Israel Document: Strategic Affairs Minister on "Existential Struggle" and No Concessions

Last week, Israel's Strategic Affairs Minister Moshe “Bogie” Ya’alon declared in an interview: "This is an existential struggle – the War of Independence has not ended. From a historical perspective, all the wars we fought, from 1948 and even before the establishment of the state, up until now, are part of a War of Independence for the existence of a national home for the Jewish people after 2,000 years of exile."

Ya'alon continued:

We cannot fold on Jerusalem. What is Jerusalem? It is Zion. Why did my mother come here after the Holocaust, why did my grandparents come here in 1925? They came to Zion. From my wife’s side, her grandparents left Morocco and came in 1897 after walking here for two years. Another predecessor came here in the 1600s. Why here?

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Ya'alon denied that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the heart of the region's disease and placed Iran at the centre of "problems." Then, he praised the "significance" of Israel to Washington's "interests," saying "the US and the West would need to deal with the wave of jihadist Islam if Israel ceased to exist".


As for Israel's relationship with Palestinians, especially with the Palestinian Authority, Ya'alon accused Ramallah of "not recognizing Israel’s right to exist as the national home of the Jewish people". At the same time, he confessed to the use of Israeli settlements to get Palestinians to the negotiation table:

We completely reject the argument that the settlements are the reason there is no peace. I think Arafat was willing to go to Oslo because of the settlements. When he saw the [massive Russian] aliya, and the settlements, he thought he was going to lose everything.

Ya'alon drew a picture in which the State of Israel has little political, military and economic intervention in the territories of the West Bank and only controls a small portion of land:

In Judea and Samaria, if you are talking about peace, there is enough place for Jews and Arabs. If you are talking about war, it is more complicated. How much open space do you have in Judea and Samaria? Quite a bit. What percentage of the territory do the Jews control? Five percent. That is what everything hinges on?

That portrayal of a "defensive" Israel underpins Ya'alon's political strategy towards direct talks:

If someone really thinks they can impose peace just like that, then they are detached from reality. I hope we will not get to that. This is an existential issue that we have to be insistent about. We need to talk, continue with the dialogue, but there are significant differences in how we view things.

In other words, if there are to be negotiations, then Israel should not be expected to make any concessions on territory. Ya'alon drives home the point with an unsubtle comparison jumping from Israel facing terror in the Middle East to the US facing terror worldwide:

I don’t even want to talk about territorial withdrawals in an age in which the withdrawal from Lebanon strengthened Hizbullah, and the withdrawal from Gaza strengthened Hamas to the point where we have the second Islamic republic in the Middle East – the first in Iran, and the second in Gaza: Hamastan. That is opposed to our strategic interest, and to the strategic interests of the west.

Jihadist Islam gains strength from our withdrawal. That is what happened with Hamas and Hizbullah. And that does not help the US soldiers in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

And with that construction, the political reality for Ya'alon is that there will be no move by Israel, towards the Palestinians or towards Washington, even to limit expansion into East Jerusalem and the West Bank:

The prime minister is opposed to it [an extension to the 10-month housing-start moratorium in the settlements]. He said that clearly. The decision was for 10 months – [it expires on] September 27. [After that] we are immediately going to return to the construction formula that was agreed between Bush and Sharon, on the basis of which Sharon accepted the road map. And Jerusalem is outside the discussion.

Here is the full transcript of the interview:

There is a lack of clarity about what the US is asking of Israel. What are their demands?

The US is Israel’s ally. This is a deep, strategic, alliance, based on common values and interests. But between friends there are disagreements that sometimes become public. On the one hand, there are disagreements, on the other there is a continuing dialogue.

We have different approaches stemming from a different viewpoint about the challenges before us. Each side sees it a bit differently.

We hear there are those in the US Administration who believe the source of the instability in the Middle East is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and that it is therefore important to deal with that first, and bring it to a conclusion as quickly as possible. There are those who think that you can solve this in two years, more or less, based on the Clinton parameters.

Most of us in the government have accompanied the diplomatic process over the last 17 years. We have a different view of the challenges before us, and what the priorities need to be in the Middle East.

We do not think the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the heart of the issue. I would even say that if Israel, God forbid, ceased to exist, the US and the West would need to deal with the wave of jihadist Islam. That is the main problem.

When we condense this conflict to a territorial one, either in Lebanon or in Gaza, we see that our withdrawals strengthened jihadist Islam. That is an example of differences in view that we share with the US.

The second difference, obviously, has to do with Iran. We see the Iranian issue as the most important.

If you are looking for a center for instability, it is not the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; it is precisely the Iranian government. It fuels the jihadist Islamic wave.

