Saturday
Jul032010
Iran Special: The Escalating Crisis Within (Verde)
Saturday, July 3, 2010 at 7:45 
Mr Verde writes for EA:Weeks into the Parliament v. President v. Rafsanjani crisis over control of Islamic Azad University, there is no resolution. There have been efforts to play down the immediate conflict, for example, with the denial of Yasr Rafsanjani, the son of Hashemi Rafsanjani, that the university's office manager was arrested (but not, the sharp-eyed will notice, a denial that a raid took place on the university's offices). Yasr Rafsanjani also said that Azad University has written to head of judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, for "clarification".
The meeting of the "proper" (i.e., Government-controlled) university board, appointed by Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, has been postponed because of "issues". No rescheduled date has been announced, so a takeover by the SCCR of the university seems to have been put off for now.
Yet while there is no immediate showdown, the significance of the dispute continues to spread within the regime. We have had the anti-Majlis demonstrations, with the slogans against members of Parliament, who are overwhelmingly "principalist", and against Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, who is from the key city of Qom. [Note: since Mr Verde wrote this, the news has come out of Ahmadinejad supporters disseminating anti-Larijani leaflets after Friday Prayers in Qom.
We had the clash between principalist MPs Kouchakzadeh and Motahari with jibes, insults, and physical confrontation. We had a principalist MP make a speech in the Parliament asking, "Why is it that when some people (meaning Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi) want to demonstrate, they have to get a permit which is denied, but when others (meaning the pro-government mob) demonstrate without a permit and insult the Majlis, they are taken around in buses and provided lunch, cakes, and drinks?
The Azad University arguments are also having effect on the dynamic between Ahmadinejad and the key party Motalefeh. As you reported, pro-Ahmadinejad MPs want to out the chairman of the Majlis education committee who is a member of Motalefeh (and incidentally is the brother-in-law of Azad University chancellor Jasbi). And now we have an interview with the chairman of Motalefeh, Mohammad-Nabi Habibi: he says that if events like 14 Khordad (the 4 June humiliation of Ayatollah Khomeini's grandson), the SCCR decision on Azad University, the President’s letter to Council of Guardians and the Prosecutor General's overruling of the decision of a court (the overturning of the injunction against the SCCR decision on Azad University) are repeated, it would harm the unity of even the followers of the Revolution.
So now we have more than an argument; we have a crisis, escalating over the last four week. Habibi had no intention of condemning the heckling of Seyed Hassan Khomeini at the 4 June ceremony for his grandfather, but the Azad University episode has forced the hand of this most principalist of Iranian parties, Motalefeh.
Right from the start, the 14 Khordad heckling of Khomeneni seemed like a stupid idea. Then details of the events emerged: Najjar, the Interior Minister, had told Ahmadinejad to extend his speech so that Khomeini could be squeezed out; the mob was organized; Khamenei had insisted that Khomeini spoke (which suggests the possibility that Khamenei was behind the incident and set Khomeini up, especially since he did not condemn the heckling). Then we had all religious figures of note backing Khomeini and condemning the events.
This has given Khomeini a strong mandate, something which Khamenei has not been able to obtain since last summer. He may be starting to use this mandate, recently criticising the economic situation and saying that the country’s problems cannot be managed with childish vindictiveness.
All this intra-principalist fighting brings another possibility: a space created for Hashemi Rafsanjani to snipe at Khamenei.
Rafsanjani is known for not speaking clearly. Usually what he says can be interpreted to mean opposite things. But recently, commemorating the 7 Tir bombing of 1981, he put out a statement which can only be read as taking direct aim at the Supreme Leader:
The sphere of our enemies is getting bigger, but our sphere of identifying enemies has become restricted.
Divisiveness is called honesty, insult is called candour, lies are called tact, slander is called boldness and slogans are called insight.
Why is Rafsanjani becoming bolder? Is it that he feels that he has too much to lose and should make a move now? Or does he feel that the other side is on the back foot?
Everyone knows that Rafsanjani does not like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In 2005 he claimed that Ahmadinejad’s election was fraudulent. Just before the 2009 election, Ahmadinejad accused Rafsanjani’s family of serious corruption and Rafsanjani in turn write a letter to Khamenei warning him of serious problems to come.
Yet even though the President may be trying to put on more pressure by trying to take Azad University from Rafsanjani, in my view, Khamenei is behind the move:
- Rafsanjani has not supported Khamenei, his President and his post-election decisions and actions. So now the Supreme Leader wants to yet again show that such lack of total support and disobedience will have serious consequences.
