2125 GMT: We Persist. The Committee of Human Rights Reporters, many of whose members have been detaineed, has issued a statement:
The Committee of Human Rights Reporters once again by maintaining the path that it has taken and by supporting other human rights organizations, emphasizes that it will continue its decisive activities in reporting human rights conditions on both national and international levels through collaborations with independent and credible international human rights organizations.
2115 GMT: Karroubi’s Big Line. Here’s the stinger statement from Mehdi Karroubi as he addressed the (banned) Islamic Iran Participation Front: “Why is it that the justifications of the Shah for his actions were wrong but the very logic and content of his words coming from you is to be considered right?”
2015 GMT: Apologies to all, but the fatigue monster grabbed me as soon as I walked through home’s front door. Back to normal service in AM — best wishes and thanks to everyone for your support this week.
1650 GMT: Why Are Detainees Being Released? Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty ask the question we’ve been pondering and get interesting answers….
Former reformist legislator Fatemeh Haghightajoo says it is the result of an understanding reached “at the highest levels of the Iranian establishment. I believe [former President] Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and the so-called pragmatic conservatives have played a prominent role.”
Jahangir Amuzegar, who was Finance Minister in Iran’s pre-1979 government, sifts through the rumours and realities of Iran’s banking sector. Originally published in Foreign Policy:
Rumors have recently spread among Iran’s jittery populace regarding the state of their country’s banking system. Although these rumors happen to be nothing but a false alarm, the financial sector really is, and has been, in crisis for a number of different reasons.
The current spate of rumors began on Jan. 28, when Iran’s commercial banks were ordered by the central bank to limit each depositor’s daily cash withdrawal to 150 million rials (about $15,000). The order was explained by authorities as a means of implementing the anti-money-laundering legislation just passed by the Majlis, Iran’s parliament, and combating what the finance minister called “financial terrorism.”
As we expected, the whipped-up controversy over the activities of the National Iranian American Committee — fuelled by the attack journalism in The Washington Times — has descended into further invective and allegations.
The Lake piece gave cover to the earlier exaggerations and distortions not only of The Weekly Standard, which is trying to blow apart any engagement with Iran, but also Jeffrey Goldberg of The Atlantic:
A couple of weeks ago I retracted my assertion that Trita Parsi, the head of the National Iranian American Council, did “leg-work” for the Iranian regime. I was trying to suggest, in a not-so artful way, that Parsi is trying to build his organization into an Iranian version of AIPAC, but “leg-work” seemed, in retrospect, like too harsh a description for his activities.
But now I may have to retract my retraction….
Meanwhile, the counter-allegation is spreading that Hassan Daioleslam, who is the source of the allegations and who is being sued by Parsi for defamation, is a long-term member of Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MKO). The group has sought the overthrow of the Iranian regime since 1979, often through violence, bombings, and assassinations.
Josh Rogin of the Cable blog of Foreign Policy is writing that Daioleslam is well-connected with Washington neoconservatives who are challenging NIAC to undercut the Obama administration’s engagement strategy.
Rogin is posting emails between Daioleslam and Kenneth Timmerman, in which the two plot strategy and discuss the plans to leak documents to Eli Lake, who wrote the Washington Times story. Timmerman is a longtime advocate of regime change in Tehran, through platforms such as the Foundation for Democracy in Iran, which he co-founded in 1995 with Joshua Muravchik and the late Peter Rodman. He has accused Iran of a role both in the September 11 attacks and the 1998 bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
Amidst the drumbeat from media, “experts”, and many politicians for further US military intervention in Afghanistan, Stephen Walt’s concise but effective survey of the complications of “the necessary war”, posted on his blog for Foreign Policy, is a depressing but essential read, “These (and other) contradictions might help us understand why the current effort in Afghanistan is likely to fail, even if we devote a lot more resources to it and even if the people in charge do their best”:
Why is Afghanistan so hard?
Why is Afghanistan so hard? It’s not difficult to think of reasons: 1) the long-standing divisions among the various tribal/ethnic groups that make up Afghan society, 2) the mountainous, inhospitable terrain, 3) lack of infrastructure, 4) weak governmental institutions and little history of centralized authority, 5) the destructive effects of many years of warfare, 6) endemic corruption, 7) traditional hostility to foreign occupation, etc. … Given all that, it is hardly surprising that outside efforts to rebuild the country and establish a legitimate central government have thus far failed to accomplish very much.
If that weren’t enough, our efforts there are also hampered by some inherent strategic contradictions. In particular, most of the things the United States might do to improve the situation tend to make other aspects of the problem worse. Even if we make progress on one dimension, it tends to set us back in some other way. Here are five reasons why running harder seems to leave us in the same place. Read the rest of this entry »
As news emerges that the Obama Administration has agreed to join direct talks with Iran over its nuclear programme, Peter Jones offers this “diplomatic primer” in Foreign Policy. Jones, an associate professor at the University of Ottawa, is a former official in the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the office of the national security advisor to the Canadian Prime Minister.
HOW TO NEGOTIATE WITH IRAN
The various messages and statements floating back and forth between the United States and Iran since the election of U.S. President Barack Obama signal one of the few moments since 1979 when a real warming of the relationship may be possible. Read the rest of this entry »
Two days after the withdrawal of the nomination of Charles Freeman as head of the National Intelligence Council, primarily because of his views on the Middle East and specifically the Israel-Palestine situation, the unspeakable is being spoken:
In our analysis today of a possible US “grand strategy” linking its approach on Israel and Palestine to a change in policy on Iran, we speculated, “One explanation for this shift is the long-awaited entry of Dennis Ross, who has long advocated “Diplomacy Then Pressure”, into the State Department.” Jim Lobe takes up the theme:
Ross Is Clearly a Major Player
Since Secretary of State Clinton set out for the Middle East over the weekend, it has seemed increasingly clear to me that Dennis Ross, contrary to my earlier speculation, pretty much got the job that he and WINEP [the Washington Institute for Near East Policy] were hoping for. Not only has he claimed an office on the coveted seventh floor, but Obama’s conspicuous placement of Ross’ name between those of Mitchell and Holbrooke in his speech on Iraq at Camp Lejeune last week strongly suggested that he considers Ross to be of the same rank and importance as the other two. Read the rest of this entry »