Thursday
Jun112009
Iran: A Preview of Tomorrow's Presidential Election
Thursday, June 11, 2009 at 16:08
Related Post: Iran Elections - Will the Results Be Accepted by All?
Related Post: Iran Elections - Mousavi on US/Israel, Nuclear Programme, Dress Code
Related Post: Iran's Election - Summary of Ahmadinejad's Final TV Message (10 June)
In Enduring America on 12 February, Chris Emery evaluated the announcement of former President Mohammad Khatami that he would stand in June's election. He wrote, "[It is] an error...to link Khatami’s entry to the tentative prospect of normalised relations between Iran and the US," and focused on internal dynamics of Iranian politics: "It had been widely reported that Khatami would not run if former Prime Minister Mir-Hussein Mousavi chose to....So all Iranian eyes will now watch if Mousavi, another popular reformist, is now the one to withdraw."
Three months later, and 24 hours before Iranians cast their votes in the first round of the Presidential election, I read Chris' piece with pride. He was half-right on the issue of the potential challenger to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad --- it was Khatami who withdrew, leaving Mousavi in the race --- but months before many "Western" journalists and analysts noticed the campaign or dismissed it out-of-hand (only yesterday Thomas Friedman cast it aside as a "pretend election"), Chris saw its significance. This would not be a procession for the re-election of Ahmadinejad or a charade for Supreme Leader Khamenei to hand-pick a winner but a political space for Iranians to consider their political and economic present and future. Equally important, he got to the core of the issues that would shape the outcome: "It will be over presidential legacies and broken promises."
Yet, with respect, not even Chris could forecast how dynamic --- and potentially important --- this campaign has become.
From the moment that the field of major candidates was settled in March --- Ahmadinejad, Mousavi, former Revolutionary Guards commander Mohsen Rezaei, and former Speaker of the Parliament Mehdi Karroubi --- it was clear that the President faced a very real challenge. Two words should have made this clear: The Economy.
When he took office in 2005, Ahmadinejad promised an uplift of Iran's people, especially its poorer people, through distribution
of state revenues and advances in technology, investment, and production. Generally speaking, that has not happened. There have been repeated conflicts between the President and his leading economic ministers and advisors, investment in key sectors has not progressed, and the over-reliance on oil income has tied re-distribution in part to the vagaries of the international market. (Of course, US-led sanctions have continued to constrict Iranian development, but these alone cannot account for Ahmadinejad's handling of the economy.)
Continuing difficulties do not doom the President. He still appears to retain a solid base of support amongst many voters who still the prospect of an improvement in their economic status, and Ahmadinejad --- normally a shrewd speaker and campaigner --- could overlay the power of his office with the appeal of nationalism. That in part explains why, far from US-Iranian relations and President Obama's "engagement", Ahmadinejad has ensured the appearance of Tehran as a front-line actor on the world stage, with setpieces such as his speech to the World Conference Against Racism and his recent summit with Afghan and Pakistani leaders. (It also probably explains in part why there have been high-profile test-firings of new Iranian missiles.)
However, as Ahmadinejad broadened the campaign beyond the economy, so did his opponents. Rezaei called for more accountability, Karroubi appealed for wider social rights, and Mousavi argued for meaningful change to ensure representation of and response to the populace's concerns. And, doing so, they (perhaps unexpectedly) opened the gates for an extraordinary escalation in the political process.
"Reform" has always accompanied the Islamic Revolution in its political discourse. President Khatami promised changes in his 1997 victory (and, arguably, was undone because he failed to deliver in his eight years in office). Ahmadinejad promoted reform in his surprise rise to the top in 2005. Lest it be forgotten, he ran as the outsider against the "establishment", defeating former President Hashemi Rafsanjani in the second round.
The convergence of economic concerns and repeated disappointment with the lack of political and social reform can lead to resignation that there will never be improvement. However, that convergence also carries the potential for moments of great change. (Forgive my one moment of a superficial jump from Iran to a "Western" analogy, but think USA 2008.) And, from my outsider's perspective, that moment may have occurred this year in Iran.