- Since well before the election, Khamenei has had to incresingly rely on sections of the top commanders of the Islamic Revoluton Guards Corps. Since the elections, he is losing legitimacy and respect elsewhere and therefore has to depend even more on the IRGC.
The methods of the military --- shooting people in the streets, running them over, jailing and torturing them --- may prove to be ineffective in the long term. But Khamenei has no choice, he is stuck with them and has to support them (no matter how stupid actions like 14 Khordad are) and appease them, by allowing them to take control of lucrative economic organizations,like the state-run telecoms company and the South Pars gas contracts.
Azad University is a rich and lucrative institution; there would be no surprise if IRGC cronies wanted to control it. So Khamenei has so far allowed SCCR to start the process of taking Azad University from Rafsanjani’s cronies and passing it to IRGC’s cronies.
- Rafsanjani has wide connections within the regime. These connections have in the past been used to overcome the regime's problems during crises. But this time a large part of the establishment is refusing to back the Supreme Leader. He is angry about this and may think he no longer needs Rafsanjani as a behind-the-scenes peacemaker.
Instead, Khamenei may be looking, or is being forced by the circumstances in which he finds himself , to eject large parts of the establishment, including the reformist and any conservatives/principalists who are not fully behind him). And he could feel that Rafsanjani’s connections and influence are hindering this cull.
A problem with these tactics: if you "cleanse" the large part of the establishment, you need to replace them with new dependable allies. And this has to take place within a distinctive and not necessarily helpful Iranian political environment:
- The Islamic Republic has not been able to install its ideology throughout Iranian society. People who have grown up under the rule of the regime do not understand and/or accept that ideology, for at times it appears not as having its own values, but as primarly being against the values of others.
- One of the main aims of the 1979 Revolution was to eradicate the corruption and cronyism of the past. If anything, this has become worse.
- From the early days of the Islamic Republic, more emphasis was placed on commitment to the regime than to expertise and knowledge. This has led to severe mismanagement at almost all levels.
- The structure of the regime does not support transparency and continuation of governance is based on competing (but closed) centers of interest. So you have the Majlis, the Council of Guardians, Expediency Council, Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution, and numerous other official and semi-official centers of power, with many having authority over the same areas. There is no proper oversight, no transparency.
This in itself leads to public mistrust of the regime. Also, Imagine if Khamenei were to resign or unable to carry on as the Leader. Then the Council of Experts would have to meet in emergency session to choose his successor. They could select anyone to succeed him (and judging by what happened outside of the Majles last week, a busload of thugs could become the determining factor). The SL has the most power --- the ultimate power --- in Iran, but there is no transparency in the way he is selected, nor are there any checks on his performance.
- The leaders of the regime have and still do promise justice for all, but their practices are creating injustices at all levels of life in Iran.
- The nature of the regime is exclusive, not inclusive. It has created a system that excludes many members of the general population from its circle for many different reasons: the way people dress, what they read, what they watch, their personal opinions, etc. The regime only accepts that part of the general population as its “citizens” who are unquestioning followers. If you ask a question, you may get the answer that you are corrupt, stupid, or an enemy agent. (Khamenei has demonstrated this well, with his complain about the “imperceptive confidants”.)
- The regime places the interests of a select few over the national interest. It may seem that the Islamic Republic values the leaders of Hamas and Lebanese Hesbollah and their interests more that the people of Iran and their concerns.
And thus the crisis --- beyond street protests, Azad University, and the regime’s nuclear projects --- of which these are only a few examples,
- When the reformist Mohammad Khatami was President, he said that talk of amending the constitution is treason (note: treason). Last year, in his statements after the elections, Mousavi said: the Constitution, not a word less, not a word more.
Mousavi is now saying that the people have the right to ask for the Constitution to be changed. He is saying that the constitution is not God’s word.
- Last year Mousavi was talking about the early days of the Revolution as the golden age. But now he is saying that not everything then was good. And the key reformist participant in the Revolution, Mostafa Tajzadeh, puts out a statement criticizing many of the actions of the regime in the 1980s.
- Alongside the sniping at Khamenei, we are beginning to see religious scholars questions the principle of velayat-e faqih (supreme clerical rule).
