Iran's Nuclear Programme: The US Strategy

UPDATE 2100 GMT: Sometimes I wonder if a psychiatrist should just diagnose schizophrenia in the patient called the US Administration. Earlier today, we cited one "senior official" who said the US did not see an imminent threat from Tehran because of technical issues in its nuclear program. David Broder of The Washington Post, however, has a different "private" view from another official: "A senior administration official, dining with a small group of reporters two weeks ago, say that in his judgment, within a year to 18 months, after the diplomats have played out their hands at the United Nations, we will face a showdown with Iran."

Perhaps the two views can be reconciled with "no war now, maybe war later", but my impression is that yet again we have an Administration at war with itself over whether to talk to Iran or beat it over the head.

***

EA has learned that one of the Obama administration's most senior officials dealing with the Iran nuclear issue revealed the core of the US strategy at a private gathering in Washington this week.



Officially the US is still interested in the talks for "third-party enrichment" of Iran's uranium. However, Washington assessed that Iran has been able to enrich enough uranium since the autumn discussions that the amount being considered is superfluous. Washington, therefore, is less eager to pursue the deal.

(I find the statement somewhat curious, as the advantages of a deal are as much political --- getting an easing of US-Iran relations --- as they are technical. I sense there may be broader reasons for Washington's stall on talks.)

While pointing to Iran's enrichment of uranium, the official said Washington believes the "nuclear clock has slowed down significantly" because of technical difficulties in the enrichment program. (I suspect this may refer to the limitations on Iran's centrifuges.)

Therefore, the official said, "We have more time before the Israelis feel the need to take action."

(Some observers believe that comment indicates a tacit understanding in the administration that Israel will eventually reach the point of action and the U.S. will not stand in its way. My own reading is that the statement tries to take the heat out of the "Israeli dimension" by indicating there is no imminent threat to the Israelis from a militarised nuclear programme in Tehran.)

Comments

[Thomas]

Scott,

A technical question: When does Iran need to have the 20% Uranium on hand so medical radiation therapies will not be distrupted?

[Robert M. Armstrong]

The administration's tacit understanding may be Israel will do what Israel will do and the United States can neither control or punish her. We will simply be left to clean up the mess.

[Catherine]

Gary Sick has praise for this news summary by Glenn Kessler of the Washington Post, calling it "a sober, sensible and non-hysterical presentation of what I regard as the reality of US-Iranian relations." Sick continues: "He quotes a series of expert observers, all of whom I know and respect, instead of the usual litany of anonymous sources who leak their bits of sensationalistic “news” in promotion of their own unspoken agendas. These get breathless play — like the latest David Sanger revelation (and gross misinterpretation) of a memo from Secretary of Defense Gates, splashed across the front page of the New York Times".

Le voila:
Even as momentum for Iran sanctions grows, containment seems only viable option
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/21/AR2010042105043.html

[Catherine]

I don't think the Obama admin ever intended to use the nuclear fuel swap deal as a first step towards a "grand bargain"or any kind of broader strategic deal with Iran, whereas it seems that AN and his club *did* want to use it for this purpose. The US wanted to start a ball rolling that they hoped would lead to Iran ending its enrichment of uranium. Conversely, before the face-to-face meetings in Geneva, Iran had set out a number of issues it wanted to discuss with the US that were anything but that.

The US realises that there's no way they're going to achieve their objective by pressing on with the swap deal, so they're canning it. Imo this is a short-sighted waste of the opportunity to pursue an engagement that could also address post-election concerns regarding human rights issues as well as the mutual interests they share and the longstanding points of contention that divide them.

[Catherine]

Two companion pieces on Israel striking Iran and Iran striking back:

How short is the Iran fuse?
Uri Avnery (Dateline Jerusalem)

7 April 2010,
Hold me back! is a part of Israeli folklore. It reminds us of our childhood. When a boy has a scuffle with a bigger and stronger boy, he pretends that he is going to attack him any moment and shouts to the spectators: “Hold me back, or I am going to kill him!” Israel is now in such a situation. We pretend that we are going to attack Iran at any moment and shout to the entire world: “Hold us back or…”

And the world does indeed hold us back. It is dangerous to prophesy in such matters, especially when we are dealing with people not all of whom are wise and not all of whom are sane. Yet I am ready to maintain: there is no possibility whatsoever that the government of Israel will send the air force to 
attack Iran.
More: http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle08.asp?xfile=data/opinion/2010/April/opinion_April41.xml&section=opinion

How Likely is an Iranian Nuclear Counterstrike?
April 6th, 2010
Jamsheed K. Choksy

