Iraq: Is This A Case of "Where is My Vote"? (Visser)

It is now seven weeks after Iraq's national election, and the democratic process has now evolved/devolved into a series of legal and political manoeuvres by rival factions to weaken their opponents. Reidar Visser reports on the latest developments:

Iraq’s powerful de-Baathification committee has dealt another blow to the idea of democracy in Iraq: After many conflicting reports over the weekend, it is becoming increasingly clear that the board’s attempt to de-Baathify 55 of the replacement candidates for other candidates that were themselves de-Baathified has been sustained by the special judicial board for the elections, along with an acceptance of its proposal to annul the personal votes for these candidates instead of transferring them to their [party's] list.

With respect to the politics of this, the de-Baathification committee...is largely controlled by the pro-Iranian Iraqi National Alliance, whereas the special judicial board for the elections is seen as leaning towards Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki after its decision to allow a Baghdad recount. The main victim of these decisions, Iraqiyya [led by former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi and the coalition with the largest number of Parliamentary seats from the elections], has no significant influence in either body. The Kurdish chief of the elections commission (IHEC), Faraj al-Haydari, had previously expressed his distaste for the idea of annulling the votes altogether.


Because of the messy process in which candidates were struck from the ballots right until the last minute, it is still unclear exactly which individuals are subject to the new decision. Seat-winning candidates that could be in trouble include Ibrahim al-Mutlak, the replacement candidate for Salih al-Mutlak [the head of the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue, the second largest Sunni party], who got some 5,400 personal votes and a seat in Baghdad. The same situation may possibly apply for candidate number two for Iraqiyya in Anbar, another Mutlak (Hamid Abid), who was not listed on most IHEC lists prior to the election and therefore may have also been a replacement candidate --– in this case representing some 14,700 personal votes.

Crucially, these examples show that this is about more than candidates –-- it is also about voters. Here we have two examples and some 20,000 Iraqis whose votes may simply be stolen from them, according to procedures that are not based on any law or even any IHEC regulation. In particular, the decision to penalise voters who used the open-list system, annulling their active use of the ballot (a passive list vote would not have been cancelled), risks putting the whole idea of democracy in disrepute in Iraq.

The de-Baathified candidates have been given one month to complain the decision – another ad hoc legal concoction by IHEC and something which firmly pushes certification of the results towards June, regardless of what happens to the Baghdad recount as well as further demands for recounts by the Kurds in some of the northern governorates (which apparently remain pending).

Iraq Update: Does the Sadr Referendum Change Outlook for Prime Minister?

The Majlis blog rounds up the latest news. The main effect of the referendum of the Sadrists, who have the most representatives in the third-placed Iraqi National Alliance, is to delay rather than advance the selection of a Prime Minister. Neither of the top candidates, Nuri Al-Maliki (State of Law) or Iyad Allawi (Iraqiya) won significant support. Personally, I can't see the "Jaafari compromise", floated here, as an alternative at this point, and does this development really make Moqtada al-Sadr a kingmaker?

US Military & Iraq’s Civilians: The “Collateral Murder” Video (Full & Short Versions)

Ibrahim al-Jaafari won the Sadrist movement's referendum on the next prime minister, with 24 percent of the roughly 1.5 million ballots cast.



Jaafar al-Sadr, the son of Dawa party founder Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr, placed second with 23 percent of the vote; Qusay as-Suhail, a Sadrist MP (and rumored candidate for the PM job), placed third with 17 percent.

Nouri al-Maliki was fourth, with 10 percent, and Iyad Allawi placed fifth with 9 percent (full results in English are here).

The referendum has no binding legal authority; the Sadrist leadership says it's merely a way to gauge public opinion. Jaafari is trying to position himself as something of a compromise candidate, a third party who wasn't involved in the pre-election fighting between Allawi and Maliki; the referendum gives him a boost.

The results of the referendum are clearly a roadblock to an alliance between Maliki's State of Law movement and the Sadrists (and, by extension, the Iraqi National Alliance). Maliki and Jaafari have an unpleasant history, and tensions remain despite recent efforts to bury the hatchet. Maliki won't be happy if the Sadrists condition their support on Jaafari's installation as prime minister.

Reidar Visser notes that Jaafari might also be unacceptable to the Kurdish parties:

Back in 2006 he was the PM nominee that was "unacceptable" to the Kurds, which led to his replacement by Maliki (who in turn ended up being seen as equally "unacceptable" by many Kurds).

Jaafari held a meeting yesterday with representatives from the Iraqiyya coalition; he issued a statement afterwards endorsing a government "formed without excluding any political component."