Mr Obama's War: Gareth Porter on the Afghanistan "Mini-Surge"

Gareth Porter, who is emerging as the best observer of the US military manoeuvres on Iraq and Afghanistan, looks behind President Obama's eventual decision to approve only part of the 30,000 extra troops request by US commanders for the Afghan War (Porter says 17,000 sent; we put the figure at just over 20,000). While the President has apparently drawn the line with the military, Porter warns, "Obama now faces the prospect that the Joint Chiefs will renew their support for McKiernan's request for the remaining 13,000 troops next month." And he has an analogy which is just short of terrifying:

Both Obama's decision to agree to just over half of his field commander's request for additional troops and the broader strategic situation offer striking parallels with the decision by President Lyndon B. Johnson in April 1965 to approve 36,000 out of a 49,000 troop request for Vietnam.

 



'What is the End Game?': Why Obama Rejected a Bigger Surge in Afghanistan
Gareth Porter

President Barack Obama decided to approve only 17,000 of the 30,000 troops requested by Gen. David McKiernan, the top commander of U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan, and Gen. David Petraeus, the CENTCOM commander, after McKiernan was unable to tell him how they would be used, according to a White House source.

But Obama is likely to be pressured by McKiernan and the Joint Chiefs to approve the remaining 13,000 troops requested after the completion of an Afghanistan-Pakistan policy review next month.

Obama's decision to approve just over half the full troop request for Afghanistan recalls a similar decision by President Lyndon B. Johnson to approve only part of the request for U.S. troop deployments in a parallel situation in the Vietnam War in April 1965 at a comparable stage of that war. Johnson reluctantly went along with the request for additional troops within weeks under pressure from both the field commander and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The request for 30,000 additional troops, which would bring the U.S. troop level in Afghanistan to more than 60,000, had been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as by Defense Secretary Robert Gates before Obama's inauguration. A front-page story in the Washington Post Jan. 13 reported that Obama was ready to "sign off" on the deployment request.

On Jan. 30 Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, said between 20,000 and 30,000 more troops would "probably" be sent to Afghanistan and the figure would "tend toward the higher number of those two."

But on Feb. 9, Mullen indicated that the Pentagon would soon announce that three brigades, or about 16,000 troops, would be deployed to Afghanistan in the coming months.

What had changed in the nine days between those two statements, according to a White House source, was that Obama had called McKiernan directly and asked how he planned to use the 30,000 troops, but got no coherent answer to the question.

It was after that conversation that Obama withdrew his support for the full request.

The unsatisfactory response from McKiernan had been preceded by another military non-answer to an Obama question. At his meeting with Gates and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon Jan. 28, Obama asked the Joint Chiefs, "What is the end game?" in Afghanistan, and was told, "Frankly, we don't have one," according to a Feb. 4 report by NBC News Pentagon correspondent Jim Miklaszewski.

Obama had also learned by early February that earlier assurances from Petraeus of an accord with Kyrygistan on use of the base at Manas had been premature, and that the U.S. ability to supply troops in Afghanistan would be dependent on political accommodations with Russia and Iran.

The rationale from the military leadership for doubling the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, even without a strategy or a concept of how the war could end, had been to "buy time" for an effort to build up Afghan security forces, as indicated by Mullen's Jan. 30 remarks.

The 17,000 troops, on the other hand, presented the upper limit of what Obama had pledged to add in Afghanistan during the campaign, according to Lawrence Korb of the Center for American Progress, who was an adviser to Obama.

Korb told IPS that Obama's decision not to wait until the key strategic questions were clarified before sending any more troops was based on the belief that he had to signal both Afghans and Pakistanis that the United States was not getting out of Afghanistan, according to Korb. "There are a lot of people in both countries hedging their bets," said Korb.

McKiernan reminded reporters Wednesday that the 17,000 troops represent only about two-thirds of the number of troops he has requested. That complaint suggested that he had been given no assurance that the remainder of the troops would be approved after the policy review.

The Wall Street Journal quoted an administration official Wednesday as saying that the troop authorization addresses the "urgent near-term security needs on the ground," but "does not prejudge or limit the options of what the [Afghanistan] review may recommend when it's completed."

Obama may have become more wary of getting mired down in an unwinnable war in Afghanistan, despite his strong commitment to increasing troops to Afghanistan during the campaign.

Former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, on whom Obama has reportedly relied for advice on foreign policy, told Sam Stein of the Huffington Post Wednesday, "We have to decide more precisely what is the objective of our involvement. Because we are increasingly running the risk of getting bogged down both in Afghanistan and in Pakistan in pursuit of objectives which we are lacking the power to reach."

