BRIC (Brazil-Russia-India-China) to accept a move towards harsh economic measures agianst Tehran.

And Cole’s conclusion hits the bull’s-eye:

Bottom line: Friday’s vote was likely symbolic and a signal to Iran from the international community that there is discomfort with its secretiveness and lack of transparency, and that many are suspicious of its motives. In China’s case, it may have been a warning against actions that could harm the Middle Kingdom’s burgeoning economy. What it likely was not was a harbinger of tougher international sanctions against Tehran or a sign that BRIC is softening on that issue