Exclusive: A Turkish "Vacation", a US Envoy, and an Israel-Syria Settlement

What could Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's vacation and the Obama strategy on the Middle East have in common?

Quite a lot.

Erdogan, after an intense workload from a showdown with Israel to success in Turkish elections, has decided that a three-day holiday in Hataywith his family is what the doctor has ordered.

That is, if Erdogan's doctor had a second degree in Politics. The two cities where the Prime Minister is relaxing, Antalya and Balikesir, were lost to opposition parties, as was Hatay, the only city with a coast on the Mediterranean.

And maybe that doctor's third degree is in Middle Eastern Politics. Hatay isn't exactly the top choice for a VIP holiday; instead, Erdogan may have noticed that the city is on the Syrian border.

However, where Hatay has been the site of Turkish-Syrian disputes in the past, today it may be the pretext for Erdogan to meet new friends in Damascus. For months up to December 2008, the Turkish Prime Minister was working with Syrian President Bashir al-Assad to arrange direct Israel-Syria talks. And, while the Gaza War was a pretty serious inconvenience to those plans, Assad's recent meeting with US envoys and signals from Damascus indicate that Syria is ready to enter negotiations with Tel Aviv.

Which is where the US, or to be precise, Obama envoy George Mitchell enters the picture. Mitchell is not one to take holidays, but it just so happens he will be arriving in the Middle East on Monday. His first stop? A visit with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Mitchell faces a tough task getting Netanyahu to agree, at least in the short-term, to talks on a two-state solution with Palestine. Pushing the Israeli Prime Minister towards discussions with the existing state of Syria would be a most welcome alternative.

A five-star vacation? Not exactly. Five-star diplomacy? Definitely.

Turkey, We Need You: Obama's Ankara Speech

Related Post: Video of President Obama's Town Hall Meeting in Turkey
Related Post: Video of President Obama's Speech in Ankara

So, after his high-profile participation in the G-20 and NATO summits, after the set-piece excitement of his speech to French and German, President Obama spoke in Turkey yesterday. And, while most of the US media missed the story, his address was just as significant as his statements on the global economy and intervention in Pakistan-Afghanistan.

TURKEY, THE US NEEDS YOU

Both the New York Times and Washington Post are still so caught up with the broad notion of Obama's "engagement" with the Islamic world that they missed the depth in Obama's approach to the Turkish Government and people. This was a talk which recognised that Ankara has a central place in both short-term and longer-term American initiatives and, doing so, set aside other general issues that could trouble the US-Turkish relationship.

From his opening sentences, Obama elevated Turkey's importance:

I have been to the G-20 Summit in London, the NATO Summit in Strasbourg and Kehl, and the European Union Summit in Prague. Some people have asked me if I chose to continue my travels to Ankara and Istanbul to send a message. My answer is simple: Evet. Turkey is a critical ally.

Of course, Obama is going to offer very nice words to flatter his audience, but that inclusion of "critical" goes beyond the requirements of rhetoric.

Turkish readers can help interpret the symbolic significance of Obama's lengthy reference to Kemal Ataturk, but I was struck by his concluding phrase: "His greatest legacy is Turkey’s strong and secular democracy." The President has swept aside the chatter, which has been prevalent in the US and Europe, about the threat of "Islamism" in Turkey's political system. (And I suspect he had also swept more immediate doubts about the legitimacy of "democracy" in the rulling AKP's recent electoral success, which has been challenged by opposition parties.)

Why the extended references to "Turkey’s democracy [as] your own achievement [which] was not forced upon you by any outside power, nor did it come without struggle and sacrifice"? In part, it is to do with the Obama "engagement" with Islamic countries --- Turkey is going to be elevated as the model for others to emulate.

The initial plans of the Obama Administration were for the President to make his appeal to the Islamic world in Cairo, given Egypt's more immediate place in Middle Eastern issues and the "Arab" dimension. Those had to be set aside, however, because of the complications of the Gaza crisis and of some far-from-trivial questions about the recent Egyptian record of democracy. So step up, Ankara: "Because of the strength of our alliance and the endurance of our friendship, both America and Turkey are stronger, and the world is more secure."

This general exaltation, however, has immediate purposes, as Obama's next sentences made clear:

Our two democracies are confronted by an unprecedented set of challenges. An economic crisis that recognizes no borders. Extremism that leads to the killing of innocent men, women and children. Strains on our energy supply and a changing climate. The proliferation of the world’s deadliest weapons, and the persistence of tragic conflict.

LET'S GET SPECIFIC: WELCOME TO EUROPE

Turkey is in the right place at the right time. In the midst of economic crisis, Washington sees the country as one with great potential for growth. That is a growth that could other US allies out of the recessionary doldrums.

And that in turn eliminates any doubts about the US position on Turkey in European Union, as Obama set out in several paragraphs:

Let me be clear: the United States strongly supports Turkey’s bid to become a member of the European Union. We speak not as members of the EU, but as close friends of Turkey and Europe.

No messing about here. Obama swept aside "human rights" objections to Turkey's EU membership, citing changes in its legal system and penal codes and its granting of minority rights to Kurds.

LET'S GET SPECIFIC: THE MIDDLE EAST

More good news for Turkey. It finds itself as a "lynchpin", just as in the 1950s, for American ambitions in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.

One key issue, of course, is that of Israeli relations with Arab States. Here Obama did hide the full US agenda. He referred at length to Turkey's role in an Israeli-Palestinian settlement but omitted a more immediate item: an Israeli agreement with Syria.

