Editor’s Note: Josh Mull send this in on Thursday night, 15 hours after the bombing in front of the Indian Embassy in Kabul. We were caught up with other stories, and we also wanted to see if developments supported his theory. An hour ago, this emerged: “Afghan Ambassador to the US, Said T Jawad has claimed Pakistan’s spy agency ISI was behind the suicide bomb blast at the Indian Embassy in Kabul on Thursday, which claimed 12 lives and injured over 80 people. Jawad said that there is enough evidence at the ground level to suggest that ISI was behind the attack.”

Could Pakistani intelligence be linked to this attack? First we have some clues on the operational capability of the perpetrators: “The assailant in a car managed to enter the neighbourhood despite stringent security arrangements put in place. The 500-metre road stretch has been barricaded for a year in the wake of a deadly suicide assault on the Indian Embassy.”

Further details came from an analyst via Twitter:

Vehicle was apparently a Lexus, to circumvent checkpoints there. Reportedly a VBIED [vehicle-delivered improvised explosive device] against National Directorate of Security (NDS) hospital, next to the Ministry of the Interior. More specifically, the blast was between the MoI, NDS hospital and Indian Embassy. That road is normally blockaded.

Photographs of the vehicle used for the attack indicated it’s a larger car, too small for an industrial vehicle or truck. This lends credence to the Lexus theory although it’s not 100% solid.

This was a well-funded and well-coordinated attack. It would not be impossible for the Taliban to accomplish something like this, but it would take a long, long time and extensive resources to spare. On top of that, some considerable luck would be involved getting past the layers of security. Luck or (abnormally expensive) bribery.

Did the attackers have help? For that we have a bit more information:

A number of Indian mission employees were among the casualties, a spokesman for the militant movement told Pajhwok Afghan News over the telephone from an undisclosed location.

Zabihullah Mujahid said Khaled, a resident of Paghman district, carried out the attack on the embassy. At least 35 Afghan and international security personnel were killed and several others injured in the assault, he claimed.

Right away we can knock out the claim of 35 killed, seeing as how the Taliban did not have any forensic teams in the area, and certainly the perpetrator wasn’t around to do any counting. But the real meat is in the assertion that they managed to kill Indian workers. What does the Islamic Emirate of the Taliban care about a handful of Indians when they just wiped out 35 (their claim) security personnel and Minstry of Interior collaborators with the Crusaders? Why make the point?

It could be that Pakistan’s intelligence service ISI was directly involved (acquisition of vehicles, clearances, etc) since they would definitely have the ability to acquire them easier in Kabul than the Taliban would. And they certainly have motive to help: in the last few days the Indian Foreign Minister has expressed the desire to negotiate with the Taliban as well as India’s support for a continued US presence in Afghanistan. A report leaked to Indian papers on Wednesday detailed a supposed plot by ISI to infiltrate Taliban fighters into Kashmir and India. (http://www.zeenews.com/news568886.html).

That leaves me stuck with two theories. Either this was an extremely sophisticated and devastating attack by the Taliban against the Ministry of Interior, or it was a terribly ineffective attack by the Taliban and ISI against the Indian embassy and/or Indian personnel. Nothing I’ve listed is enough to confirm either theory, but we do have hints. If anyone can add to this, please do so.

America’s National Security Strategy is changing.

Last week the New York Times published an article detailing the Pentagon’s plan to shift focus away from international terrorism, known under the previous administration as the Global War on Terror, towards larger strategic threats to the United States such as destabilized governments and mass refugee crises provoked by climate change. Most in the defense establishment welcome this shift in strategy, but the threat from terrorism still remains.

This time, however, there is a difference. The terror threat comes largely not from foreign nationals but from Americans.

In 2009 almost 70 Americans, including police officers and medical personnel, have been killed by domestic terror attacks. This is a breathtakingly sharp rise from 2008, when only two people lost their lives, both of whom died at the hands of anti-Liberal terrorist Jim D. Adkisson in Tennessee. The first attack in 2009 was in Samson, Alabama, when Michael McLendon went on a cross-county shooting rampage that killed 11 people including himself. The most recent was on June 10, when James von Brunn opened fire inside the Holocaust Museum in Washington DC, killing one guard and wounding several others.

While each of these attacks is unique, they can be roughly broken down into a handful of categories. In this piece, we will explore these terrorist archetypes, the ecosystem that produced them, as well as common tactics, both harmful and helpful, used to counter them. The intention is to provide students, analysts and researchers, with a sound and coherent image of the domestic terror threat facing the United States.

A Brief History of Killing Each Other

The United States has considerable experience dealing with domestic terrorism throughout its history. In the 19th century, militias and terrorist groups were responsible for everything from razing Mormon outposts (and massacring the inhabitants) to bloody commando raids by extremist Abolitionists on plantations and other elite southern institutions. Following the Civil War, terrorism shifted to the domain of racial supremacists like the Ku Klux Klan, who launched a series of brutal attacks on Reconstruction governments in a (successful) bid to re-instate segregation, as well as carrying out the infamous public lynchings of countless innocents.

Gallean Anarchists bomb Wall Street in 1920

In the 20th century, newly naturalized cells of anarchists, Galleanists, and hyper-conservatives unleashed waves of bombings against Wall Street and other major financial interests. Incidentally, one of these terrorists, Mario Buda, is credited with the invention of the modern-day car bomb. Later in the century, these tactics would be further evolved into the full-on asymmetric warfare carried out by insurgent groups like the Weather Underground, the American Indian Movement, and the Black Panthers.

In the 1980’s and 1990’s, the modern day domestic terrorist archetype took shape in the form of Anti-Abortion bombers and Anti-Government “Freeman” militias. Their reign of terror culminated with one of the most spectacular and devastating terrorist attacks on American soil, the 1995 bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City which left 170 dead and many others wounded. With the foreign-borne attacks of September 11, 2001, most domestic terror groups quietly dropped into torpor. That is, until the catastrophic collapse of the US economy and the election of President Obama in 2008.

Asylum Of the Inmates, By the Inmates, and For the Inmates

America is an extremist country. Similar to its allies Israel or Pakistan, America perceives itself, true or not, as having faced the brink of total obliteration several times in its relatively short existence. This has led to not only a reflexive reliance on violence and violent imagery to make its voice heard, but has also combined with indigenous cultural strands of alienation, paranoia, and apocalypticism to form a permanently deranged opposition class, a mass movement of citizens opposed to anything and everything outside of their delusional ideological boundaries, regardless of how it may benefit them.

Rick Perlstein vividly describes this effect on the contemporary debate on health care reform in a column for the Washington Post. He writes:

So the birthers, the anti-tax tea-partiers, the town hall hecklers — these are “either” the genuine grass roots or evil conspirators staging scenes for YouTube? … They are both. If you don’t understand that any moment of genuine political change always produces both, you can’t understand America, where the crazy tree blooms in every moment of liberal ascendancy, and where elites exploit the crazy for their own narrow interests.

It is within this garden of culture-wide delirium and fanaticism that domestic terror takes root. In this regard it should be considered as a side effect, albeit malignant, of normal American life. The domestic terror groups are not dangerous for their extremism, their paranoia, or their particular calibration of ideology. Rather, the danger lies in their imminent potential to separate themsevles from normal political discourse, adopting violence, terrorism, and murder.

This detail may seem obvious, but it is a factor of American life most often misunderstood by analysts and observers, and it should be considered integral to any accurate debate on domestic terror. Be wary of serious research being overwhelmed by the obfuscation of hysteria, it’s a simple mistake to make.

“Pro-Life” Abortion Activists

By far the most well-organized of American domestic terrorists, the radical anti-abortion movement is dedicated to the eradication of all family planning services in the United States, seeing it as an affront to their religious beliefs sanctifying the life of the unborn.