(the list is longer than this)
What we are witnessing are serious questions not just about the actions of the regime officials, but about the founding principles of the Islamic Republic and the actions of Islamic Republic since it was founded; not just from last year or five years ago when Ahmadinejad became president or 20 years ago when Khamenei became Supreme Leader. In his statement, Tajzadeh talks about returning to what Ayatollah Khomeini was putting forth during his exile in France, the promises made before the Revolution.
But regime officials and the groups divide further and carry on with their own fights, while the problems get worse. Neither Khamenei nor anyone else within the system appears to have any idea about fixing these problems. As individuals and as groups, they are best at fanning the flames.
We have a large part of the Iranian population which is very unhappy. The regime has not done anything to ease the unease of the post-election protestors; if anything, it has done a lot to upset even more people. The economy is getting worse, and the sanctions --- despite what Ahmadinejad may say --- will not make things easier.
A dangerous power vacuum is emerging, as Khamenei is not able to lead in many cases. Having to clear up the mess after something goes wrong, his authority is waning. The President does not appear to have the required competence, and regime reformists are excluded from any involvement. For some, the answer emerges that sections of the Revolutionary Guard may hope to grab power.
But none of these political scenarios offers an imminent answer. For the in-fighting and soul searching reveals a vacuum beyond the political vacuum of power, the emptiness may now be that of the principles of the Islamic Republic.
Reader Comments (21)
"Yet even though the President may be trying to put on more pressure by trying to take Azad University from Rafsanjani, in my view, Khamenei is behind the move:"
Thank you for your comments. The above has been the story from the beginning, hasn't it? Khamenei 'hiding' behind anyone possible while he conducts his foul and ineffective business, or so it seems nowadays. We're running out of other reasons.
What's your take on the situation if Khamenei dies? Will the IRGC just take over, wipe parliament, etc.? Do you know of any force to stop them from filling a new vacuum?
Thanks again for your thoughts.
Thank you Mr Verde,
If you haven't already done so, you (and everyone else) really must read Muhammad Sahimi's imo excellent article, 'Who's in Charge?' on Tehran Bureau, which is a perfect companion piece to yours.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/06/fissures-in-the-regime.html" rel="nofollow">http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranb...
It starts with the historical background of how Khamenei and the clerics around him, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, each developed their power bases and who constitutes those bases. Then after the heading 'Frictions Begin to Emerge', he examines the present crisis in the light of detailed evidence of a behind-the-scenes power struggle between the clerics and the Guards in which Sahimi sees the Guards' ultimate goal as expelling the clerics from power and playing the same role in Iran that the military plays in Pakistan and Egypt, and used to play to Turkey.
[...] vom 3. Juli Die Systemkrise der Islamischen Republik spitzt sich zu (Kommentar Mr. Verde, [...]
Posted on Homylafayettes' blog: Majlis deputies acclaim Khamenei more loudly than the Prophet Muhammed
A video posted by Jonbesheh Raheh Sabz on Thursday, June 1, 2010, allegedly shows Principlist Majlis representatives mumbling a prayer after the Prophet Muhammed is mentioned at the start of a speech, but enthusiastically acclaiming Leader Ali Khamenei when Speaker Ali Larijani utters his name a few minutes later...
http://homylafayette.blogspot.com/2010/07/majlis-deputies-acclaim-khamenei-more.html" rel="nofollow">http://homylafayette.blogspot.com/2010/07/majli...
Ahmadinejad supporters in Qom denounce Head of Parliament
http://www.zamaaneh.com/enzam/2010/07/ahmainejad-supporters-in.html" rel="nofollow">http://www.zamaaneh.com/enzam/2010/07/ahmaineja...
Something else to watch - Prof. Sahimi mentions in an answer to a reader that he believes Ahmadinejad is trying to keep his darling Mashaei in the public eye because he wants groom him for 2013, as a sort of copy of the Medvedev-Putin relationship.
Mr Verde
Thank you for summarizing us the situation overlooked by your talents; you have to send it to Mr Obama and Mr Cameron; it could help them !
Chilling analysis, Mr. Verde! Thank you for always reminding us we have to think of the future as well, instead of just trying to get to grips with what's happening today. "A dangerous power vacuum is emerging..."
I agree with our angel from Paris: I hope policy makers in US and UK (and elsewhere) are aware of your observations.
Thank you so much, Mr Verde!
