Israel Shock Announcement: Saudis Go Nuclear...All Tehran's Fault

The Latest from Iran (24 August): The 4-D Chess Match

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Last Saturday, the Saudi Arabian newspaper Al-Watan reported the statement of Saudi Arabia’s minister of water and electricity, Abdullah bin Abdul-Rahman al-Husayen, that Riyadh was looking at building its first nuclear power plant. The announcement follows a May 2008 US-Saudi Memorandum of Understanding on civil nuclear energy cooperation.

This all seems fairly straightforward. The Saudis, while sitting on oil reserves, diversify their energy production. The US bolsters a strategic alliance.

Except that, of course, in today's framing of the Middle East, everything has to be connected to Iran. Israeli defense officials immediately said that Saudi interest in nuclear power was connected to Tehran's continued quest for The Bomb: "The Saudis are genuinely scared of what will happen if Iran turns nuclear. This is part of their response."

Now Tel Aviv's defense officials probably know that the civilian nuclear programme of Saudi Arabia has been established jointly with the United States, since a Memorandum of Understanding isn't exactly secret, and has been developed within the framework of International Atomic Energy Agency regulations. But why pass up a pretext for showing the Iran-inspired “danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East”? After all, you can convert not only Saudi Arabia's interest but that of the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Yemen, Morocco, Libya, Jordan, and Egypt into a fear-induced response to the bad boys in the Iranian capital.

Fun Fact 1: Iran has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Israel has not.

Fun Fact 2: Iran has 0 nuclear weapons. Israel has (estimated) 150.

Gaza: "Moderate" Hamas Does a Balancing "War on Terror" Act

World, may we introduce you to the "moderate" Hamas?

During last Friday's prayers in Rafah, the leader of Junut Ansar Allah (Soldiers of Allah's Supporters), Abd al-Latif Musa, declared "the birth of an Islamic emirate in Gaza". There were his last words of him. Hamas attacked the mosque, killing 24 --- including six unarmed civilians –-- and injuring 125.

Now this may seem a curious way to become "moderate". However, with the Rafah mosque attack, Hamas was not only acting against a perceived insurgent threat. In the past, it has often been alleged that al-Qaeda militants are training and receiving support from Hamas. The Gazan leadership has always denied this but, with last Friday's operation, it offered a war against anti-American Islamist “terrorism”, distancing itself from “radicalism” and sending “positive” signals to Washington and Brussels.

Doing so, the Gazan organisation is striking a delicate balance. On the one hand, it is maintaining a low-profile vigilance against any anti-Western rhetoric that might give its opponents (read "Israel") ammunition for a public-relations assault. On the other, it is maintaining relations with Islamic groups, including some backed by Iran, to prevent any opening of space for challengers in Gaza.

Khaled Meshal, the political director of Hamas, said last week in an interview with Qatari newspaper al-Watan that the post-election turmoil in Iran would not endanger Tehran’s support for Hamas: "No doubt what is happening in Iran concerns and worries us, but we consider it to be an internal affair… But we are definitely not worried about the relationship with Iran or the support that Iran offers us.” Meshal's words took on new signficance after the provocative speech of Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah on Friday: "Hezbollah is able to hit every city in Israel, and I repeat: if they hit Beirut, we will attack Tel Aviv.”

For, while Hezbollah might want to shake a fist at Israel right now, Hamas does not. So Meshal’s “worry” indicates a thin red line between Hamas and Tehran. Iran, for both domestic and regional reasons, is anxious to keep the heat on Tel Aviv, and it may be sending a message to Hamas to be less forthcoming towards an Israel-Palestine settlement. On the other hand, Meshal in particular has been attentive to sending signals to Washington that Hamas welcomes the US brokering of an agreement.

So Hamas finds itself manoeuvring both vis-a-vis external powers and against internal challenges. Flexibility becomes the keyword for strategy. But if that means Iran cannot be put to one side, it also means that "radicalism" is no longer an attractive label for Gaza's political leaders.

Welcome then to the new, moderate (if War-on-Terror-fighting) Hamas. But how will the world (read "United States") react?