Monday
Feb232009
Analysis: Josh Mull on "Mr Obama's War" in Afghanistan and Pakistan
Monday, February 23, 2009 at 7:46
Related Post: Mr Obama’s War - US Special Forces Training Pakistani Units, US Military Pressing Pakistani Allies
Related Post: Mr Obama’s War - Ceasefire in NW Pakistan; More on US Drone Strikes
Related Post: Mr Obama’s War - Expanding the Enemies in Pakistan
I was trying to write a full analysis, based on our revelations of US political and mililtary activity in Pakistan over the last week, when Josh Mull, a.k.a. "UJ", posted this comment on yesterday's entry "Mr Obama’s War: Expanding the Enemies in Pakistan".
The comment rightly corrects me on several points but, more importantly, I think it offers the answers I was seeking: "What we are witnessing is a long-term, wide-ranging strategy of creating international legitimacy and political credibility for an escalation of violence by the US, Pakistan, and NATO against religious and tribal insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan."
Excellent analysis but…come on now…Obama is “happy” to expand the war in Pakistan? How could you possibly know something like that? Maybe he was outraged or furious to expand the war.
I agree with you that “the media” does often misuse the term “Taliban” but US Military literature as well as relevant trade/industry publications are quite specific about the differences between Big T Taliban, that is the Afghan Mullah Omar-led insurgency and al-Qa’eda militants, and little t taliban, or the Pakistani (Sirajuddin Haqqani, Baitullah Mehsud, etc.) insurgency and tribal militants. As long as we’re picking at the mainstream press, they also like to lump in everyone from Jundallah (Iranian People's Resistance Movement) to the Baloch National Democratic Party as “Taliban,” so really, what are we hoping for from them?
You said: “Thus it is unclear whether the US strategy co-exists with Islamabad’s effort, reaching accommodations with some local groups while striking at others, or whether it is in direct conflict with an effort to defuse tensions with insurgents.”
The synergy of these two strategies becomes a bit more clear with the inclusion of more data.
For instance, describing one strategy as “Islamabad’s effort, reaching accommodations with some local groups while striking at others” is a bit misleading. For one thing, the specific machinations of “Islamabad” have to be made apparent. The Pakistani Military is in charge, and it uses the popularly elected civilian government as a credible tool for diplomatic negotiations with insurgent/militant factions throughout Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kashmir, and India. This alone tells us that the strategy is much broader in scope than simply Afghanistan, or even the Global War on Terror, but it also helps clarify the second part of the statement, “reaching accommodations with some local groups while striking at others.”
Since we’re clear that the entire Pakistani National Security strategy is based on relations with “some” militants and hostility to “others,” let’s focus exclusively on Pakistan’s small t taliban. Since 2002, the Pakistani government has been striking deals with the militants. Each time, the violence increases, and the US and Pakistani military are forced to crack down. What’s absent from your analysis is that each time the US and Pakistani military crack down, including the recent drone strikes against Mehsud ordered by President Obama, they come with much more international credibility and political legitimacy.
Domestically, the Pakistani military was seen as brutal and thuggish bullies for invading the tribal areas unilaterally. Once they cooperated with the insurgents, and the Pakistani civilian population was rewarded with bloody kidnappings and suicide bombings, public demand for a violent crack down was solidified. The international community is also given a stark moral choice: live with the human rights black hole of Sharia Law or provide more support to the effort to quash the insurgency. Even President Obama was able to openly campaign on promises of increased violence against Pakistani insurgents on the foundation of failed Pakistani government truces and increased Afghan attacks, and he was rewarded with a 9+ million vote mandate from the American electorate.
Thus we have an answer to your final question, whether or not these strategies are “in direct conflict with an effort to defuse tensions with insurgents.” The answer is yes, these strategies are directly opposed to any effort to “defuse tensions with insurgents,” and for that matter, it has never been the stated goal of anyone relevant to the conflict to defuse tensions with the militants. Instead, what we are witnessing is a long-term, wide-ranging strategy of creating international legitimacy and political credibility for an escalation of violence by the US, Pakistan, and NATO against religious and tribal insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Related Post: Mr Obama’s War - Ceasefire in NW Pakistan; More on US Drone Strikes
Related Post: Mr Obama’s War - Expanding the Enemies in Pakistan
I was trying to write a full analysis, based on our revelations of US political and mililtary activity in Pakistan over the last week, when Josh Mull, a.k.a. "UJ", posted this comment on yesterday's entry "Mr Obama’s War: Expanding the Enemies in Pakistan".The comment rightly corrects me on several points but, more importantly, I think it offers the answers I was seeking: "What we are witnessing is a long-term, wide-ranging strategy of creating international legitimacy and political credibility for an escalation of violence by the US, Pakistan, and NATO against religious and tribal insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan."