Though I agree with most of your remarks, I wonder about the logic and practical consequences of the following sentence: "In his statement, Tajzadeh talks about returning to what Ayatollah Khomeini was putting forth during his exile in France, the promises made before the Revolution."
Obviously Khomeini promised "democracy blah blah" in Neauphle Le Chateau only to dupe ignorant western journalists and even more ignorant Iranian political activists. In fact he never intended to establish democracy, but his principles of "Hokumat-e eslami" (Islamic government), written down on the basis of his lectures in Najaf.
Instead of accepting that he has been duped like so many others, Tajzadeh continues to repeat his mantra of our "beloved Leader". Khomeini was the first Supreme Liar, and Khamenei is only his successor.
Why should we listen to people like Tajzadeh, who continue to spread this IR's fundamental lies?
Arshama
Arshama,
Actually Mr Verde is just describing what Tajzadeh said and showing its significance in the context of the subject of his article.
Your important criticism should be directed at Tajzadeh himself! :-) Any chance of that happening? I would love to see his answer - but supposedly we've only seen part 1 of the confession so far, as I recall.
[...] Enduring America | July 3, 2010 By Mr. Verde [...]
Catherine,
You are pointing at the problem: I expect an analyst to be critical of what he analyses, not just descripting. Obviously Mr Verde is a supporter of the reformists and knows all to well, what I'm refering to ;-)
Anyway, it doesn't change anything to my respect for his work. I'm happy that a fellow countryman offers us such incisive insights into actual developments. dasteshan dard nakonad!
Arshama
Arshama,
Re. “Obviously Mr Verde is a supporter of the reformists and knows all to well, what I'm refering to ;-)”
I am believe that the comments section of EA is not a place for personal issues, but since your comment refers to what Scott has kindly agreed to post in EA on my behalf, I would like to say the following:
I have to say categorically that I am not sending comments and opinion to EA on behalf of anyone (including IR reformists) other than myself. I am not now nor was anytime in the past a supporter of any Iranian - or other - individual/political group or party /faction/regime/etc (including IR reformists).
I do not intend to defend and I am not the supporter of any individual/political group or party/faction/regime/etc.
If IR reformists want Scott to post something on their behalf on EA, I am sure he’d have no issues with that (as we have seem many times over the past year, when Scott has encouraged regime supporters to engage in constructive arguments and criticism), but that is their concern and has nothing to do with me.
What I say is not the “party line”, it is meandering thoughts.
Now to your comments about Khoemini’s speeches in France and your question: “Why should we listen to people like Tajzadeh, who continue to spread this IR's fundamental lies?”
I do no defend Tajzadeh and IR reformists. If Tajzadeh wants to go back to 1978 and start this all again, that is his opinion. I would point out to him that starting from 1978 in France has led us to the chaotic and disturbing mess of 2010 in Iran. I know that the reformists are paying a heavy price now, but it should be remembered that countless ordinary Iranian citizens (not the regime “khavas” or other “important” people like reformists) are paying an exact or even higher price for the chaotic mess which is called the Islamic Republic. And don’t forget that the “price” is not just the brutality, rapes, torture, murders, etc (which is an unbelievably high price in itself), but it also is things like poverty, destitute, drugs, lost opportunity, depression, hopelessness, etc (what I refer to as mismanagement in the above piece).
It is worth remembering that most of the terrible things that happened during the “golden age of Eman” (which by the way included almost everything – rapes, killings, etc - that has happened since June 2009) happened when the current reformists (the old “khat-e emanmi”s) were running Iran.
I would guess that if they were to have the upper hand within the regime now (as they did in the 1980s), many of them would not be calling for “democracy” or “people’s rights” or “justice”. They would be talking about support for the regime and its “Emam” (as they used to in the 1980s).
I believe that the circumstances of the 1990s (the fact that they were being squeezed out of power) probably had a lot to do with these people becoming “reformists” and the starts of the “reforms”. There may have been some genuine will to change the regime for better, but that did not happen, because the regime has proven that it is not only un-reformable, but that has got to a point that it cannot manage its internal problems (like Azad University, which let’s face it, is an internal regime issue). But now we have a strong and perceptive public will for change. The Iranian society has changed a lot since 1979 but the regime has changed little since then. This has created a paradox, which even prior to the 2009 elections was picked up by even the most superficial foreign journalist. Many used to out this down to regime flexibility and its ability to manage the society. But since the last year it has become apparent that the regime was going in one direction and large parts of the society was going in the opposite direction. The street protests – even the huge 25 Khordad 1388 demonstration - were a small indication of the public will. While the reformists were probably hoping to use the public discontent before the elections to their advantage, its size and scale probably socked them as much as it has shocked Khamenei & co.
