The Latest from Iran (30 September): Confusion

NEW Iran: Mousavi Meeting with Reformists (30 September)
Iran: Karroubi Letter to Rafsanjani (27 September)
NEW Video/Transcript: “Will Israel Attack Iran?”
Iran Top-Secret: The President’s Gmail Account
Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Obama Backs Himself into a Corner
UPDATED Iran: So What’s This “National Unity Plan”?


The Latest from Iran (29 September): The Forthcoming Test?

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2040 GMT: We now have an English translation of the Mousavi meeting with the reformists, posted in a separate entry.

1910 GMT: Parleman News has updated and extended its summary of the Mousavi meeting with reformist faction Imam Khomeini Line. The story reiterates the significant shift in Mousavi's approach that we have noted (1240 GMT, 1615 GMT, 1800 GMT).

1900 GMT: Overseas Mystery of Night. Why is Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki in Washington? I presume it's to visit the Smithsonian Institution and maybe the National Art Gallery, since the State Department denies he is seeing US officials.

The party line is that Mottaki, having been in New York for the United Nations meeting, is visiting the Iranian Interests Section at the Pakistan Embassy. No explanation, however, of what he has been doing in the several days after the UN gathering. (AP has an English summary.)

1815 GMT: Another Clue to the Plan? From Mehr News:

Grand Ayatollah Nasser Makarem Shirazi has called for the establishment of a committee comprised of MPs and other prominent national figures that would be tasked with attempting to end the political disputes in society.

“A committee comprised of MPs and certain elite people outside the Majlis should… create friendship between political groupings so that these disputes end. The continuation of these deputes is not in our country’s interests,” he told seminary students and religious figures at meeting in Qom on Wednesday.

1800 GMT: This.  Could. Be. Huge. Consider this extract from Mir Hossein Mousavi's statement to reformists, posted on the Facebook page linked to him: "Forming a new party cannot add to countries existing capacities, while strengthening the cores of the social movement will create new capacities and improve the movement."

Throughout the summer, Mousavi talked of forming a new political movement (he didn't call it a "party", since that would have to be licensed by Iranian authorities). Even in his recent promulgation of The Green Path of Hope as a "social movement", he implied that it would have a political role challenging the Ahmadinejad Government.

Now he has abandoned that approach, one presumes, because he has chosen to work with the Plan promoted by institutions within the system that he was challenging up to this week.

1615 GMT: Quiet afternoon but this further summary of Mousavi's message to reformists sets off a bell: "Today, national unity is of outmost importance."

Now, of course, all politicians are going to make calls for unity but does this mean that, whether or not a National Unity Plan has been agreed, Mousavi is going to work with an "establisment" committee for a political accommodation?

1300 GMT: The reformist Imam Khomeini Line, which met Mir Hossein Mousavi yesterday (see 1240 GMT), will also be meeting Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami. (But what about Karroubi?)

1254 GMT: The Movement Cannot Be Silenced. A reader kindly directs us to a blog by Persian Umpire on the spread of information inside Iran. Amidst interesting notes such as "BBC Persian is...gobbling up the Voice of America audience because of superior programming and better news coverage", the author sets out this important observation:

We see your tweets, pics, posts, leaks, walls, rumors, articles, flames, trolls, messages of support, slogans, comments, funnies, videos, and everything else you produce. Let us take Twitter which is actually an important source for us, especially for breaking news even if it is happening in Iran. Case in point: this week’s student protests. For those who do not have accounts, there are websites that broadcast the public tweets from any hashtag. Surprisingly some of these sites are not yet filtered. In cases where filtering is in place, we use proxies to get to this information. Also, there are RSS feed readers that we can use to get to your messages through web-based mail services and thus bypassing the filters in a different way. There is no way to block us in, other than cutting the internet altogether, and the government cannot do that easily as some of the crucial internal communications, such as banking, depends on it. If they ever decide to do this, it will take a campaign of outlawing and phasing out residential connections. Even in this case we still have internet at work, and in the end, long-distance dial-up. If I have to pay a $200 phone bill per month to read what you write, so be it.

He/she adds, "How does a minority crawling the nooks and crannies of the internet, let a majority know about it? Information gathered from websites is first disseminated through chat and email, and then word-of-mouth does what it does best."