Symbolically, the catalyst appears to have been the Presidential Debates. The mere announcement that there would be, for the first time in Iran, head-to-head discussions between the four major candidates raised public interest. However, it was the second of the debates, between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi, that lit the touchpaper. Thousands of people came onto the streets to watch the big-screen broadcasts. Politics turned into political theatre as Ahmadinejad --- again trying to stay off the ground of the economic situation --- levelled charges of corruption against not only Mousavi but also former Presidents Khatami and Rafsanjani but impropriety against Mousavi's wife and, equally importantly, as Mousavi overcame initial nervousness to put an effective case against the President's four years in office.
What does it means tomorrow? Any prediction of a victor would be not only fool-hardy but premature. After all, this is only the first round of the election when, unless anyone captures an unlikely majority of the vote, four candidates are narrowed to the top two. (I really do not believe many Western journalists, in their simplified renditions of the campaign, have noticed this.)
Those top two --- although this should not diminish the efforts of Rezaei and Karroubi --- will probably be Ahmadinejad and Karroubi. So, once more on the narrow but important ground of the pragmatic, there will be assessments of whether Karroubi will endorse Mousavi and his voters will follow (probable) and whether Rezaei will express any second-round preference, publicly or privately (uncertain). Ahmadinejad will likely re-double his paradoxical effort to portray himself as the "outsider" running, after four years in office, against the corrupt establishment of political figures such as Rafsanjani, although this may be curbed by the increasing disquiet not only of many voters but also of politicians and clerics over the tactic. Mousavi will turn the President's tactic around, portraying Ahmadinejad as not only the insider but the leader who has frittered away his mandate, and the good of the Iranian people, since 2005.
But what will happen tomorrow and even in the second round does not capture the ongoing importance of these recent months.
On my visits to Iran, and afterwards in correspondence with friends and colleagues, I have learned about and been reminded often of the "third generation", those Iranians who came of age after the Islamic Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. Quite often, the third generation was characterised as detached from the Revolution, disillusioned, dissatisfied. In recent weeks, however, the third generation --- and more than a few other Iranians --- have been in rallies, on the streets (on Monday, there was the largest outside gathering in more than a decade), and, yes, even on Facebook with excitement and some expectation.
I don't know if this constitutes a "Gradual Revolution", another phrase that I have frequently heard. I certainly would not twist and misrepresent it with the politically-loaded "Velvet Revolution". But, again as an outsider, there has been an opening of debate and thus of political space which could be significant not just for this election but for years to come.
Put simply --- and anticipating Western headlines after Friday about "The Obama Effect" in Iran, about "moderates" v. "hard-liners", about reinforcement or downfall of an Axis running from Iran to Syria to Lebanon's Hezbollah to Palestine's hamas --- these events first and foremost are not about the US. They are not about a clash in the Middle East, in nuclear arsenals, between civilisations.
These events are about Iranians: their concerns, their hopes, their ideals. And, whatever the outcome tomorrow and in the second round, they should be respected as such.
Related Post: Iran Elections - Mousavi on US/Israel, Nuclear Programme, Dress Code
Related Post: Iran's Election - Summary of Ahmadinejad's Final TV Message (10 June)
In Enduring America on 12 February, Chris Emery evaluated the announcement of former President Mohammad Khatami that he would stand in June's election. He wrote, "[It is] an error...to link Khatami’s entry to the tentative prospect of normalised relations between Iran and the US," and focused on internal dynamics of Iranian politics: "It had been widely reported that Khatami would not run if former Prime Minister Mir-Hussein Mousavi chose to....So all Iranian eyes will now watch if Mousavi, another popular reformist, is now the one to withdraw."Three months later, and 24 hours before Iranians cast their votes in the first round of the Presidential election, I read Chris' piece with pride. He was half-right on the issue of the potential challenger to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad --- it was Khatami who withdrew, leaving Mousavi in the race --- but months before many "Western" journalists and analysts noticed the campaign or dismissed it out-of-hand (only yesterday Thomas Friedman cast it aside as a "pretend election"), Chris saw its significance. This would not be a procession for the re-election of Ahmadinejad or a charade for Supreme Leader Khamenei to hand-pick a winner but a political space for Iranians to consider their political and economic present and future. Equally important, he got to the core of the issues that would shape the outcome: "It will be over presidential legacies and broken promises."
