In his 17th statement, Mir-Hossein Mousavi made five specific points that he deemed necessary to start the political (and national) reconciliation process. The proposal lead to a noticeable uptick in the weeks leading up to 22 Bahman in talk of the need for national “unity” and also garnered much attention from Iranian intellectuals and dissidents. Ultimately, the regime’s more radical elements reemerged and silenced the chatter before the security apparatus prevented a strong opposition showing on the revolution’s 31st anniversary. But Mousavi’s “five points,” as they have come to be called, still carry much weight. Generally, they are:
Government accountability for post-election violations
Legislation of new election laws that would safeguard reform-minded candidates from regime’s current vetting process
Release of all political prisoners
Freedom of the press and political-neutrality on state-run IRIB television
Freedom to assemble, as guaranteed by the Islamic Republic’s constitution
Were these five conditions to be met, the Green movement would arguably have the breathing space it needs to mobilize and begin the long process of transforming Iranian society. For if anything became apparent in the weeks leading up to and after the June election, it was that Iran has undergone an awakening. It has simply been the repression that the above five grievances capture that has prevented the social movement’s aspirations from coming to fruition.
Forget all the talk and newspaper articles, which EA correspondents like Josh Shahryar took apart on Saturday, about this conflict being settled in favour of a heavy-fisted Government. While the opposition is still considering its next moves, there was more than enough to show that 1) this is far more than a simple narrative of Government putting down the Green Movement and 2) that Government is far from secure in its supposed victory.
First, the less dramatic — frankly, quite mundane — but significant political move. The “ambiguous” Hashemi Rafsanjani is no longer ambiguous. His statement at the Council reaffirmed his basic position of siding with the Supreme Leader, but equally important were his call for unity and the need to make changes to ensure the security of the Iranian system.
Yesterday, three days after a Human Rights Watch report on the same topic (see separate entry), the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center released its initial findings, “Violent Aftermath: The 2009 Election and Suppression of Dissent in Iran”:
INTRODUCTION
On June 13, 2009, the day after the tenth presidential election in the Islamic Republic of Iran, demonstrations erupted in cities across the country. Demonstrators protested what they viewed as widespread fraud—calls of “Where is my vote?” predominated. The Guardian Council had permitted only four men to campaign: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the incumbent; Mohsen Rezaei, a former head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah), considered a conservative; Mir-Hossein Mousavi, a former prime minister of Iran during the war with Iraq, considered a reformist; and Mehdi Karroubi, a former speaker of the Majlis, also a reformist.
Mousavi had declared himself the winner late on Election Day. The government immediately announced that Ahmadinejad had won by 62 percent of the vote. The regime also responded by cutting off electronic communication avenues within Iran and with the outside world. As the week progressed, cell phone and internet services were regularly shut down and slowed. On June 16, the authorities announced that foreign journalists were forbidden from reporting from the streets, and that their visas would not be renewed. Hundreds of domestic journalists and members of the press were arrested and intimidated.
The nearly nine months since Iran’s presidential election sparked widespread popular demonstrations against alleged vote-rigging have been among the most tumultuous in the history of the Islamic Republic, which marks the 31st anniversary of the revolution that paved the way for its establishment on February 11, 2010. This has been a period of repeated serious human rights abuses that include extra-judicial killings, violations of the rights to freedom of assembly and expression, and the prohibition of torture, not to mention arbitrary arrest and detention and countless due process violations.
In the two months immediately following the June 12 election, the government carried out a major campaign of repression that included mass detentions of protestors, political reform figures, and rights activists, culminating in public trials in August. November and December saw renewed attacks on protestors as large demonstrations commemorated significant dates in the history of the Islamic revolution and the Shia Muslim religious calendar.
2125 GMT: Reports have emerged that two more journalists, Mohammad Ghaznavian and Hamid Mafi, have been detained. They join more than 60 others in Iran’s prisons.
2120 GMT: We have posted a snap analysis of what appears to be a serious challenge by Khabar Online, the website linked to Ali Larijani, to President Ahmadinejad. If we are on the mark, then in light of this week’s suppression of Ayande News, it will be intriguing to see the Government’s response to another location of “conservative” criticism.
2025 GMT: We have posted the text of Mehdi Karroubi’s first interview after 22 Bahman.
1955 GMT: Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has written the academic colleagues of imprisoned Iranian-American scholar Kian Tajbakhsh, “The espionage charges leveled against Dr. Tajbakhsh are groundless. The State Department is using every available diplomatic tool to achieve Dr. Tajbakhsh’s release.”
Tajbakhsh was jailed for 15 years in October on charges of espionage. Clinton said in her letter that Kian Tajbakhsh has not been allowed to meet with Swiss diplomats, who serve as the United States’ diplomatic representatives in Iran, because Iran considers Tajbakhsh an Iranian citizen.
1940 GMT: A Friday Prayer for All. Neday-e Sabz Azadi reports, via Radio Zamaneh, that the Friday Prayers leader of Zahedan, Molavi Abdolhamid, described the Islamic Republic as a system that gives equal freedom to both pro- and anti-Government groups and allows voices of opposition to be heard: “The people of Iran brought the Revolution to victory to achieve its goals and now they demand the reviewing and realization of those goals.”