Brezinzski said the administration needed "very specific, narrow objectives".

Korb told IPS that the policy review will deal with political-diplomatic as well as military policy issues, including the option of seeking to incorporate at least elements of the insurgents into the government through negotiations. He recalled that Afghan President Hamid Karzai has been advocating negotiations with the Taliban for two years.

Both Obama's decision to agree to just over half of his field commander's request for additional troops and the broader strategic situation offer striking parallels with the decision by President Lyndon B. Johnson in April 1965 to approve 36,000 out of a 49,000 troop request for Vietnam.

Johnson's decision, like Obama's, was made against a background of rapid deterioration in the security situation, worry that the war would soon be lost if more U.S. troops were not deployed, and an unresolved debate over how the troops would be employed in South Vietnam. Some of Johnson's advisers still favored a strategy of protecting the key population centers, whereas the field commander, Gen. William Westmoreland, was calling for a more aggressive strategy of seeking out enemy forces.

Another parallel between the two situations is high-level concern that too many U.S. troops would provoke anti-U.S. sentiment. That was the primary worry of some of Johnson's advisers about the effect of deploying three divisions in South Vietnam.

Similarly, Gates said Dec. 14 he would be "very concerned" about deploying more than the 30,000 troops requested by McKiernan, because, "At a certain point, we get such a big footprint, we begin to look like an occupier." Gates repeated that point in Congressional testimony Jan. 27, in which he again stressed the failure of the Soviet Union with 120,000 troops.

McKiernan, on the other hand, said Wednesday, "There's always an inclination to relate what we're doing with previous nations," he said, adding, "I think that's a very unhealthy comparison."

Johnson was worried about sliding into an open-ended commitment to a war that could not be won. But two months later he gave in, against his better judgment, to a request from Gen. William Westmoreland, the commander in Vietnam, for "urgent reinforcements". The escalation of the war continued for another two years.

Obama now faces the prospect that the Joint Chiefs will renew their support for McKiernan's request for the remaining 13,000 troops next month. And if the full 30,000 troop increase proves to be insufficient, he is likely to face further requests later on for "urgent reinforcements."

Mr Obama's War: US Special Forces Training Pakistani Units, US Military Pressing Pakistani Allies

Related Post: Josh Mull on "Mr Obama's War" in Afghanistan and Pakistan
Related Post: Ceasefire in NW Pakistan; More on US Drone Strikes
Related Post: Mr Obama's War - Expanding the Enemies in Pakistan

The New York Times reports this morning, from US military sources, "More than 70 United States military advisers and technical specialists are secretly working in Pakistan to help its armed forces battle Al Qaeda and the Taliban in the country’s lawless tribal areas."

The secret task force, overseen by US Central Command and Special Operations Command, was created last summer. The US military that the task force training and information from the CIA has helped a new Pakistani commando unit to kill or capture up to 60 militants, including at least five high-ranking commanders, since last July.

This, however, is only the headline story. Underneath is an effort by the US military to put pressure on Pakistan. The sources claim that the task force "was launched with the support of the Pakistani Government and military". However, the Pakistanis still are holding back from an all-out offensive against the insurgents:

The main commanders of the Pakistani Taliban, including its leader, Baitullah Mehsud, and its leader in the Swat region, Maulana Fazlullah, remain at large. And senior American military officials remain frustrated that they have been unable to persuade the chief of the Pakistani Army, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, to embrace serious counterinsurgency training for the army itself....
The American officials acknowledge that at the very moment when Washington most needs Pakistan’s help, the greater tensions between Pakistan and India since the terrorist attacks in Mumbai last November have made the Pakistani Army less willing to shift its attention to the Qaeda and Taliban threat.

It is no coincidence that Kayani is in Washington this week for the White House review on Afghanistan and Pakistan. He will be having direct meetings with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and the US Joint Chief of Staff.

Bottom line? Expect more US-backed attacks on the military front against the bad guys and expect more psychological warfare against any Pakistani officials who appear reluctant to get on with the campaign, either by holding back on the battlefield or by offering political concessions to the local "Taliban" groups.

Obama v. The Military (Part 39): The Latest on the Afghanistan "Surge"

The military's effort, supported by some officials in the Pentagon, to bounce President Obama into an immediate troop increase in Afghanistan is now approaching soap-opera status. Obama discussed the situation with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on Wednesday but no decisions were announced.