A preemptive attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities by the U.S., Israel, or both nations has been on the table for quite some time. Yet because Iran has at least a dozen centers related to its nuclear activities, demolishing the program would be extremely difficult. None the less, there is no dearth of war game scenarios by think tanks, universities, government departments, even magazines in the U.S. and Israel. ......
Yet there is a far more devastating scenario that needs to be given much greater consideration. Iran could retaliate by actively or tacitly providing low enriched uranium (LEU) to militant and terrorists groups that are targeting the U.S., E.U., and Israel.
More: http://www.insideiran.org/news/how-likely-is-an-iranian-nuclear-counterstrike/

[James]

Iran is not a threat. Nor is it capable of being a threat for probably 2-3 years. Or more. Having nuclear power generation is great. Making sufficiently enriched (89.4% or greater) Uranium for a fission bomb (or for some very uneducated pundits, a fission trigger) will take a significant chunk of that time in itself.

Putting that to one side, we then need to compare Iran to the other 'rogue state', North Korea, and reflect on the fact that despite two decades of development from significantly more advanced Chinese and Soviet plans, they still haven't been able to build a rocket, let alone hone their miniaturisation technology to the level required in order to put said 'bomb' (which is probably about the size of a house, hence all the underground tests away from prying eyes) - atop said rocket or other delivery vehicle.

This brings us back to Iran, who don't have a hope of creating said rocket, and therefore would need to produce either a suitcase-nuke for terrorist delivery abroad or similar (is this starting to sound like Tom Clancy yet?). Alternatively they could try and mount something sufficiently resilient on to one of their aging strike fighters, most of which however are outdated and lacking the spare parts needed to make them mission ready anyway.

All a pre-emptive strike (non-nuclear, naturally, the Americans need to justify Raytheon's contracts) will do is to kill more innocent civilians.

[Scott Lucas]

Thomas,

I have seen varying estimates of when Iran would run out of fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. Most see a critical point by mid-2011.

S.

[Megan]

James,

What makes think that Islamic Republic would rely only on its own capabilities in making highly enriched uranium? Why do you not enter into your analysis the possibility that Islamic Republic could and would purchase 99.4% enriched uranium in the black market? Islamic Republic certainly has enough dough, the motivation and desire to do so. And there plenty of places in the world and enough profiteers to oblige.

Did you hear or read the AP report about the seizure of highly enriched uranium in Georgia? http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/04/21/ap/national/main6419298.shtml?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+CBSNewsGamecore+(GameCore%3A+CBSnews.com)

[James]

Megan,

I did not place your point into the equation simply because I was basing my argument upon facts and reasonable estimations of Iran's nuclear and military capabilities. Whilst I'm sure there are 'black markets' for weapons in the world, I am not sure if any would allow the trade or purchase of nuclear materials in a post-911 world. Even more volatile nuclear states such as Pakistan and Israel are likely heavily monitored by the US and similarly capable countries whose best interests are served by keeping such materials behind lock and key. Back in the 1990s, sure - Libya for example with its shady Gas Centrifuge aquisition - But to suggest its even feasible to trade such materials nowadays is broaching on sheer fiction.

As for Georgia, if you read to the end of that particular article, it states very clearly that the amount being offered by the gang was miniscule, whether merely a sample of a larger quantity as the Guardian reports: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/13/nuclear-summit-georgia-uranium-plot or not. Then you have the fact that it was found in Georgia, a country so desperate to make itself look capable in the shadow of Russia that said 'plot' could very well just be an elaborate hoax to improve its growing relationship with NATO.

I'd also question whether Iran has the motivation or desire to acquire uranium from abroad if it has a domestic alternative; given a number of factors, but most importantly for its own security. If Iranian officials or individuals suspected to be sponsored by Iran were caught handling nuclear materials abroad, not only would it shatter the public façade of peaceful power generation ambitions, but it might necessitate a pre-emptive strike from the West (or indeed the West South West). Neither of which a very isolated and technological resource-limited country such as Iran can afford.

[Catherine]

Earlier this week I saw an interesting interview by Riz Khan with Flynt Leverett and Abbas Milani in which they were asked: Has the Obama administration changed its tone toward Iran and will a more hard-line approach deter Tehran from its nuclear programme?

Both had imo pretty reasonable things to say about sanctions and engagement, but some sparks did fly when the Green Movement was mentioned ;-)
This video is now up on AJE's site: http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/rizkhan/2010/04/201042193343169237.html

[Thomas]

Scott,

Thanks, I was under the assumption that it would be this summer or fall.