Afghanistan Exclusive: US Talking to Insurgent Leader Hektamayar

Last November, Barack Obama's election as President overshadowed another story in The Washington Post:

As U.S. and NATO officials revamp their strategy in Afghanistan, a renegade Afghan commander could prove central to U.S. plans to rein in the insurgency through negotiations.

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is a 61-year-old veteran of Afghanistan's three decades of war who gained infamy for rocketing his own capital during a brief stint as prime minister in the 1990s. More recently, his supporters have carried out several devastating attacks on the Western-backed government of President Hamid Karzai.

But with casualties among foreign forces at record highs, and domestic and international confidence in Karzai's government at an all-time low, U.S. and Afghan officials may have little choice but to grant Hekmatyar a choice seat at the bargaining table.

Five months later, those talks are happening.

US officials have been in discussions with a key Hekmatayar assistant, Daoud Abedi, an Afghan-American businessman based in California. Abedi told the Asia Times:

I was approached by the US government here and we did speak....I spoke to some people here and al-Hamdullilah [thank God] the results of the talks were positive....The purpose of those meetings was to see how we can bring peace Afghanistan and to make sure foreign troops leave Afghanistan as soon as possible.

Saying that this is a shift in US policy is a bit of an understatement. In the first years after the overthrow of the Taliban, the US military was intent on destroying Hekmatayar's group. Indeed, it tried to assassinate Hekmatayar was a "test case" for the US missile warfare now being carried out in northwest Pakistan: the Americans tried to assassinate him with a strike from an unmanned drone planes.

Now, however, Washington is prepared to overlook Hekmatayar's bloody period in power in the early 1990s. (The Washington Post reference to "rocketing his own capital" is another understatement, not mentioning the thousands who died during the fighting.) Put bluntly, the US can't find his group and the Taliban and other insurgents at the same time.

Whether or not Hekmatayar is "the great hope of all parties as the only Pashtun strongman untainted by al-Qaeda and possibly capable of taking on the Taliban", the US is trying to bring him inside the camp rather than fighting him outside it.

That, however, poses an immediate question and a tricker one down the road. Immediately, is the US hoping really hoping that Hekmatayar will "take on the Taliban"? Daoud Abedi is making clear that Hekmatayar wants the Taliban around the negotiating table:

Taliban are also the sons of Afghanistan. They are sacrificing for Afghanistan and for the freedom of Afghanistan so we are hopeful that they will give a positive answer to our request [to join talks] as well.

And beyond those talks, what would a US relationship with Hekmatayar mean for the Karzai Government or indeed any central government in Afghanistan? The current Afghan President is no friend of Hekmatayar; while Karzai has openly called for discussions with the Taliban, he has not included Hekmatayar's group in those statements.

This, however, may be a trivial enquiry compared to the pointedly immediate: the US military "surge" cannot face down all the insurgents that it faces. So Hekmatayar, formerly one of the most wanted US targets, has once again become an acceptable political leader.

Playing for Time: Clinton-Obama and the Hague Conference on Afghanistan

Related Post: Text of Clinton Remarks to Hague Conference on Afghanistan

Lots of sound and not much substance (yet). That's the quick summary of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's address to the international conference on Afghanistan at The Hague yesterday.

First and very much foremost, the American priority was tipped off in the final paragraphs of Clinton's statement:

Now the principal focus of our discussions today is on Afghanistan, but we cannot hope to succeed if those who seek to reestablish a haven for violence and extremism operate from sanctuaries just across the border. For this reason, our partnership with Pakistan is critical. Together, we all must give Pakistan the tools it needs to fight extremists within its borders.

As for the continuing vagueness of "What Is to Be Done?" on Afghanistan, CNN's headline grab is a tip-off: "Clinton Backs Talks With Moderate Taliban".

