Iran's Political Confusion: Khamenei, Ahmadinejad, and the Nuclear Agreement

Latest from Iran (26 October): After the Fair

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This short, little-noticed story may be important in more than one way.

Yesterday, speaking to an association of engineers, Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Reza Bahonar declared:

Presently, the Supreme National Security Council and the Supreme Leader emphasize that our strategic policies are based on the absence of negotiations with the United States.That is why we will not have any direct negotiations with the United States.....The conditions for such negotiations must emerge, which have not as yet emerged.

With those three sentences, Bahonar attempted to sweep away both the current talks on Iran's nuclear programme and the concept of "engagement" with Washington. The immediate effect, if his words were heeded, would be Tehran's refusal --- after last week's Vienna discussions and the original deadline of last Friday --- to accept the proposal for "third-party enrichment".

That alone would let the conflict genie out of the diplomatic bottle, with the Obama Administration backed into a corner to set aside talks for harsher economic sanctions. That's pretty big, but it is still not as big as the internal outcome. Bahonar may be the messenger not only for a blow against engagement, but also a smack-down of President Ahmadinejad

Last week, when Bahonar came out against the nuclear discussions, we downplayed his remarks, seeing him as a bystander. When Speaker of the Parliament jumped in with his criticisms of Vienna, however, we raised an eyebrow: was this Ayatollah Khamenei's signal that he was drawing a line across engagement?

Bahonar's latest public declaration indicates, "Yes". And with that Yes comes an even bigger turn of the Iranian political wheel: is the Supreme Leader challenging not only engagement but his own President's authority?

If the signals continue, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has a decision to make. He either defies Ayatollah Khamenei for the sake of his foreign policy, but this risks a showdown with the leader of the Iranian system. On the other hand, if he accepts the Supreme Leader's veto, ensuring a renewed diplomatic isolation for Iran.

More importantly, if Ahmadinejad bows down, he risks unveiling the conditional footing of his own legitimacy. For almost five months, he has fought --- with much more success than we initially predicted --- to establish his position not only against the Green opposition but against the Supreme Leader. He gave way in the dispute over First Vice President Rahim-Mashai, only to bring his ally back into the Government as Chief of Staff, and he made an aggressive move to control of the Ministry of Intelligence. Against doubts within the establishment, Ahmadinejad got Khamenei's approval for his Inauguration and the Supreme Leader's intervention for Parliamentary endorsement of his Cabinet.

Now all that might be unsettled.

In one sense, this is business as usual. The Supreme Leader is the nominal Number One in the Islamic Republic, and that is especially pertinent on issues of Iran's foreign policy and national security.

But this business as usual comes in a most unusual situation. Those not so fond of Ahmadinejad, both outside and inside the political establishment, will see this as a cutting-back of the President's autonomy. And that trimming opens up political space for others to stake their own positions.

Your move, Mahmoud.

Comments

[observer]

does this look like a good cop/bad cop move?
AJ would score brownie points with the West by attempting to do a deal but the SL would shoot it down. The result : no deals but creating the hope in the Western governments that AJ is attempting to engage and needs more of their support, therefore watering down the new sanctions.

[ange paris]

Don't worry; they will deal and I am sure; this is the iranian "loossbazi", a kind of game belonging only to them; they want to show off how powerful they are !!!

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[whereismyvote]

The theater is at play again. This is for internal and external consumption that there is a rift and a debate between the SL and AN and that these issues are ripping the regime apart. Externally, the Americans will be emboldened by the theory that engagement has resulted in the ripping apart of the establishments unity. Internally the theater is supposed to engage the people and shift focus from the 5 months rift. Showing that the AN government may fail, is supposed to keep the people off the streets and give them the hope that change will happen.....

Obama may be forced to eat up some heat, but then the Iranians will follow with their own proposal that will be able to keep the discussion going. It will all take a few months...
@ Ange Paris;
Loossbazi is one way of calling it, but a more accurate way is "Eshfeh chogondary".... Either way such a sad state of affairs...

[scott harrop]

Scott, perhaps there's more room for confusion here in that we have different accounts of what Bahonar actually said, and that's before we get to the apparent confusion of how important his remarks are -- and if (as you seem to be suggesting) he speaks for Khamenei. For starters, here's the ILNA version of Bahonar quotes: (as translated today by OpenSourceCenter)

"Sometimes some members of the country's executive and government officials say that the time has now come to hold official negotiations with the US. However, the Supreme National Security Council's approval and the leader's consent are needed for such a thing. None of the country's branches of power and political and legal figures have the right to overlook such a thing.