Does the US not see in Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas’s refusal to accept Ehud Olmert’s generous offer in 2008 as a lack of willingness on the Palestinian side to come to an agreement?

Apparently not. From the dawn of Zionism there has not been a Palestinian leadership willing to recognize Israel’s right to exist as the national home of the Jewish people. This is the source of the problem, and not what is called the occupied territories since ’67. The opposition to Zionism began before we liberated Judea, Samaria and Gaza; before we established a state.

In order for there to a proper prognosis, you need a proper diagnosis. We are arguing, and not only with them, but with the Israeli Left, about what is the root of the problem. Part of the issue, which influences the US and European positions, is our internal confusion.

I also used to think the solution was land for peace, until I became the head of military intelligence, saw things from up close and my thinking underwent an evolution.

But how do we remain Jewish and democratic? There is a majority who believe we have to separate here.

First of all, we disengaged politically in Judea and Samaria, and physically from Gaza. The policy of the Netanyahu government is that we don’t want to rule over them. But not ruling over them does not mean we have to withdraw to the 1967 borders, which are indefensible borders; or that we have to divide Jerusalem in order to bring Hamas snipers into Jerusalem.

The prime minister has said he is ready for two states. Are you?

What he said is that we don’t want to rule over them … And as he said at Bar-Ilan University, if at the end of the day they will be willing to recognize the right of a national home for the Jews; that refugees will not return into Israel; that their political entity will be demilitarized and we will get international guarantees for that; and that an agreement would mean an end to the conflict, then you can call it what you want – a state, even an empire.

We are willing to move forward in Judea and Samaria with the government of Abu Mazen [Abbas] and Salam Fayyad. But for this we don’t have to return to the ’67 borders or divide Jerusalem; we don’t have to place ourselves in danger again.

There is a general denial – including by Fayyad – of the connection between the Jewish people and the Land of Israel. He gave a lecture at an interfaith conference in New York two years ago about the sanctity of Jerusalem, and he talked about how it was holy for Christianity and Islam. How is it possible to deny the connection between the Jewish people and Jerusalem? How?

Have you seen any improvement in this attitude recently?

No, there is no change. There is a change in tactics. They understood that terror doesn’t work, especially after 9/11. It is better to characterize this as opposition to occupation, that is more convincing in the postcolonial world, because those who don’t know the details here think we are colonialists, deny that this was our home dating back 3,000 years.

Those who want to continue the Oslo process, who want us to continue to give and give and give, without a Palestinian willingness to recognize our right to a national home, are cooperating with the phased plan for Israel’s destruction.

Before Annapolis, which was not that long ago, Abu Mazen – the head of a government considered moderate – was asked by Olmert to agree at the end of the conference to a declaration saying ‘two states for two peoples.’ He was not willing.

Saeb Erekat was asked why not on Al Jazeera, and said because there is no Jewish people; that Judaism is a religion, and why should a religion get a state.

Israel’s critics say enlarging settlements helps Palestinian extremists and ruins any efforts to get the Palestinians to recognize our right to be here.

The prime minister said before the elections he was willing to accept the commitments of the previous government, among them the understanding between [George] Bush and [Ariel] Sharon, that no new settlements would be built in Judea and Samaria, and that construction in the settlements would be allowed [to enable] normal life, not exactly natural growth. That was the understanding, and construction continued through the Olmert and Sharon governments.

More than that, he [Netanyahu] said we accept our commitment regarding dismantling 23 outposts that were defined by the Sharon government as illegal. He accepted that, until it became clear that the US administration does not accept the commitments of the previous administration.

Secondly, we completely reject the argument that the settlements are the reason there is no peace. I think Arafat was willing to go to Oslo because of the settlements. When he saw the [massive Russian] aliya, and the settlements, he thought he was going to lose everything.

But if we are talking about coexistence and peace, why the insistence that the territory they receive be ethnically cleansed of Jews? Why do those areas have to be Judenrein? Don’t Arabs live here, in the Negev and Galilee? Why isn’t that part of our public discussion? Why doesn’t that scream to the heavens?

Do you really want Jews to live there under Palestinian authority? Is that realistic?

First, we are very far from that. I am not talking about that. I am talking about Jews living in Judea and Samaria under Israeli sovereignty and citizenship. Why is it impossible to get to that solution if we are really headed toward peace and coexistence?

Do you really think Jews will be allowed to live there under Israeli sovereignty in a future Palestinian entity?

In Judea and Samaria, if you are talking about peace, there is enough place for Jews and Arabs. If you are talking about war, it is more complicated. How much open space do you have in Judea and Samaria? Quite a bit. What percentage of the territory do the Jews control? Five percent. That is what everything hinges on?