At the end of an intriguing political day, another twist: the high-profile member of Parliament, Ali Motahhari, an ally of Ali Larijani and a critic of the Ahmadinejad Government, has written an open letter to Mir Hossein Mousavi. (Note “open”, which raises this to a very public signal of the position of the “conservative opposition”.)
The summary of the letter, published in The Tehran Times, deserves to be quoted in full. At one level, the reason for publication is obvious: Motahhari is asking Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi to make clear their allegiance to the Supreme Leader and the system of velayat-e-faqih (ultimate clerical supremacy). There is another level of significance, however, Motahhari’s unsubtle implication is that, if Mousavi and Karroubi come “within the system”, then the abusers in the Government can be dealt with — and “dealt with” may include the President himself
It is left up to readers to consider whether this move is linked to our analysis last month of a post-Ashura plan, involving Speaker of Parliament Larijani, Tehran Mayor Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, and Secretary of the Expediency Council and Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei, to isolate and possibly remove Ahmadinejad:
I have read your interview in the Kalemeh website and saw positive and negative points in your remarks. I believe that you have stated the pains well, but you have not suggested remedies appropriately. The gist of your remarks is that you have entered the scene for making reforms not for seeking power, taking revenge, or devastating (the country). This approach can be the pivot of unity and the common cause to deal with the current political crisis, especially when one of the bases of the Islamic teachings is continuous social reform.
UPDATE 26 JANUARY: This reading is now overtaken by our special analysis on the significance of the Karroubi statement
UPDATE 1915 GMT: First, an apology. I got this wrong earlier — I missed the important nuances in Karroubi’s statement and made the wrong connection: it is not linked to the Larijani-Rezaei-Qalibaf initiative.
Second, a top EA correspondent is finishing checks with sources and will have the best analysis of this situation later tonight.
UPDATE 1630 GMT: An EA reader points us to a curious piece that appeared in Mehdi Karroubi’s Saham News this past weekend. The apparent confusion and even dispute between Karroubi and Khatami over a supposed approach to the Supreme Leader has been at the back of my mind while trying to read latest events. Any assistance from readers appreciated.
UPDATE 1500 GMT: EA sources, as well as readers, offer important amendments to our reaction:
First, it should be noted that Hossein Karroubi contacted a number of press outlets after Fars News claimed that Mehdi Karroubi had declared, without reservation that, he “recognised the President”. Given Fars’ past record, as well as the unlikely scenario that Karroubi would make such an important statement through that outlet, the scenario is that Hossein Karroubi was putting out a hasty “clarification” to prevent the Fars story from getting any traction.
Second, Hossein Karroubi’s clarification had two important qualifiers. First, he made clear that his father saw Ahmeadinejad as “selected leader” rather than “elected President”. Second, even though that selection was on the basis of the Supreme Leader’s endorsement, there was a pointed reference to this as the action of “Mr Khamenei”.
So the story seems to move away from a concerted response linking Karroubi and the “establishment” critics of the Government. Still, questions remain:
Why did Hossein Karroubi not give a simple repudiation of the Fars report? For the statement he offered has a curious tension: Mehdi Karroubi accepts the overriding verdict of the Supreme Leader (and thus velayat-e-faqih) even as he diminishes leader and system with the “Mr” tag.
And perhaps more importantly, is the Khatami letter to the Supreme Leader legitimate? For if so, Karroubi’s response is not only to Ayatollah Khamenei; it is to the former President’s attempt to bring together a group for reconciliation.
A quick reaction to emerging events, combined with the inside information Enduring America received last week:
Last week, as part of our articles on a possible “Plot Against President Ahmadinejad”, we noted that the key participants (Ali Larijani-Mohsen Rezaei-Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf) had extended invitations to Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi to join the move.
2200 GMT: And, on the political front, Mehdi Karroubi’s Etemade Melli party has issued a statement calling for the holding of a free election and permission to stage demonstrations.
Etemade Melli, via the Saham News website, repeated that Karroubi had the material to back up his accusations of detainee abuse: “It is necessary for you to know that Mr. Karroubi is standing firm and tall and has evidence for all his comments.” it added in an address to the country’s regime.
2145 GMT: Little hard news tonight, although rumours about Iran’s economic situation continue to swirl. There is also nothing to clarify an increasingly complex domestic political contest.
A Russian banking delegation, headed by the deputy governor of the country’s Central Bank, is due to visit Tehran on Monday, the Iranian envoy to Moscow announced on Saturday.
“Deputy governor of Russia’s Central Bank Melnikov and a number of officials from the other Russian banks will pay a visit to Iran on Monday in a bid to resolve banking issues and facilitate exchange and economic and trade activities between the two countries,” Seyed Mahmoud Reza Sajjadi told [Fars News Agency].
The Russian delegation is scheduled to meet Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Iran Pourmohammadi and managing directors of a number of Iranian banks to discuss ways to expand banking relations between the two states.
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