1250 GMT: Nice to see that The New York Times hasn't been completely diverted by the nuclear issue. Nazila Fathi writes today about Tuesday's second set of universities protests, in particular the demonstrations at Sharif University.

1245 GMT: Reformist MP Darius Ghanbari has criticised the Parliamentary fact-finding committee for avoiding the issues of Kahrizak Prison and secret burials, as well as the points in Mehdi Karroubi's letter, in their unclassified report.

1240 GMT: The Plan in Action? Parleman News has published an account of a meeting between Mir Hossein Mousavi and the reformist Imam Khomeini Line. Mousavi's message? "Greens are now within the system."

1230 GMT: We've posted the English translation of Mehdi Karroubi's second letter to Hashemi Rafsanjani. To say it's critical is an understatement; Karroubi is calling out the former President for not backing demands for justice and reform.

1050 GMT: It is reported that leading reformist Saeed Hajjarian was released this morning from Evin Prison.

1045 GMT: Police representatives have announced that 10 officers have been arrested in connection with claims of detainee abuse at Kahrizak Prison.

1030 GMT: The intrigue on the "National Unity Plan" (see our separate entry) gets stranger. Fars claimed last night that Assembly of Experts member Ayatollah Haeri-Shirazi had denounced talk of a Plan being brought to the Assembly as a "lie". Haeri-Shirazi's office this morning issues a statement denying any such discussion. Fars News then brings out the transcript and the audio file of the conversation.

1000 GMT: Telling Half the Story. CNN splashes the headline, "IAEA: Iran broke law by not revealing nuclear facility", on an interview with the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohammad El Baradei. He says:

Iran was supposed to inform us on the day it was decided to construct the facility. They have not done that. They are saying that this was meant to be a back-up facility in case we were attacked and so they could not tell us earlier on.

Nonetheless, they have been on the wrong side of the law, you know in so far as informing the agency about the construction and as you have seen it, it has created concern in the international community.

Here, however, is the El Baradei comment that does not get a headline and only
a reference near the bottom of the article:

Whether they have done some weaponization studies as was claimed is still an outstanding issue. But I have not seen any credible evidence to suggest that Iran has an ongoing nuclear program today.

0900 GMT: Confirmation of reports from earlier this week: post-election detainee Alireza Eshraghi has been sentenced to 5 1/2 years in prison for acts against national security by "insulting the Supreme Leader and President" and attending illegal gatherings.

0830 GMT: One other report which emerged last night. The Iranian Government is still considering the temporary closure of universities because of "swine flu".

0820 GMT: A morning to re-assess what has happened in the last 24 hours, especially with the purported "National Unity Plan". Latest indications are that the plan, which emerged last night, is actually an early draft, so it raises more questions than answers. We've got up-to-the-minute analysis in a separate entry.

The other event on the radar is tomorrow's meeting between Iran and the "5+1" powers in Geneva on Tehran's nuclear programme. Media fury continues in the US, but the Obama Administration is now far more cautious in its statements. In particular, it appears that the American attempt to "negotiate from strength" through the sanctions threat is running into difficulties. We've got the latest in another entry.

Finally, for those who prefer the "real" story, Enduring America has gotten access to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's Gmail account.

Iran's Nukes: Did Gates Just Complicate the Obama Position?

Transcripts: Secretary of Defense Gates on CNN, ABC
Iran’s Nuclear Program: Gary Sick on the US Approach after the “Secret Plant”
Iran’s “Secret” Nuclear Plant: Israel Jumps In
The Latest from Iran (27 September): Is There a Compromise Brewing?

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UPDATE 2035 GMT: The Los Angeles Times summarises Gates' appearance on ABC's This Week: noting that the unemployment rate is 40% among Iran's young people, he asserted that past economic sanctions "are having an impact" and said severe additional sanctions "would have the potential to bringing them to change their policies". The article also notes Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on CBS's Face the Nation: "World powers have learned more about how to effectively use sanctions in their recent effort to halt the nuclear and missile programs of North Korea."

