Mr Obama's War: Expanding the Enemies in Pakistan

Saturday's New York Times offers confirmation that, even as he holds back from the full "surge" requested by the US military in Afghanistan, President Obama is happy to widen the battle across the Pakistan. Two missile strikes in the last week have been aimed not at Al Qa'eda or Afghan Taliban but Pakistani insurgents led by Baitullah Mehsud.

The distinction is important, especially as the media's easy label of "Taliban" across a number of religious groups obscured the distinction between Mehsud and Afghans in a Pakistan "sanctuary". The Bush Administration never authorised missile strikes against Mehsud's camps, even though, after his alleged ordering of the assassination of from Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, he was included on a list of opponents whom the CIA was authorised to capture or kill.

The Times notes that the expanded American operations are occurring even as the Pakistani Government is seeking cease-fires with Pakistani "Taliban" movements in the region, but it makes no connection between the American military effort and Pakistan's political initiative. Thus it is unclear whether the US strategy co-exists with Islamabad's effort, reaching accommodations with some local groups while striking at others, or whether it is in direct conflict with an effort to defuse tensions with insurgents. That key issue becomes even murkier in The Times' account:

According to one senior Pakistani official, Pakistan’s intelligence service on two occasions in recent months gave the United States detailed intelligence about Mr. Mehsud’s whereabouts, but said the United States had not acted on the information. Bush administration officials had charged that it was the Pakistanis who were reluctant to take on Mr. Mehsud and his network.

We are left with a footnote to watch: as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton holds a joint meeting on Thursday with Afghan and Pakistani foreign ministers, the head of the Pakistani Army, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, and the head of Pakistani military intelligence, Lieutenant General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, will meet Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Oh, yes, another little quibble with The Times story and, possibly, the Obama strategy. For The Times, the only consequences of the missile strikes are the death of 2a number of senior Qaeda figures". Nowhere does the article mention the tiny consideration that lobbing missiles at Mehsud and his followers might take out a few bystanders, as has repeatedly been the case in Afghanistan.

And, far from

Comments

[UJ]

Excellent analysis but...come on now...Obama is "happy" to expand the war in Pakistan? How could you possibly know something like that? Maybe he was outraged or furious to expand the war.

I agree with you that "the media" does often misuse the term "Taliban," but US Military literature as well as relevant trade/industry publications are quite specific about the differences between Big T Taliban, that is the Afghan Omar-led insurgency and al-Qa'eda militants, and little t taliban, or the Pakistani (Haqqani, Mehsud, etc) insurgency and tribal militants. As long as we're picking at the mainstream press, they also like to lump in everyone from Jundallah to the Baloch National Democratic Party as "Taliban," so really, what are we hoping for from them?

You said: "Thus it is unclear whether the US strategy co-exists with Islamabad’s effort, reaching accommodations with some local groups while striking at others, or whether it is in direct conflict with an effort to defuse tensions with insurgents."

The synergy of these two strategies becomes a bit more clear with the inclusion of more data.

For instance, describing one strategy as "Islamabad’s effort, reaching accommodations with some local groups while striking at others" is a bit misleading. For one thing, the specific machinations of "Islamabad" have to be made apparent. The Pakistani Military is in charge, and it uses the popularly elected civilian government as a credible tool for diplomatic negotiations with insurgent/militant factions throughout Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kashmir, and India. This alone tells us that the strategy is much broader in scope than simply Afghanistan, or even the Global War on Terror, but it also helps clarify the second part of the statement, "reaching accommodations with some local groups while striking at others."

Since we're clear that the entire Pakistani National Security strategy is based on relations with "some" militants and hostility to "others," let's focus exclusively on Pakistan's small t taliban. Since 2002, the Pakistani government has been striking deals with the militants. Each time, the violence increases, and the US and Pakistani military are forced to crack down. What's absent from your analysis is that each time the US and Pakistani military crack down, including the recent drone strikes against Mehsud ordered by President Obama, they come with much more international credibility and political legitimacy.

Domestically, the Pakistani military was seen as brutal and thuggish bullies for invading the tribal areas unilaterally. Once they cooperated with the insurgents, and the Pakistani civilian population was rewarded with bloody kidnappings and suicide bombings, public demand for a violent crack down was solidified. The international community is also given a stark moral choice: live with the human rights black hole of Sharia Law or provide more support to the effort to quash the insurgency. Even President Obama was able to openly campaign on promises of increased violence against Pakistani insurgents on the foundation of failed Pakistani government truces and increased Afghan attacks, and he was rewarded with a 9+ million vote mandate from the American electorate.

Thus we have an answer to your final question, whether or not these strategies are "in direct conflict with an effort to defuse tensions with insurgents." The answer is yes, these strategies are directly opposed to any effort to "defuse tensions with insurgents," and for that matter, it has never been anyone relevant's stated goal to defuse tensions with the militants. Instead, what we are witnessing is a long-term, wide-ranging strategy of creating international legitimacy and political credibility for an escalation of violence by the US, Pakistan, and NATO against religious and tribal insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

[Scott Lucas]

UJ,

Thanks for a superb analysis, making important corrections. I'm catching up with the latest --- see Mike Dunn's piece on NW Pakistan and the airstrikes and our update on US Special Forces training Pakistan units, but hope that we can later post a fuller, more coherent analysis that will do justice to your points.

S.