Randall Terry, Operation Rescue

They maintain vast networks of sympathetic volunteers and church workers who funnel a wide range of support to terrorist cells across the country. This support includes financing, propaganda, and even emotional support for imprisoned members of the movement. Much like transnational jihadist terrorism, convicted or slain anti-abortion terrorists are elevated as heroes or “martyrs” of the movement.

Typical anti-abortion terrorist attacks target medical facilities that provide family planning services, as well as the personnel of these facilities. Tactics include daily physical harassment, threatening communications, vandalism, bombings, and assassination.

The most recent victim of these terrorists was abortion provider Dr. George Tiller, who was shot in the head while attending church services by Scott Roeder on May 31. Roeder is connected to several extremist groups, including a few militias, but most notably to Operation Rescue, headed by religious extremist Randall Terry.

Terry’s history includes disowning his son for homosexuality and expulsion from a New York church for abandoning his wife and children for a much younger bride. In a recent public appearance broadcast on CSPAN, Terry overtly warned that if Obama is successful with his legislative agenda, America would suffer more violence and terrorist attacks at the hands of abortion activists.

Sovereign Citizen Patriot Militias

Claiming that the Second Amendment of the US Constitution allows for organized citizen militias, these groups fund, equip, and train citizens in modern asymmetrical warfare and survival techniques, presumably to be used against government and law enforcement agencies.

Timothy McVeigh, OK City Bomber

Members of these militias are opposed to nearly all taxation by the federal government, any immigration policies which they claim weaken the nation, as well as any movement at all by the government to regulate the sale of weapons and firearms. They also traffic heavily in pedestrian conspiracy theories, such as the responsibility of the Bush administration for the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the coming establishment of a tyrannical global government headed by the United Nations and foreign banking interests (often referred to as the New World Order), and the notion that Mexican immigration is a covert plot to re-conquer the southern United States by Hispanics.

At the height of their popularity in the 1990s, these groups were estimated to have some 40,000 members operational in all 50 states. Citing law enforcement sources, the Southern Poverty Law Center claims that since the election of President Obama, more than 50 new militia training centers have been established in the United States. Without a doubt the most numerous of terrorist groups, militias are also the best trained, often drawing their membership from former law enforcement and military personnel.

While no recent attacks have been directly connected to militia activities, the Department of Homeland Security has warned of a “Second Wave” of militia attacks in response to the election of President Obama and other contentious political issues of the day.

Culture Warrior Phantom Cells

Richard Poplawski, Mass Murderer

Most of the domestic terror attacks in 2009 would fall under this category, being committed by individual, independent actors with no apparent material support from wider networks. These terrorists are similar to so-called Lone Wolf killing sprees by sociopathic and/or psychopathic individuals (such as the 2007 Virginia Tech massacre), but nevertheless qualify as terrorism due to the deliberate targeting of victims of a particular political or cultural persuasion, such as the previously mentioned attacks on a Unitarian Church in Tennessee and the Holocaust Museum in Washington.

Invented by white supremacist Louis Beam, the idea of “Leaderless Resistance” is that a motivated individual should handle of the responsibility for supplying, planning, and carrying out terrorist attacks entirely by himself (all known cases of domestic terrorism have been carried out primarily by males) so as to completely avoid the vulnerabilities of a group-endeavor, like snitching and infiltration. These terrorists are far and away the most difficult for law enforcement agencies to monitor, given the near-absence of public information and warning signs.

Since the election of President Obama, the Department of Homeland Security has launched what it calls its “Lone Wolf Initiative” aimed at pre-empting such attacks. However, given that security services were unable to locate past Culture Warriors like Theodor Kaczynski (the Unabomber) and Eric Rudolph for years (or decades in Kaczynski’s case), there is little evidence that contemporary law enforcement efforts will be any more successful than in the past.

The Wrong Way to Fight

The domestic terror attacks of 2009 have been high-profile affairs, widely publicized across television, print, and the internet. Understandably, American citizens have reacted against the terrorists with a fierce backlash. However, these reactions have often been counter-intuitive and, in some cases, directly harmful to counter-terrorism efforts. It is important for both lay observers and dedicated analysts to understand what works and what does not against domestic terrorism.

Anti-Obama Propaganda Poster

Partisan Politics – With few exceptions, the great majority of domestic terrorism in the United States since the 1970s has been carried out by individuals who are politically conservative, libertarian, or Republican. However enlightening this might first appear, there are absolutely zero conclusions one can draw from this in the fight against terrorism.

As a democracy, the US often vacillates wildly between conservative leadership and that of a more liberal or progressive persuasion. With the current administration being avowedly liberal, it is logical that any major domestic opposition groups, including terrorists, would come from the opposite political persuasion, the right wing. It is as offensive and outrageous to politically attack Conservatives for domestic terror as it is to attack all Muslims or Arabs because of attacks by Transnational Jihadists.

Quite simply, the politics, religion, or cultural disposition of a person has absolutely nothing to do with terrorism. This is never a useful identifying feature.

Repression – The instinctive reaction of many opponents of domestic terror has been to viciously and systematically attack the freedom of expression of anyone who references or publishes material that could be linked to domestic terror. Victims of this scapegoating include media mega-stars Glenn Beck, Bill O’Reilly, and Lou Dobbs, not to mention the countless others too unpopular to withstand such attacks. In the fight to counter domestic terror, this is madness.

The tactic allows terrorist entities to feel victimized, which perversely empowers their rhetoric. It can also drive them underground, making their activities even more difficult to track – and exploit. Most importantly, free speech in the US acts as a “free marketplace of ideas” in which hate and fear-based arguments like those of the terror organizations will wither into dust when faced with the “competition” of rational and reasoned arguments from the populace at large. This can not happen while left-wing groups assail their opponents’ very right to express themselves.

The Right Way to Fight

The siren song of American partisan lunacy can be highly seductive, but it is important to remember the practical skills the US has developed in countering domestic terrorism. As a free democracy, the country is easily susceptible to radicalism and rancor, but as a nation of laws, it is also equipped to prevent it. Now that we understand the history of domestic terrorists, their specific makes and models, and the ways in which they are often empowered by efforts to undermine them, the image of a successful counter-terror campaign should begin to come into focus.

It is recommended these actions are carried out under the authority of older laws, such as the Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO Act), as opposed to newer anti-terror legislation like the Patriot Act. This will prevent unproductive controversy on the constitutional legitimacy of Federal counter-terror operations.

The Blind Sheik, convicted in US Courts

GWOT Remix – While the garish and gratuitous Human Rights violations of the George W. Bush administration tend to overshadow its counter-terrorism efforts, it has quietly developed a host of tactics and best practices for countering Transnational Jihadist terrorism, tactics which could easily be adapted from battling Ayman al-Zawahiri and al-Qa’eda to battling Randall Terry and Operation Rescue.

One of the most powerful techniques for countering terrorism has been attacking them at the source of their financing. The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) has all the capabilities required to freeze, capture, and dismantle the entire financial infrastructure of terror cells. Combined with standard law enforcement tactics like surveillance, infiltration, and sabotage, a coordinated assault by the FBI on domestic terrorist infrastructure could weaken, if not permanently damage, these groups’ ability to carry out terrorism.

Devilish Details – In the 1920it s, Al Capone ran one of the widest reaching and most sophisticated organized crime elements in the history of the United States. In 1931, he was arrested, convicted, and imprisoned. Not on charges of racketeering or murder, but rather income-tax evasion. The lesson here is that direct combat against criminal elements is unwise when you can easily dismantle them with smaller regulations. This is a strategy that has been used against domestic terrorists before, and it is also the most likely to yield immediate results.

