UPDATED: "Taliban": Well, They All Look the Same....

This week Josh Mull ("UJ"), both in his guest blog and in his comments, has offered valuable insight into the complexity of local groups and insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan. I've now discovered an analysis by Steve Hynd ("Cernig"), which I think is an excellent introduction to the political, economic, and social dimensions beyond the label "Taliban". It's reprinted below this report from Al Jazeera:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fWT1kqoeszI[/youtube] 

Taliban: What's in a Name?

Two years into the Iraq war, moderately well read Westerners already knew that the insurgency there wasn't monolithic. Honest reporting repeatedly made clear that Al Qaeda, Sunni militant groups of various varieties and Sadrists didn't see eye to eye and often worked at cross purposes even while all were hostile to America and its allies.

Yet after seven years in Afghanistan, the same cannot be said about Western knowledge of militants in the region. There's a big, amorphous mass called "The Taliban" which is in cahoots with Al Qaeda - and that's about as fine grained as it usually gets.


That was sufficient back in 2001. The American-led coalition invaded to engage Osama bin Laden's group and the Taliban's organized fighters and on the battlefield itself Afghans quickly sorted into those who were either Al Qeada or Taliban, or those who were against them.

But it doesn't cover the current complex situation at all well,which means the West's voters are at a disadvantage when it comes to understanding - and approving or disapproving - their leaders' plans. As Brandon Friedman, a former officer who served in Afghanistan, put it in a recent email:

Instead of fighting organized theocratic government forces and their foreign terrorist guests, we're now arrayed against a Tatooine-esque combination actual foreign terrorists, actual Taliban fighters from two different countries, narco-warlords jockeying for regional power and influence, regular warlords jockeying for regional power and influence, angry Afghan citizens who've grown weary of civilian casualties, angry Afghan civilians who've grown weary of foreign forces and their broken promises, regular Afghan citizens who side with the Taliban out of sheer necessity for survival, angry opium farmers, Pakistani agents, and, finally, the invisible blight of government corruption.

Reducing that complexity to a simple "Us and Them" formula hinders much of the debate about Afghanistan.

So it was pleasant to see, among coverage of recent US missile strikes, a report by Mark Mazzetti, David Sanger and Eric Schmidt of the New York Times which tried to explain the various flavors of Taliban, their motives and their aims. The piece highlighted the difference between the Taliban group that Pakistan is most interested in opposing, Baitullah Mehsud's Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and the network run by Jalaluddin Haqqani, which is believed responsible for the campaign against Western forces in Afghanistan.

The latter group thinks the former has no business attacking Pakistani security forces or the Pakistani government, pointing to a reciprocal tension between Pakistan and the US-led coalition in Afghanistan. While the Pakistani government is happy to do peace deals with Haqqani's network and less so with Mehsud's, the coalition is more likely to eventually do so with the latter. Meanwhile, Pakistani counter-terror efforts are always going to focus on Mehsud's groups - which isn't all that useful to the West.

We could do with more of this kind of reporting about the region. In particular, we could do with more differentiation on press reports of the four or five main current strains of Taliban of interest to Western efforts in the region. That's the plea recently made by Frederick Kagan, in a short article for the National Review Online reproduced at the American Enterprise Institute:

There is no such thing as "the Taliban" today. Many different groups with different leaders and aims call themselves "Taliban," and many more are called "Taliban" by their enemies. In addition to Mullah Omar's Taliban based in Pakistan and indigenous Taliban forces in Afghanistan, there is an indigenous Pakistani Taliban controlled by Baitullah Mehsud (this group is thought to have been responsible for assassinating Benazir Bhutto). Both are linked with al-Qaeda, and both are dangerous and determined. In other areas, however, "Taliban" groups are primarily disaffected tribesmen who find it more convenient to get help from the Taliban than from other sources.

In general terms, any group that calls itself "Taliban" is identifying itself as against the government in Kabul, the U.S., and U.S. allies. Our job is to understand which groups are truly dangerous, which are irreconcilable with our goals for Afghanistan--and which can be fractured or persuaded to rejoin the Afghan polity. We can't fight them all, and we can't negotiate with them all. Dropping the term "Taliban" and referring to specific groups instead would be a good way to start understanding who is really causing problems.

Mullah Omar's Taliban - the original Afghanistan-ruling Taliban - is nowadays more under the day-to-day direction of Mullah Bradar (or Brehadar), Omar's trusted chief of military operations but it still leans heavily towards the position of Jalaluddin Haqqani's Taliban, which has largely supplanted it as the pre-eminent force in Afghanistan. Both are based in Pakistan but mostly interested in attacking allied forces in Afghanistan and the Afghan government. As one prominent member of Omar's group told Asia Times reporter Syed Saleem Shahzad last September:

It is necessary to understand that there is a sea of difference between the people who call themselves the Pakistan Tehrik-i-Taliban [led by Mehsud] and the Taliban. We have nothing to do with them. In fact, we oppose the policies they adhere to against the Pakistani security forces.