There was a political sensitivity at work here. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's anger with Tel Aviv over the Gaza War was because it interrupted, indeed threatened to demolish, Ankara's brokering of direct Israeli-Syrian talks. Obama, both for the sake of his hosts and sensitivities in Israel, thus did not say "Syria", but the signal was clear. Washington is hoping for a resumption of the discussions and would be pleased for Turkey to take the diplomatic credit.

Obama, however, was looking beyond Israel and the Arab world with his reference to Turkey's regional importance. For Washington, Ankara now has a part to play in keeping Iran "sensible". The President was a bit ham-fisted with his emphasis on the nuclear issue, rather than the political significance of Iranian policy in the region, but Turkish leaders undoubtedly picked up on the wider message. Ankara can be a major player, as Obama pursues "engagement", working with Syria to ease Tehran into an acceptable place in discussions on the Middle East.

PROBLEMS? WHAT PROBLEMS?

Obama didn't shy away from headline issues that could have jeopardised this vision of US-Turkish co-operation. He did refer to Armenia and Cyprus, looking in each case to "reckoning with the past" and "just and lasting settlements".

That finessing of sensitive issues led Obama to Iraq, where he made clear that Washington would recognise Turkey's position over the threat from the Kurdish separatists of the PKK:

Make no mistake, though: Iraq, Turkey, and the United States face a common threat from terrorism. That includes the al Qaeda terrorists who have sought to drive Iraqis apart and to destroy their country. And that includes the PKK.

Ahh, the Obama magic. By re-framing Turkey's relationship with the Bushian legacy of Iraq in this way, the President could once again elevate Ankara's political importance in America's new fights:

We share the common goal of denying al Qaeda a safe-haven in Pakistan or Afghanistan.

Yes, Turkey, Uncle Sam and President Barack need you.

The Evaluation of the Local Elections in Turkey: Towards a More Cooperative Government?

The Turkish local elections took place last Sunday. Before jumping into evaluations and the possible implications for Turkish domestic and foreign policies voiced by experts, we should have a look at the percentages obtained by the leading party, the Justice and Development Party, and by opposition parties in this recent election;  we should also compare the results with the previous general election.

The overall JDP votes slightly diminished compared with the previous general election. PM Erdogan's party obtained only 40% of the vote whereas this percentage was 47 in 2007. Votes for the right-wing party, the Nationalist Movement Party remained the same at 14%; the secularist party in the opposition, the Republican People's Party increased its share from 20 to 28%. While the overall votes of the JDP decreased, it was still successful in winning in Istanbul and Ankara. In addition to these, although the Democratic Turkey Party obtained the same percentage of 5 in this election, it was successful in increasing its number of mayoralties from 5 to 8 in the south-eastern part of Turkey towards which the first reaction came after days from the General Staff. The Brigadier General who is the head of the Communication Department of the General Staff stated that it was not possible to make an evaluation regarding the consequences of the election, yet added that this situation was not an obstacle to think about the causes of the consequences of this election, especially in the south-eastern part of Anatolia.

There has been much commentary on the elections this week. Some were arguing consequences of the decrease of the JDP votes and some were pointing out the increasing effects of the Democratic Turkey Party in Turkish politics. However, for me, the most significant point was the incomprehensible coolness of the representatives who were responsible from the elections when there were some speculations that many votes of the opposition parties were stolen and buried during elections. Even during on election day, many stamped voting papers were found discarded around various neighbourhoods in many cities. We cannot blame anyone for having planned and financed this as we have no clue about who were behind it but I believe that these kind of things are serious enough to immediately rerun the elections, regardless of who would gain and who would lose.

PM Erdogan has stated that the result did not satisfy him as he had been expecting more than the overall votes he obtained in the previous general election, but some experts believe that this may change the unilateral attitudes of the JDP towards a more respectful dialogue with opposition parties and the public, especially in the media. In light of this, there are still question marks in terms of the JDP's next decisions on critical points such as: the ongoing surveillance operations in respect of the continuing Ergenekon case; the Kurdish thaw, especially in terms of its relations with the Democratic Turkey Party (as Erdogan has been accusing the Democratic Turkey Party of being the political arm of the terrorist/separatist group, PKK); its dialogue with critical media organizations and with the army;  and so on... As for Turkey's foreign policy, I do agree with many scholars that this result is going to shake the 'trouble-making guy' image of PM Erdogan after his Davos walkout and the government is going to feel more pressure to pay attention to the EU engagement process. Ironically however, PM Erdogan can also strengthen his 'hero' image after the Davos Summit by playing his cards right due to his indirect involvement in the Syrian-Israeli dialogue process. While serious diplomatic efforts have been coming from the US President on the Iranian issue, and while the Palestinian-Israeli peace process is stuck for the time being, the international consensus is warming towards a possible Syrian-Israeli peace negotiation, with Turkey in a mediation role. This is also supported by the US. On the other hand, PM Erdogan is expected to normalize and balance his relations with the various parties in the Middle East. State policy as applied by his predecessors has included harsher warnings against Hamas and the strengthening of the Israeli-Turkish relations.

It looks likely that the election will bring more pluralist policies both in the domestic and in the foreign policies. While the 'heroic' walkout in Davos does not seem to have helped Erdogan increase his votes in the recent election, at least not to the extent he may have expected; his new foreign and domestic policies are likely to be stable and based on more tolerant approaches towards opposition parties and on the less controversial EU-engagement track (without ignoring the opportunities of the Syrian-Israeli dialogue process), before core topics regarding foreign policy, security and domestic politics will have been opened in prior to the next general elections.