UPDATED: "Taliban": Well, They All Look the Same....

This week Josh Mull ("UJ"), both in his guest blog and in his comments, has offered valuable insight into the complexity of local groups and insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan. I've now discovered an analysis by Steve Hynd ("Cernig"), which I think is an excellent introduction to the political, economic, and social dimensions beyond the label "Taliban". It's reprinted below this report from Al Jazeera:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fWT1kqoeszI[/youtube] 

Taliban: What's in a Name?

Two years into the Iraq war, moderately well read Westerners already knew that the insurgency there wasn't monolithic. Honest reporting repeatedly made clear that Al Qaeda, Sunni militant groups of various varieties and Sadrists didn't see eye to eye and often worked at cross purposes even while all were hostile to America and its allies.

Yet after seven years in Afghanistan, the same cannot be said about Western knowledge of militants in the region. There's a big, amorphous mass called "The Taliban" which is in cahoots with Al Qaeda - and that's about as fine grained as it usually gets.


That was sufficient back in 2001. The American-led coalition invaded to engage Osama bin Laden's group and the Taliban's organized fighters and on the battlefield itself Afghans quickly sorted into those who were either Al Qeada or Taliban, or those who were against them.

But it doesn't cover the current complex situation at all well,which means the West's voters are at a disadvantage when it comes to understanding - and approving or disapproving - their leaders' plans. As Brandon Friedman, a former officer who served in Afghanistan, put it in a recent email:

Instead of fighting organized theocratic government forces and their foreign terrorist guests, we're now arrayed against a Tatooine-esque combination actual foreign terrorists, actual Taliban fighters from two different countries, narco-warlords jockeying for regional power and influence, regular warlords jockeying for regional power and influence, angry Afghan citizens who've grown weary of civilian casualties, angry Afghan civilians who've grown weary of foreign forces and their broken promises, regular Afghan citizens who side with the Taliban out of sheer necessity for survival, angry opium farmers, Pakistani agents, and, finally, the invisible blight of government corruption.

Reducing that complexity to a simple "Us and Them" formula hinders much of the debate about Afghanistan.

So it was pleasant to see, among coverage of recent US missile strikes, a report by Mark Mazzetti, David Sanger and Eric Schmidt of the New York Times which tried to explain the various flavors of Taliban, their motives and their aims. The piece highlighted the difference between the Taliban group that Pakistan is most interested in opposing, Baitullah Mehsud's Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and the network run by Jalaluddin Haqqani, which is believed responsible for the campaign against Western forces in Afghanistan.

The latter group thinks the former has no business attacking Pakistani security forces or the Pakistani government, pointing to a reciprocal tension between Pakistan and the US-led coalition in Afghanistan. While the Pakistani government is happy to do peace deals with Haqqani's network and less so with Mehsud's, the coalition is more likely to eventually do so with the latter. Meanwhile, Pakistani counter-terror efforts are always going to focus on Mehsud's groups - which isn't all that useful to the West.

We could do with more of this kind of reporting about the region. In particular, we could do with more differentiation on press reports of the four or five main current strains of Taliban of interest to Western efforts in the region. That's the plea recently made by Frederick Kagan, in a short article for the National Review Online reproduced at the American Enterprise Institute:

There is no such thing as "the Taliban" today. Many different groups with different leaders and aims call themselves "Taliban," and many more are called "Taliban" by their enemies. In addition to Mullah Omar's Taliban based in Pakistan and indigenous Taliban forces in Afghanistan, there is an indigenous Pakistani Taliban controlled by Baitullah Mehsud (this group is thought to have been responsible for assassinating Benazir Bhutto). Both are linked with al-Qaeda, and both are dangerous and determined. In other areas, however, "Taliban" groups are primarily disaffected tribesmen who find it more convenient to get help from the Taliban than from other sources.

