Writing for Foreign Policy, Gilles Dorronsoro looks over the political and military strategy discussed at last week’s London Conference between Afghan leaders and “Western” powers and comes away unimpressed:
Washington, Paris and Berlin made their best efforts to keep up appearances during last week’s Afghanistan conference here, but the gap between official rhetoric and reality could not have been wider. Participants called for reintegrating members of the Taliban who accept the Afghan constitution, enacting measures against government corruption, and building more regional cooperation.
Yet the coalition is systematically undermining what’s left of the Afghan state. The New York Times reports that the Shinwari tribes have agreed to fight the Taliban — in exchange for about $1 million. What’s lesser known and less understood is that Washington didn’t even feel obligated to notify the Karzai government of this decision.
1115 GMT: Pajhwok News Agency is offering a stream of reports pointing to manipulation and fraud in the counting of the vote. In one case in Khost Province, it claims that while residents say less than 500 people, the election commission returned a total of more than 22,000 for Hamid Karzai.
0840 GMT: No, I’ve Won. Abdullah Abdullah’s camp claim that he, not Hamid Karzai, is a first-round winner, taking 63 percent of the vote to Karzai’s 31.
If I were a cynic (which, of course, I am not), I would say that all remains to make this situation complete is for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to show up and say he won.
0715 GMT: Jim Sciutto of ABC News reports that the campaign of Abdullah Abdullah, Hamid Karzai’s main challenger, has denied the claims of a first-round victory by the Karzai camp.
Perhaps more importantly, other questions are opened up. Look, for example, to how Karzai tries to exert his authority, not only with other Afghan groups but against his American “allies”. And, for all the cautions about “democracy” in this election, has the process opened up some space — symbolic or “real” — for social and political action against corruption and for rights and development?
21 August, 0600 GMT: A Full Glass for Karzai? All day yesterday we used the phrase “half-empty, half-full” for the election, with mixed returns on turnout, “minor” violence which killed at least 27 people, and reports of irregularities and fraud.
The trend continues today, with one important exception. Election authorities say that the national turnout was between 40 and 50 percent, well down on the 70 percent for the 2004 Presidential election but above the 30 percent threshold needed for a valid result. Caroline Wyatt, reporting from Helmand for the BBC, has just engaged in a bit of cheerleading for the “success” and “incredible result”, given the issues of security. Other observers, such as Al Jazeera English, are being more measured in their views.
The important exception is President Karzai, whose team are already prepared to celebrate. Karzai’s campaign manager told Reuters this morning, “Initial results show that the president has got a majority. We will not got to a second round.” Read the rest of this entry »
[This] leaves only the Pakistani military, whichever way it chooses to play the hand with the Americans, as the only significant force in the country with a symbolic and real modicum of power. If Zardari protests this, the prospect of his overthrow emerges. If he accepts his emasculation, he is no more than an irrelevant figurehead. Either way, it’s an effective coup.
Last Thursday, I embarked on a new, challenging, and exciting project, working with postgraduate students at the Clinton Institute for American Studies in Dublin . Introducing a course on contemporary US foreign policy, I tried out the idea of dissecting that morning’s Page 1 story, whatever it might be, in The New York Times.
Writing for Foreign Policy, Gilles Dorronsoro looks over the political and military strategy discussed at last week’s London Conference between Afghan leaders and “Western” powers and comes away unimpressed:
[This] leaves only the Pakistani military, whichever way it chooses to play the hand with the Americans, as the only significant force in the country with a symbolic and real modicum of power. If Zardari protests this, the prospect of his overthrow emerges. If he accepts his emasculation, he is no more than an irrelevant figurehead. Either way, it’s an effective coup.
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