Threatening to punish Iran's young people? Crippling the economic life of "ordinary" Iranians? I stand by my assessment below --- if Tehran does not make concessions at the 5+1 meeting, can the Obama Administration really cross the line of harsh across-the-board sanctions? And will that be a precipice not only for Iran's people but for the White House strategy, bringing confrontation rather than solution?

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates had a major set-piece interview on CNN today. While the most prominent issue will be US strategy in Afghanistan, he also spoke at least on Iran's nuclear programme. And while I can see his tactical path --- balancing tough talk on the "secret second plant" with the maintenance of a diplomatic track --- I think he may have cluttered it with excessive rhetoric.



Gates laid the criticism on thick and without reservation: "Certainly the intelligence people have no doubt that....this is an illicit nuclear facility, if only … because the Iranians kept it a secret.”

That conveniently throws out the complexity of Iran's position under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. (Tehran is relying on the provision of the NPT that it only needs to give six months' notice before uranium is placed in a plant.) And then Gates pushed his boat out, without supporting evidence, on the allegation of military intent: “If they wanted it for peaceful nuclear purposes, there's no reason to put it so deep underground, no reason to be deceptive about it, keep it a … secret for a protracted period of time.” (That ignores the perfectly logical explanation that Iran, wanting to protect enrichment capacity, would put a plant underground as protection against an airstrike. Its first plant, Natanz, is in open air.)

Gates at least did emphasize diplomatic efforts even though, in the standard sop to domestic hard-line opinion, he would not explicitly rule out military action:

The reality is, there is no military option that does anything more than buy time. The estimates are one to three years or so. And the only way you end up not having a nuclear-capable Iran is for the Iranian government to decide that their security is diminished by having those weapons, as opposed to strengthened. And so I think, as I say, while you don't take options off the table, I think there's still room left for diplomacy.

So what's the problem with this balance between tough talk and a maintenance of engagement? If the rhetoric does not bring Iranian concessions but, to the contrary, pushes Tehran into resistance (and, at least for some inside Iran, justify that resistance), then the Obama Administration will find that its balance between pressure and engagement is more rather than less precarious. A good section of US domestic opinion will be baying for, at the least, a wide range of punishing economic sanctions, while the objective of Iran's cooperation on issues such as Afghanistan will be harder to meet.

Analysis: 'New' Washington Consensus on Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process!

The tripartite meeting between Israeli, Palestinian, and American delegations took place in New York on Tuesday, with the leaders of the three groups participating. This was the picture which signals a shift in the US apparoach towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict , from a step-by-step Road Map to an edited Washington version of a 2002 Saudi initiative based on wider issues and a regional context.

Yet Washington's "middle way" between the demands of Palestinians and Israelis is not new. The steps taken in the Obama Administration's Middle East foreign policy since last January were supposed to be clearer when the leaders of Israelis and Palestinians shook hands on Tuesday. But even this picture is incomplete, since the failure to include regional actors such as Syria, Iran, Lebanon and Iraq will undermine any effort on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

According to Washington, the final status agreement must come with continuing negotiations on other issues, especially on the Israeli halt of settlements in the West Bank. The formula is clear: the reassurance of the Palestinian side with the promised withdrawal of Israelis to pre-1967 war borders while reducing pressure on the Israeli side by moving the discourse of “total settlement freeze” to that of “restraining settlements activity” as the Israeli concede a nine-month freeze.



On Tuesday, U.S. President met with the Israeli delegation at first. Then, he talked to the Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas and his aides. Defense Minister Ehud Barak, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, National Security Council head Uzi Arad, US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Mitchell took part in the earlier bilateral Israeli-American meeting. At the end, the tripartite meeting finally was displayed.

"Permanent status negotiations must begin and begin soon. And more importantly, we must give those negotiations the opportunity to succeed," Obama said and added:

It is past time to talk about starting negotiations; it is time to move forward. It is time to show flexibility and common sense and sense of compromise that is necessary to achieve our goals... Leaders in the Middle East could not continue 'the same patterns, taking tentative steps forward, then taking steps back.'

For Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel achieved what it had wanted after the tripartite meeting. He said to reporters in New York:

There was general agreement, including on the part of the Palestinians, that the peace process has to be resumed as soon as possible with no preconditions... We had two good meetings, even very good, I would say – one with President Obama and his team and later with the Palestinian team. Although the importance of the meeting is in its existence, it was an ice-breaking meeting between people who have not worked with each other for months. It provides a possibility to change things in the future.

However, Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman was not as “positive” as his premier. He actually saw eye to eye with Abbas and said that "although the Palestinian side is saying it has no preconditions, it has all kinds of demands for moves in the West Bank." On the other hand, Netanyahu kept calm and came closer to Obama's diplomatic stance. He said:

They can raise the Jerusalem issue and we'll present our stance... In the joint meeting with Abu Mazen (Abbas) I told him that 'there is no use in insisting on these matters. Let's move forward.'

Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas did not mention Netanyahu's 'talks without any preconditions' and reiterated that Israel had to leave all occupied lands and stop construction in Israeli settlements in the West Bank. He said:

In today's meetings we confirmed our positions and commitment to the road map and its implementation. We also demanded that the Israeli side fulfill its commitments on settlements, including on natural growth.

As for resuming talks, this depends on a definition of the negotiating process that means basing them on recognizing the need to withdraw to the 1967 borders and ending the occupation, as was discussed with the previous Israeli government when we defined the occupied territories as the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem.

This was reiterated in the talks with President Obama and in the trilateral talks. We believe the American administration will review the positions of the two sides in the coming weeks to make it possible for us to renew peace talks based on our stated position.

At the end of the tripartite meeting, we can say that the political discourses of each disputed party has not changed. For Israel, the following negotiations will continue without any Palestinian pre-conditions and for Palestinians, there will be no agreement without the withdrawal of Israeli existence and without a full halt to settlement construction. Lastly, and more importantly, for the Obama Administration, the process is likely to be a middle way: Guaranteeing Palestinians the full withdrawal of Israeli soldiers from the occupied lands and the Israeli halt to settlement freeze under Israeli authorization in the course of time; all of which to be mentioned in the final status agreement whereas confirming Israeli temporary freeze in settlements which is to come closer to a total halt in the course of time in return of Arab concessions in the name of normalization with Israel. So, all parties look like they have taken from the meeting now.

George Mitchell's answer to a question on whether the Obama Administration had skipped the settlement freeze focus and moved straight to final status issue tipped off the US position:

We have always made clear that they are means to an end, the end being the re-launching of negotiations on permanent status in a context in which there is a reasonable prospect for a successful conclusion to those negotiations... So there is absolutely no change in our focus.

However, this new version of Saudi Initiative in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is just a part of the Obama Administration's policy in the region. This middle-way solution can only work with new developments in US and Israeli relations with Iran, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. The follow-up period, so sensitive to any regional development, is more significant than the plans of the Obama Administration on paper. Therefore, right after the tripartite meeting, Obama said he is watching the process closely and the U.S. Mideast special envoy George Mitchell would meet with Israeli and Palestinian negotiators next week, adding that he had asked his secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, to report back to him on the status of the talks in October. For now, the Obama Administration has consolidated its position vis-a-vis Palestinians and Israelis. But, that is only for now....

Brzezinski: Grand Strategy and Shooting Down Israel's Jets Over Iraq

In an interview with the Daily Beast's Gerald Posner, Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former national security adviser to U.S. President Jimmy Carter, said on Sunday that President Obama's scrapping missile defense was the right thing to do. The George W. Bush Administration's defense missile shield project had been based on "a nonexistent defense technology, designed against a nonexistent threat".

This, however, become an irrelevance next to Brzezinski's more provocative assertion: Washington has to shoot down Israeli jets over Iraqi airspace if they are en route to attack Iran. This would be an example of US assertiveness to ensure the success of engagement with Tehran and Middle Eastern states. It would be a marker of a "strong strategy" backed-up with decisiveness, lacking in US foreign policy.

Transcript:

Is the Obama administration decision to end the missile-defense program the right one?

Well, let me first of all say that my view on this subject for the last two years has been that the Bush missile-shield proposal was based on a nonexistent defense technology, designed against a nonexistent threat, and designed to protect West Europeans, who weren’t asking for the protection.

Does scrapping the missile program weaken our defense options in Europe vis-à-vis the Russians?