So in today's episode, "defence officials" have told The New York Times that Obama is "facing a choice on whether to grant commanders' requests" for up to 25,000 more soldiers and support units. They then offer the President a compromise: "Mr. Obama could choose a middle ground, deploying several thousand more troops there in the coming months but postponing a more difficult judgment on a much larger increase in personnel until after the administration completes a review of Afghanistan policy".

The compromise would be "one or two additional brigades", with 3500 in each brigade, rather than the three requested by the military. This would be in addition to a brigade which was deployed in eastern Afghanistan in January.

The Pentagon's campaign is now so blatant that its press secretary even went public with it yesterday. Geoff Morrell said Obama "“could make a decision about none, one, two or all of the brigades....However, there does need to be a decision made about a couple of brigades sooner rather than later if you want them on the ground in time to make a difference in the security situation for the national election in late August.”

The White House response to the military's latest push? Stonewall. Just as Obama has spun out the process with an inter-agency review to be headed by Bruce Riedel (the Obama Presidential campaign's advisor on South Asia), so his unnamed spokesmen are ruling nothing in, ruling nothing out:

Several administration officials said it was also possible — though less likely — that [Obama] could postpone any deployments until after his review was complete....It is also possible that Mr. Obama will fill the request for all three brigades, administration officials said.

Today's Obamameter: The Latest in US Foreign Policy (5 February)

Latest Post: The Latest on (Possible) US-Iran Talks

Current Obamameter: Gloomy ("What is the Exit Strategy? Frankly, We Don't Have One.")

9:05 p.m. The situation in Iraq is fluid as election returns come in, but it looks like the US has dodged one immediate problem from the outcome.

The final Anbar province results were satisfactory for Awakening Councils leader Ahmed Abu Risha, who had previously threatened action over the outcome (see 4 p.m.). The secular group al-Mutlaq, which had a narrow lead in the final count, is dissatisfied it did not have a greater margin, but it has agreed to work with the Awakening Councils, which worked with the US military in the "surge" of 2007/8.

That, however, leaves the potential problem in Baghdad, where Sunnis have won only a small number of seats.

9 p.m. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is not sounding very optimistic about the prospects of changing the Kyrgyzstan decision on closure of the US airbase:

It is regrettable that this is under consideration by the government of Kyrgyzstan. We hope to have further discussions with them. We will proceed in a very effective manner no matter what the outcome of the Kyrgyzstan government's deliberations might be.

4 p.m.Early confirmed returns from the Iraqi provincial elections point to substantial success for the Daw'a Party of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The corollary, which has not been noted in the mainstream media so far, is that Sunni political parties have been almost shut out in Baghdad. Marc Lynch has an excellent reading of this.

This Baghdad situation should be linked to the paradox that local Sunni groups, whom the US built up in their vaunted "Awakening Movement", have been the losers outside Baghdad. Some of those groups, who are alleging they were beaten by voter fraud, are now threatening confrontation with the al-Maliki Government.

Much, much on this in an analysis tomorrow.

3:30 p.m. US diplomatic sources, amidst the setbacks with supply routes in Pakistan and Kyrgyzstan, are playing up a likely deal with Uzbekistan, linked to existing deals with Russia and Kazakhstan, for transport to Afghanistan.

But you may want to read the small print: the transport is of "non-lethal, non-military supplies". Fine, if you're throwing C-rations at the Taliban bad guys, not so good if you need ammo.

1:30 p.m. And while we're considering Russian moves....If Russia is prepared to trade support for Iran for US concessions on missile defence and nuclear forces, it's ensuring that it has a very big bargaining chief. The head of the Russian state nuclear corporation has said that Russia will start up a nuclear reactor at Iran's Bushehr plant by the end of 2009.

1:20 p.m. An important parallel story to the Russian-backed Kyrgystan closure of the US airbase. Russian President Dmitri Medvedev has announced a Collective Security Treaty Organization including Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

The step is more evidence that while Russia is happy to deal with the Obama Administration on general security matters, especially over missile defense, it is now moving to re-establish its political and military position in Central Asia.

1:15 p.m. A suicide bomber has killed at least 12 people in an attack on a restaurant in Diyala province, 100 miles north of Baghdad. A roadside bomb in Baghdad targeted the Deputy Trade Minister, but he was unharmed.

