Sunday
Sep272009
Iran's Nukes: Did Gates Just Complicate the Obama Position?
Sunday, September 27, 2009 at 20:27
Transcripts: Secretary of Defense Gates on CNN, ABC
Iran’s Nuclear Program: Gary Sick on the US Approach after the “Secret Plant”
Iran’s “Secret” Nuclear Plant: Israel Jumps In
The Latest from Iran (27 September): Is There a Compromise Brewing?
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UPDATE 2035 GMT: The Los Angeles Times summarises Gates' appearance on ABC's This Week: noting that the unemployment rate is 40% among Iran's young people, he asserted that past economic sanctions "are having an impact" and said severe additional sanctions "would have the potential to bringing them to change their policies". The article also notes Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on CBS's Face the Nation: "World powers have learned more about how to effectively use sanctions in their recent effort to halt the nuclear and missile programs of North Korea."
Threatening to punish Iran's young people? Crippling the economic life of "ordinary" Iranians? I stand by my assessment below --- if Tehran does not make concessions at the 5+1 meeting, can the Obama Administration really cross the line of harsh across-the-board sanctions? And will that be a precipice not only for Iran's people but for the White House strategy, bringing confrontation rather than solution?
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates had a major set-piece interview on CNN today. While the most prominent issue will be US strategy in Afghanistan, he also spoke at least on Iran's nuclear programme. And while I can see his tactical path --- balancing tough talk on the "secret second plant" with the maintenance of a diplomatic track --- I think he may have cluttered it with excessive rhetoric.
Gates laid the criticism on thick and without reservation: "Certainly the intelligence people have no doubt that....this is an illicit nuclear facility, if only … because the Iranians kept it a secret.”
That conveniently throws out the complexity of Iran's position under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. (Tehran is relying on the provision of the NPT that it only needs to give six months' notice before uranium is placed in a plant.) And then Gates pushed his boat out, without supporting evidence, on the allegation of military intent: “If they wanted it for peaceful nuclear purposes, there's no reason to put it so deep underground, no reason to be deceptive about it, keep it a … secret for a protracted period of time.” (That ignores the perfectly logical explanation that Iran, wanting to protect enrichment capacity, would put a plant underground as protection against an airstrike. Its first plant, Natanz, is in open air.)
Gates at least did emphasize diplomatic efforts even though, in the standard sop to domestic hard-line opinion, he would not explicitly rule out military action:
So what's the problem with this balance between tough talk and a maintenance of engagement? If the rhetoric does not bring Iranian concessions but, to the contrary, pushes Tehran into resistance (and, at least for some inside Iran, justify that resistance), then the Obama Administration will find that its balance between pressure and engagement is more rather than less precarious. A good section of US domestic opinion will be baying for, at the least, a wide range of punishing economic sanctions, while the objective of Iran's cooperation on issues such as Afghanistan will be harder to meet.
Iran’s Nuclear Program: Gary Sick on the US Approach after the “Secret Plant”
Iran’s “Secret” Nuclear Plant: Israel Jumps In
The Latest from Iran (27 September): Is There a Compromise Brewing?
Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis
UPDATE 2035 GMT: The Los Angeles Times summarises Gates' appearance on ABC's This Week: noting that the unemployment rate is 40% among Iran's young people, he asserted that past economic sanctions "are having an impact" and said severe additional sanctions "would have the potential to bringing them to change their policies". The article also notes Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on CBS's Face the Nation: "World powers have learned more about how to effectively use sanctions in their recent effort to halt the nuclear and missile programs of North Korea."
Threatening to punish Iran's young people? Crippling the economic life of "ordinary" Iranians? I stand by my assessment below --- if Tehran does not make concessions at the 5+1 meeting, can the Obama Administration really cross the line of harsh across-the-board sanctions? And will that be a precipice not only for Iran's people but for the White House strategy, bringing confrontation rather than solution?
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates had a major set-piece interview on CNN today. While the most prominent issue will be US strategy in Afghanistan, he also spoke at least on Iran's nuclear programme. And while I can see his tactical path --- balancing tough talk on the "secret second plant" with the maintenance of a diplomatic track --- I think he may have cluttered it with excessive rhetoric.
Gates laid the criticism on thick and without reservation: "Certainly the intelligence people have no doubt that....this is an illicit nuclear facility, if only … because the Iranians kept it a secret.”