Yet, with respect, not even Chris could forecast how dynamic --- and potentially important --- this campaign has become.
From the moment that the field of major candidates was settled in March --- Ahmadinejad, Mousavi, former Revolutionary Guards commander Mohsen Rezaei, and former Speaker of the Parliament Mehdi Karroubi --- it was clear that the President faced a very real challenge. Two words should have made this clear: The Economy.
When he took office in 2005, Ahmadinejad promised an uplift of Iran's people, especially its poorer people, through distribution
of state revenues and advances in technology, investment, and production. Generally speaking, that has not happened. There have been repeated conflicts between the President and his leading economic ministers and advisors, investment in key sectors has not progressed, and the over-reliance on oil income has tied re-distribution in part to the vagaries of the international market. (Of course, US-led sanctions have continued to constrict Iranian development, but these alone cannot account for Ahmadinejad's handling of the economy.)
Continuing difficulties do not doom the President. He still appears to retain a solid base of support amongst many voters who still the prospect of an improvement in their economic status, and Ahmadinejad --- normally a shrewd speaker and campaigner --- could overlay the power of his office with the appeal of nationalism. That in part explains why, far from US-Iranian relations and President Obama's "engagement", Ahmadinejad has ensured the appearance of Tehran as a front-line actor on the world stage, with setpieces such as his speech to the World Conference Against Racism and his recent summit with Afghan and Pakistani leaders. (It also probably explains in part why there have been high-profile test-firings of new Iranian missiles.)
However, as Ahmadinejad broadened the campaign beyond the economy, so did his opponents. Rezaei called for more accountability, Karroubi appealed for wider social rights, and Mousavi argued for meaningful change to ensure representation of and response to the populace's concerns. And, doing so, they (perhaps unexpectedly) opened the gates for an extraordinary escalation in the political process.
"Reform" has always accompanied the Islamic Revolution in its political discourse. President Khatami promised changes in his 1997 victory (and, arguably, was undone because he failed to deliver in his eight years in office). Ahmadinejad promoted reform in his surprise rise to the top in 2005. Lest it be forgotten, he ran as the outsider against the "establishment", defeating former President Hashemi Rafsanjani in the second round.
The convergence of economic concerns and repeated disappointment with the lack of political and social reform can lead to resignation that there will never be improvement. However, that convergence also carries the potential for moments of great change. (Forgive my one moment of a superficial jump from Iran to a "Western" analogy, but think USA 2008.) And, from my outsider's perspective, that moment may have occurred this year in Iran.
Symbolically, the catalyst appears to have been the Presidential Debates. The mere announcement that there would be, for the first time in Iran, head-to-head discussions between the four major candidates raised public interest. However, it was the second of the debates, between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi, that lit the touchpaper. Thousands of people came onto the streets to watch the big-screen broadcasts. Politics turned into political theatre as Ahmadinejad --- again trying to stay off the ground of the economic situation --- levelled charges of corruption against not only Mousavi but also former Presidents Khatami and Rafsanjani but impropriety against Mousavi's wife and, equally importantly, as Mousavi overcame initial nervousness to put an effective case against the President's four years in office.
What does it means tomorrow? Any prediction of a victor would be not only fool-hardy but premature. After all, this is only the first round of the election when, unless anyone captures an unlikely majority of the vote, four candidates are narrowed to the top two. (I really do not believe many Western journalists, in their simplified renditions of the campaign, have noticed this.)