10:30 a.m. The New York Times finally catches up with the story of the closure of the US airbase in Kyrgyzstan. Lots of useful information, but the most significant, somewhat hidden revelation is that --- less than a month after Genius/General David Petraeus had assured Washington that a deal had been wrapped up to extend the lease on the airbase --- the US will look for alternatives for the Afghan supply effort:

A senior State Department official said that negotiations with Kyrgyzstan over the base had been halted and that the alternatives under consideration included bases in Europe and the Persian Gulf, as well as a possible expansion of existing bases in Afghanistan.

Another alternative is to treat the Kyrgyz decision as horse-trading, with Moscow and Washington in a bidding war. The State Department official said, "“Once we evaluate what this is really worth to us, we’ll talk to them about money.” The US pays Kyrgyzstan more than $150 million in assistance and compensation each year, but "only a portion of that money went directly to the Kyrgyz government" (and here I'm not going to use the words bribe, backhander, kickback, etc.).

10 a.m. Jean Mackenzie at GlobalPost.com offers an incisive analysis on the looming political crisis in Afghanistan:

His term officially expires May 22, and the law states that elections should be held 30 to 60 days before the end of the president's tenure. Given the difficulties of voter registration, elections cannot take place before Aug. 20. But the parliament, which stands in bitter opposition to Karzai, has threatened to withhold recognition of his administration once his mandate is up.

9:30 a.m. Following President Obama's reassurances yesterday that he would not be pursuing economic protectionism, the US Senate weakened the "Buy American" clause in the economic stimulus package, stating that it would not override existing international treaties. On the other hand, the Senate rejected an amendment by John McCain to remove the clause altogether.

8:15 a.m. We've posted our latest reading of possible informal talks between US and Iranian officials this weekend.

Morning Update (6 a.m. GMT; 1 a.m. Washington): With US attention focused on domestic issues, notably the fate of the Obama economic stimulus package, the main developments in foreign policy are behind the scenes.

Afghanistan is still the site for major Administration battles. NBC News followed up on the story of the Joint Chiefs of Staff report, for an increase of up to 25,000 troops by summer and a shift of non-military activities to others, to be pressed on President Obama. Its killer line, however, came in an admission by a military official, "What is the end game? Frankly, we don't have one."

Afghanistan: The US Military to Obama - Make a Decision Now; Obama to Military - No

Throughout yesterday afternoon, the military leaks to the media and the Pentagon public statements began to fill the in-box. Several officials began putting out the story that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would soon give a secret report to President Obama. This would advise the President "to focus on ensuring regional stability and eliminating Taliban and Al Qaida safe havens in Pakistan, rather than on achieving lasting democracy and a thriving Afghan economy".



This recommendation in one respect is a smokescreen. As we noted when Secretary of Defense Robert Gates spoke in the same vein before Congressional committees last week, the US has always sought "regional stability" in Afghanistan, even if it hasn't done very well in achieving it.

Much more important, when you decode, are these demands in the recommendations. Continue the airstrikes in Pakistan, whatever the domestic political cost. Let others worry about Afghan "democracy" and the "economy", i.e., the US will concentrate on military efforts rather than nation-building.

And, Mr President, immediately approve our request in full for more troops to Afghanistan: one brigade already sent, three more in the next weeks, a fifth in the summer.

Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell wrapped all of this up in a lot of jargon for reporters yesterday:

There needs to be established a baseline of security. We need to reverse the trend that we are seeing in some parts of the country in terms of a deteriorating security situation. That is accepted as the foundation on whatever the president decides to develop in terms of a further strategy.

Meanwhile, the White House is countering the military by leaking its own evaluation. In an article in today's Washington Post, Administration officials set out a 60-day timeframe for a decision, tied to the 3 April NATO summit. And they are making that it is Obama who is the Decider, not the Joint Chiefs of Staff or Secretary of Defense Gates:

The president . . . wants to hear from the uniformed leadership and civilian advisers as to what the situation is and their thoughts as to the way forward. But he has also given pretty direct guidance.

Just in case you missed that signal, the article shouts it out later:

Officials described Obama's overall approach to what the administration calls "Af-Pak" as a refusal to be rushed, using words such as "rigor" and "restraint." "We know we're going to get [criticism] for taking our time," said a senior official.

And there is even a clear hint that Obama is not on the same page as the Gates-military emphasis on Pakistan as a safe haven for Afghan operations:

Senior administration officials described their approach to Pakistan -- as a major U.S. partner under serious threat of internal collapse -- as fundamentally different from the Bush administration's focus on the country as a Taliban and al-Qaeda "platform" for attacks in Afghanistan and beyond.