In my view the protests did not start on 3 June 09, they started about one month early during the election campaigns. For example the “green chain” across Tehran and other cities on 8 June 09 (18 Khordad 88) was as amazing as the post-election demonstrations. The only difference was that the regime did not kill or arrest people then. I think that once the demonstrations started and were repeated, a process was started that is still unfolding. Unfortunately Khamenei and sections of IRGC have decided to make the process as painful as possible. But make no mistake: the process has started and once it is finished we will see a different Iran. It is impossible to say how long it will take or what phases it will go through, but it is happening right now.
Different groups and individuals are coping with this process differently. Khamenei decided the changes that are happening were based on public protests. So quite early on he decided to crush the protests. On 29 Khordad 88 he was possibly thinking: I’ll threaten them, and they’ll go home. And on 30 Khordad 88 he may have been thinking: we’ll kill a few and arrest some and they’ll go home. As it turned out, things got worse. As a result of the shock that I mentioned above, almost all institutions of the Islamic Republic have entered a permanent status of crisis. This is leading to increasing rivalries and infighting, which is in turn spreading the sense of crisis.
The reformists are probably feeling that they are being left behind by the public. Ever since 12 June 09 Mousavi, etc are playing catch up (Mousavi has said many times that he is not the leader of the Greens). As a result you get the rather peculiar statements by Kadivar (sitting in the USA and saying that the people of Iran were shouting “ham ghazeh, ham lobnan, kanam fadayeh iran” and not “na ghazeh, na lobnan…”, something he was later forced to correct by saying he preferred the former, but the latter was shouted in demonstrations, video of which is on the internet) and his brother-in-law Mohajerani saying in effect that only regime loyalists are part of the Green Movement 9he is acting as a self appointed Council of Guardians for the Greens!). While one reason for such remarks maybe to try to turn even more of the regime loyalists against Khamenei (by saying: looks the Greens are like you, but nicer, so come to our side), I believe another reason is that they are feeling that the movement is slipping away from them, and the reformists are losing the ability to claim to be the leaders of the Green Movement (which is nothing other than the social movement against the status quo). As far as I am concerned, Kadivar and Mohaverani are entitled to their views and should be free to express them.
Now to Karroubi, Mousavi and Tajzadeh (the point of your comment) criticisms of the regime… I don’t know how genuinely they believe in what they say or is it just to a) push back against Khamenei and say to him, look we are prepared to even question the foundation of IR, and b) to try keep up with what they think is the public mood. I personally have no desire to follow any of these individuals - or anyone else - blindly, so I am not too worried about how genuine these people are. However I think what they are saying is significant because this is an indication that the crisis in the Islamic Republic is reaching such levels that people like Mousavi, Karroubis and Tajzadeh are starting to question a lot of the principles and actions of the Islamic Republic. We are yet to see any explanation of their personal roles in the actions of the Islamic Republic (and this one may not be happening very soon).
As for Tajzadeh saying that we should go back to what Khomeini was saying in France..
Firstly I am guessing that Tajzadeh has probably coordinated his statement with other regime reforists. In that case, this may be the beginning of a larger move by them.
My take is that Tajzadeh is saying that the Islamic Republic has gone against everything that Khomeini said in France, which is close to your point in you comment: he says it was not done, you’re saying they never intended to do it. So both you and Tajzadeh agree that what Khomeini said in France was not done by the Islamic Republic in Iran. I would argue that Tajzadeh’s views are becoming closer to yours and I think that’s a good sign (not because like Khamenei I love “unity”, because it shows that sections of IR are accepting that they did not carry out what was promised by Khomeini in France).
Sorry this is a long “comment”, but you asked ;-)
Finally, re “..Mr Verde is a supporter of the reformists and knows all to well, what I'm referring to..”
I am afraid I don’t know what you’re referring to. I would be very grateful if you were to explain it.
Regards,
Verde
Mr. Verde,
Thank you VERY much for your long and incisive reply!
I take back all my allegations immediately. omidvaram man ra bebakhshid.