Rather than full paramilitary assaults on domestic terrorists, such as in 1993 with the tragic massacre in Waco, Texas, law enforcement would be better served by chipping away at organizations for smaller legal violations. Has the suspect paid their taxes? Do they have licenses for their firearms? Do they have the right credentials for purchase and possession of dynamite, blasting caps, or controlled fertilizing substances which could be used to produce an improvised explosive device? These questions are easy to answer, and will lead to much cleaner convictions than more ethereal charges of “terrorism” which have produced little to zero legitimate convictions in American courts.

The Consequences of Violence

While the predictions and warnings in this text may seem dire, there is very little evidence of successful terror campaigns in the United States. If anything, terror attacks usually have the opposite reaction, pushing the country and its culture away from whatever values are being espoused by radicals and extremists. Veteran American activist Bob Morris wrote about this tendency on the blog Politics in the Zeros [Disclosure: I am a Contributor to Polizeros]. Recalling the left-wing terror campaigns of the 1960s, he writes this:

[In] the 60s Jerry Rubin said “kill your parents.” Things got quite radical then. But within a few years, the right wing was ascendant and the left mostly in tatters. That’s because the middle class got turned off by leftie howlings and went rightward. The right saw this as a huge organizing opportunity and took full advantage of it. It wasn’t until the past couple of years that the pendulum started moving leftwards again.

This is not to excuse the violent actions of domestic terrorists, but to illustrate that the battle against terrorism is not a hopeless or impossible task. With a clear understanding of the threat and a sober, determined strategy for dealing with it, the United States can easily withstand whatever the radicals may throw at it.

However, if the debate over domestic terrorism continues along hysterical, partisan, and sometimes downright tyrannical lines, the threat of domestic terror will go unchecked, and many innocent Americans will lose their lives. And they may die at the hands of terrorists, but the incompetence and negligence of those in the political and security establishment will surely bear a great deal of responsibility as well.

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UPDATE (7 July, 0800 GMT): There is still a lively debate over what Joe Biden “really meant” with his words on Sunday. That seems to miss the point that the significance is what others think he meant or how they turn his words to their advantage. The latest reaction comes from the Iranian Government. where Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani issued a stern warning at a meeting in Qatar on Monday:

We will consider the Americans responsible in any adventure launched by the Zionist entity….No politician or person in the world can imagine that the Zionist entity can lead an operation without getting the green light from the United States.

Marc Lynch, always perceptive and well-informed, shares my concern with Joe Biden’s Sunday statement that “Israel can determine for itself — it’s a sovereign nation — what’s in their interest and what they decide to do relative to Iran and anyone else”. He is especially concerned with how it is being interpreted by Israeli and regional media.

Lynch adds, however: “A senior White House source tells me that this is being misreported, and points me to this from White House spokesman Tommy Vietor:
‘The Vice President refused to engage hypotheticals, and he made clear that our policy has not changed. Our friends and allies, including Israel, know that the President believes that now is the time to explore direct diplomatic options, as with the P5+1[talks on Iran's nuclear programme].’”

For another challenging interpretation that sees Biden’s statement as part of a shrewd and subtle White House strategy on both Israel and Iran, see Josh Mull (“UJ”) in the comments on the original post: “If [Obama's advisors] backpedal, I’m willing to give in and say that yes Biden gaffed. If the administration stays quiet, or even better defends Biden, then I think my reading will be in the neighborhood of accurate.”

Meanwhile, the Israelis — in line with Lynch’s concern — are quite happy to run with the idea that Biden has given them the go-ahead. Last night the Israeli Consulate in New York, via Twitter, eagerly sent out the message, “Biden on whether US would block Israeli att 2 target Iran’s nuclear facilities. ‘ISR has a right 2 determine its intrests.’”

The Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz offers an alternative approach from Tel Aviv:

Israel is urging the United States and other countries to start preparing now for the possibility that Washington’s proposed dialogue with Iran will fail, by readying a “Plan B” that includes “paralyzing sanctions” and other measures against Tehran. The U.S. has resisted this idea so far.

The Israeli messages – sent against the background of the recent unrest in Iran – have been delivered to the White House, the State Department and senior officials in the U.S. intelligence community by senior officials in the Prime Minister’s Office and the Foreign Ministry. Similar messages have been sent to senior officials in Germany, Russia, France and Japan.

Related Post: Obama Fiddles, Afghanistan and Pakistan Burn

I’m still looking for the video of CNN’s discussion with Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari, but apparently interviewer Wolf Blitzer combined the patronising and the surreal. Enduring America’s Josh Mull commented, “Zardari is…trying to remain calm and classy while the anchors explain to him how his country works,” while Dana Milbank of The Washington Post has a darkly entertaining account:

Blitzer directed him to look at a video of a CNN “iReport” from a Pakistani college student in Florida. “Turn around and you can see him,” Blitzer ordered. Zardari, looking bewildered by Blitzer’s arsenal of plasma screens, obeyed.

“Are you going to send your troops in,” Blitzer demanded, “and clean out that area from the Taliban and al-Qaeda?” “Most definitely,” Zardari promised. Blitzer was satisfied. “Mr. President,” he said, “good luck.”

The transcript bears out the impression that Pakistan is going straight to hell and Zardari better know his place in rescuing it. It’s titled, “Nuclear Nation Could Explode”.

BLITZER: One of the worst fears of the Obama administration right now, that Taliban extremists will seize control of Pakistan and its nuclear arsenal, threatening the region, the United States, indeed the entire world.

President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan, he’s here in Washington right now for talks with President Obama, along with the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai. President Zardari joined me just a short while ago here in THE SITUATION ROOM for an exclusive interview.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

BLITZER: Are your nuclear weapons safe?

ASIF ALI ZARDARI, PRESIDENT OF PAKISTAN: Definitely safe. First of all, they are in safe hands. We have a command and control system under the command of Pakistan.

And (INAUDIBLE), like you say, as the crow flies, these mountains are 60, 70 miles from Islamabad. They’ve always been there. And there’s been fighting there before. There will be fighting there again. And there’s always been an issue of people in those mountains who we’ve been taking on.

BLITZER: Because you know the world is worried if the Taliban or associated groups were to take over.

ZARDARI: It doesn’t work like that. They can’t take over.

BLITZER: Why can’t they take over?

ZARDARI: They have a 700,000 army. How could they take over.

BLITZER: But aren’t there elements within the army who are sympathetic to the Taliban and al Qaeda?

ZARDARI: I deny that. There aren’t any sympathizers of them.

There is a mindset maybe who feel akin to the same religion, God, et cetera, et cetera. But nothing that should concern anybody where — as far as the nuclear arsenal or other instruments of such sort.

….

BLITZER: Tom Foreman, our correspondent, is here in THE SITUATION ROOM, and he has on the map — he is going to show us where some of the threats to your government, what some would consider to be existential threats, are located.

He’s here.

ZARDARI: If I may say, they are not threats to my government. They are a threat to my security, they are a threat to my security of (INAUDIBLE), for my Army, my police, yes. They’re not set to my government. My government is not going to fall because one mountain is taken by one group or the other.

BLITZER: All right. I want you to watch this and then we’ll discuss — Tom.

TOM FOREMAN, CNN CORRESPONDENT: Thanks, Wolf.

Let’s take a look at the geography of this land and get a sense of what we’re talking about here. Of course you know area, Iraq over here, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan. The area we’re most interested in here is the northwestern region of Pakistan.

This has been an area where the Taliban has been strong, particularly down here, south Waziristan, north Waziristan, just across the border from Afghanistan. You know after 9/11, when the Taliban was crushed here, they retreated largely into this area, including al Qaeda leaders.

The concern for the United States and, Mr. President, presumably for your government, from what you say, has been the expansion this way toward the east, into this area. And north, up here.

Only a year ago, the limit was sort of here with influence up here. But now it’s moved up further.

This is the Swat Valley, very important up here, and of course Buner we were talking about a little bit ago. All of this area along here, to some degree, can be described as contested these days, and when we zoom in tighter to Islamabad, you can actually see that distance we’re talking about. If you look at the actual measurement from here down to here, it’s going to be about 60 miles.