The MP reiterated that the Islamic Republic of Iran's policy is not to officially negotiate with the US, and stressed: The necessary conditions have to be set for such negotiations. But as far as we are concerned, such a thing hasn't happened yet."

Interesting he brings up SNSC -- which as far as I know, Kharrazi still chairs, and Velayati still plays key role thereon, vis-a-vis Khamenei. (no?) SNSC surely reports directly to Khamenei, and they've been quite "behind the scenes lately." Yet surely they've been very much involved in the calculus behind Iran's response to 5+1, which was forming long before the elections, -- and mostly likely also to Soltanieh's statements and efforts at IAEA.

Correct me if I've misunderstood you, but are you suggesting that somehow Ahmadinejad/Soltanieh at IAEA has been free-lancing it? Or are you talking about something else? Also, are you suggesting a revamped version of KS's misleading contention that Khamenei somehow needs to have bad relations with the US for internal politics?

[Scott Lucas]

Scott,

Thanks for a really challenging post. I have to admit at this point that I don't have any answers but a lot of questions, both about the standard version that the Supreme Leader, through the SNSC, has been supervising Iran's nuclear strategy, and the alternative of an emerging initiative being set and developed by Ahmadinejad and advisors such as Jalili and Soltanieh.

Part of this has to do with a major gap in the key story that Iran made the approach to the IAEA in June for an enrichment deal to keep the medical research reactor going. Who in the Iranian system made that decision?

But part of this has to do with how the negotiations have unfolded since then. Why, given that there was a clear path in September towards engagement leading up to Geneva at the start of October and then Vienna, pull the rug out now? That doesn't strike as a well-coordinated policy and there was no "Western" action that merits such a shift (if anything, I think US has been very conciliatory in allowing process to play out beyond the artificial deadline of last Friday).

I come back to speculation --- and it is speculation --- that this is sign of an Iranian system in tension and possibly one that is fragmenting. Part of this may be because Khamenei has been impaired by health, limiting his recent action but conversely pushing him to assert assert authority at this key point, whatever his current state of fitness. Part of this may be because Ahmadinejad testing how far he could assert his own power of policy- and decisionmaking. Part of it could be because Bahonar and Larijani are not only reflecting Supreme Leader's wishes but a Parliament which feels it is being slighted.

What I think can be said, however much of this speculation is on the mark, is that an Iranian path to engagement which seemed certain --- if hedged with the standard conditions of bureaucracy and diplomatic game-playing --- is now far from so.

S.

[JCC]

Scott, Saeed Jalili is the Secretary of SNSC.

[Scott Lucas]

JCC,

I appreciate that but I think it is far too straightforward to say Jalili is just acting for SNSC (and thus for Supreme Leader), for example, in his role at Geneva at start of this month. Consider: Jalili at that meeting spoke 1-on-1 with Burns about the enrichment deal. He returns to Tehran, as Iran proceeds with Vienna technical talks:

1. Now, did SNSC (and Khamenei) mandate Jalili to push ahead with engagement at that point but, for some reason, pulled back from that position in subsequent three weeks?

2. Or when Jalili went to Geneva was he acting for a policy decision that went beyond SNSC?

S.

[Kevin Scott]

I appreciate the well thought-out theories above suggesting that Ahmadinejad and Khamenei are orchestrating something, whether it is the good cop/bad cop scenario, the "manufactured rift" scenario, or something else. And clearly they aren't *beyond* orchestrating things; the best working theory of the election results is that it was a Khamenei & Ahmadi joint effort. However, I just don't see enough evidence yet to justify such a conclusion. Larijani and Bahonar's comments may be coordinated with the Supreme Leader, and they may not.

But primary in my mind is the fact that if you look at all the information that has come in so far, this looks more sloppy than 'coordinated plan', or 'coordinated disagreement'. It just "feels" to me like various players in the Iranian system, already under stress, and rubbed raw from the last few months, are not quite on the same page as each other. Just my hunch - I'm willing to adjust this view if more evidence comes in opposing it.

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