In general terms, any group that calls itself "Taliban" is identifying itself as against the government in Kabul, the U.S., and U.S. allies. Our job is to understand which groups are truly dangerous, which are irreconcilable with our goals for Afghanistan--and which can be fractured or persuaded to rejoin the Afghan polity. We can't fight them all, and we can't negotiate with them all. Dropping the term "Taliban" and referring to specific groups instead would be a good way to start understanding who is really causing problems.

Mullah Omar's Taliban - the original Afghanistan-ruling Taliban - is nowadays more under the day-to-day direction of Mullah Bradar (or Brehadar), Omar's trusted chief of military operations but it still leans heavily towards the position of Jalaluddin Haqqani's Taliban, which has largely supplanted it as the pre-eminent force in Afghanistan. Both are based in Pakistan but mostly interested in attacking allied forces in Afghanistan and the Afghan government. As one prominent member of Omar's group told Asia Times reporter Syed Saleem Shahzad last September:

It is necessary to understand that there is a sea of difference between the people who call themselves the Pakistan Tehrik-i-Taliban [led by Mehsud] and the Taliban. We have nothing to do with them. In fact, we oppose the policies they adhere to against the Pakistani security forces.

We individually speak to all groups, whether they are Pakistanis, Kashmiris, Arabs, Uzbeks or whosoever, telling them not to create violence in Pakistan, especially in the name of the Taliban.

Journalists in the West could do worse than refer to veteran reporter Anand Gopal's incisive look at the various competing groups of militants in the region, which also include the resurgent Hizb-i-Islami of charismatic fundamentalist Hekmatyar, who like Haqqani used to be one of those favored by both CIA and ISI intelligence agencies. Gopal writes of a "rainbow coalition" arrayed against U.S. troops, which is "competing commanders with differing ideologies and strategies, who nonetheless agree on one essential goal: kicking out the foreigners."

As Brandon Freidman writes, it's tempting to default to the soundbite term "Taliban" when talking about all these groups and to thus treat them as if they were one monolithic structure. But a more nuanced debate is not only healthy in any democracy, it might pave the way for Western public acceptance of what every military commander has said must eventually happen if there is ever to be real peace - an accord with more moderate groups to reconcile them to mainstream Afghan and Pakistani politics.

Mr Obama's War: Latest from the Pakistan Insurgency

The Asia Times reports, in the aftermath of the local cease-fire between the Pakistani Governments and groups in the Northwest Frontier Provice:

A mujahideen shura (Shura Ittehad al-Mujahideen) council was formed this weekend due to the personal efforts of Sirajuddin Haqqani. His network is the most resourceful and strongest component of the Taliban-led Afghan resistance, and has long-standing links to Pakistan. Other members of the council include pro-Pakistan militants such as Moulvi Nazeer and Hafiz Gul Bahadur and, importantly, Pakistan Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, who has fought against Pakistani troops in the tribal areas.

The shura decided that the leaders would combine forces for a joint struggle against coalition forces in Afghanistan and end hostilities against Pakistan.

Mr Obama's War: US Special Forces Training Pakistani Units, US Military Pressing Pakistani Allies

Related Post: Josh Mull on "Mr Obama's War" in Afghanistan and Pakistan
Related Post: Ceasefire in NW Pakistan; More on US Drone Strikes
Related Post: Mr Obama's War - Expanding the Enemies in Pakistan

The New York Times reports this morning, from US military sources, "More than 70 United States military advisers and technical specialists are secretly working in Pakistan to help its armed forces battle Al Qaeda and the Taliban in the country’s lawless tribal areas."

The secret task force, overseen by US Central Command and Special Operations Command, was created last summer. The US military that the task force training and information from the CIA has helped a new Pakistani commando unit to kill or capture up to 60 militants, including at least five high-ranking commanders, since last July.