We individually speak to all groups, whether they are Pakistanis, Kashmiris, Arabs, Uzbeks or whosoever, telling them not to create violence in Pakistan, especially in the name of the Taliban.

Journalists in the West could do worse than refer to veteran reporter Anand Gopal's incisive look at the various competing groups of militants in the region, which also include the resurgent Hizb-i-Islami of charismatic fundamentalist Hekmatyar, who like Haqqani used to be one of those favored by both CIA and ISI intelligence agencies. Gopal writes of a "rainbow coalition" arrayed against U.S. troops, which is "competing commanders with differing ideologies and strategies, who nonetheless agree on one essential goal: kicking out the foreigners."

As Brandon Freidman writes, it's tempting to default to the soundbite term "Taliban" when talking about all these groups and to thus treat them as if they were one monolithic structure. But a more nuanced debate is not only healthy in any democracy, it might pave the way for Western public acceptance of what every military commander has said must eventually happen if there is ever to be real peace - an accord with more moderate groups to reconcile them to mainstream Afghan and Pakistani politics.

Analysis: Josh Mull on "Mr Obama's War" in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Related Post: Mr Obama’s War - US Special Forces Training Pakistani Units, US Military Pressing Pakistani Allies
Related Post: Mr Obama’s War - Ceasefire in NW Pakistan; More on US Drone Strikes
Related Post: Mr Obama’s War - Expanding the Enemies in Pakistan

I was trying to write a full analysis, based on our revelations of US political and mililtary activity in Pakistan over the last week, when Josh Mull, a.k.a. "UJ", posted this comment on yesterday's entry "Mr Obama’s War: Expanding the Enemies in Pakistan".

The comment rightly corrects me on several points but, more importantly, I think it offers the answers I was seeking: "What we are witnessing is a long-term, wide-ranging strategy of creating international legitimacy and political credibility for an escalation of violence by the US, Pakistan, and NATO against religious and tribal insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan."

Excellent analysis but…come on now…Obama is “happy” to expand the war in Pakistan? How could you possibly know something like that? Maybe he was outraged or furious to expand the war.

I agree with you that “the media” does often misuse the term “Taliban” but US Military literature as well as relevant trade/industry publications are quite specific about the differences between Big T Taliban, that is the Afghan Mullah Omar-led insurgency and al-Qa’eda militants, and little t taliban, or the Pakistani (Sirajuddin Haqqani, Baitullah Mehsud, etc.) insurgency and tribal militants. As long as we’re picking at the mainstream press, they also like to lump in everyone from Jundallah (Iranian People's Resistance Movement) to the Baloch National Democratic Party as “Taliban,” so really, what are we hoping for from them?

You said: “Thus it is unclear whether the US strategy co-exists with Islamabad’s effort, reaching accommodations with some local groups while striking at others, or whether it is in direct conflict with an effort to defuse tensions with insurgents.”

The synergy of these two strategies becomes a bit more clear with the inclusion of more data.

For instance, describing one strategy as “Islamabad’s effort, reaching accommodations with some local groups while striking at others” is a bit misleading. For one thing, the specific machinations of “Islamabad” have to be made apparent. The Pakistani Military is in charge, and it uses the popularly elected civilian government as a credible tool for diplomatic negotiations with insurgent/militant factions throughout Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kashmir, and India. This alone tells us that the strategy is much broader in scope than simply Afghanistan, or even the Global War on Terror, but it also helps clarify the second part of the statement, “reaching accommodations with some local groups while striking at others.”

Since we’re clear that the entire Pakistani National Security strategy is based on relations with “some” militants and hostility to “others,” let’s focus exclusively on Pakistan’s small t taliban. Since 2002, the Pakistani government has been striking deals with the militants. Each time, the violence increases, and the US and Pakistani military are forced to crack down. What’s absent from your analysis is that each time the US and Pakistani military crack down, including the recent drone strikes against Mehsud ordered by President Obama, they come with much more international credibility and political legitimacy.

Domestically, the Pakistani military was seen as brutal and thuggish bullies for invading the tribal areas unilaterally. Once they cooperated with the insurgents, and the Pakistani civilian population was rewarded with bloody kidnappings and suicide bombings, public demand for a violent crack down was solidified. The international community is also given a stark moral choice: live with the human rights black hole of Sharia Law or provide more support to the effort to quash the insurgency. Even President Obama was able to openly campaign on promises of increased violence against Pakistani insurgents on the foundation of failed Pakistani government truces and increased Afghan attacks, and he was rewarded with a 9+ million vote mandate from the American electorate.