In your mind there will be no need in the future to uproot any settlement?

No settlement. I don’t even want to talk about territorial withdrawals in an age in which the withdrawal from Lebanon strengthened Hizbullah, and the withdrawal from Gaza strengthened Hamas to the point where we have the second Islamic republic in the Middle East – the first in Iran, and the second in Gaza: Hamastan. That is opposed to our strategic interest, and to the strategic interests of the west.

With that, we are completely isolated today, and the Palestinians can sit and wait until the Americans step in and impose something.

First, we are not completely isolated. The issue today is whether there is a partner who is willing to recognize our right to a national home here. That is the key. That is where the discussion needs to start, not about construction in the settlements or east Jerusalem.

But that is not happening.

OK, but we as a government have to do the best we can to make that the discussion, with the US, and with the Europeans.... For the Americans this may be just one issue among many all around the world. For us, it is existential. We need to contend with this and be insistent here.

We tried to prevent a conflict with the [US] administration. The [settlement housing start] moratorium was an attempt on one hand not to give in – we did not go for a complete not-even-one-brick freeze – and on the other hand to avoid a conflict. But now we see that this did not succeed.

But here there is also an issue of trust between us and them [the US]. We heard from the secretary of state after we declared the moratorium that it was unprecedented, and that the ball was now in the Palestinian court.

What have the Palestinians done since then to enter the negotiations? What have they done? For a full year they did nothing to get into the process, and all of a sudden the ball is back in our court because of the excuse of 1,600 apartments that went through a bureaucratic process in Jerusalem?

Does that not reflect deep gaps with the Administration?

I am not hiding the conceptual gaps, there are differences.

And is the Administration’s direction now not toward imposing something on us?

If someone really thinks they can impose peace just like that, then they are detached from reality. I hope we will not get to that. This is an existential issue that we have to be insistent about. We need to talk, continue with the dialogue, but there are significant differences in how we view things.

What will happen if Obama stands up in September and says this is our plan? How do you react?

There have been so many plans in the past, so many proposals, and none of them were implemented. I hope we don’t get to that.

If the Arab world feels that the US has given Israel a cold shoulder, then the likelihood of an outburst of violence will increase. Therefore, we need to do continue to talk [to the Administration], share with them our thoughts, and prevent the types of situations that we have been reading about over the last few days in the papers.

You talk about the possibility of a renewed outburst of violence. Do we have the internal solidarity to withstand it when you have people saying the government’s polices on settlements are leading to problems with the US and perhaps to war?

The internal challenge is indeed a challenge. When people ask me what is the greatest internal challenge, I say one word – confusion. We have seen that when there is internal unity and consensus, there is no external pressure. We saw that after the Bar-Ilan speech. On the settlement issue there is no consensus, so it is no coincidence the Americans jumped on that issue.

In Jerusalem there is a consensus, but still the Americans are applying pressure.

You hear different voices from the Labor Party [on Jerusalem inside the government] and that causes us great damage.

Many of our internal disagreements end with us blaming ourselves. Many say that Oslo failed because of us, because we didn’t give enough.... This is a Western phenomenon, especially a Jewish one. And it is dangerous.

Most people in the country don’t feel Oslo failed because of us. But there are many who believe that not stopping the settlements is complicating our situation.

That is the role of leadership, and the job of education. We need to explain the challenges we are facing, what we are up against, and what we are willing to fight and struggle for.

This is an existential struggle – the War of Independence has not ended. From a historical perspective, all the wars we fought, from 1948 and even before the establishment of the state, up until now, are part of a War of Independence for the existence of a national home for the Jewish people after 2,000 years of exile.

We cannot fold on Jerusalem. What is Jerusalem? It is Zion. Why did my mother come here after the Holocaust, why did my grandparents come here in 1925? They came to Zion. From my wife’s side, her grandparents left Morocco and came in 1897 after walking here for two years. Another predecessor came here in the 1600s. Why here?

But there are those who say Zion is not necessarily Isawiya or Abu Dis.

You don’t have to talk to me about territorial compromise, because I was willing until Oslo.

I grew up amid the camp prepared for territorial concession.... I was ready for territorial compromise along the lines of Oslo. But then it became clear to me that there was no partner, including among those considered moderates.

But how do you create a situation that helps them make the switch and recognize the right of the Jews to be here? Adding settlements does not help them make that switch.

Why does it need to bother them that there is more building inside Gush Etzion, or in Ariel? No new settlements are being built; no additional land is being grabbed. What is the problem? This didn’t bother them in the days of Olmert or Sharon. Why all of a sudden?