Excellent analysis but…come on now…Obama is “happy” to expand the war in Pakistan? How could you possibly know something like that? Maybe he was outraged or furious to expand the war.
I agree with you that “the media” does often misuse the term “Taliban” but US Military literature as well as relevant trade/industry publications are quite specific about the differences between Big T Taliban, that is the Afghan Mullah Omar-led insurgency and al-Qa’eda militants, and little t taliban, or the Pakistani (Sirajuddin Haqqani, Baitullah Mehsud, etc.) insurgency and tribal militants. As long as we’re picking at the mainstream press, they also like to lump in everyone from Jundallah (Iranian People's Resistance Movement) to the Baloch National Democratic Party as “Taliban,” so really, what are we hoping for from them?
You said: “Thus it is unclear whether the US strategy co-exists with Islamabad’s effort, reaching accommodations with some local groups while striking at others, or whether it is in direct conflict with an effort to defuse tensions with insurgents.”
The synergy of these two strategies becomes a bit more clear with the inclusion of more data.
For instance, describing one strategy as “Islamabad’s effort, reaching accommodations with some local groups while striking at others” is a bit misleading. For one thing, the specific machinations of “Islamabad” have to be made apparent. The Pakistani Military is in charge, and it uses the popularly elected civilian government as a credible tool for diplomatic negotiations with insurgent/militant factions throughout Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kashmir, and India. This alone tells us that the strategy is much broader in scope than simply Afghanistan, or even the Global War on Terror, but it also helps clarify the second part of the statement, “reaching accommodations with some local groups while striking at others.”
Since we’re clear that the entire Pakistani National Security strategy is based on relations with “some” militants and hostility to “others,” let’s focus exclusively on Pakistan’s small t taliban. Since 2002, the Pakistani government has been striking deals with the militants. Each time, the violence increases, and the US and Pakistani military are forced to crack down. What’s absent from your analysis is that each time the US and Pakistani military crack down, including the recent drone strikes against Mehsud ordered by President Obama, they come with much more international credibility and political legitimacy.
Domestically, the Pakistani military was seen as brutal and thuggish bullies for invading the tribal areas unilaterally. Once they cooperated with the insurgents, and the Pakistani civilian population was rewarded with bloody kidnappings and suicide bombings, public demand for a violent crack down was solidified. The international community is also given a stark moral choice: live with the human rights black hole of Sharia Law or provide more support to the effort to quash the insurgency. Even President Obama was able to openly campaign on promises of increased violence against Pakistani insurgents on the foundation of failed Pakistani government truces and increased Afghan attacks, and he was rewarded with a 9+ million vote mandate from the American electorate.
Thus we have an answer to your final question, whether or not these strategies are “in direct conflict with an effort to defuse tensions with insurgents.” The answer is yes, these strategies are directly opposed to any effort to “defuse tensions with insurgents,” and for that matter, it has never been the stated goal of anyone relevant to the conflict to defuse tensions with the militants. Instead, what we are witnessing is a long-term, wide-ranging strategy of creating international legitimacy and political credibility for an escalation of violence by the US, Pakistan, and NATO against religious and tribal insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Reader Comments (1)
Absent from my analysis is any actual accounting of the economic and financial capabilities of the players involved. Any massive change in funding or resources for the US, Pakistan, or NATO could drastically alter the implementation of the strategy, the results of the strategy, or even the basic nature of the strategy.
The latest US Government Accountability Office report, "SECURING, STABILIZING, AND DEVELOPING PAKISTAN’S BORDER AREA WITH AFGHANISTAN," finds that...
"Defense estimated that around $230 million would be required to fully support the Security Development Plan initiatives in fiscal year 2009. In fiscal year 2009, the plan received a total of $62.5 million ($37.5 million in counternarcotics funding and $25 million in Frontier Corps Train and Equip Authority funding).
"As a result, Defense's Security Development Plan faces a shortfall of approximately $167.5 million, about 73 percent of its funding goal for fiscal year 2009."
But "as of December 2008, no existing security assistance funds have been re-directed toward the Security Development Plan. Defense officials stated that without dedicated long-term funding, implementation of the Security Development Plan may be hampered, and the training and equipping of the Frontier Corps could slow down by March 2009."
(Hat tip to Jeff Stein at CQ for this report who, as of right now, has a bunch of crazy errors in his webpage that keep crashing Firefox. So, instead of linking to him, here's the GAO report http://tinyurl.com/d3w9pa Sorry.)