That is one big concern on the Pakistani front. But for the United States there is another concern. The more that the Taliban is able to establish firm hold in here, uncontested by the Pakistani government, for the United States the concern is this is a big base from which to wage war into Afghanistan, where President Obama says he wants to reestablish the government based in Kabul.

Which, as you know, Wolf, and Mr. President, is having a very hard time.

BLITZER: Is that a pretty accurate assessment of what’s going on in those areas?

ZARDARI: No. I would say it’s an accurate assessment, but exaggerated.

BLITZER: What is exaggerated?

ZARDARI: The exaggeration is that they have been there — they have been not today…

BLITZER: The Taliban.

ZARDARI: The Taliban, they’ve been there historically. They are the tribes. They are the people. They are the kin.

If they have been there, the Taliban, the United States has been there for the last 10 years. And if they don’t know the exact locations of individuals, then don’t expect us to know.

But we have been giving them a fight. We’ve taken back — we’ve cleaned out Bajaur, Mohmand (ph), Buner, Dir (ph), all of those areas. We’ve cleaned them out.

BLITZER: Because you’re going in there now after you’ve made a cease-fire, you made a deal with these Taliban-related groups that — has it collapsed completely?

ZARDARI: The provincial government, (INAUDIBLE), made an arrangement, an agreement with them that if they were to lay down their arms, we would talk to the reconcilables.

BLITZER: You would let them, for example, institute Sharia law?

ZARDARI: No, no, no, no, no. Not at all.

It was swift (ph) justice under the constitution of Pakistan, and as is, the constitution of Pakistan would work and the laws of the country would apply there, not Sharia law. Sharia law is already in Pakistan, all around.

BLITZER: Because right now we’re seeing and hearing reports that women can’t leave their homes in some of these areas unless not only they’re fully covered, but unless their husband or a male takes them outside.

ZARDARI: That is their interpretation of their law. That does not mean that we adhere to it or we accept it. We do not accept that. Wherever we are, wherever the government is, that is not happening.

Whenever they come in (INAUDIBLE) — because you must remember, this is — hasn’t been — there’s no police station in most of this area. There is no law in most of this area. It has been like…

(CROSSTALK)

BLITZER: Are you going to send your troops in? You have 600,000 or 700,000 troops.

ZARDARI: Yes, sure.

BLITZER: Are you going to send them in and clean out that area from the Taliban and al Qaeda?

ZARDARI: Most definitely. Most definitely, we’ve cleaned out like…

BLITZER: So that cease-fire agreement is history? That’s…

ZARDARI: The cease-fire agreement is not holding. But we are going to try and hold them to it because they’re the reconcilables. They’re supposed to fight for us.

BLITZER: Do you need American help, more drone attacks, for example, against suspected al Qaeda or Taliban targets in Pakistan?

ZARDARI: I need drones to be part of my arsenal. I need that facility. I need that equipment. I need that to be my police arrangement. I need to own those…

BLITZER: Because there you can see, we have some — if you turn around over there, you can see some pictures from those Hellfire missiles on those U.S. drones going after suspected Taliban or al Qaeda targets in your country.

Are you OK with this U.S. strategy of attacking targets inside sovereign Pakistani soil?

ZARDARI: Let’s agree to disagree. What I have agreed upon is I need this. We’ve have asked for them — we’ve asked the United States for this…

BLITZER: For the technology?

ZARDARI: Technology.

BLITZER: Have they agreed?

ZARDARI: We’re still in dialogue. They haven’t disagreed, but they haven’t agreed.

BLITZER: Is that the most important item on your shopping list right now?

ZARDARI: It is one of the items on our shopping list.

BLITZER: So you will ask the president of the United States for these drones?

ZARDARI: I will request the president of the United States to give it a thought that if we own them, then we take out our targets rather than somebody else coming and do it for us.

BLITZER: We invited some of our viewers to submit a comment or a question because knowing you would be coming here. And we have this iReporter who is a Pakistani student studying in Melbourne, Florida, right now. He’s a Fulbright scholar. And I’m going to play what he wants to ask you.

Turn around and you can see him.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

ZEESHAN USMANI, CNN IREPORTER: Why can’t we solve the problems we have created for ourselves? And why do you have to beg to the U.S. every time anything goes wrong in Pakistan?

(END VIDEO CLIP)

BLITZER: His name is Zeeshan Usmani. He’s a student in Florida.

ZARDARI: Definitely, Zeeshan, democracy is part of the answer. We — this is our problem, this is our situation, this is our issue. We will solve it. By bringing in democracy, by electing me as the president to Pakistan, the people of Pakistan have voted. They have said yes to democracy and no to the Talibanization of Pakistan.

So we are solving this problem, and we shall.

BLITZER: The president of the United States, at his news conference the other day, he also said this about your fears of your neighbor, India. And I’m going to play the clip for you.

Listen to President Obama.

ZARDARI: Sure.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

BARACK H. OBAMA, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: On the military side, you’re starting to see some recognition just in the last few days that the obsession with India as the mortal threat to Pakistan has been misguided.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

BLITZER: All right. Has your what he calls “obsession with India as the mortal threat to Pakistan” been misguided?

ZARDARI: Democracies have never gone to war. No Pakistan democratic government has gone to war with India. We’ve always wanted peace. We still want to — want peace with India. We want a commercial relationship with them.

I’m looking at the markets of India for the Pakistani — for the industrialists of Pakistan and am hoping to do the same. I’m waiting for the elections to be over so that all of this rhetoric is over and I can start a fresh dialogue with the Indian government.

BLITZER: Because, as you know, there is concern, especially in the Congress, that of the approximately $10 billion the U.S. has provided Pakistan since 9/11, most of that money has been used to beef up your arsenal against some sort of threat from India, as opposed to going after the Taliban and al Qaeda.

ZARDARI: Let’s say they’ve given $10 billion in 10 years, a billion nearly a year for the war effort in — against the Taliban, and the war that is going on.

BLITZER: Just explain what that means.

ZARDARI: That money has been spent, my forces — 125,000 forces are mobilized, they’re there in the region fighting the Taliban for the last 10 years. It takes — it is a lot of expense.

BLITZER: Do you want U.S. troops in Pakistan?

ZARDARI: I don’t think the U.S. troops want to come to Pakistan.

BLITZER: But if you were to ask the United States, we need help — maybe, I don’t know if you do — to deal with this threat, is that something you’re open to?

ZARDARI: No, I’m open to the fact that we need more equipment, we need more intelligence equipment, we need support, intelligence- wise, et cetera. But not personnel. I don’t think personnel are necessary. They’ll be counterproductive.

BLITZER: Because the defense secretary, Robert Gates, told our Fareed Zakaria this the other day, saying he’s open to listen to what you need.

Listen to Gates.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

ROBERT GATES, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: There has been a reluctance on their part up to now. They don’t like the idea of a significant American military footprint inside Pakistan. I understand that. And — but we are willing to do pretty much whatever we can to help the Pakistanis in this situation.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

BLITZER: All right. What do you think about that?

ZARDARI: I think the last statement, I’ll take it on first value and go with it. I’ll run with it and ask for more help.

BLITZER: Because he says, pretty much what you want you’ll get. Just ask.

ZARDARI: We are asking. We’ve been asking for a lot of help, and it has been in the pipeline for a long time. And I’m not here to, you know, point fingers at anybody. I’m here to get more support for democracy, get more support for the war effort, and show them my record, and try and tell them, listen, one year of democracy, eight months of — seven-and-a-half months of my presidency, we’ve done more than your dictator did before…

(CROSSTALK)

BLITZER: Do you have confidence in President Obama?

ZARDARI: I have confidence in the American system. I have confidence in the democracy in America. And definitely, I have hope in Obama.