We are not expanding the territory, or building new settlements. But they are evading. I know why. Because it is comfortable for Abu Mazen to continue forever without coming to a resolution. Because if he wanted to reach a resolution, he could have done it with Olmert. But when he was asked by Jackson Diehl in The Washington Post about Olmert’s offer, he said the gaps were too wide. Let’s remember what we are talking about.

Maybe because he wants an imposed solution?

OK, but that is what we have to struggle against, politically – in terms of hasbara [public diplomacy] – both domestically and abroad.

We are not succeeding.

OK, you don’t always succeed, but you don’t need to despair. You don’t have to give in. I think that if we give in on these positions we will be on a very slippery slope. Jihadist Islam gains strength from our withdrawal. That is what happened with Hamas and Hizbullah. And that does not help the US soldiers in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

How concerned are you by the argument heard increasingly in the US that we are endangering the lives of US soldiers?

That is first and foremost a manipulation, and a lie. The truth is the complete opposite. If we are seen as standing firm against the jihadists, against Hamas and Hizbullah, that serves the US interests. And if we are seen as weak, whether in Lebanon, Gaza, or in Judea and Samaria, that harms US interests.

It is clear to us that the central threat today, and the thing that needs to be the highest priority for the world, is not the Israeli-Palestinian issue, but rather the Iranian one. Even before Iran has nuclear capability, it nourishes terrorism, supports it, and pays for it. It also does this in the US’s backyard, in South America. The link between Chavezism and jihadism is crawling, but has now spread to five states.

When it comes to the Iranian nuclear threat, it is clear that what is needed is steadfastness from the west. It is not Israel vs Iran, which unfortunately I see in headlines on CNN. It is America, Western civilization vs Iran.

We think the Iranian government should long ago have had to face this dilemma: the bomb or survival. That is the dilemma, and it should be created before you deploy a military option. But it has to be based on Western determination, Western unity, diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions and in the background a credible military option.

Which leaders today are the most determined regarding Iran?

We see France today demonstrating the right policies, and Britain. They understand the enormity of the challenge.

Does Obama?

Something has happened here that we haven’t seen in the past. Previously the US led the aggressive line. Today, as I said, the president of France and prime minister of Britain are leading a more aggressive line than the president of the US. And then you have Germany and Italy, who join up with the American position.

I don’t think there is an actor in the world who wants to see a nuclear Iran.

Then why don’t they do more?

There are many complex interests involved. With Russia and China it partly has to do with national policy toward the US; the superpower games.

Some of this has to do with unwritten understandings, modus vivendi, that I think existed between Russia and Iran: “We will help you in this area, and you will not cause us problems in the Islamic republics.” Something they [the Iranians] seem [now] to be doing. [Look at] Kyrgyzstan, and I would not be surprised if the renewal of terrorism in Chechnya is not connected.

For the Chinese there are energy considerations, they need the oil supply. And there is some good news here. At the beginning of the year, according to statistics, China’s oil demands from Iran dropped 40 percent. Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf countries are providing China with alternatives.

You don’t really think that another UN round of sanctions will get Iran to stop their nuclear program. What will?

First of all, I hope this isn’t the last step to place the Iranian government in the dilemma between bomb and survival. I hope the free world will continue to lead these types of steps against Iran. And as I said, a credible military option always has to be waved in the background … Those who want to prevent using that option need to invest in diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions.

Beyond that, things are happening inside Iran. The Iranian economy is in a problematic condition. The government is already having to deal with the issue of whether to cancel subsidies, which can by itself awaken instability.

And then there is the opposition … It is an unorganized opposition, but very authentic and energetic, and does not like the government of the ayatollahs.

According to our understanding, most Iranians do not want a jihadist Islamic government. Therefore, from a historical perspective, this government will not survive forever. [But] the link between unconventional weapons and an unconventional regime is a poisonous and dangerous connection.

Look at the Washington [Nuclear Security] summit … Where will the nuclear material for terrorism come from, if not from these types of regimes? This is the big concern – that a regime of this type, which is messianic-apocalyptic, and has as its strategic objective the imposition of Islam all over the globe, can use proxies with dirty bombs against the US, Europe and Israel.

So you don’t think they will hit us directly, but that there is a danger they may give nuclear capability to a non-state actor?

That is certainly their first choice.

How concerned are you that the Americans have come to grips with the idea of a nuclear Iran?

It needs to concern us.

Are there people here who are thinking about how to contain Iran if it does get a bomb?

One way or another, the Iranian military nuclear project should be stopped. And we should not discuss any other possibility.

It should be stopped, but it might not be, so then what?

It should be stopped.

