Afghanistan: The Problem of Military-Led Development

Readers will know of our concern over a "militarised" US approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan. While President Obama's declared strategy called for an increase in civilian participation, and while Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and General David Petraeus have declared the need for non-military involvement, the fundamental point remains: the Pentagon is, or is seeking to be, in control of American programmes in both countries.

Last week, a 25-page report by 11 non-governmental aid organisations (ActionAid, Afghanaid, CARE Afghanistan, Christian Aid, Cordaid, DACAAR, Interchurch Organisation for Development Cooperation,
International Rescue Committee, Marie Stopes International, Oxfam International, Save the Children UK) eloquently set out these concerns.

The report is available in full on the Oxfam website. Pertinent and troubling extracts include:

1. On the US emphasis on Provincial Reconstruction Teams, involving the military, State Department, and Agency for International Development:

When security and other conditions exist which allow specialised civilian development actors to operate, the military should not be engaged in activities in the development or humanitarian sector. PRT engagement in development activities is neither effective nor sustainable.

2. On the damage to the distinction between humanitarian and military operations:

There has been an increasing blurring of this distinction....Some military actors engage in relief activities for the purposes of force protection; and certain...contingents, such as the US and France, are failing to identify themselves as combatants by the continued use of unmarked, white vehicles, which are conventionally used by the UN and aid agencies. The expansion of PRT activities and the use of heavily protected contractors to implement reconstruction projects have also contributed to a blurring of the civil-military distinction. Ultimately, these practices have contributed to a diminution in the perceived independence of NGOs, increased the risk for aid workers, and reduced the areas in which NGOs can safely operate.

3. On the difficulties of building up local groups, the counter-insurgency strategy favoured by General Petraeus:

Through the Afghan Social Outreach Programme (ASOP) district councils are established by the
government purportedly to build local support, improve communications and gather information about
militant activities. The programme carries a high risk of failure and may even exacerbate local security
conditions....[We should] support the development of a civil society strategy to build the capacity of the central authorities in matters of local governance and justice.

The report concludes:

There is a need for a truly comprehensive strategy for the long-term reconstruction
and stabilisation of Afghanistan. However, NATO and other international military actors should
acknowledge the limits to the scope of activities which are suitable and legitimate for their engagement.
The military should focus on providing security, while civilian actors must determine and implement
policies that address the wide range of reconstruction, development and humanitarian challenges
currently facing the country.