BLITZER: How would you describe right now the U.S.-Pakistani relationship? ZARDARI: I think our relationships are pretty strong. I think it needs more effort. I think it needs more understanding on both our sides, and we need more interaction. But I think our relationship is pretty strong.

BLITZER: As you know, I interviewed your late wife. Benazir Bhutto, here. She was sitting in that seat, where you are right now, just before she went back to Pakistan. All of us were worried what might happened, and we know the worst-case scenario happened.

Let me ask you, how worried are you, Mr. President, about your security?

ZARDARI: I’m always – that is a very — it’s in the back of my mind. But the fact of the matter is, running doesn’t solve anything.

She came, she was there, she got attention. She managed to throw out a dictator. In her spirit, under her name, under her philosophy, democracy, we took the presidency, we took the prime ministership, we made a first time woman speaker of Pakistan and Parliament.

Now, under the same philosophy, we shall defeat the Taliban, we shall defeat all the challenges, and take Pakistan into the 21st century.

BLITZER: Mr. President, good luck.

ZARDARI: Thank you.

Matt Benyon Rees of Global Post offers a useful reminder today that very little of the $5.2 billion promised to rebuild Gaza after the December/January war has made it into the area. He could have gone farther, reflecting on Josh Mull’s recent post in Enduring America: “Only a slice of the money is even allocated to the Gaza Strip, under the control of the democratically elected Hamas government, while the majority goes to the West Bank, held in the iron grip of Fatah’s Mahmoud Abbas and his Palestinian Authority.”

Still, Rees provides a direct answer for the non-reconstruction: “‘Keeping the money out of the hands of Hamas is a challenge,’ says one Israeli official.”

Billions promised, but Gazans still waiting

RAMALLAH — Money, wrote the English philosopher Francis Bacon, is like manure: of very little use unless it is spread.

Since an international aid conference in March promised $5.2 billion to rebuild Gaza, the stink of un-spread money has been strong in the nostrils. That’s particularly unpleasant for the people of Gaza, who also have to deal with a largely destroyed sewage system, thus giving them a double-helping of manure.

International diplomats, Israeli officials and leaders of the Palestinian Authority haven’t been able to figure out how to rebuild Gaza while keeping the cash out of the hands of Hamas, which runs the narrow strip of land. Food aid can get in, but substantial reconstruction hasn’t begun.

Read rest of article….

Yesterday Tristan McConnell of Global Post and Enduring America’s Josh Mull offered analyses of Somalia, and the response to its political, paramilitary, and social situation, which went far beyond “Kill the Pirates” rhetoric. Writing for URB Magazine, K’Naan, a Somali-Canadian poet and musician, offers this perspective with the context of recent Somali history and ongoing “Western” activities off the Somali coast:

Why We Don’t Condemn Our Pirates in Somalia

Can anyone ever really be for piracy? Outside of sea bandits, and young girls fantasizing of Johnny Depp, would anyone with an honest regard for good human conduct really say that they are in support of Sea Robbery? Well in Somalia, the answer is: it’s complicated.

The news media these days has been covering piracy in the Somali coast, with such lopsided journalism that it’s lucky they’re not on a ship themselves. It’s true that the constant hijacking of vessels in the Gulf of Aden is a major threat to the vibrant trade route between Asia and Europe. It is also true that for most of the pirates operating in this vast shoreline, money is the primary objective. But according to many Somalis, the disruption of Europe’s darling of a trade route is just Karma biting a perpetrator in the butt. And if you don’t believe in Karma, maybe you believe in recent history. Here is why we Somalis find ourselves slightly shy of condemning our pirates.

Somalia has been without any form of a functioning government since 1991. And despite its failures, like many other toddler governments in Africa, sprung from the wells of post-colonial independence, bad governance and development loan sharks, the specific problem of piracy was put in motion in 1992.

After the overthrow of Siyad Barre, our charmless dictator of twenty-some odd years, two major forces of the Hawiye Clan came to power. At the time, Ali Mahdi, and General Mohamed Farah Aidid, the two leaders of the Hawiye rebels were largely considered liberators. But the unity of the two men and their respective sub-clans was very short-lived. It’s as if they were dumbstruck at the advent of ousting the dictator, or that they just forgot to discuss who will be the leader of the country once they defeated their common foe. A disagreement of who will upgrade from militia leader to Mr. President broke up their honeymoon. It’s because of this disagreement that we’ve seen one of the most devastating wars in Somalia’s history, leading to millions displaced and hundreds of thousands dead. But war is expensive and militias need food for their families, and Jaad (an amphetamine-based stimulant) to stay awake for the fighting. Therefore a good clan-based Warlord must look out for his own fighters. Aidid’s men turned to robbing aid trucks carrying food to the starving masses, and reselling it to continue their war. But Ali Mahdi had his sights set on a larger and more unexploited resource, namely: the Indian Ocean.

Already by this time, local fishermen in the coastline of Somalia have been complaining of illegal vessels coming to Somali waters and stealing all the fish. And since there was no government to report it to, and since the severity of the violence clumsily overshadowed every other problem, the fishermen went completely unheard. But it was around this same time that a more sinister, a more patronizing practice was being put in motion. A Swiss firm called Achair Parterns, and an Italian waste company called Progresso, made a deal with Ali Mahdi, that they could dump containers of waste material in Somali waters. These European companies were said to be paying Warlords about $3 a ton, where as in to properly dispose of waste in Europe costs about $1000 a ton.

In 2004, after Tsunami washed ashore several leaking containers, thousand of locals in the Puntland region of Somalia started to complain of severe and previously unreported ailments, such as abdominal bleeding, skin melting off and a lot of immediate cancer-like symptoms. Nick Nuttall, a spokesman for the United Nations Environmental Program, says that the containers had many different kinds of waste, including “Uranium, radioactive waste, lead, cadmium, mercury and chemical waste.” But this wasn’t just a passing evil from one or two groups taking advantage of our unprotected waters, the UN Convoy for Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, says that the practice still continues to this day. It was months after those initial reports that local fishermen mobilized themselves, along with street militias, to go into the waters and deter the Westerners from having a free pass at completely destroying Somalia’s aquatic life. Now years later, that deterance has become less noble, and the ex-fishermen with their militias have begun to develop a taste for ransom at sea. This form of piracy is now a major contributor to the Somali economy, especially in the very region that private toxic waste companies first began to bury our nation’s death trap.

Now Somalia has upped the world’s pirate attacks by ove r21 percent in one year, and while NATO and the EU are both sending forces to the Somali coast to try and slow down the attacks, Blackwater and all kinds of private security firms are intent on cashing in. But while Europeans are well in their right to protect their trade interest in the region, our pirates were the only deterrent we had from an externally imposed environmental disaster. No one can say for sure that some of the ships they are now holding for ransom were not involved in illegal activity in our waters. The truth is, if you ask any Somali if they think getting rid of the pirates only means the continuous rape of our coast by unmonitored Western vessels, and the production of a new cancerous generation, we would all fly our pirate flags high.

It is time that the world gave the Somali people some assurance that these Western illegal activities will end, if our pirates are to seize their operations. We do not want the EU and NATO serving as a shield for these nuclear waste-dumping hoodlums. It seems to me that this new modern crisis is a question of justice, but also a question of whose justice. As is apparent these days, one man’s pirate is another man’s coast guard.

Josh Mull is working on the idea that the Obama Administration’s strategy on Pakistan and Afghanistan, to be unveiled later today, draws substantially from proposals put forth by now-Vice President Joe Biden almost 18 months ago.

As a Presidential candidate in November 2007, Biden gave a talk at St. Anselm College in New Hampshire on “re-engaging America in the world”. His demonstration of US leadership (others in the world might not like us, but they recognise that we are the country that can make a difference) focused on a solution for the internal difficulties in Pakistan, linked to an escalation of the US military intervention in Afghanistan. Biden, in particular, offered a mix of American “soft power”, reaching out to the Pakistani people, while emphasizing good governance and finding a way forward with Pakistan’s military.