That conveniently throws out the complexity of Iran's position under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. (Tehran is relying on the provision of the NPT that it only needs to give six months' notice before uranium is placed in a plant.) And then Gates pushed his boat out, without supporting evidence, on the allegation of military intent: “If they wanted it for peaceful nuclear purposes, there's no reason to put it so deep underground, no reason to be deceptive about it, keep it a … secret for a protracted period of time.” (That ignores the perfectly logical explanation that Iran, wanting to protect enrichment capacity, would put a plant underground as protection against an airstrike. Its first plant, Natanz, is in open air.)
Gates at least did emphasize diplomatic efforts even though, in the standard sop to domestic hard-line opinion, he would not explicitly rule out military action:
The reality is, there is no military option that does anything more than buy time. The estimates are one to three years or so. And the only way you end up not having a nuclear-capable Iran is for the Iranian government to decide that their security is diminished by having those weapons, as opposed to strengthened. And so I think, as I say, while you don't take options off the table, I think there's still room left for diplomacy.
So what's the problem with this balance between tough talk and a maintenance of engagement? If the rhetoric does not bring Iranian concessions but, to the contrary, pushes Tehran into resistance (and, at least for some inside Iran, justify that resistance), then the Obama Administration will find that its balance between pressure and engagement is more rather than less precarious. A good section of US domestic opinion will be baying for, at the least, a wide range of punishing economic sanctions, while the objective of Iran's cooperation on issues such as Afghanistan will be harder to meet.
Reader Comments (2)
Scott,
I think you may be nit-picking Gates on the rhetoric. For instance, the bit about an underground facility being "illicit" because it's underground, ignoring the fact that the underground construction could be a precaution against air-strikes. If Gates had gone with your reasoning rather than his own, the effect would be exactly the same; Iran is up to no good in Qom. After all, if you're worried about something being blown up in an air-strike, it's probably not a secret underground medicine and baby food factory, it's something somebody would want to destroy, right?
Furthermore, Gates' statement regarding the "illicit" intent of the facility does fairly and accurately imply military intent. The Qom facility, hidden from the IAEA, is roughly the same size, and presumably the same output capacity, as the disclosed facility in Natanz. From that we can conclude that Iran was attempting to produce highly enriched uranium, sometimes referred to as weapons-grade uranium, in the same quantities as Natanz, only this time in secret. Who needs a bunch of secret HEU? Somebody building a weapon. You don't heat stoves with HEU.
But set that aside for a moment, I believe the rhetoric may be more harmonious if we pull back and examine Gates' appearance in the full context of the Sunday news show circuit. I think what we saw this week was a full-spectrum "show of force" by the Obama administration.
After a week of hateful diatribes from dictators at the UN, revelations of a secret Iranian nuclear facility, and an Iranian missile test, the Obama administration flooded the airwaves with officials and leaders known for their overt strength. We saw Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, Senators Feinstein, Webb and Kyl all displaying a face of calm and determination on national security, topped off with the "Big Dog" himself President Clinton demanding that everyone support the strong Obama, lest they be part of the weak right-wing conspiracy.
All of these folks are known for their strength in foreign policy and national security, at least as far as the American public is concerned. Whatever problem the public may fear, al-Qa'eda in Afghanistan, secret nukes in Iran, AIDS in Africa, even right wing extremists, the message this week was "it's OK, we have everything under control."
In that context, we might find that Gates' rhetoric not only didn't confuse the American position on the Iranian nuclear file, but was in fact entirely irrelevant. In other words, these appearances were not based on foreign policy or national security, they were completely political. It wasn't for the parsing and analysis of elites and observers, but for the raw consumption of average American citizens.
--UJ
UJ,
Iran's line will be that the enrichment plant is a back-up for "peaceful" enrichment at Natanz. That may or may not be true --- my concern is that the US Administration is playing judge and jury in advance of this week's talks, which I think is a risky strategy. The Qom facility at this point is far smaller than Natanz, which has capacity 60,000 centrifuges (vs. alleged 3000 at Qom). If there is a drive for highly-enriched uranium, Iran is still a good distance from capability, and Qom doesn't add much right now.
I think we agree on "show of force" (alongside Chris Emery on Obama's "aggressive engagement"). Washington Times article yesterday --- I hope to include it in an analysis later today or tomorrow --- indicates Administration was planning for nine months to reveal the "secret plant" at a point of maximum advantage for negotiations. My point is not to deny that but to question whether it's really the most effective approach.
S.