This, however, is only the headline story. Underneath is an effort by the US military to put pressure on Pakistan. The sources claim that the task force "was launched with the support of the Pakistani Government and military". However, the Pakistanis still are holding back from an all-out offensive against the insurgents:

The main commanders of the Pakistani Taliban, including its leader, Baitullah Mehsud, and its leader in the Swat region, Maulana Fazlullah, remain at large. And senior American military officials remain frustrated that they have been unable to persuade the chief of the Pakistani Army, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, to embrace serious counterinsurgency training for the army itself....
The American officials acknowledge that at the very moment when Washington most needs Pakistan’s help, the greater tensions between Pakistan and India since the terrorist attacks in Mumbai last November have made the Pakistani Army less willing to shift its attention to the Qaeda and Taliban threat.

It is no coincidence that Kayani is in Washington this week for the White House review on Afghanistan and Pakistan. He will be having direct meetings with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and the US Joint Chief of Staff.

Bottom line? Expect more US-backed attacks on the military front against the bad guys and expect more psychological warfare against any Pakistani officials who appear reluctant to get on with the campaign, either by holding back on the battlefield or by offering political concessions to the local "Taliban" groups.

Mr Obama's War: Ceasefire in NW Pakistan; More on US Drone Strikes

Today's Observer featured an excellent report by Jason Burke which contains some fairly significant developments in the Pakistan-Taliban-US relationship. According to Burke:

Taliban fighters and Pakistani government officials have agreed a controversial deal which will lead to a "permanent ceasefire" in the troubled northwestern Swat valley, threatening to create an outpost of militant rule and a terrorist haven only 100 miles from the capital, Islamabad.

Many are alarmed that the deal seemingly involves the reinstatement of sharia law in the region in exchange for peace, as well as at the possibility of the creation of a haven for pro-Taliban and/ or al-Qaeda militants.

Further in, there's an insight into the thinking behind the US drone strikes which, we learned this week, are being launched from bases inside Pakistan and which are likely to be "broadened in scope":

A list of 20 individuals was drawn up by the CIA and cleared with the Pakistani government in consultations last summer, despite public denials by Islamabad. Intensive strikes over recent months have pleased global intelligence services because they put al-Qaida "on the back foot", provoking damaging internal witch-hunts and forcing senior leaders to take time-consuming and demoralising security precautions.

Read the full article here.

Mr Obama's War: Expanding the Enemies in Pakistan

Saturday's New York Times offers confirmation that, even as he holds back from the full "surge" requested by the US military in Afghanistan, President Obama is happy to widen the battle across the Pakistan. Two missile strikes in the last week have been aimed not at Al Qa'eda or Afghan Taliban but Pakistani insurgents led by Baitullah Mehsud.

The distinction is important, especially as the media's easy label of "Taliban" across a number of religious groups obscured the distinction between Mehsud and Afghans in a Pakistan "sanctuary". The Bush Administration never authorised missile strikes against Mehsud's camps, even though, after his alleged ordering of the assassination of from Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, he was included on a list of opponents whom the CIA was authorised to capture or kill.

The Times notes that the expanded American operations are occurring even as the Pakistani Government is seeking cease-fires with Pakistani "Taliban" movements in the region, but it makes no connection between the American military effort and Pakistan's political initiative. Thus it is unclear whether the US strategy co-exists with Islamabad's effort, reaching accommodations with some local groups while striking at others, or whether it is in direct conflict with an effort to defuse tensions with insurgents. That key issue becomes even murkier in The Times' account:

According to one senior Pakistani official, Pakistan’s intelligence service on two occasions in recent months gave the United States detailed intelligence about Mr. Mehsud’s whereabouts, but said the United States had not acted on the information. Bush administration officials had charged that it was the Pakistanis who were reluctant to take on Mr. Mehsud and his network.

We are left with a footnote to watch: as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton holds a joint meeting on Thursday with Afghan and Pakistani foreign ministers, the head of the Pakistani Army, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, and the head of Pakistani military intelligence, Lieutenant General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, will meet Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Oh, yes, another little quibble with The Times story and, possibly, the Obama strategy. For The Times, the only consequences of the missile strikes are the death of 2a number of senior Qaeda figures". Nowhere does the article mention the tiny consideration that lobbing missiles at Mehsud and his followers might take out a few bystanders, as has repeatedly been the case in Afghanistan.

And, far from