Shirvin Zeinalzadeh: The Possibilities of US-Iran Talks

On Friday, Scott Lucas wrote of "Iran's Pride" in the speech of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on the country's nuclear program. No surprise to the trained eye here: rallying around the flag is of great importance to any Iranian politician involved in forthcoming elections, and vagueness of Ahmadinejad's announcement was designed to create a media circus around the incumbent President.

Beyond the electoral short-term, the Iranian nuclear program should be compared to a ’slow boat to self-independence’. It is a long and expensive journey, but it will get there in the end.

Yet, beyond that obvious statement, there is a key element forgotten by the international community and sceptics of the Iranian program, one to consider alongside the statement issued by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, ‘It would benefit the Iranians, in our view, if they cooperated with the international community.' The view and constant rhetoric of the Iranian government is that Iran IS abiding by such rules, rules set by the Non-Proliferation Treaty to which Iran became a signatory in 1969.

The key with diplomacy at this level is communication. Iran and the US have failed to seize upon clear opportunities to talk face-to-face on this issue. After 30 years of mistrust since the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iranians may ask why their scepticism of Washington should change. Each time Iran has tried to reconcile with the West, for example in negotiations with the European Union 3 of Britain, France, and Germany, the US that has undermined any progress, for example, rejecting the admission of Iran to the World Trade Organization.

Tables have now started to turn, however, with ‘corridor diplomacy’ taking place on issues concerning Iran's border states of Iraq and Afghanistan. The common ground for Tehran and Washington is that Iran can assist with the rebuilding of Iraq, bringing regional security, support the American eradication of the Taliban.

In time, diplomatic corridors become negotiating rooms where bilateral talks can begin. However, this requires time and patience. Instead of looking at this like a business negotiation, where no deal is considered a success until both parties have signed the dotted line, one should consider in diplomacy that the mere fact of US-Iran talks is a victory.

The truth about Iran's supposed pursuit of nuclear weapons is that if Tehran obtained and used them, it would be the end of the country. If it obtained the weapons and did not use them, it will open the door to either 1) a strike by other countries to cripple Iran's military capability or 2) a ‘horizontal proliferation’ in which all states in the region become nuclear powers, causing a very uncomfortable global security dilemma.

This summer should reveal these truths and the possibilities in US-Iran discussions. Change has occurred in the US with the Obama willingness to extend the hand of diplomacy; now the question is whether Iran will accept it. If President Ahmadinejad remains in office after the elections, that acceptance might not come, in which case the issue will be how long US patience will last. If Ahmadinejad fails, however, it will be a question of how much time it takes for the Iranians to start direct talks.

Comments

[Mo]

Iran's response to Obama will have little to to with Ahmadinejad remaining in office or not, but a lot to do with whether Obama is serious about change in US policy towards Iran.

[William deB. Mills]

Skill, patience, consistency, logic, and understanding go a long way toward the design of an effective foreign policy. These attributes — perhaps obvious but frequently in short supply among foreign policy decision-makers — build a much firmer policy foundation than rude and emotional outbursts, erratic challenges, public bullying, contemptuous disdain, or efforts to isolate and demonize. With a new administration in place, now is the time to ask if U.S. policy toward Iraq can shift from viewing Iran as an "ultra-nationalistic, theologically conservative, politically radical, or Shi'ite" state and instead design a foreign policy based on skill, patience, consistency, logic, and understanding.

Despite the many emotional and poorly reasoned public claims to the contrary, it isn't obvious that Washington needs to "do" anything at all about Iran. Iran certainly isn't threatening the national security of the U.S. homeland. Iran does, however, resist Washington's desires and challenges its goals in the region. If Washington perceives Iranian foreign policy as a problem requiring resolution, solutions are well within its grasp without recourse, either to knee-jerk hostility or a war of aggression.

Designing the actual tactics for reaching agreement with Iran will take not just skill and patience but a lot more flexibility and imagination than decisionmakers in Washington have typically demonstrated over the last 30 years, but it will not require any miracles. Innumerable ways to move forward at minimal risk are available to Washington.

One of the key areas that must be addressed in moving forward with Iran is clearly security. Possible ways to make progress in this arena include:

• Base Inspections. One could imagine a U.S. invitation to Iran to join in discussions about the type of armaments to be installed in U.S. bases surrounding Iran, for example. Going a step further, the U.S. might offer a new principle for international law: following the precedent of inspections of nuclear capabilities, why not have inspections of foreign military bases?
• Regional Arms Limitations. Iran has been criticized for trying to import land-to-air missiles, a weapon class by definition defensive. A sincere effort at regional security would permit defensive arms while attempting to constrain offensive arms (e.g., the capability to refuel long-range fighter/bombers or bunker-busting bombs).
• Nuclear Arms Race. A maximal step toward regional security would be to ban nuclear arms in the region. If that is deemed politically too difficult, a lesser step would be a U.S. “nuclear umbrella,” i.e., a U.S. guarantee to defend any country threatened by nuclear attack (in return for a believable renunciation of the goal of acquiring nuclear arms).
I will not attempt to spell out these ideas here. The point is simply to demonstrate that if Washington decisionmakers are committed to making progress, they have many paths they can follow to test the willingness of Tehran decisionmakers to respond.