While I think the US plan in it specifics will look far different from Biden’s 2007 conception, the general tenet of “engaging” with Pakistan while stepping up the Afghan campaign — as well as the (superficial) mix of military and “soft power” programmes — does underlay this Obama strategy.

Have a listen and see what you think.

This morning there are stories flying around the Web that Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, may have stopped a military coup in Pakistan through a series of phone call to General Ashfaq Pervez Kiani, through a series of phone calls.

It is being reported by more reliable sources like Al Jazeera that Kiani and President Asif Ali Zardari have clashed in the last 24 hours, but Mullen didn’t intervene to stop a military takeover. Here’s how the rumour, and distortion, started.

On Thursday night, Mullen was interviewed by Charlie Rose of the US Public Broadcasting System. Here’s the video and transcript of the key exchange in the discussion:

CHARLIE ROSE: But you see reports today of increasing strife between Zardari, the leader of Pakistan, and his opposition, worrying some people that it might become Musharraf all over again.

MICHAEL MULLEN: Sure. We’re watching — obviously watching this lawyers march very carefully. And I’ve been engaged from the standpoint of understanding what’s going on there, and I know that there are people are concerned that this could degenerate into a situation that could very possibly generate a crisis, which may cause actions to be taken on the part of the military.

I don’t think that possibility is out there as a high probability right now, but certainly it’s a concern. And I’ve interacted with my counterpart in Pakistan upwards of 10 times. I mean, I’ve been with him
upwards of 10 times over the last year, and he is committed to a civilian government. He’s committed to the democracy that’s there. In my view, the last thing in the world he wants to do is become — is take over as President Musharraf did.

CHARLIE ROSE: He wants to stay out of politics?

MICHAEL MULLEN: He does want to stay out of politics. He also — he wants to do the right thing for Pakistan. And he’s in a very, very tough spot. He also knows his country well, and so obviously he’s paying a lot of attention to this as well, as we all are. And I’m just hopeful that this doesn’t turn into another crisis in Pakistan.

This is straightforward: those pushing the “coup” question have turned Mullen’s 10 exchanges with Kiani over the last year, which include recent meetings in Washington and Kabul, into 10 phone calls from Mullen to Kiani in recent days. Those discussions were on broader military matters, notably the handling of the insurgency in the Northwest Frontier Provinces.

The US Government does not want a coup in the middle of this crisis. If Washington thinks Zardari is too damaging to stay in power, then it will look for his replacement, but at a quieter time and a less dramatic process.

If those jumping to coup conclusions had listened to the next section of Mullen’s interview, they would have gotten to the real heart of the story:

CHARLIE ROSE: How do you get the army chief of staff, Kiyani, to take those military forces and use them not in anticipation of conflict with India, but more in pursuit of forces that want to destabilize Pakistan?

MICHAEL MULLEN: Well, first of all, he recognizes that he has an extremist threat in Pakistan. They’ve lost many, many citizens. And in fact, there’s — if you look at the suicide bombings which have occurred over the last year or so, they’ve actually moved towards — and a couple of them have actually occurred in Islamabad. So he recognizes there’s a serious extremist terrorist threat inside his country, and in fact his forces have fought very hard this year up in Bajaur, which is in Mohmand, up on the western border.

Clearly, the Mumbai attacks in India put him in a position where he had to focus more on the Indian border, and he has. I mean, he’s a chief who’s got threats coming from both directions. It’s very important — and I give President Musharraf and Prime Minister Singh a lot of credit – because they actually detentioned [sic] that border during President Musharraf’s time, and in fact the tourism started to flourish, there was trade which started to flourish across that border, and all that got suspended with the Mumbai attacks.

So General Kiyani knows what he has to do. He needs to move more troops to the west and he needs to train them in counterinsurgency.

There you have it. As Josh Mull has noted on this site, the Obama Administration wants to keep the Pakistani military focused on the “sanctuary” in the northwest and wants the Pakistani Government firmly behind Pakistani, US, and joint operations there. There should be no conflict with India distracting from that effort.

And — here is the point of the US policy towards the Long March — there should be no distraction of domestic politics from that overriding objective. So Washington’s efforts over the last few days have been not to topple Zardari but to get the President to back off from a showdown with political rivals like Nawaz Sharif and to be careful in his handling of the lawyers’ movement.

If Zardari continues to see political and judicial opponents as Public Enemies Number One, and thus loses the plot on the approach to the “real” insurgency, then he may have to go.

But not now.

“The ‘Obama Doctrine’ looks something like this: the United States will continue to use its military power as its premier tool in international affairs and may even act preemptively. However, it will not  do so on issues it deems outside of reasonable American national security concerns, and it will act only with support and cooperation from the international community. To put it frankly, this is something like a cross between ‘walk softly and carry a big stick’ and the Buddy System. While still violent, imperial, and aggressive, it is a marked departure from the so-called Bush Doctrine and even the Global War on Terror.”

Yesterday Scott Lucas, in “Mr. Obama’s War: The Fantasy of the Pakistan Sanctuaries”, analysed US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ appearance on Meet the Press, pointing out the cognitive dissonance in Gates’ assertion that the US understands safe havens in Pakistan because it has previously used those same Pakistani safe havens so effectively. Lucas also raises some very interesting questions, particularly over Gates’ apparent non-answer to the question of the consequences for Pakistan of the US campaign. This is my attempt to answer those questions, as well as a proposal to parse out a broader US “grand strategy” from Gates’ appearance.

Host David Gregory asked Gates on Sunday, “The trouble and consequences of jihadists making significant gains in either Afghanistan or Pakistan is perhaps more acute in Pakistan given its nuclear potential. True?” In reply, Gates’ offered this:

Well, as long as we’re in Afghanistan and as long as the Afghan government has the support of dozens and dozens of countries who are providing military support, civilian support in addition to us, we are providing a level of stability in Afghanistan that at least prevents it from being a safe haven from which plots against the United States and the Europeans and others can be, can be put together.

The key is this: Gates isn’t answering the question about Pakistan to David Gregory. He’s answering the question about Pakistan directly to the Pakistanis.

I decoded Gates’ reply as: “Well, as long as I can go on a Sunday morning Prime Time talk show and say 9/11, Taliban, and Osama bin Laden and as long as my Commander-in-Chief can draw crowds of 200,000 screaming Europeans, Pakistan can suck it up and deal with whatever we want to do, including destabilizing or overthrowing their corrupt government and/or stealing or destroying their illegal nuclear weapons, which by the way, I already have the authority to do from a little thing called the Lugar-Obama bill to secure weapons of mass destruction.”

In short, it’s not the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense to keep Pakistan stable, it is his responsibility to attack extremist safe havens in Pakistan in order to prevent a catastrophic terrorist attack against the US, Canada, or the European Union. President Obama, and by extension the plans of his Secretary of Defense, enjoys bipartisan political support as well as stable international credibility. Accordingly the US will act, as Lucas said in his article, as if “there are no consequences whatsoever for the internal Pakistani situation” or, more appropriately, without regard to these consequences.

But there is more we can glean from Secretary Gates’ interview than it appears. Beyond the purposes Lucas pointed out — pitching Obama’s Iraq withdrawal plan and articulating US Afghanistan policy — it’s possible Gates was offering us, and the international audience, insight into the broader strategic calculations of the United States, particularly the role of the Department of Defense and US military power abroad.

President Obama has shown himself to be somewhat of a Centrist, if only in regard to his desire to hear from all sides of an argument or debate. One thing all foreign policy and national security analysts, from the Conservative “Fall of Rome” crowd to the Realist “Second World” types all the way to the Neoconservative “Team America” folks, can agree on is this: the United States of America is now and will continue to be Earth’s preeminent military force, at least for the foreseeable future.