At a superficial glance, that seems dramatic. The US talking to the same people who sheltered Al Qa'eda, who held Afghanistan under a reign of terror until they were toppled at the end of 2001? Here is how Clinton framed the call:

We must...support efforts by the Government of Afghanistan to separate the extremists of al-Qaida and the Taliban from those who joined their ranks not out of conviction, but out of desperation. This is, in fact, the case for a majority of those fighting with the Taliban. They should be offered an honorable form of reconciliation and reintegration into a peaceful society if they are willing to abandon violence, break with al-Qaida, and support the constitution.

All well and good, but who gets approached? Vice President Joe Biden is spreading the good news that 75 percent of Taliban members, with no incentive other than "desperation", can be stripped away from the organisation, but it is unclear how the US or the Afghan Government gets to those members.

In practice, if General Petraeus's model for Iraq is used, the manoeuvres will be with local commanders and leaders who may be persuaded --- by kind words or by lots of money --- to join the right side. In the Petraeus model, however, those former Sunni enemies of the US were already in powers in villages and towns. Is Washington considering a similar offer of political influence to ex-Taliban?

And who is to make the approach? Clinton's statement indicates that this will be "the Government of Afghanistan", and she none-too-subtly opened her remarks with an acknowledgement of "President Karzai, who fills a critical leadership role in his nation, and whose government helped to shape the shared comprehensive and workable strategy that we are discussing today".

Yet only weeks ago, some US officials were putting about the story that Karzai was to be curbed or even removed from power, and Washington was desperate not to let the President call a quick election for April. So is Clinton now signalling --- from reconciliation or from a lack of other options --- that the US will now accept Karzai's lead or equal participation in the political strategy?

Beyond the politics, Clinton offered the reconstruction approach of "the raw material of progress – roads, public institutions, schools, hospitals, irrigation, and agriculture". Again, nothing unexpected in the rhetoric. And again no specifics: earlier this year, the US Government was thinking that European and NATO partners could take the burden of non-military projects but President Obama's declaration last Friday of an expanded US civilian corps indicated that Washington may take the lead.

Clinton's statement tilted towards the former option: "We hope that others gathered here will heed the United Nations’ and Afghan Government’s call for help throughout the country with job creation, technical expertise, vocational training, and investments in roads, electrical transmission lines, education, healthcare, and so much else." At the same time, in another indication that Washington --- for all the charges of corruption leveled at the Karzai Government --- is having to put up with Kabul, Clinton supported "the Government of Afghanistan’s National Development Strategy, the National Solidarity Program, and other initiatives".

There was, however, a possible sting in the tail in Clinton's statement. Having set out a political, security, and economic approach which seemed to be premised on co-operation with the current Afghan Government, she declared:

To earn the trust of the Afghan people, the Afghan Government must be legitimate and respected. This requires a successful election in August – one that is open, free, and fair. That can only happen with strong support from the international community. I am, therefore, pleased to announce today that to advance that goal, the United States is committing $40 million to help fund Afghanistan’s upcoming elections.

Clinton's reference to "open, free, and fair" is jarring, to say the least: were previous Afghan elections --- and thus the rule of Hamid Karzai --- illegitimate? Washington's private assessment has been that the President is likely to win re-election in the summer. So is the US bowing to his continued presence, attempting (rather crudely) to put on a bit of pressure, or still pursuing an alternative leadership?

I don't have an answer. Nor, in my reading, does Washington. The more that one parses the Obama speech of last Friday and the Clinton statement yesterday, the more that it appears that the major objective for the Administration was to have something, anything, before next week's NATO gathering. The US is now clearly on its own militarily, and President Obama, for all that charm, will struggle in getting an expanded non-military commitment from European partners outside Kabul.

This is a "hold the line" approach, trying to ensure that the Taliban does not expand its hold on territory, until the right partnership with the right Government in Kabul can be foreseen. More importantly, the line is to be held until the US can resolve its core problem, which lies not in Afghanistan but across the border in northwest Pakistan.

And those prospects are no closer or clearer from last week's events and announcements.