Those top two --- although this should not diminish the efforts of Rezaei and Karroubi --- will probably be Ahmadinejad and Karroubi. So, once more on the narrow but important ground of the pragmatic, there will be assessments of whether Karroubi will endorse Mousavi and his voters will follow (probable) and whether Rezaei will express any second-round preference, publicly or privately (uncertain). Ahmadinejad will likely re-double his paradoxical effort to portray himself as the "outsider" running, after four years in office, against the corrupt establishment of political figures such as Rafsanjani, although this may be curbed by the increasing disquiet not only of many voters but also of politicians and clerics over the tactic. Mousavi will turn the President's tactic around, portraying Ahmadinejad as not only the insider but the leader who has frittered away his mandate, and the good of the Iranian people, since 2005.
But what will happen tomorrow and even in the second round does not capture the ongoing importance of these recent months.
On my visits to Iran, and afterwards in correspondence with friends and colleagues, I have learned about and been reminded often of the "third generation", those Iranians who came of age after the Islamic Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. Quite often, the third generation was characterised as detached from the Revolution, disillusioned, dissatisfied. In recent weeks, however, the third generation --- and more than a few other Iranians --- have been in rallies, on the streets (on Monday, there was the largest outside gathering in more than a decade), and, yes, even on Facebook with excitement and some expectation.
I don't know if this constitutes a "Gradual Revolution", another phrase that I have frequently heard. I certainly would not twist and misrepresent it with the politically-loaded "Velvet Revolution". But, again as an outsider, there has been an opening of debate and thus of political space which could be significant not just for this election but for years to come.
Put simply --- and anticipating Western headlines after Friday about "The Obama Effect" in Iran, about "moderates" v. "hard-liners", about reinforcement or downfall of an Axis running from Iran to Syria to Lebanon's Hezbollah to Palestine's hamas --- these events first and foremost are not about the US. They are not about a clash in the Middle East, in nuclear arsenals, between civilisations.
These events are about Iranians: their concerns, their hopes, their ideals. And, whatever the outcome tomorrow and in the second round, they should be respected as such.
Reader Comments (9)
Thanks for the kind comments, Scott.
I think the level of public engagement in this election is extraordinary-
possibly with no equivalent anywhere else in the world? It has been reported that an audience of 40 million watched the tv debates. That's not too far off the entire voting population (48 million according to Election Commission in Iran). Could this portend of a huge turnout- possibly even greater than the 80% that saw Khatami elected in 1997?
To put this in perspective, the Obama-McCain debates averaged a still
pretty healthy 57.4 million (US adult population approximately 230
million- 142 million registered voters). The eventual turnout was 61%.
Iran 2009
"Quite often, the third generation was characterised as detached from the Revolution, disillusioned, dissatisfied. In recent weeks, however, the third generation — and more than a few other Iranians — have been in rallies, on the streets (on Monday, there was the largest outside gathering in more than a decade), and, yes, even on Facebook with excitement and some expectation."
United States 2008
http://bit.ly/F35Nm
"It has long been said that our generation (18–30 year olds) don’t care and are apathetic about politics; however, this past Presidential campaign proven that notion to be false. In fact, young people have come out to vote in the primaries in record numbers and that is in large part because so many of them are excited about Barack Obama’s candidacy. In addition, these young voters aren’t simply voting -- they are also organizing, volunteering, knocking on doors, calling undecided voters and fundraising for the campaign as well."
But just so we don't get ahead of ourselves, I've got two words for ya: Ken Blackwell.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ken_Blackwell#Involvement_in_the_2004_U.S._Presidential_Election
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0432337/
Watch the IRGC.
UJ,
Points well taken but....
1. Ken Blackwell (thank goodness) is not in Tehran;
2. Chris Emery made the point, which I have seen repeated by good Iran analysts recently, that the Supreme Leader can live with any of the 4 candidates --- I also think that Ahmadinejad, beyond some tensions with Khamenei over his handling of economy and political affairs, may have hurt himself with the high-profile attacks on Rafsanjani;
3. It was notable that IRGC senior commander blatantly intervened this week for Ahmadinejad but I am not sure if that reflects an organised movement within and beyond IRGC to rig election for the current President.
S.
Scott,
I didn't mean to imply that the vote would be rigged. More just to float the notion that elections are actually very simple to tip, even in the face of a huge opposition movement. In the case of Iran, it's not hard to imagine that the IRGC might perceive a threat to the regime itself, not just its apparent ally Ahmadinejad. Even though they rally in support of a hand-picked candidate, massive crowds taking to the streets in the name of change and reform could easily become a nightmare for an autocrat like Khamenei. (Think Tiananmen Square 1989)
There is also the variable of the recent terror attacks in southern Iran. While I suspect these are just the last throes (sorry) of Abdolmalik Regi's militants attempting to prove to their former pay masters in Tel Aviv (and Washington and New Dehli...maybe) that they're still operationally capable, the combination of foreign terror and an immense populist movement could understandably freak out the folks tasked with protecting with the "revolution," however Khameini deems to define it.
We cannot underestimate the Iranians' fear of foreign interference, and neither can we blame them for it. Their country is founded on opposition to foreign control, and the history of US-backed "Velvet revolutions" doesn't do anything to calm those fears. It may not happen as simply as the IRGC stuffing ballot boxes, but they do have plenty of secret police and plenty of tanks, and from what we can tell from Baluchistan and Kurdistan, they're not shy about using them on their own people.
Personally, I don't think much of this, if any at all, will come to pass. However, having lived through the stolen election of 2000 and the (criminal?) shenanigans of 2004 here in the Land of the Free, you'll forgive me for being wary of less-than-open regimes like Iran. Sometimes even the internet and face paint aren't enough to win an election, y'dig? ;)
Rumours have been flying around of vote rigging- latest one was that soldiers were having their id cards taken off them. Also a "Fatwa" issued by
ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi which sanctions cheating in Friday’s presidential.
I think that rigging is a strong and very probably (hopefully) inaccurate statement. Perhaps some 'extra' help has been given to the president. For example the use of state funds for A'jad's campaign (which he was warned about). Yesterday, the state-run Iranian TV apparently gave Ahmadinejad twenty minutes of free air time for a speech, while offering one minute each to his three rivals.
Some reports that Khamenei quitely appointed Ali Akbar Nategh Nouri to supervise the elections- in response to Rafsanjani's unprecedented letter to the Supreme Leader (complaining about A's campaign). No idea if this is the case or not.
A very good source in Iran, however, told me that reports of rigging are grossly exaggerated and that Khamenei would be reconciled with whoever wins.
A'jad's attacks on Rafsanjani and Mousavi's previous record in govt (as President and PM respectively) were particularly unwise because they essentially insinuated that the govts of the 1980s and 1990s were corrupt. That basically amounts to saying the IRI was illegitimate at a time when Khamenei was president.
IRGC are amongst A's strongest supporters- I agree with Scott though. Interestingly, Rezae is a former head of the Guard and could draw some of their votes this time.
Chris/UJ,
Thanks to both of you. Signing off until tomorrow AM, but have just been in touch with some folks in Tehran. Much excitement and genuine hope that all will go well tomorrow....
S.
Nice to see that John Bolton is using this time to restate his disappointment that Israel didn't attack Iran during the Bush admin. Also heartening to see that apparently attacking Iran would pose very few problems to the West and may even persuade the Iranian people to embrace it. Of course, not one word on whether an attack could actually succeed in disabling the nuclear program...but rest assured; in any case, Iran's repercussions would be trifling.
This has to be the classic line:
"a strike accompanied by effective public diplomacy could well turn Iran's diverse population against an oppressive regime"
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124467678369503997.html
Chris,
Isn't Bolton Logic(TM) awesome? Bomb them and they'll love us! I want him to write a book on relationships. "First my wife was with another man, but then I beat the s**t out of her and she decided to marry me!"
Bolton is such an unqualified fool. Surely no one with any sense would appoint him so, say, a diplomatic post, or position of great responsibility (like, ambassador to the UN, to give a purely random example) because only a total idiot would do something like that.
And I see he was a senior member of the "American Enterprise Institute", which styles itself a "think tank". How is it that someone scarcely qualified to serve as village idiot, is one of the senior "thinkers" at AEI? Sounds more to me like a "can't think tank".