Not at all. What is left is militarily sounder. It gives the U.S. more options while still enhancing America’s ability to develop more effective defense systems, which is what the Russians really dislike. But now they have less of an excuse to bitch about it.

What about the way we informed our allies of our decision?

The way it was conveyed to the Czechs and Poles could not have been worse. It involved [laughs] waking up the Czech prime minster after midnight with a sudden phone call from President Obama. The Polish prime minister was at least allowed to sleep late. But as far as Poland was concerned, unfortunately, poor staff work did not alert the United States that today, September 17, is a particularly painful anniversary for Poland. In 1939, the Poles were still fighting the Germans when on September 17 the Russians stabbed them in the back. To the Poles, that is something very painful. And since they misconstrued—and I emphasize the word “misconstrue”—that the missile shield somehow strengthened their relationship with the U.S. when it comes to Russia, it was immediately suggestive of the notion of a sellout. It’s the wrong conclusion, but in politics, even wrong conclusions have to be anticipated.

How is it possible that the State Department did not bring up the sensitivity of this day to the Poles?

Lousy staff work. Period. I don’t know who precisely to point the finger at. It was obviously not anticipated in this case.

There are some pundits who believe that by abandoning the missile-defense program, we will gain the help of Russia when it comes to arm-twisting Iran over its nuclear weapons program. Anything to that?

I doubt it. The Russians have their own interests in Iran, which are far more complex than the simplistic notion that the Russians want to help us with Iran. The Russians have a complicated agenda with Iran. They also know in the back of their heads that if worse came to worse—and I am not saying they are deliberately promoting the worst—but if worse came to worse, which is an American-Iranian military collision, who would pay the highest price for that? First, America, whose success in ending the Cold War the Russians still bitterly resent. And we would also pay a high price in Iraq, Afghanistan, and massively so with regards to the price of oil. Second, who would suffer the most? The Chinese, who the Russians view as a long-range threat and of whom they are very envious, because the Chinese get much more of their oil from the Middle East than we do, and the skyrocketing price would hurt them even more than us. Third, who would then be totally dependent on the Russians? The West Europeans. And fourth, who would cash in like crazy? The Kremlin.

Is the fallout as bad if Israel preemptively strikes Iran?

Absolutely. That is the way, more importantly, how the Iranians would view it. They really can’t do much to the Israelis, despite all their bluster. The only thing they can do is unify themselves, especially nationalistically, to rally against us, and the mullahs might even think of it as a blessing.

How aggressive can Obama be in insisting to the Israelis that a military strike might be in America’s worst interest?

We are not exactly impotent little babies. They have to fly over our airspace in Iraq. Are we just going to sit there and watch?

What if they fly over anyway?

Well, we have to be serious about denying them that right. That means a denial where you aren’t just saying it. If they fly over, you go up and confront them. They have the choice of turning back or not. No one wishes for this but it could be a Liberty in reverse. [Israeli jet fighters and torpedo boats attacked the USS Liberty in international waters, off the Sinai Peninsula, during the Six-Day War in 1967. Israel later claimed the ship was the object of friendly fire.]

Did it surprise you that it took the Obama administration so long to do away with the missile-defense program? Is he setting firm lines that can’t be crossed, such as with Iran and Israel?

Well, Obama has been very impressive in refining our policy toward the world on a lot of issues, very impressive. But he has been relatively much less impressive in the follow-through.

You mean his policy sounds ideal but the follow-up isn’t good?

Not as precise, clear-cut, and forthcoming as would be desirable.

What would you like have seen already from this administration?

By now we should have been able to formulate a clearer posture on what we are prepared to do to promote a Palestinian-Israeli peace. Simply giving a frequent-traveler ticket to George Mitchell is not the same thing as policy. It took a long time to get going on Iran, but there is an excuse there, the Iranian domestic mess. And we are now eight months into the administration, and I would have thought by now we could have formulated a strategy that we would have considered “our” strategy for dealing with Iran and Pakistan. For example, the Carter administration, which is sometimes mocked, by now had in motion a policy of disarmament with the Russians, which the Russians didn’t like, but eventually bought; it had started a policy of normalization with the Chinese; it rammed through the Panama Canal treaty; and it was moving very, very openly toward an Israeli-Arab political peace initiative.