There is a saying amongst foreign policy elites:  “Who has the world’s largest air force after the US Air Force? The US Army.”

With Pakistan, Gates is essentially saying that, as long as the US, Canada, and Europe are threatened by extremist attacks from Afghanistan and Pakistan, the US will continue to act aggressively with its military force. It will do so in any manner and on any territory of its choosing, provided it has the support and cooperation of Europe and NATO (whose members will suffer from terrorism long before the US).

What’s absent is any mention of India, which implies the support of India in Afghanistan and protection from Pakistan-launched, “Mumbai-style” attacks are not part of the US calculation. (“Your problem, not ours.”)

It may seem like Gates casually forgot to mention India and Mumbai in his response on Pakistan. After all, “AfPak” is an extremely complicated subject, and it’s easy to leave things out or get things mixed up. At least, that will be the talking point if this becomes an issue. However, we know two things: first, India and Pakistan are inextricably linked together in any strategic calculus, and second, that this wasn’t just a casual visit to Meet the Press by Bob Gates. It was the public coming-out ceremony for George W. Bush’s former and now President Obama’s current Secretary of Defense, civilian leader of the United States Military.

The importance of this public appearance can’t be understated. It was not necessarily designed for the domestic audience of NBC viewers, but rather was aimed at a more global audience and, directly, to the Pakistanis. This is what makes the apparently deliberate absence of India from the “AfPak” equation so significant. The absence, the answer, and the entire interview together could lead us to presume that Gates is articulating the prototype for what will later be called “the Obama Doctrine”.

The “Obama Doctrine” looks something like this: the United States will continue to use its military power as its premier tool in international affairs and may even act preemptively. However, it will not  do so on issues it deems outside of reasonable American national security concerns, and it will act only with support and cooperation from the international community. To put it frankly, this is something like a cross between “walk softly and carry a big stick” and the Buddy System. While still violent, imperial, and aggressive, it is a marked departure from the so-called Bush Doctrine and even the Global War on Terror.

The India-Pakistan and Kashmir and Bangladesh) conflict is the perfect illustration. Under the old rules of the Bush Doctrine, the response to something like the Mumbai attacks might be airstrikes, special forces, or some other combination of clandestine military force. Under the “Obama Doctrine”, the Defense Department under Gates, and thus the US military, are not responsible for the India-Pakistan conflict. Rather this would fall under the portfolios of US Attorney General Eric Holder and his FBI as well US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and her cadres of ambassadors and envoys,with support and cooperation from that throbbing heart of diplomacy in Brussels (the European Union), law enforcement agents with Interpol and NATO, and the mediation and oversight of the United Nations.

Obviously it’s an extreme departure from George W Bush’s radical Napoleonic-cum-Bolshevik strategy of the Global War on Terror, but that doesn’t necessarily mean the “Obama Doctrine” will turn out any more successfully than the Bush Doctrine. In fact, the strategy is brimming with vulnerabilities.

The US may be the most powerful military, it is not the only military on the planet. In the fall of 2007 as civil unrest was broiling in Pakistan under General Pervez Musharraf, then-Senator now Vice President Joe Biden campaigned in the Democratic Party primaries on a promise to pull strategic military aid from Pakistan, that is weapons used against India, to pressure Pakistan to focus on the insurgency rather than more ethereal, strategic conflicts. In response, however, the Chinese offered to sell Pakistan a new fleet of MiG fighter jets, similar to the American planes Biden was threatening to withdraw. Now, as then, there is a constant danger that any diplomatic “sticks” threatened by the US can simply be neutralized by other international actors willing to take its place.

Furthermore there is the problem caused by the global financial meltdown and the massive economic depressions it is causing. While Secretary Gates may have it in his authority to bomb Pakistani safe havens as well as police the Straits of Malacca, the United States may not ultimately be able to afford the high price of imperialism. And if the US is forced to cut back on its imperalist designs, it will create some extremely uncomfortable strategic questions for policy makers. For example, what is the higher priority between preventing a bus bombing in London or preventing a missile exchange between Korea and Japan when you can’t afford both?

So we don’t end on such a morbid tone, let me point out that this prototypical “Obama Doctrine” has some very powerful advantages over the Bush Doctrine, the Global War on Terror, and the so-called Long War/Great Game theories. The most important advantage is that it is absolutely conscious of and constructed on the idea of a “Multi-Polar” world. Even though the US seeks to dominate international affairs, it acknowledges and plans for the participation of other actors, states, or non-states. By allowing for participation, it allows for competition, and as President Obama displays with his choice of Hillary Clinton for Secretary of State, competition has both winners and losers who can still join together for a common purpose. There is no absolute victory or defeat of good and evil, but rather a competition among partners.

Enduring America, 23 February: “The Asia Times reports, in the aftermath of the local cease-fire between the Pakistani Governments and groups in the Northwest Frontier Provice, ‘A mujahideen shura (Shura Ittehad al-Mujahideen) council was formed this weekend due to the personal efforts of Sirajuddin Haqqani.’”

The Guardian, 3 March: “Three rival Pakistani Taliban groups have agreed to form a united front against international forces in Afghanistan in a move likely to intensify the insurgency just as thousands of extra US soldiers begin pouring into the country as part of Barack Obama’s surge plan. The Guardian has learned that three of the most powerful warlords in the region have settled their differences and come together under a grouping calling itself Shura Ittihad-ul-Mujahideen, or Council of United Holy Warriors.”

The Guardian may be getting to the story a bit late but at least, unlike most media in the “West”, it has noted a significant development.

And, to give reporter Saeed Shah further credit, the article picks up on the equally important “other half” of the story: “The unity among the militants comes after a call by Mullah Omar, the cleric who leads the Afghan Taliban, telling Pakistani militants to stop fighting at home in order to join the battle to ‘liberate Afghanistan from the occupation forces’.”

No doubt Josh Mull, who has posted essential blogs for Enduring America on the Pakistani insurgency, can go a bit further than the simple call-and-response narrative. As he has noted, the “Taliban” is now a coalition of forces, some of whom have moved beyond Mullah Omar, and Pakistani local insurgents have their own motives for offering to hold fire at home and fighting abroad.

Still the essential question is now put: are the manoeuvres between the insurgent groups and the Pakistani Government for cease-fires and local deals going to free up these forces to wage an even more intense campaign against the US and its “Obama Doctrine” not just in Pakistan but across the border?

Click here to view the embedded video.

Taliban: What’s in a Name?

Two years into the Iraq war, moderately well read Westerners already knew that the insurgency there wasn’t monolithic. Honest reporting repeatedly made clear that Al Qaeda, Sunni militant groups of various varieties and Sadrists didn’t see eye to eye and often worked at cross purposes even while all were hostile to America and its allies.

Yet after seven years in Afghanistan, the same cannot be said about Western knowledge of militants in the region. There’s a big, amorphous mass called “The Taliban” which is in cahoots with Al Qaeda – and that’s about as fine grained as it usually gets.

That was sufficient back in 2001. The American-led coalition invaded to engage Osama bin Laden’s group and the Taliban’s organized fighters and on the battlefield itself Afghans quickly sorted into those who were either Al Qeada or Taliban, or those who were against them.

But it doesn’t cover the current complex situation at all well,which means the West’s voters are at a disadvantage when it comes to understanding – and approving or disapproving – their leaders’ plans. As Brandon Friedman, a former officer who served in Afghanistan, put it in a recent email:

Instead of fighting organized theocratic government forces and their foreign terrorist guests, we’re now arrayed against a Tatooine-esque combination actual foreign terrorists, actual Taliban fighters from two different countries, narco-warlords jockeying for regional power and influence, regular warlords jockeying for regional power and influence, angry Afghan citizens who’ve grown weary of civilian casualties, angry Afghan civilians who’ve grown weary of foreign forces and their broken promises, regular Afghan citizens who side with the Taliban out of sheer necessity for survival, angry opium farmers, Pakistani agents, and, finally, the invisible blight of government corruption.