As to Tajzadeh, I still believe that he is cheating himself (if not everyone). I simply cannot accept that he never read Khomeini's "Hokumat-e Eslami", so why does he ignores it completely? How can he do so after 31 years of this "Jomhouri-ye jahanami" (Republic of Hell), based on Khomeini's infernal concept of "velayat-e faghih"?
Obviously it is up to him to answer this question, as it is up to all other reformists to rethink their failed "reforms".
Even though I blame them for their failure, which was predictable, given the anti-democratic nature of this mockup "republic", one of their biggest merits was that they reestablished a culture of dialogue, trying to put an end to the predominant governemental violence. But the events of 18 Tir (student's unrest) proved their inability to maintain this dialogue with the society.
You say: "In my view the protests did not start on 3 June 09, they started about one month early during the election campaigns."
On the eve of the 11th anniversary of this bloody event I would say that the protests against this regime started much earlier, i.e. eleven years ago. The bloody crackdown on students and the ridiculous retreat in the media press case (vetoed by the SL) were a final proof to the Iranian people that these representatives did not represent them, but their own political interests.
I don't talk about the hardliners -- MP's, who support the killings of helpless citizens on the streets, are a shame to mankind.
Regards,
Arshama
Thank you Mr Verde and Arshama for continuing the discussion. The comments section of this post is just as illuminating as the post itself!
Arshama,
Re. 18 Tir
The 1999 student protests and the subsequent regime crackdown (which incidentally was not much different to the post-election brutality: Ezat Ebrahimenjad was shot in the face and thrown out of a first floor window and his funeral and memorial was controlled by the security forces, and the only conviction on the regime side was that of a conscripted soldier who was found guilty of stealing an electric shaver!) were very significant and relevant to the developments in Iran over the next decade (for example that led to even the regime controlled parts of the student movement turning against IR). I do not however see the 2009 protests as a continuation of the student protests of 1999 (and subsequent years). I see it this way: 1999 was when the student movement used an excuse (closing down of Salam newspaper) to serve notice that it was going its own way; 2009 was when a large number of the cross section of Iranian society started serving notice that it is going its own way. In 1999 it was very easy for the regime to force the student protests to become violent, which then allowed regime thugs to brutally suppress the students. All regime attempts to force the protestors of 2009 to become violent failed (for example: there was not a single credible report of people causing damage on 15 June 09 – that is before the Basijis starting shooting people from rooftops, and even then the attacks were limited to the attacking Basij base). Even on Ashura attacks on the security forces were to the point of pushing them back and forcing them to retreat in humiliation; there was no wanton violence on the part of the protestors; compared to the running over of people by police vans and throwing them off bridges, overturning a police car, pales into insignificance (it was like telling them that it is not that difficult for us to push you around too). This forced the regime to change tactics and lock Tehran down like a military camp on 22 Bahman. Since after Ashura the regime, by its actions, has admitted that a) it cannot accommodate the protestors and b) it is unable to guarantee its superiority in case of street protests, and it is therefore forced to line up all of its recourses on the city’s streets. And we are seeing the results of this new regime tactic: the overuse of regime thugs (to even humiliate Hassan Khomeini and attack the Majles) and the deepening of rifts within conservative/principalist ranks (example: Ali Motahati is reported to be forming a new faction in the Majles). If the street protests had become violent like 1999, things would have been very different now.
Just a reminder about 18 Tir in 1378: those events happened a few months after the revelations about the “chain murders”. I would guess that some of the heavy-handedness by the regime was probably to stamp its authority after the humiliation of having to admit that some of its best security agents were being used as death squads in extrajudicial murders within Iranian territory. If you recall at first Khamenei’s response to the murders of the Froohars and others was to say that they weren’t that important (as if he was saying that we dint kill them because they were not important, nit that we didn’t kill them because we don’t murder people in cold blood). Then he said that it was the work of US and Israel. This led the Islamic Republic having to accuse a deputy Intelligence Minister and other very high ranking Intelligence Ministry officials of being foreign spies (and then having to kill/suicide Saeed Emami with “hair removal cream”). All of this would have damaged the image of the regime and also caused serious doubts in the minds of its security operatives: what if there were problems in the future? The regime had shown that it had no problems with sacrificing its own high ranking officials in order to save it from embarrassment. The brutality of the 18 Tir attacks on student dorms and the fact that no one was held to account (as I said only one conscript was convicted of stealing a shaver) would have been a good platform to reassure regime thugs that they would be immune no matter what it was that they did in their service of the Supreme Leader.
