Iran Analysis: 4 June "The Day the Regime Will Regret" (Verde)

Mr Verde writes for EA:

When the history of this post-election conflict is written, the events of Friday, 4 June 2010, may be as significant as last year’s Qods Day and Ashura. They may be even more important.

The regime is trying to pretend that there is no crisis of confidence/legitimacy and that the post-election protests are over. But last Friday, at what was supposed to be the commemoration of Ayatollah Khomeini's death, President Ahmadinejad was still talking about last year’s elections and the Supreme Leader was still threatening former (and possibly even current) regime officials –-- this time with execution. Seyed Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of the Ayatollah, was shouted down during his speech.

Events like the 4 June commemorations are planned well in advance, tightly controlled, and well-choreographed. We can therefore dismiss with great confidence any suggestion that the hecklers were ordinary people acting in the moment. They were thugs organized by regime officials.

Whatever the true intentions of the organizers,these events have and will continue to damage Ayatollah Khamenei. The reason?

There are two possibilities: either the thugs were organized on the order of Khamenei, or the heckling was carried out without his permission.

If Khamenei was kept out of the loop, then he is losing his grip on the Islamic Republic. When a group of regime thugs can barrack Hassan Khomeini with impunity right in front of the Supreme Leader and the world media, when Khamenei cannot even control his audience for a few minutes during an important ceremony. how can one expect him to have control over the actions of other regime officials? (Which, looking backward, raises the question: how can the Supreme Leader claim so confidently that there was no fraud during the June 2009 elections?)

If the thugs were carrying out Khamenei’s orders, then the Islamic Republic is gripped by such a dangerous crisis that its highest official is forced to sacrifice the reputation of his regime in an attempt to embarrass and humiliate another regime insider. If this is the case, then Khamenei’s warm embrace of Hassan Khomeini after the latter’s abandoned speech also points to the nasty, duplicitous personality of the Supreme Leader.

In either case, the events of 4 June have provided a rallying point for Khamenei’s detractors within the regime –-- whose numbers, by the way, seem to be growing by the week. It not only Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, but alsoother reformists and even principlists like Ali Motahari have used these events as an excuse to criticise Khamenei personally.

If the intention of the regime's show on 4 June was to weaken the opponents of Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, the scheme appears to have backfired.

One may argue that the Supreme Leader is trying to wipe out any reference to Ayatollah Khomeini and replace Khomeini’s legacy with his own. The problem is that, since last June, Khamenei’s reputation as a religious and political leader has been damaged. He has not been able to make repairs and all high-profile regime manoeuvres, including last Friday, have brought more damage.

Let’s not forget that the June ceremonies were cut back from 3 days to 1 day this year; despite all the preparations the numbers attending were far less than what he regime had claimed and hoped for; 15 Khordaad (5 June), the day which marks the beginning of the uprising in the 1960s that eventually led to the 1979 Revolution, was completely forgotten this year.

Ayatollah Khomeini is the main pillar of the Islamic Republic. The regime owes its existence to him, and all of its officials claim his approval for their ideas and actions. doing. His burial site, where the 4 June ceremonies were taking place, is similar to the shrines of Shia Imams. The failure of regime officials to capitalise on this --– and by their actions disrespecting his memory –-- points to serious problems within the Islamic Republic.

In February, I mentioned that, because of the crisis in the Islamic Republic, the regime will be forced into display that will come back and haunt them. Add the events of 4 June to that growing list.

Comments

[Dissected News]

Sharp analysis, Mr. Verde. I think that, looking at history, it is typical for a struggling party to show this kind of disunity. As the internal frustrations over the existence of the Green Movement, and the growing opposition from the Kurds, begins to bubble, Khamenei and Ahmadinejad may resort to reckless behavior in order to show power. Equally as likely, those subservient to these leaders will pull to either ideological side: some to the left, blaming their continued problems on hardline tactics and crackdowns, and others on the right, arguing that the crackdown is not hard enough.

The results, I agree, will haunt these people. Hopefully sooner, but definitely later.

[Catherine]

Estimado señor Verde,
Incisive (not to repeat Dissected News!) analysis and well-written as usual. I do have a question. I'm still catching up after an absence and I've missed coverage (in English) of incidents when "Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, but alsoother reformists and even principlists like Ali Motahari have used these events as an excuse to criticise Khamenei personally" - what did they say about him personally?
Thanks.

[Arshama]

Catherine,

Khamenei was not criticised personally of course (too dangerous in this Holy Republic), but by attacking AN opposition leaders and Ali Mottahari certainly meant also him as his staunch supporter since the rigged elections. Radio Farda summarizes their reactions: http://www.rferl.org/content/Reformists_Condemn_Heckling_Of_Khomeinis_Grandson/2063368.html" rel="nofollow">http://www.rferl.org/content/Reformists_Condemn...

Arshama

[Verde_e]

Catherine,

> "Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, but alsoother reformists and even principlists like Ali Motahari have used these events as an excuse to criticise Khamenei personally" - what did they say about him personally? <

In their reaction to 4 June events, these people did not name Khamenei in person, but took issue with, and criticised, his comparing himself with Iman Ali (the first Shia Imam). This is a direct criticism. As Arshama says (06:55 PM) no one would dare to name Khamenei in such circumstances, but what he said was criticised directly.

I would suggest that if things carry on the way they are and the Supreme Leader’s stature is eroded further, we can start seeing him criticised by name. For example refer to The Latest from Iran, 9 June, 1720 GMT: Rafsanjani’s office said today in a statement that Khamenei’s silence (possibly also meaning his inaction)has allowed Ahmadinejad to lie with impunity about people on TV (referring to Ahmadinejad accusing the Rafsanjnai and Nategh-Nouri families of corruption during his TV debate with Mousavi last year). This is direct criticism, by name.

Verde

[Catherine]

Arshama and Mr Verde,
Thanks for your clarifications. The way things are going, it does look like the day is not too far off when KH will be personally named and shamed.

[Arshama]

Mr Verde,

Thank you very much for your incisive analysis (couldn't comment yesterday). The "forgotten" 15 Khordaad ceremonies support your second thesis that the SL is trying to wipe out any reference to Khomeini and replace his legacy with his own. But the problem is that wiping out the founder of this IR is equal to wiping out the system in itself.
Khamenei's efforts to declare himself as the genuine incarnation of the IR were nicely commented by Ali Keshtgar: "Neither you are Khomeini, nor Iran is the same as of yesterday (31 years ago)" http://www.iran-chabar.de/article.jsp?essayId=29964" rel="nofollow">http://www.iran-chabar.de/article.jsp?essayId=2...

Regards,
Arshama

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