Reducing that complexity to a simple “Us and Them” formula hinders much of the debate about Afghanistan.

So it was pleasant to see, among coverage of recent US missile strikes, a report by Mark Mazzetti, David Sanger and Eric Schmidt of the New York Times which tried to explain the various flavors of Taliban, their motives and their aims. The piece highlighted the difference between the Taliban group that Pakistan is most interested in opposing, Baitullah Mehsud’s Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and the network run by Jalaluddin Haqqani, which is believed responsible for the campaign against Western forces in Afghanistan.

The latter group thinks the former has no business attacking Pakistani security forces or the Pakistani government, pointing to a reciprocal tension between Pakistan and the US-led coalition in Afghanistan. While the Pakistani government is happy to do peace deals with Haqqani’s network and less so with Mehsud’s, the coalition is more likely to eventually do so with the latter. Meanwhile, Pakistani counter-terror efforts are always going to focus on Mehsud’s groups – which isn’t all that useful to the West.

We could do with more of this kind of reporting about the region. In particular, we could do with more differentiation on press reports of the four or five main current strains of Taliban of interest to Western efforts in the region. That’s the plea recently made by Frederick Kagan, in a short article for the National Review Online reproduced at the American Enterprise Institute:

There is no such thing as “the Taliban” today. Many different groups with different leaders and aims call themselves “Taliban,” and many more are called “Taliban” by their enemies. In addition to Mullah Omar’s Taliban based in Pakistan and indigenous Taliban forces in Afghanistan, there is an indigenous Pakistani Taliban controlled by Baitullah Mehsud (this group is thought to have been responsible for assassinating Benazir Bhutto). Both are linked with al-Qaeda, and both are dangerous and determined. In other areas, however, “Taliban” groups are primarily disaffected tribesmen who find it more convenient to get help from the Taliban than from other sources.

In general terms, any group that calls itself “Taliban” is identifying itself as against the government in Kabul, the U.S., and U.S. allies. Our job is to understand which groups are truly dangerous, which are irreconcilable with our goals for Afghanistan–and which can be fractured or persuaded to rejoin the Afghan polity. We can’t fight them all, and we can’t negotiate with them all. Dropping the term “Taliban” and referring to specific groups instead would be a good way to start understanding who is really causing problems.

Mullah Omar’s Taliban – the original Afghanistan-ruling Taliban – is nowadays more under the day-to-day direction of Mullah Bradar (or Brehadar), Omar’s trusted chief of military operations but it still leans heavily towards the position of Jalaluddin Haqqani’s Taliban, which has largely supplanted it as the pre-eminent force in Afghanistan. Both are based in Pakistan but mostly interested in attacking allied forces in Afghanistan and the Afghan government. As one prominent member of Omar’s group told Asia Times reporter Syed Saleem Shahzad last September:

It is necessary to understand that there is a sea of difference between the people who call themselves the Pakistan Tehrik-i-Taliban [led by Mehsud] and the Taliban. We have nothing to do with them. In fact, we oppose the policies they adhere to against the Pakistani security forces.

We individually speak to all groups, whether they are Pakistanis, Kashmiris, Arabs, Uzbeks or whosoever, telling them not to create violence in Pakistan, especially in the name of the Taliban.

Journalists in the West could do worse than refer to veteran reporter Anand Gopal’s incisive look at the various competing groups of militants in the region, which also include the resurgent Hizb-i-Islami of charismatic fundamentalist Hekmatyar, who like Haqqani used to be one of those favored by both CIA and ISI intelligence agencies. Gopal writes of a “rainbow coalition” arrayed against U.S. troops, which is “competing commanders with differing ideologies and strategies, who nonetheless agree on one essential goal: kicking out the foreigners.”

As Brandon Freidman writes, it’s tempting to default to the soundbite term “Taliban” when talking about all these groups and to thus treat them as if they were one monolithic structure. But a more nuanced debate is not only healthy in any democracy, it might pave the way for Western public acceptance of what every military commander has said must eventually happen if there is ever to be real peace – an accord with more moderate groups to reconcile them to mainstream Afghan and Pakistani politics.

I was trying to write a full analysis, based on our revelations of US political and mililtary activity in Pakistan over the last week, when Josh Mull, a.k.a. “UJ”, posted this comment on yesterday’s entry “Mr Obama’s War: Expanding the Enemies in Pakistan”.

The comment rightly corrects me on several points but, more importantly, I think it offers the answers I was seeking: “What we are witnessing is a long-term, wide-ranging strategy of creating international legitimacy and political credibility for an escalation of violence by the US, Pakistan, and NATO against religious and tribal insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan.”

Excellent analysis but…come on now…Obama is “happy” to expand the war in Pakistan? How could you possibly know something like that? Maybe he was outraged or furious to expand the war.

I agree with you that “the media” does often misuse the term “Taliban” but US Military literature as well as relevant trade/industry publications are quite specific about the differences between Big T Taliban, that is the Afghan Mullah Omar-led insurgency and al-Qa’eda militants, and little t taliban, or the Pakistani (Sirajuddin Haqqani, Baitullah Mehsud, etc.) insurgency and tribal militants. As long as we’re picking at the mainstream press, they also like to lump in everyone from Jundallah (Iranian People’s Resistance Movement) to the Baloch National Democratic Party as “Taliban,” so really, what are we hoping for from them?

You said: “Thus it is unclear whether the US strategy co-exists with Islamabad’s effort, reaching accommodations with some local groups while striking at others, or whether it is in direct conflict with an effort to defuse tensions with insurgents.”

The synergy of these two strategies becomes a bit more clear with the inclusion of more data.

For instance, describing one strategy as “Islamabad’s effort, reaching accommodations with some local groups while striking at others” is a bit misleading. For one thing, the specific machinations of “Islamabad” have to be made apparent. The Pakistani Military is in charge, and it uses the popularly elected civilian government as a credible tool for diplomatic negotiations with insurgent/militant factions throughout Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kashmir, and India. This alone tells us that the strategy is much broader in scope than simply Afghanistan, or even the Global War on Terror, but it also helps clarify the second part of the statement, “reaching accommodations with some local groups while striking at others.”

Since we’re clear that the entire Pakistani National Security strategy is based on relations with “some” militants and hostility to “others,” let’s focus exclusively on Pakistan’s small t taliban. Since 2002, the Pakistani government has been striking deals with the militants. Each time, the violence increases, and the US and Pakistani military are forced to crack down. What’s absent from your analysis is that each time the US and Pakistani military crack down, including the recent drone strikes against Mehsud ordered by President Obama, they come with much more international credibility and political legitimacy.

Domestically, the Pakistani military was seen as brutal and thuggish bullies for invading the tribal areas unilaterally. Once they cooperated with the insurgents, and the Pakistani civilian population was rewarded with bloody kidnappings and suicide bombings, public demand for a violent crack down was solidified. The international community is also given a stark moral choice: live with the human rights black hole of Sharia Law or provide more support to the effort to quash the insurgency. Even President Obama was able to openly campaign on promises of increased violence against Pakistani insurgents on the foundation of failed Pakistani government truces and increased Afghan attacks, and he was rewarded with a 9+ million vote mandate from the American electorate.

Thus we have an answer to your final question, whether or not these strategies are “in direct conflict with an effort to defuse tensions with insurgents.” The answer is yes, these strategies are directly opposed to any effort to “defuse tensions with insurgents,” and for that matter, it has never been the stated goal of anyone relevant to the conflict to defuse tensions with the militants. Instead, what we are witnessing is a long-term, wide-ranging strategy of creating international legitimacy and political credibility for an escalation of violence by the US, Pakistan, and NATO against religious and tribal insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan.