Tuesday
Dec162008
Corruption and Intrigue in Afghanistan
Tuesday, December 16, 2008 at 14:10
Sarah Chayes, who runs a cooperative in Afghanistan, has a compelling but disturbing account (printed in full below) in The Washington Post. In contrast to most headlines that focus on "the Taliban", Chayes' anger is directed at the Government:
Chayes rejects negotiations with the Taliban: "Ask any Afghan what's really needed, what would render the Taliban irrelevant, and they'll tell you: improving the behavior of the officials whom the United States and its allies ushered into power after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks." She makes the disturbing assertion, "What I've witnessed in Kandahar since late 2002 has amounted to an invasion by proxy, with the Pakistani military once again using the Taliban to gain a foothold in Afghanistan."
Indeed, that allegation is doubly disturbing because, on the same day, The Times of London writes of Pakistani Major-General Faisal Alavi, "murdered last month after threatening to expose Pakistani army generals who had made deals with Taliban militants".
Most of my conversations with locals about what's going wrong have centered on corruption and abuse of power.
Chayes rejects negotiations with the Taliban: "Ask any Afghan what's really needed, what would render the Taliban irrelevant, and they'll tell you: improving the behavior of the officials whom the United States and its allies ushered into power after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks." She makes the disturbing assertion, "What I've witnessed in Kandahar since late 2002 has amounted to an invasion by proxy, with the Pakistani military once again using the Taliban to gain a foothold in Afghanistan."
Indeed, that allegation is doubly disturbing because, on the same day, The Times of London writes of Pakistani Major-General Faisal Alavi, "murdered last month after threatening to expose Pakistani army generals who had made deals with Taliban militants".
Reader Comments (1)
This article reminds me of Jeff Race's claim in War Comes to Long An, that for Vietnamese villagers it didn't matter how good or evil the Viet Cong's actions were in absolute terms, it only mattered that their actions appeared more just relative to those of the government. And we know how that ended.
Ultimately success for the West in Afghanistan can only be judged by the viability of the Afghan goverment, not the degree of security in the countryside. Security can only help; but it is not the key to success. The surge isn't going to do anything about the endemic corruption in the government and Kabul's inabilities to meet the needs of its people.