Where did the impetus come from in the Carter administration, and why aren’t we seeing it with Obama?

There was a closer connection between desire and execution. Also the president was not as deeply embroiled, and buffeted, by a very broad, and commendable and ambitious domestic program as President Obama is. I think the Republican onslaught to the president, the wavering of some Democrats, has vastly complicated not only his choices in foreign affairs, but even limited the amount of attention he can give to them.

Is there truth that the more issues he is embroiled in, the less he can act?

I don’t think it’s the number of issues; it’s how decisively a president acts. A president, in his first year, is at the peak of his popularity, and if he acts decisively, even if some oppose him, most will rally around him, out of patriotism, out of opportunism, out of loyalty, out of the crowd instinct, just a variety of human motives.

Some in the Obama administration have told me that it’s only just over half a year, and we are jumping to too early conclusions about anything. Are the early months more critical than other times in an administration?

The first year is decisive. How much you can set in motion the first year sets the tone for much of the rest of the term. In part, that’s because all these things take more than one year to complete. But the point is you want to have a dynamic start that carries momentum with it.

President Carter early on ran into strong opposition from American-based pro-Israeli lobbying groups that opposed the administration’s ideas for a peace initiative in the Middle East. What lesson should the Obama administration learn in formulating its own approach to an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue?

The lesson is if you are forthright in what you are seeking, you tend to mobilize support within the Jewish community. Because a majority of American Jews are liberal, and in the long run they know that peace in the Middle East is absolutely essential to Israel’s long-term survival.

Are you concerned about Afghanistan?

Quite unintentionally, but potentially and tragically, we are sliding into a posture which is beginning—and I emphasize the word “beginning”—to be reminiscent of what happened to the Soviets.

We have plenty of time to reverse course?

There is some time to reverse course. But time flies.

The Afghanistan Routine (Again): Obama Cautious, Military Insistent, 25,000 More Troops Sent

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Enduring America, 5 September: "Obama history is only repeating itself....A period of intense debate with US commanders pushing for as big a troop increase as possible, and Obama’s advisors spinning back to limit the escalation....The immediate culmination, with a “compromise” of an additional 30,000 American forces (complementing a rise in private “security” units and contractors). You will find it justified by the rhetoric that we must fight Al Qa’eda and extremists in Afghanistan so they will not terrorise us “here” and supported by the promise that this is a combination of non-military and military steps to bring stability and progress to the Afghan people."

UPDATED 1545 GMT: Washington chatter is buzzing about the initial source of today's "McChrystal: More Forces or 'Mission Failure'" story, Bob Woodward of the Washington Post. The pillow fight will be over whether Woodward was right to run with a report leaked to him by a Government insider.

All this will miss the point. Woodward, the reporter of Watergate fame, has become Rent-a-Journalist for whichever side in the Government wants to turn the wind their way on a story. So this summer he was the outlet for the Obama Administration's insistence that they would ask, "WTF [What the F***]?" on any demand for a troop increase. This time he could be serving those who want to push the military's case for the boost or Administration insiders who want to uphold the line that they will not be bumped.

Doesn't really matter. In the end, we'll get to the settlement which will give the military what it wants while allowing Obama advisors to preserve the image that they have kept a lid on the escalation.


I really can't be bothered to spill a lot of words on the latest development in US strategy towards Afghanistan. Why bother to go through 400+ pages of a supposed mystery when you've seen the "surprise" ending in the final paragraphs? President Obama plays the cautious line, in his media blitz yesterday (here and here and here), of no decision taken yet but tips his hand with the rhetoric of "Must Fight Al Qa'eda". His military, just to make the President isn't so cautious that he might actually rule against them in the purported review of strategy, ensure that high-profile US outlets like The New York Times carry the message today, "General [McChrystal, the top US commander in Afghanistan] Calls for More U.S. Troops to Avoid Afghan Failure". The White House undoubtedly will put out its response, for tomorrow's newspapers, that discussions continue under the eye of a President wanting to make sure all dimensions are considered.

And sometime in the next month or two, the "compromise" will be announced of 25,000 more US troops to Afghanistan.

Please, it's bad enough being depressed about this spin cycle. At least don't bore me with repetition.