And if others don’t do it, will we have to?

I always say we should not jump to the lead on the Iranian issue, because it truly is not only an Israeli challenge, but a challenge for the whole free world. Therefore we need to act like those whose work, preferably, would be done by others. On the other hand, we also need to be prepared to act according to the dictum, “If am not for myself [who will be for me].”

You describe a situation, both concerning the Palestinians and the Iranians, in which we feel the Americans think they know better than us what our interests are, and where we are trying to educate the Americans what their interests are.

Look, we live in the Middle East. I can testify, as someone familiar with the relationship with the US over many years … that there were many times when, yes, we needed to explain to the US what is really happening, and what is really the right way to do things. You see how many mistakes the Americans have made in the last few years.

Because they didn’t listen to us?

Yes, because they didn’t listen to us. In Iraq, at the beginning, they didn’t come here to learn. [Also] on other questions, on the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

[Former US envoy Anthony] Zinni came here [in 2002] and said the [terrorism] problem is because of the roadblocks.... We live here [and experience] the fundamental problems. If you don’t live it, if you come to the area on a visit, then you say, ‘Oh, the problem is the roadblocks. Take them down and there will be no more terror.” But before 2000, there were no roadblocks from Jenin to Hebron, only on the perimeter … So nobody can come and tell me the terrorism is because of the roadblocks. The roadblocks are because of the terrorism. Were there no terror, there would be no roadblocks.

Is the administration willing to listen?

Some people are; some I am not able to get to.

Do the Americans expect written responses from us to their demands on east Jerusalem and the proximity talks?

The tensions have lessened.... In my opinion we need ... to free ourselves from the [Oslo] paradigms that have taken root here for 17 years.

But people like Olmert and Sharon strengthened the impression that we could just set the borders unilaterally. The American reaction now is partly a result of the policy of previous governments.

There is not one person in the septet who thinks it is possible to reach a permanent agreement according to this formula in the foreseeable future. Not one person.

The difficulty is that despite the failures, we are still stuck with that paradigm, which is dominant in the media, in academia, and in the international arena. Israel, according to the election results, sobered up. But that paradigm still rules, and is dominant. That explains the pressures on the prime ministers.

Do you oppose an extension to the 10-month housing-start moratorium in the settlements?

The prime minister is opposed to it. He said that clearly. The decision was for 10 months – [it expires on] September 27. [After that] we are immediately going to return to the construction formula that was agreed between Bush and Sharon, on the basis of which Sharon accepted the road map. And Jerusalem is outside the discussion.

Do you have higher political ambitions?

I always focus on the job at hand. When I was the commander of a platoon, I aimed to be the best platoon commander. When I was the commander of a company, I wanted to be the best company commander. When I went into the army I didn’t think about being the chief of General Staff, or even of being an officer. Life carried me where it has. I continue in the same way today. I am not making declarations, and not dealing with those issues. I try to do the job that I was given in the best way possible.

This conversation has been a bit depressing. Where is the ray of light?

Naturally, when you discuss challenges and threats you are discussing the empty half of the glass. But when you look at what we have achieved here, even as we are still fighting for our independence, it is not insignificant.

Whether in the economic sphere, or in the spheres of science, technology, culture and spirit, the cup is full. There are tremendous achievements, sometimes it seems miraculous how in 62 years this was all created in a land where there is milk and honey, but no oil, no gold, and even water you have to desalinate or recycle for agriculture.

And these achievements are because of two things – the brain and the heart, knowledge and spirit. That is what we have. That is what Jews have had for thousands of years, and that is what we have here.

If there is something we need to strengthen on the 62nd Yom Ha’atzmaut it is the spirit. That has been eroded, at a time when the physical dimensions are so strong.

Unfortunately we hear statements – we heard them from the previous government – that time is not on our side. We hear this even today. My reply is that the fathers of Zionism used to say that time is on the side of those who take advantage of it. Just as we took advantage of it in the past, so too must we take advantage of it in the future: to build, to grow, to develop in all spheres. I am convinced we can do it, the fact is that we have done it successfully in the past. We just need to continue.

Comments

[Amir in Tel Aviv]

Ya'alon is 110% right.
This is an existential struggle with Islam.
Will Iran accept a Hebrew state in the Holy Land? Never.!

[Ali Yenidunya]

I suppose you meant "struggle against extremists/Islamists" instead of Islam, right?

[Amir in Tel Aviv]

Depends, Ali.

How many people in the Arab / Muslim world will identify themselves as "secular" ?.
As long as there is no secular democracy, or at least democracy,
the struggle is with Islam as a whole.

Political correctness is a great way to conceal painful realities. I don't need PC.