Even Farhad Nazari, the police commander at the time of the raid on the dorms, was eventually let off the hook and even allowed to complain about his “unjust treatment”.
Re. “omidvaram man ra bebakhshid.”
None of this is personal. No hard feelings. No apology necessary. My concern was that I was being accused of peddling the reformists’ points of view on EA, while I had not indentified myself as a regime reformist to them (which, for the record, I am not).
Regards,
Verde
Thank you Mr Verde,
RE "1999 was when the student movement used an excuse (closing down of Salam newspaper) to serve notice that it was going its own way; 2009 was when a large number of the cross section of Iranian society started serving notice that it is going its own way."
I think you could also see 2009 as the next logical step after 1999 - the extension (and expansion) of similar resentments and aspirations to a much broader segment of the public.following an exponentially larger affront: the "shutting down" of an election.
Mr Verde,
Catherine has already answered to your reply, but I will try to explain my allegation: Imho the 1999 student's protests were the first sign that something had gone completely wrong in this "republic", especially because this generation had grown up under Islamic rule, and because of the fact that these students were mostly from Islamic academic organisations.
Their protests reminded me very much of the 1968 student protests, which were obviously quite different, but also a rebellion against the fathers' generation.
Although the regime and Khatami reacted in the traditional Iranian way of "Sohrab-koshi" (Sohrab was the son of Iran's epic hero Rostam), this incident appeared to me as a significant change in social behaviour, i.e. an affront against authorities, both political and domestic. The students protested against the closure of Salam daily in place of their fathers, who remained silent - it was not an excuse.
Ten years later this sort of self-emancipation has spread to a large part of society, which decided that she would allow the regime no longer to treat her like a child. The initial cause was obviously different, but the motivation is the same: an attempt to liberate oneself from an omnipotent authority, a process, which continues.
I'm happy that you didn't take it personal, and I enjoy our discussion very much.
Regards,
Arshama
Arshama,
Re. post-election protests being a continuation of student revolts (and 18 Tir):
I must say that most people I discuss this issue with hold a point of view similar to yours. I concede on this point.
Re. similarities between 18 Tir and the late 1960s protests in the West (which I think you’re referring to):
I guess this may be one of the traits of baby boom generations when they’re coming of age. In Europe there was enough flexibility in the system of governance to take the edge off the protests (eventually). In Iran the regime’s inflexibility even on minor issues and the use of unrestrained brutality, turned limited protests into a large and uncontrollable movement.
Regards,
Verde
Hi Mr Verde,
Thank you for your reply. I wonder however, if you concede because of my argumentation or most of the people ;-)
Shoukhi be kenar. I just read an interview, in which a young Iranian woman says that she participated in last year's protests, being angry that her father didn't support them. Obviously this is only one voice, but interestingly supportive of what I had said about 18 Tir.
Re: similarities between 18 Tir and the late 1960s protests in the West
I disagree with you in a key aspect: contrary to Europe or the west in general, we have never had an established culture of protest or rather a culture of objection (contradiction) in Iran. Throughout our history we had a series of revolts and riots, but never somewhat like the right to dissent. Even the Iranian educational system is based on copying instead of criticism and discourse (as in the west).
Perhaps the enormous pressure this IR put on Iranian society during its lifetime has been the main cause for the formation of a genuine fundamental dissent.
Look at our society in general: all common foundations are slowly eroding, especially family structures, with rising divorce rates (very untypical for Iran), the so-called farzand-salari (rule of children) and other related phenomenons.
I believe that Iranian society is experiencing fundamental changes, the most important of which are the disintegration of patriarchal and religious structures (which are in a certain way congruent).
The attacks on the houses and offices of Qom's maraje were certainly politically motivated and are a very negative example, but the event in itself is a novelty. As far as I know nothing comparable happened even during the Shah's reign.
On a positive note this kind of ghedasat-zodayi (desacralisation) will certainly accelerate the movement towards a more egalitarian society, which recognises criticism, debates and conflicts as positive values, instead of following anxiously her sacred godfathers, persisting in a state of humiliating minority.
Regards,
Arshama
One third of marriages now result in divorce, according to recent numbers disclosed by Sadegh Akbari, the Deputy to the Iranian Youth Organization.
http://features.kodoom.com/en/iran-society/sharp-increase-in-divorce-rate-in-iran-alarms-authorities/v/2050/" rel="nofollow">http://features.kodoom.com/en/iran-society/shar...