Thus we have an answer to your final question, whether or not these strategies are “in direct conflict with an effort to defuse tensions with insurgents.” The answer is yes, these strategies are directly opposed to any effort to “defuse tensions with insurgents,” and for that matter, it has never been the stated goal of anyone relevant to the conflict to defuse tensions with the militants. Instead, what we are witnessing is a long-term, wide-ranging strategy of creating international legitimacy and political credibility for an escalation of violence by the US, Pakistan, and NATO against religious and tribal insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

One to Watch: Secret Talks in Afghanistan with the Taliban

Amidst the attention to the possible US military "surge" in Afghanistan, we've been keeping a close eye on an alternative strategy, namely, talks with "moderate Taliban". High-ranking officials in Pakistan have long favoured such a strategy, and Afghan President Hamid Karzai has been vocal recently in advocating such discussions.

The twist in the excellent article below by Kim Sengupta of The Independent is the detail of Saudi Arabia, notably the head of Saudi intelligence Prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (pictured), in setting up these secret negotiations. Conversely, there is little sign of Pakistani involvement, probably of the great pressure from Washington for Islamabad to show a tough line against the Taliban as well as its own insurgents.

Secret talks with Taliban gather pace as surge looms: Saudis warn Washington that offensive may hinder talks with militant group
By Kim Sengupta

Secret talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban, brokered by a Saudi royal who heads the country's intelligence service, are gathering pace before the US-led military surge in Afghanistan.

Prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz Al Saud is said to have been greatly encouraged by meetings he had held with both sides on recent visits to Afghanistan and Pakistan, paving the way for a fresh round of negotiations, The Independent has learnt.

The militant groups have appointed a former member of the Taliban regime as their envoy because of his good relations in the past with the Saudi government. He is Aghajan Mutasim, a minister under the ousted Taliban leader Mullah Omar, who is believed to have held detailed discussions with Saudi officials and also to have visited the kingdom during Ramadan.

The Afghan President Hamid Karzai, uncertain of US support in the forthcoming national elections, is said to be prepared for direct dialogue with the insurgent leadership. Officials close to him claim there is also growing concern that the US military offensive, with its prospect of a rising toll of civilian casualties, would hinder prospect of a peace deal.

Abdul Hakim Mujahid, a former Taliban envoy in New York at the time of 9/11, was invited by Mr Karzai to return to Afghanistan and help organise the reconciliation process. In 2001 he conveyed the Bush administration's demands to Mullah Omar, that Osama bin Laden should be handed over. He was among those, including Mr Karzai's older brother Qayum, who took part in a meeting with representatives of the insurgents organised in Mecca last September by the Saudi King Abdullah.

Mr Mujahid said: "Prince Muqrin is an influential man and so his involvement in the negotiation process is very important. The talks he held here in Kabul were at the top level and the armed opposition groups on the other side also respect him. The appointment of Aghajan Mutasim by the resistance is also important because he had very good relations with the Saudis and also because it shows that some of the armed resistance is taking this seriously.

"The Saudi government is doing its best to get peace talks going but there may be big problems if the Americans carry out this big offensive in the wrong way. That kind of action will lead to anger and help those in the Taliban who do not believe in any kind of negotiations. So it is important that we start doing things before this offensive starts and the international community should try to persuade the US that there should be less military action and not more."

Mr Karzai has repeatedly complained that Afghan civilians have been wounded and killed in Nato air strikes. He recently sent a document to Nato outlining new "rules of engagement" which Nato officials say are "totally impractical" as they would directly interfere with the mandate for foreign forces in the country.

Diplomatic sources say Mr Karzai's recent pronouncements on welcoming back insurgents into the fold show his need to show he is a nationalist standing up to the West. He told the Afghan parliament last week: "Once again I call on all oppositions to return home without any fear, save the life of children and help rebuild their country."

Facing each other: The negotiators

Prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz Al Saud

Given the post of the head of Saudi intelligence service with the task of combating jihadist groups which had declared war on the kingdom. He played a part in establishing a reconciliation process under which a number of Saudis arrested on terrorism charges were rehabilitated. He also knew Osama bin Laden well and encouraged him to join the jihad against the Russians in
Afghanistan where the Yemeni-born Saudi set up al-Qa'ida. Although the Saudi government fell out with Bin Laden it has maintained contacts with militants and Prince Muqrin is said to have used these links to try to broker peace with the Afghan government.

Aghajan Mutasim

Became finance minister under the Taliban and, in that capacity, had extensive dealings with the Saudis who were bankrolling the Islamist regime. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001 and the battle of Tora Bora which saw Osama bin Laden and leading Taliban leaders escape to Pakistan, Mr Mutasim issued a statement saying: "We want to tell the people that the Taliban system is no more. They should not give donations in the name of the Taliban." Since then he had been living in Pakistan keeping a low profile before emerging recently as a key negotiator in the recent talks organised by the Saudis with whom he had maintained contacts through the years.